ORDER K. L. Shrivastav, J. 1. This revision petition under section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') is directed against the order dated 24-8-1985 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority; Indore (for short the Authority') whereby the petitioner's application under section 23-A of the Act for eviction of the non-applicant from the accommodation in dispute situate at Indore, has been dismissed. 2. Circumstances giving rise to the revision petition are these. The petitioner, a widow aged 55 years filed the application under Sec. 23-A of the Act on 25-10-83 on the ground that the non-applicant is her tenant in the accommodation in question on a monthly rent and the accommodation is required bona fide for her residence with her relations and that she has no other reasonably suitable accommodation of her own in the city of Indore for the purpose. 3. The non-applicant was granted leave to contest the application. He contended that he was owner of the accommodation in dispute and was not a tenant. The averment of bona fide requirement was also controverted. 4. Subsequently the non-applicant remained ex-parte. 5. After ex-parte evidence, the learned Authority held that in view of the averment in the written statement, the petitioner has failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant and further that she has failed to prove that the family members whom she wants to reside with her dependent on her and, therefore, she is not entitled to an order for eviction of the tenant. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that on the evidence of the petitioner (A. W. 1) and her witness Gopal (A. W. 2) the relationship of landlord and tenant, in the absence of any rebuttal evidence, is clearly established. He goes on to contend that the learned Authority has passed the impugned order without advertence to section 23 A (a) of the Act and the important provision embodied in section 23-D (3) ibid. 7. The point for consideration is whether the revision petition deserves to be allowed. 8. The first contention is quite correct, Now as to the second one, from a perusal of the application under section 23-A of the Act it appears that the applicant for reasons of her old age wants other members of her family to reside with her so that she may be looked after. 8. The first contention is quite correct, Now as to the second one, from a perusal of the application under section 23-A of the Act it appears that the applicant for reasons of her old age wants other members of her family to reside with her so that she may be looked after. According to her evidence she requires the accommodation for the residence of her husband's brother. Under section 23-A a landlord is entitled to apply for eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. The ground incorporated in section 23-A (a) is in these terms ;- "that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required "bona fide" by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned." The phrase 'members of family' has been defined in section 2 (e) of the Act in these terms:- "In this Act unless the context otherwise requires, number of the family in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother brother, unmarried sister, parental uncle parental uncle's wife or widow, or brother's son or unmarried daughter living jointly with or any other relation dependent on him." Thus, out of the relations, the law recognizes the requirement of the specified relations living jointly or dependent relations alone and of no other relations. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that according to the application under section 23-A, the requirement of the accommodation is for the applicant herself and not for her relations as such and, therefore, there is no question of their being dependent on the applicant and the learned Authority erred in passing the impugned order basing it also on the question of dependency. With reference to section 23-D (3) of the Act he urges that the question of 'bona fide' has to be presumed. The provision is in these terms:- "In respect of an application by a landlord it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, the requirement by the landlord with reference to clause (a) or clause (b) as the case may be of section 23-A is bona fide." 10. The provision is in these terms:- "In respect of an application by a landlord it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, the requirement by the landlord with reference to clause (a) or clause (b) as the case may be of section 23-A is bona fide." 10. From a perusal of the provision as embodied in section 23-A (a) of the Act extracted above, it is clear that despite the presumption under section 23-D (3) of the Act as to the' bona fide' nature of the requirement, it has first to be prima facie found as a fact that the requirement of the persons, as contemplated by law, exists. According to the provision in section 23-A (a) ground for eviction may be said to exist only when the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for relations. It is the petitioner's case that she requires the accommodation for being occupied not only by herself but also by her relations. The relations do not answer the description in section 2 (e) of the Act. If the provision is interpreted to cover the kind of requirement averred by the petitioner, the protection which the Act intends for the tenants would altogether be rendered illusory. 11. In this connection it is also pertinent to point out that in the decision in M/s. Sunil Cloth Stores v. Mrs. Debal Begum 1986 MPRCJ 147 interpreting the provision in section 23-D (3) of the Act, it has been observed thus in paragraph 6 : "I am clearly of the opinion that although the landlord, who claims relief under section 23-J for tenant's eviction under section 23-A, is not required to prove his case for 'eviction' like any other plaintiff, the provisions of sub-section (3) of section of section 23-D does not relieve the Authority of its duty first to ascertain whether in its application under section 23-A such landlord has made out a prima facie case under clause (a) or clause (b) thereof. Because at no point of time earlier, the Authority can have the opportunity to take up for decision the issue of eviction, the earlier, determination being confined to the question of 'leave' to defend the application for eviction. Because at no point of time earlier, the Authority can have the opportunity to take up for decision the issue of eviction, the earlier, determination being confined to the question of 'leave' to defend the application for eviction. Indeed, it is only when the Authority makes a positive and affirmative finding that the landlord had made out a specific case, either under clause (a) or clause the of section 23-A, for tenant's eviction, he can have jurisdiction to require the tenant to adduce evidence in rebuttal in respect thereof. It is necessary to make it clear that the statutory presumption contemplated under sub-section (3) aforesaid merely shifts the burden to the tenant to rebut landlord's case &s held in B. Johnson (supra) but the landlord is not still relieved of his duty to make out his case under clause (a) of clause (b) of section 23-A to invest jurisdiction in the Authority. It. therefore, becomes the duty of the Authority to first determine the question as to whether a prima facie case under clauses (a) or (b) of section 23-A is made out by the landlord which had to be rebutted by the tenant. This jurisdictional requirement, according to me, is inexorable as the Act has created in the Authority a special forum which can act only within four corners of its prescribed jurisdiction on the fulfillment of the conditions-precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction. It is only in the prescribed cases that the Authority can pass orders for "eviction" under section 23-A as the landlord is normally required to sue the tenant in the ordinary Civil Court for eviction on other grounds, not contemplated under section 23-A, according to section 12 of the Act." 12. From the foregoing discussion it follows that the finding recorded by the Authority that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant is clearly erroneous and is, therefore, set aside. I hold that on the unrebutted evidence on record that relationship is established. However, as the requirement under section 23-A (a) of the Act is not made out, I find that the impugned order does not call for any interference. 13. In the result, the revision petition fails and is dismissed. It is, however, ordered that the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court as incurred.