JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - The petitioner is the acting Head Master of the Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Sadakpur, district Bijnor. He is challenging the validity of the selection of Mahesh Chandra Tyagi, the respondent No. 6 in the petition, for the post of Head Master of the said institution. 2. The aforesaid institution was originally a Junior High School, of which the petitioner was imparting education upto class VIII in the year 1981. The institution was raised from the level of a Junior High School to a Higher Secondary School and, by an order dated October 19, 1984 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, the petitioner was approved for promotion on an ad hoc basis as the Head Master of the institution which had been raised to the level of a Higher Secondary School. In that order it was provided that on the recommendation of a candidate by the U.P. Secondary Education Services commission for appointment to the post of the Head Master of the Junior High School on a substantive basis the petitioner's appointment would automatically terminate. Subsequently selections were held by the aforesaid Commission. The petitioner was also called for an interview. The Commission, however, selected Mahesh Chandra Tyagi for appointment to the post of Head Master. Thereupon the petitioner filed this petition. The selection of Mahesh Chandra Tyagi is challenged by the petitioner on the ground that under the relevant regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act which shall be adverted to later in this judgment, the petitioner would be deemed to have automatically become a substantively appointed Head Master on the status of the Junior High School being raised to the level of a Higher Secondary School. That being so, the post of the Head Master of the institution could not be treated as vacant for being filled by selection through the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission. 3. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned standing counsel we find no merit in this petition. That being so, the post of the Head Master of the institution could not be treated as vacant for being filled by selection through the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission. 3. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned standing counsel we find no merit in this petition. For the petitioner it was urged that in view of Regulation 4 of Chapter II of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act read with the definition of the term `teacher' as laid down under U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982 (U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982), the petitioner automatically became a Head Master of the Higher Secondary School on the institution being raised to the level of Higher Secondary School. 4. The submission is devoid of any merit. In order to appreciate the submission, we will first have a look at the relevant statutory provisions. Chapter II of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act deals with the appointment of heads of institutions and teachers. Clause (2)(a) of Regulation 2 of the Chapter provides : "(2)(a) Where an institution is raised from a High School to an intermediate College, the post of Principal of such college shall be filled by promotion of the Head Master of such High School, if he was duly appointed as Head Master in substantive capacity in accordance with law for the time being in force and possesses a good record of service and the minimum qualifications prescribed in that behalf or has been granted exemption from such qualifications by the Board." 5. Regulation 4 of Chapter II on which learned counsel mainly relied reads as follows : "Where any Junior High School is recognised as a High School under Section 7, a permanent or temporary teacher of such school, possessing the minimum qualifications under regulation 1, shall be deemed to be permanent or temporary teacher, as the case may be of such High School provided that the services of a temporary teacher who is not selected for appointment in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the regulations shall be dispensed with after giving him one month's notice in that behalf or one month's pay in lieu of such notice." 6. The next relevant provision relied on by the learned counsel in Section 2(k) of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 which defines the term `teacher' as : "Teacher" means a person employed for imparting instruction in an institution and includes a Principal or a Head Master." 7. U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 was enacted to establish Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards for the selection of teachers in institutions recognised under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Section 32 of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 says that the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations made thereunder insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 shall continue to be in force for purposes of selection, appointment, promotion, etc. of a teacher. 8. The first feature which strikes us is that under the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act whereas there is an express provision for an automatic appointment of the Headmaster of a High School to the post of Principal upon the High School being raised to the level of an Intermediate College subject of course, to the Head Master possessing a good record of service and the minimum qualifications prescribed for appointment to the post of Principal, significantly there is a conspicuous absence of any such corresponding provision for an automatic promotion of a Head Master of a Junior High School to the post of Head Master of a High School on the Junior High School being raised to the level of a High School. Regulation 4 of Chapter II quoted above on which learned counsel based his entire argument appears in the same Chapter i.e. Chapter II in which Regulation (2)(a) quoted above, appears. That being so, the acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel that the petitioner became entitled to an automatic promotion to the post of a Head Master on the Junior High School being elevated to the status of a High School in virtue of Regulation 4 of Chapter II would be plainly repugnant to the unmistakable legislative intent disclosed by Clause (2)(a) of Regulation 2 of Chapter II which clearly limits the scheme of automatic promotion only to Head Master of a High School to the post of Principal on the High School being raised to the level of an Intermediate College. If the intention of the legislature was to confer a similar benefit on Head Master of Junior High School on the latter being elevated to the status of High Schools, one should have expected a positive provision to that effect in Clause (2)(a) of Regulation 2 of Chapter II. Regulation 4 on which learned counsel placed reliance deals, in our opinion, only with the rights of permanent or temporary teachers of a Junior High School when the same is recognised as a High School and it does not deal with the status of Head Masters of Junior High Schools on the latter being elevated to the level of a High School. That subject is dealt with exhaustively and, in our opinion exclusively by Regulation 2 of Chapter II: 9. Further in the Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations framed thereunder the selection, appointment and promotion of teachers, Head Masters and Principals have all been dealt with separately and the term `teacher' does not include within its ambit Head Masters and Principals. The heading of Chapter II also speaks of appointment of heads of institutions and teachers. The scheme of the Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations framed thereunder thus clearly negatives the submission of the learned counsel, namely, that on a Junior High School being raised to the level of a High School the Head Master of a Junior High School automatically becomes a substantively appointed Head Master of the High School. 10. As regards the definition of the term `teacher' as laid down in U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982. it must be borne in mind that the inclusive definition of the term `teacher' is applicable and available only while construing the provisions of that enactment and we see no valid reason whatever for using that definition in construing the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act or the Regulations framed thereunder. Further, the reason why under U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 the term `teacher' has been given an inclusive and wider meaning as including Principals and Head Masters also is that the process of selection which has been laid down therein is substantially the same, whether the selection is held for appointment to the post of a teacher or Head Master or Principal of an institution. There is, therefore, no justification for extending that definition in construing the provisions of Regulations of Chapter II. 11. There is, therefore, no justification for extending that definition in construing the provisions of Regulations of Chapter II. 11. As regards Section 32 of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 which provides that the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act shall continue to be in force if they are not inconsistent with the provisions of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982, we have already noticed above that the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act themselves do not provide for automatic promotion of the Head Master of Junior High School to the post of Head Master on the Junior High School being raised to the level of a High School. Even if, therefore, the Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations framed thereunder were to prevail over U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 the same will not take the case of the petitioner any further. 12. For the reasons stated above, we reject the first submission of the learned counsel. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have accepted the submission advanced by the petitioner while issuing notice on a special leave petition in a matter taken to the Supreme Court by one Saligram Misra and others and that the order passed by their Lordships contains a declaration of law which is binding on this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 14. The submission is devoid of any merit. The order of the Supreme Court on which counsel placed reliance reads as follows : "There is no ground to interfere in the judgment of the High Court in so far the selection of the candidates to the post of Principal is concerned. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, contends that each of the four petitioners was holding substantively the post of Headmaster of Junior High School which was upgraded as High School under the new scheme and that these petitioners were entitled to continue as Principals by virtue of Regulation 4 chapter II of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Issue notices to the respondents to the above question. The petitioners shall continue to function as Principals impending notice." 15. We have not the slightest doubt that the aforesaid order does not by any stretch contain a declaration of law on the legal issue raised before the Court. Issue notices to the respondents to the above question. The petitioners shall continue to function as Principals impending notice." 15. We have not the slightest doubt that the aforesaid order does not by any stretch contain a declaration of law on the legal issue raised before the Court. All that their Lordships did was to notice the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners and thereafter issue notices to the respondents for the consideration of the above question. It is by no means an expression of final opinion or a decision on the controversy raised before their Lordships. The simple implication of the order passed by their Lordships is that the Supreme Court has admitted the petition for the consideration of the question raised before it. 16. Learned counsel, however, submitted that even ex parte decisions of the Supreme Court have a binding effect under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. There can be no quarrel with this proposition. However, as mentioned above the order quoted above does not directly or even by implication embody any decision or adjudication of the controversy sought to be raised before the Supreme Court. Learned counsel also adverted to some authorities on Jurisprudence on the true import of the term `law'. We are, however, concerned here with the expression "declaration of law" as appearing in Article 141 of the Constitution of India. This, in our opinion, clearly implies a decision on a question or issue of law raised before the Supreme Court. We are also aware that even obiter dicta of the Supreme Court operates as a binding precedent but whether it is a question which is directly involved in the case or which has been the subject of comment by the Supreme Court by way of obiter, in order to attract Article 141 of the Constitution of India, there must be discernible some statement of law on the issue or question raised before the Supreme Court. 17. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the order of the Supreme Court quoted above does not contain any final expression of opinion having a binding effect under Article 141 of the Constitution of India on the question whether the Head Master of a Junior High School becomes automatically entitled to be promoted as Head Master of the High School by virtue of Regulation 4 of Chapter II of the Intermediate Education Act. 18. In the premise, the petition fails and is dismissed. But we make no order as to costs.