JUDGMENT S.P.Das Ghosh, J. 1. A petition for complaint was filed by the opposite party No. 1, the Registrar of Companies, West Bengal, against the accused-petitioner, Satish Kumar Jhunjhunwalla and two other persons under section 58A(6) of the Companies Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of convenience) read with Rule 3(2)(ii) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposit) Rules, 1975. The averments in the petition of complaint were that it appeared from the return submitted by M/s. Victory Iron Works Private Limited under Rule 10 of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposit) Rules, 1975, (Rules, for short) as on 31.3.1982, filed in the office of the complainant on 21.1.1983, that the total amount of deposits of the kinds referred to in Rule 3(4) (ii) of the Rules was Rs. 1.92 lakhs against the total amount of Rs. 1.31 lakhs, being the aggregate of the paid-up capital and free reserves reduced by the accumulated loss, deferred revenue expenditure etc. as arrived at on the lines indicated in the explanation to Rule 3 of the Rules. These deposits to the tune of Rs. 1.92 lakhs were in contravention of Rule 3(2)(ii) of the Rules for exceeding 25% of the aggregate of the paid-up share capital and free reserves of the company. M/s. Victory Iron Works Private Ltd., of which the petitioner-accused and the two other accused persons mentioned in the petition of the complaint were the OfficersDirectors at the relevant time. On the basis of these allegations in the petition of complaint, which was filed on 20.7.1983 in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah, an order was passed by the learned Magistrate for issuing summons on the accused persons. Subsequently, a petition was filed in the court of the learned Magistrate by the petitioner for dropping the proceedings on the ground that the case was barred by limitation as well as on the further ground that the opposite party No. 1 failed to implead the company as a party in the petition of complaint. 2. THIS petition filed for the accused-petitioner was disposed of by the learned Magistrate who was pleased to reject the prayer of the petitioner. Thereafter, the present revisional application, heard as a contested application has been filed by the accused-petitioner. Mr. 2. THIS petition filed for the accused-petitioner was disposed of by the learned Magistrate who was pleased to reject the prayer of the petitioner. Thereafter, the present revisional application, heard as a contested application has been filed by the accused-petitioner. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate for the accused-petitioner has argued that the proceedings are to be quashed as the company, M/s. Victory Iron Works Private Ltd., has not been joined as a party in the petition of complaint. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee has referred to the cases of Maya Chandra v, Inspector, Minimum Wages Office1, State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh2 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan3. Mr. Mukherjee has also referred, in this connection, to another decision in the case of Krishna Trading Co. v. State of Bihar4. The second contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that the case is barred by limitation. 3. MR. Das, the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 1, has challenged both these contentions of MR. Mukherjee. According to MR. Das, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh (Supra) has been reconsidered by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Sheoratan Agarwal v. State of M.P.5 and the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the matter is that section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, does not lay down any condition that the person in charge or an officer of the company may not be separately prosecuted, if the company itself is not prosecuted. 4. MR. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the State has submitted that the proceedings should not be quashed even if the company has not been joined as a party in the petition of complaint. According to him, directions should be given to the learned Magistrate to see that the company was joined as a party in the petition of complaint. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the proceedings are to be quashed for non-joinder of M/s. Victory Iron Works Private Ltd. as a party in the case. Generally, the penal provisions in all statutes relate to persons. The word person is defined in section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to include any company of association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Generally, the penal provisions in all statutes relate to persons. The word person is defined in section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to include any company of association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Similar is the definition of the word personT in section 11 of the Indian Penal Code. According to section 11 of the Indian Penal Code, the word person, includes any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. In view of this comprehensive definition of the word person, generally every penal provision in every statute relating to a person includes also a company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. Nevertheless, in some special statutes some special penal provisions have also been specifically incorporated relating to offences by companies. Such special provisions relating offences by companies are to be found in section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, section 22C of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, etc. These special provisions regarding offences by companies have been incorporated in such statutes by way of additional precaution so that each and every officer of the company, be he a Director or not, is not fastened with criminal liability simply because of his relationship with the company. To fasten such officer or Director with liability in case any contravention is by the company itself, it should be proved by the prosecution further that such Director or officer was in charge of or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. There is generally a rider in all such penal provisions regarding offences by companies to the effect that no such officer or Director will be liable to any punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent commission of such offence. All such special provisions in such statutes regarding offences by companies are by way of additional precaution to save the officers or Directors of the Company, who would otherwise be liable on the basis of the other penal provisions in each of such statutes. All such special provisions in such statutes regarding offences by companies are by way of additional precaution to save the officers or Directors of the Company, who would otherwise be liable on the basis of the other penal provisions in each of such statutes. It was in this context that the Supreme Court first decided in the case of C. V. Parekh (supra) that the Manager or Director of a company could not be convicted by applying section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act as liability of persons in charge can arise under that section only when the contravention is by the company itself. If the contravention is not by the company but by other persons, be he a Director or officer or other employee of a company, he can be prosecuted under the other general Penal provisions in each of such statutes. This position has been clarified by the Supreme Court in the subsequent decision in the case of Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) Mr. Mukherjee has tried to argue that the decision in the case of Sheoratan cannot have precedence over the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C.V. Parekh (supra) as the decision in the case of C.V. Parekh was by three most eminent Judges of the Supreme Court and the decision in the case of Sheoratan (supra) was by two most eminent Judges of the Supreme Court. Mr. Mukherjee could not, however, show any decision of the Supreme Court that a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court by a lesser number of Judges, clarifying an earlier decision of the Supreme Court by a greater number of Judges, is not to be followed under Article 141 of the Constitution. As the matter stands, the Supreme Court has since clarified its earlier decision in the case of C.V. Parekh and has held that section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act does not lay down any condition that the person-in-charge or an officer of the company may not be separately prosecuted if the company itself is not prosecuted. According to the decision in the case of Sheoratan (supra), each or anyone of the person mentioned in section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act may be separately prosecuted or along with the company. The only condition precedent for such prosecution is that there should be a finding that the contravention was by the company. According to the decision in the case of Sheoratan (supra), each or anyone of the person mentioned in section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act may be separately prosecuted or along with the company. The only condition precedent for such prosecution is that there should be a finding that the contravention was by the company. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheoratan and the disjunctive provisions in clauses (a) and (b) to section 58A(6) of the Act, the decision of that Court in the case of they were responsible for conducting the business of the disputed samples. In the present case, there are allegations in paragraph 5 and 8 of the petition of complaint against the accused-petitioner and the other two accused-persons. In paragraph 8 of the petition of complaint it has been stated that the Officers/Directors of the company, who are in default for violating the provisions in Rule 3(2)(ii) of the Rules, have knowingly and wilfully contravened these provisions. Rules 4 and 4A of the Rules show the liability of the Directors in the matter. Section 5 of the Act defines the officer who is in default. In the circumstances, on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 67, it cannot be stated that the proceedings against the petitioner and tile other two accused of the case are to be quashed in the absence of proper allegations against them in the petition of complaint. As the matter stands the proceeding cannot be quashed because the company has not been joined as an accused in the case. 5. SO far as the question of limitation is concerned, it appears that the petition of complaint was filed on 20.7.1983. The averments in the petition of complaint are that return for the period ending 31.3.1982 under Rule 10 of the Rules was filed in the office of the opposite party No. 1 complainant on 21.1.1983. The learned Magistrate held that the complaint was not barred by limitation as the opposite party No. 1 came to know of the violation of Rule 3(2)(ii) of the Rules on 21.1.1983, when the return was filed, though the return ought to have been filed by 31.3.1982. The learned Magistrate held that the complaint was not barred by limitation as the opposite party No. 1 came to know of the violation of Rule 3(2)(ii) of the Rules on 21.1.1983, when the return was filed, though the return ought to have been filed by 31.3.1982. Under section 469(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the period of limitation runs from the date of knowledge where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence. As the commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the opposite party No. 1 only on 21.1.1983 the learned Magistrate found that the complaint filed on 20.7.1983, within six months of the knowledge about commission of the offence, was not barred by limitation. This is also the argument advanced by the learned advocate for the opposite party No. 1. Mr. Mukherjee contends that when offence for violation of Rule 3(2)(ii) of the Rules is punishable only under Rule 11 of the Rules, the petition of complaint ought to have been filed within September, 1982, for the period ending 31.3.1982, as the Registrar of Companies could have resorted to various provisions of the Act itself to acquaint themselves with the actual state of affairs prevailing in the company. I am unable to accept the contention of either Mr. Mukherjee or the learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 1 as regards the question of limitation. Under Rule 11 of the Rules, if a company or any other person contravenes any provision of the Rules for which no punishment is provided in the Act (emphasis supplied by me), the company and every officer of the company who is in default or such other person shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 500/- and where the contravention is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 50/- for every day after the first during which the contravention continues. Both Mr. Mukherjee and the learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 1 proceed on the assumption that Rule 11 of the Rules will govern the question of limitation in this case. I am unable to accept this contention because of the expression, for which no punishment is provided in the Act in Rule 11 of the Rules. Both Mr. Mukherjee and the learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 1 proceed on the assumption that Rule 11 of the Rules will govern the question of limitation in this case. I am unable to accept this contention because of the expression, for which no punishment is provided in the Act in Rule 11 of the Rules. The Rules were made by the Central Government, in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India in exercise of the powers conferred by section 58A read with section 642 of the Act. Section 58A (6) (b) of the Act contains the penal provision in respect of every officer of the company who is in default for violation of the provisions in Rule 3(2)(ii) of the Rules. This penal provision is imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and also fine. When this penal provision for violation of Rule 3 (2)(ii) of the Rules by the every officer of the company, who is in default, is incorporated in section 58M6) of the Act itself, the penal provisions in Rule 11 of the Rules regarding such officer of the company who is in default cannot have any application and hence the period of limitation will not be six months or even one year. Needless to say, section 468 Cr.P.C. lays down three periods of limitations ranging from six months to three years depending on the question whether the offence is punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. As the period of imprisonment may exceed three years under the penal provisions in section 58A(6)(b) of the Act, there is no question of limitation in this case under section 468 Cr.P.C. and hence the petition of complaint cannot be barred by limitation. The proceedings cannot, therefore, be quashed. The application heard as a contested. application is accordingly rejected. The prayer of the petitioner for granting special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused, Application rejected.