JUDGMENT K. S. Varma, J. - By an earlier order of this Court, these two revision applications were directed to be heard together and I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. 2. Section 29(7) of the U. P. Muslim Wakfs Act, 1960 provides that on receipt of an application for registration, the Board may, before the registration of the Wakf, make such inquiries as it thinks fit and the Board shall, before registering the Wakf, give notice of the application to the person administering the Wakf property and shall, after affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it may deem fit. Section 29(8) of the Act provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the Board under subsection (7) may, by application within 90 days from the date of that order, refer the dispute to the Tribunal which shall give the decision thereon. It is not in dispute between the parties that an application under Section 29(8) of the Act was moved by the applicant alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 with a prayer that the application for reference of the dispute to Tribunal be entertained beyond 90 days and that the delay in filing the reference be condoned. This application was opposed by the other side and the Court by order dated 2731984 held that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not maintainable. Aggrieved by the said order the applicant filed a revision application under Section 76 of the U. P. Muslim Wakfs Act, In my opinion, Section 76 is not the appropriate Section under which the revision can be filed in this Court. This Court may, in exercise of its powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the order provided the order suffers from error of jurisdiction or is otherwise illegal. The said powers can be exercised by the High Court either at the instance of an aggrieved party or suo motu. In the first instance, I propose to examine the correctness of the order passed by the Court below. The said powers can be exercised by the High Court either at the instance of an aggrieved party or suo motu. In the first instance, I propose to examine the correctness of the order passed by the Court below. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as follows "(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." A close analysis of the said provisions would indicate that the Limitation Act provides that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. What we have to see is whether application of Section 5 Limitation Act has been excluded by any of the provisions of the Wakf Act. It would be relevant to point out that the Act has provided in Section 74 of the Wakf Act that the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) when trying a suit or executing a decree or order. To the same effect is Section 72 of the Act which provides for the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 3. Learned counsel for the parties were unable to point out whether any provision of the Act makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to proceedings under the Wakfs Act. In this background it has to be seen whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the proceedings under the LJ. 3. Learned counsel for the parties were unable to point out whether any provision of the Act makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to proceedings under the Wakfs Act. In this background it has to be seen whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the proceedings under the LJ. P. Muslim Waqfs Act on the ground that the said Act does not exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (AIR 1976 Supreme Court, 105). In this respect the observations of Bhagwati, J. are pertinent and are quoted as follows: "There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provisions contained in Section 29, subsection (2) is concerned. Whereas under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29, sub section (2), Cl. (b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of Limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 other than those contained in Sections 4,9 to 19 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded. Section 29, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act, 19C3 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 which would include Section 5, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Section 29, subsection (2), clause (b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 specifically excluded the applicability of Section 5, while Section 29, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in clear and unambiguous terms provided for the applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decisions in Kaushalya Rani's case, therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitation Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason of Section 29 (2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Since under the Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29, subsection (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by special or local law if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the special or local law excludes the applicability of Section 5 that would stand displaced.'' 4. The question whether in the instant case Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies or not to the proceedings in question would have to be decided by reference to the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above. It is indisputable that under Section 29(8) of the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act an aggrieved person may by an application within 90 days from the date of that order refer the dispute to the Tribunal for decision. If the application is entertained under Section 29(8) of the Muslim Waqfs Act then the Tribunal under Chapter IX of the said Act will decide the dispute between the parties. It is, accordingly, apparent that the moving of an application under Section 29(8) of the Muslim Waqfs Act initiates the proceedings which are ultimately decided by a Tribunal constituted under Chapter IX of the Act. It has been contended on behalf of the applicant that since the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has not been excluded by the Muslim Waqfs Act, the said section shall be applicable in the case of an application under Section 29 (8) of the Muslim Waqfs Act. The observations of the Supreme Court quoted above clearly lay down the principle that the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply to the extent to which they are not specially excluded by such special or local law. The observations of the Supreme Court quoted above clearly lay down the principle that the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply to the extent to which they are not specially excluded by such special or local law. The learned counsel for the parties were unable to point out that the Muslim Waqfs Act, in any manner, excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. This Court in M. M. Hasan Jaffrey v. Azam Ali and others (1983 AWC 409) held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings under Section 29(8) of the Muslim Waqfs Act. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above and the decision of this Court, it is obvious that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under Section 29(8) of the U. P. Muslim Wakfs Act. 6. On behalf of the other side it was contended that the decision rendered by this Court in M. M. Hasan Jaffrey v. Azam Ali and others (1983 AWC 409) is incorrect and calls for reconsideration. In this respect relience was placed on Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra (AIR 1974 Supreme Court, 480). This case arose under the Representation of Peoples Act. In the said Act, there are specific provisions relating to period of Limitation for filing election petition. Under Section 86 of the Representation of Peoples Act there is a peremptory command that the High Court shall dismiss a petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sections 81,82 or 117 of the Act. After analysing various provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court held that the Representation of Peoples Act was a complete Code and provided for period of limitation for filing petitions and, therefore, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be excluded. The line of reasoning which persuaded the Supreme Court was that the provisions of the Act were specific and mandatory in regard to dismissal of election petitions and, therefore, resort could not be had to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In my opinion, this decision is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the present case and cannot be of any assistance in determining whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to a case under the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act. In my opinion, this decision is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the present case and cannot be of any assistance in determining whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to a case under the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act. The next case relied upon by the other side is U. P. Sunni Central Board v. Mohammad Alim Cheshti. This case has, obviously, no application to the facts of the present case as the point of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not in issue. The next case relied upon by the other side is Mohammad Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal U. P (AIR 1976 Supreme Court, 2161). This is a case under Motor Vehicles Act which provides that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be entitled to entertain it or to condone the delay in filing the application. The Supreme Court also observed that there was an express provision under subsection (3) of Section 58 of the Act that the delay in making an application for renewal shall be condoneable only if it was not more than 15 days. This provision, according to the Supreme Court, expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in cases where the application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days. This case again has no application to the facts of the present case. 7. Learned counsel then referred to M/S. Bhanu Prakash Ajit Kumar and another and Vidya Bhushan (1979 ALR 457), Smt Kamal Bhandari v. Brig. Shamsher Singh Malhotra (AIR 1982 Delhi, 102) and Kulmani Kar and others, v. Orissa Land Reforms TribunalcumSubordinate Judge, Cuttock (AIR 1983 Orissa, 63). All these three decisions have no application to the facts of the present case as observations of the Supreme Court in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (AIR 1976 Supreme Court, 105) are clearly explicit and lay down the principle which governs the applicability of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act. All these three decisions have no application to the facts of the present case as observations of the Supreme Court in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (AIR 1976 Supreme Court, 105) are clearly explicit and lay down the principle which governs the applicability of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act. I have examined the line of reasoning indicated in the above three decisions but I find that having regard to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Supra) and in M. M. Hasan Jaffrey v. Azam Ali & others (1983 AWC 409) it is not possible to agree with the opposite party that the latter decision, namely, M. M. Hasan Jaffrey v. Azam Ali and others (1983 AWC 409) needs reconsideration. 8. The next question that arises is under which provision of law relief can be granted if this Court is satisfied that the order passed by the Court below is incorrect in so far as the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned. The Court has held that section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in the instant case. For the reasons that I have already indicated above, I am of the view that section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 applies to proceedings under section 29, U. P. Muslim Wakfs Act. The revision application has been filed under section 76 of the Muslim Wakfs Act. This section is clearly inapplicable as it relates to the power of the High Court to interfere with the order of the Tribunal and inquire into the correctness or propriety of any award made under the Muslim Waqfs Act. In the instant case the revision application is not directed against an award. Therefore, Section 76 of the act has no application. In the instant case the revision application is not directed against an award. Therefore, Section 76 of the act has no application. Since I am of the view that the order passed by the Court below is incorrect, the decision can be rectified by this Court either in exercise of its powers under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution, while disposing of an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act,, the Court below has held on merits that the delay in making the application under Section 29 (8) of the Muslim Waqfs Act is not condonable as the applicant had knowledge of the proceedings relating to the registration of the Waqfs. 9. I have examined the pleadings of the parties and I find that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been considered properly on merits. There are certain factors which have been emphasized by the applicant in his application and if the court below was really minded to enter Into the question of delay, he should have done it in greater detail after recording clear findings on each explanation furnished by the applicant. It appears that the Court below was largely influenced by the fact that the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is not maintainable and in a cursory way has also observed that the applicant had knowledge of registration proceedings. I am not satisfied with the way application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been dealt with on the merits. It was expected of the Court below to have gone in more detail to give finding on the question whether the applicant is entitled to the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act as valuable rights of the applicant were involved. It is true that the delay affects the rights of the parties but if sufficient explanation has been furnished then the law provides for condonation of delay. It is in this background that it is necessary that a clear finding should be recorded by Court below whether the applicant has explained the delay in moving the application under Section 29(8) of the Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 10. It is in this background that it is necessary that a clear finding should be recorded by Court below whether the applicant has explained the delay in moving the application under Section 29(8) of the Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 10. For the reasons stated above, the order passed by the Court below dated 2731984 is set aside and the case is remanded to that Court to record a clear finding whether the explanation of delay furnished by the applicant is adequate and sufficient regard being had to the principles applicable for disposal of application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on the 14th April, 1986. (Revision allowed).