Judgment :- 1. This is a revision by the husband from an order made by the District Judge in proceedings by the wife for ancillary relief under S.24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, the Act). There is no dispute between the parties on certain essential facts of this case. 2. The husband and wife were married on 13th November, 1969. The couple had one child. There was a breakdown of marriage. Husband complained desertion by the wife. He filed an application for dissolution of the marriage, O. P. No. 10 of 1980. It was filed on 26-3-1980. Notice on the application was issued on 9-4-1980. Pending the main petition, O. P. 10/80, the wife filed an application I. A. 3486/80 on 24-11-1980 for the relief of interim alimony and for court's direction to the husband to pay a lump sum amount to the wife to meet the expenses of the litigation. This application was disposed of only on 31-1-1981. Before the disposal of this application, the main petition O. P. 10/80- was dismissed on 15-12-1980. The husband did not appear before the court. The court was not inclined to postpone the case for good reason and in that circumstance, the O. P. was dismissed for non-prosecution. 3. The District Court considered the interim application IA. 3486/80 and passed the impugned order directing the husband to pay an amount of Rs.750/- per month from the date of notice, viz. 9-4-1980 till the disposal of the main petition, viz. 15-12-1980. The order further directed the husband to make a lump sum payment of an amount of Rs. 1,500/- towards litigation expenses. The husband feels aggrieved. He challenges the order in this revision. 4. The learned counsel for the husband, raised before me certain points and argued those points very ably. The submission of the counsel is simple but forceful. He says that the trial court had no jurisdiction to pass the order on I. A. 3486/80 directing the husband to pay interim alimony, and litigation expenses after the disposal of the main proceedings for divorce. To support this argument, the counsel wanted me to examine the integrants of S.24 of the Act. He says that I should accept the view taken in a similar situation by the Delhi High Court in the decision reported in Chitra Lekha v. Ranjit Rai (AIR 1977 Delhi 176). To support this argument, the counsel wanted me to examine the integrants of S.24 of the Act. He says that I should accept the view taken in a similar situation by the Delhi High Court in the decision reported in Chitra Lekha v. Ranjit Rai (AIR 1977 Delhi 176). Counsel also submits that the trial court has plainly gone wrong in the exercise of its discretion in determining the quantum of interim alimony and the lump sum for litigation expenses. 5. The learned counsel for the wife submits that there is no rational justification for this court to say that interim alimony cannot be given on the happening of an event for which the wife is in no way responsible, namely, the inordinate postponement of the disposal of her interlocutory application. Counsel wants me to take note of the plain fact that usually the disposal of an application for interim relief is delayed for several reasons. Some are certainly reasons beyond the control of the applicant. Some of them are plainly attributable to the respondent (the husband in this case) and some on account of the normal and inevitable exigencies of the court. The counsel submits that the whole purpose and scheme of the enactment should be examined carefully, particularly the benign devoir that informs S.24 of the Act. The counsel further submits that this court should not and could not review the exercise of the discretion of the trial court in regard to the quantum of interim alimony and the lump sum amount fixed for litigation expenses. 6. Two questions arise for decision on this revision: the ambit of S.24 of the Act and the extent of the powers of this court to review the exercise of the discretion of the trial court. 7. At the proscenium I should call attention to know the nature of that institution the marriage and how Court should consider it. Its nature, character and incidents vary in different countries, but what are its essential elements and invariable features? Can we conceive some pervading identity and universal basis. Two fundamental views on this subject have divided the world and thinkers alike. One view is that marriage is a contract merely civil. Others hold that it is sacred, religious and spiritual contract and only so to be considered. I feel that neither of these views is perfectly accurate. Can we conceive some pervading identity and universal basis. Two fundamental views on this subject have divided the world and thinkers alike. One view is that marriage is a contract merely civil. Others hold that it is sacred, religious and spiritual contract and only so to be considered. I feel that neither of these views is perfectly accurate. According to juster notions of the marriage contract, it is not merely either a civil or religious contract. 8. "It is a contract according to the law of nature, antecedent to civil institution and which may take place to all intents and purposes wherever two persons of different sexes engage by mutual contracts to live together. Our first parents lived not in a political society but as individuals without the regulation of any institutions of that kind. It is hardly necessary to enter something of a protest against the opinion, if any such opinion exists that a mere commerce between the sexes is itself marriage. A marriage is not every "casual commerce"; nor would it be so, even under the law of nature. A mere casual commerce without the intention of co-habitation and bringing up of children would not constitute marriage under any supposition. But when two persons agree to have that commerce for the procreation and bringing up of children and for such lasting co-habitation. THAT, in a state of nature would be a marriage and in the absence of all civil and religious institutes might safely be presumed to be as it is popularly called a marriage in the sight of God." Vide Sir William Scott. 9. It admits of no doubt that marriage is something more than a contract either religious or civil to be an institution. It postulates mutual rights and obligations as ail contracts do, but beyond that it confers a status. The position or status of 'husband' and wife' is a recognized one throughout the world and the law of our country enjoins that status a variety of legal incidents during the lives of the parties and induce definite rights upon their offsprings. I hold the opinion that in India as well as in most civilized countries, marriage is a religious as well as a natural and civil contract. I conceive that it is a great mistake to suppose that because it is the one, therefore it may not likewise be the other. I hold the opinion that in India as well as in most civilized countries, marriage is a religious as well as a natural and civil contract. I conceive that it is a great mistake to suppose that because it is the one, therefore it may not likewise be the other. "Heaven itself is made a party to the contract and the consent of individuals pledged to each other is ratified and con secreted by a vow to God." 10. Marriage brings in marital duty. What is its nature? I feel to say most plainly and clearly that persons who choose to enter the sacred bonds of marriage or the secular civil bonds of marriage as the case may be. are obliged to conduct themselves to one another so that they shall fulfil the vows and promises which they have taken on the contract. They are also bound and should take upon themselves a responsibility serious and onerous towards such children as they may have. This in turn demands of them so to live that those children shall have that benign gift which they are entitled to of the joint care and affection of both father and mother. This again postulates that neither the man nor the woman is entitled so to act or conduct themselves as to deprive the children of that which by the compulsion of the society they have this guaranteed to them. 11. True, statutes providing for regulating the contract of marriage invest with courts the power to dissolve a marriage under certain circumstances. This does not alter the fundamental conception that marriage is still a "union for life of one man and woman to the exclusion of all others" since parties enter into matrimony in that state of mind. The petitioner and respondent have allowed to change this state of mind. There is a break down of the marriage. Husband claims dissolution of marriage. Wife resists it and to resist the attempt of the husband she wants interim alimony pending the proceedings and a lump sum payment by the husband as the expenses of the litigation. Certainly, the statute provides for meeting the situation in S, 24 of the Act. But what is the width and scope of S.24? 12. Now I quote S.24 of the Act. "24. Maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings. Certainly, the statute provides for meeting the situation in S, 24 of the Act. But what is the width and scope of S.24? 12. Now I quote S.24 of the Act. "24. Maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings. Wherein any proceedings under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceedings, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the court to be reasonable." 13. The object and purpose of enacting S.24 of the Act is to secure the indigent spouse some financial assistance to prosecute the case and also for the purpose that the indigent spouse should not suffer during the pendency of the proceedings because of his or her indigence. The counsel emphatically submits before me that it should be the prime duty and concern of nutrimo-vial courts to give an expeditious decision on applications for ancillary reliefs, like grant of interim alimony so that the indigent spouse is not handicapped because of paucity of funds. In the background of this purpose, a liberal interpretation has to be given enabling the court to pass an order on the interlocutory application under S.24 of the Act, even if the main petition is dismissed. 14. I feel that the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent is more attractive and acceptable than the argument of the counsel for the revision petitioner. If I hold construing S.24 of the Act that there is an in built interdiction in the provision prohibiting matrimonial courts from ordering interim alimony when the main petition stands dismissed, it will only promote and encourage the dilatory tactics now very commonly used for unduly delaying the disposal of interlocutory applications particularly applications under S.24 of the Act. Further I have to consider whether it is a case of lack of jurisdiction for the court below to dispose of an interim application after the disposal of the main petition. I see no good principle to hold so. Further I have to consider whether it is a case of lack of jurisdiction for the court below to dispose of an interim application after the disposal of the main petition. I see no good principle to hold so. Normally the court is expected to dispose of all interlocutory applications before the disposal of the main petitions. The counsel submits that an interlocutory application independent of a main petition may not be entertainable. But once an interlocutory application is entertained validly it has to be disposed of notwithstanding the disposal of the main application. Certainly, I see clear logic in this submission. 15. This view gets very able support in the decision reported in Sohan Lal v. Kamlesh (AIR 1984 Punjab & Haryana 332). A Division Bench of that court considered the question very carefully and held that if the application under S.24 of the Act has not been disposed of during the pendency of the main proceeding on account of a dilatory tactics of the other spouse or for some unforeseen circumstances, the whole purpose of the section would be frustrated in case it is dismissed on the score that after the disposal of the main petition it does not survive. The court held: "Therefore, we are of the opinion that if the application under S.24 continues after dismissal of the main petition, the applicant is entitled to maintenance till the date of the decision of the main petition." The same view is seen taken in the decisions reported in Sundershan Kumar Khurna v. Smt. Deepak (AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 305), Bhanwar Lal v. Smt. Kamla Devi (AIR 1983 Raj. 229), Amrik Singh v. Smt. Narinder Kaur (AIR 1979 Pun. & Hary. 211) and Nirmala v. Ram (AIR 1973 Pun. & Hary. 48). 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred me to the decision reported in Chitra Lekha v. Ranjit Rai (A.I.R.1977 Delhi 176). I feel that I should follow the ratio of the decision reported in AIR 1984 Punj. & Hary. 332 in preference to the decision of the Delhi High Court. It has to be noted that in this decision (Chitra Lekha's case) the court was more concerned about providing for litigation expenses. What is the reason stated for declining such a claim? & Hary. 332 in preference to the decision of the Delhi High Court. It has to be noted that in this decision (Chitra Lekha's case) the court was more concerned about providing for litigation expenses. What is the reason stated for declining such a claim? The court says that there was nothing left for the appellant to defend after the termination of the main petition and so the grant of the application at that stage would be outside the purview of the object of the statutory provision. Certainly I cannot agree with this reason. The section only mandates that if it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and for necessary expenses of the proceedings the court may order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding. Implicitly or explicitly the section did not say at what point of time a party who has got the entitlement to claim for an order for the expenses of the proceedings should apply. The language of the section may indicate that the application should be filed as an interlocutory application in the main proceedings. Certainly S.24 does not contemplate the initiation of an independent proceedings. But it shall not be created as an independent proceedings on the mere happening of an accident that such an application remained undisposed of when the main proceedings ended. In my judgment notwithstanding the disposal of the main proceedings the Court should dispose of the petition under S.24 on merits; if circumstances do require it. The Court has power to do so. 17. It has to be noted that in Chitra Lekha's Case the learned judge has said: "This is not to say that the applications for interim alimony should be allowed to lapse: In fact, orders on such applications should be passed as expeditiously as possible and the party should not be encouraged to continue with the proceedings by deferring orders or implementation of orders under S.24. This should, however, be done before the proceedings are concluded. This should, however, be done before the proceedings are concluded. But, if there is no legal proceeding left to prosecute or defend at any stage and in any court, then certainly no order under S.24 of the Act can be passed." I am of opinion that the view expressed in the last sentence of the above quote seems to be an oversimplification of the whole matter. The peculiar facts emerged in the case dealt with by the Delhi High Court may perhaps justify such a view. The Delhi High Court has not considered the question on a jurisdictional basis. 18. Counsel on both sides submitted that there is no reported decision of this court directly covering this point. The view I have taken can find implied support from the decision of this court reported in Hema v. Lakshmana Bhat (A.I.R.1986 Kerala 130) The chief point for doubt in this case was with regard to the duration over which the court can order alimony. Relying on a decision reported in Radhakumari v. K. M. K Nair (1982 KLT 417) this court said that there is no legal impediment for the court directing maintenance to be paid by the husband from the date of service of summons in the main petition eventhough the petition for interim relief was filed sometime after the filing of the main petition. 19. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no justification for the court to award Rs. 1,500/- as legal expenses when the original petition was dismissed without costs. It has to be renumbered that what is the amount to be awarded as litigation expenses is mainly a discretion of the court below. Certainly, the court has to exercise that power of discretion judicially and reasonably. The counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the evidence of the wife itself shows that the total amount spent for the litigation is only Rs. 1,000/- and this evidence was given on 22-1-1981 after the main petition was disposed of. I feel that when the court decreed Rs. 1500/- as expenses of the proceedings, it has omitted to consider the clinching evidence I have adverted to and so there is no justification for me to confirm it. Hence I reduce the amount awarded as litigation expenses from Rs. 1,500/-t o Rs. 1000/-. 20. The counsel for the revision petitioner also submitted that the rate of alimony, viz., Rs. 1500/- as expenses of the proceedings, it has omitted to consider the clinching evidence I have adverted to and so there is no justification for me to confirm it. Hence I reduce the amount awarded as litigation expenses from Rs. 1,500/-t o Rs. 1000/-. 20. The counsel for the revision petitioner also submitted that the rate of alimony, viz., Rs. 750/- is unjustifiable. The court below has considered all the relevant aspects of the matter in arriving at this amount. In deciding the question what is the amount to be given as the interim alimony, the court is bound to take into consideration the income of the spouses and the needs of the claimant, having consideration to the status of the parties and other relevant circumstances involved in the case. I do not think that there is any justification for me to interfere with the discretion exercised in this matter by the court below. 21. Counsel for the revision petitioner further submitted that the whole matter has been decided ex parte, and he did not get an opportunity to contest the matter. The court below has given sufficient reasons for deciding the matter ex parte and I do not think that the court has gone wrong in this aspect of the matter. After all, I am exercising a power under S.115 CPC and I am bound to interfere with orders of the courts below only if they suffer from any jurisdictional error. With the small amendment in regard to the litigation expense, the order of the court below is confirmed. CRP is dismissed. No order as to costs.