This is an appeal under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the appellant-complainant against the order of acquittal dated 30.5.80 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Class, Jorhat in C.R. Case No. 5477 of 1978. 2. The complainant's case is that he was running a shop in the left corner of the Jorhat Fish market -after obtaining due permission of the Jorhat Municipal Board But on 6.11.78 the accused-respondent along with some labourers of the Muni­cipality demolished his shop and took away all goods and articles worth about Rs. 775/-. Complainant has also alleged that he sustained a total loss of Rs. 13,000/-. The complainant filed a complaint petition before the court and the court after making preliminary inquiry issued summons against the accused-respondent under sections 379/427 of the Indian Penal Code. After examining the witnesses on behalf of the complainant the trial court framed charges under the aforesaid sections against the accused person to which be pleaded not guilty. 3. Five witnesses were examined on behalf of the compla­inant. Statement of the accused person was duly recorded who stated that as per orders of the Executive Magistrate and in the presence of the said Magistrate he demolished the constru­ction in question with the help of labourers of the Municipality. He has further stated that he removed the articles to the office of the Municipality. On witness was examined on behalf of the accused. It is an admitted fact that at the relevant time the Municipality, which was superseded, was under the control of the State Government. 4. The learned trial court after considering the entire evid­ence on record found the accused person not guilty on the ground that the accused is not liable for the occurrence and he is protected under the law'. He relied on the provisions of section 78 of the Indian Penal Code while arriving at the above decision. 5. Sri Mannan, learned Counsel for the appellant has urged that the construction in question was demolished by the Municipality in violation of the provisions of law and without giving reasonable opportunity to the complainant. He has further contended that in view of this, the demolition of the construction is illegal inasmuch as the order itself was not a valid and legal order. He has further contended that in view of this, the demolition of the construction is illegal inasmuch as the order itself was not a valid and legal order. According to him the accused cannot get protection under section 79 of the Indian Penal Code as the demolition of construction by the accused was not done in good faith. In support of his contention that the order of demolition is illegal, the learned Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to Parama Singh vs. Shi I long Municipal Board, AIR 1964 Assam 180. 6. In Parama Singh (supra) the question arose regarding the order passed by the Magistrate under the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 directing the petitioner to remove his stall. While allowing the petition this Court observed that the function of the Magis­trate being judicial it is necessary for him to investigate into the correctness of the stand taken by the Municipal Board and determine whether there is any substance in the objection which can be done only after giving notice to the persons affected-This case is not relevant for the purpose of instant case as this is a criminal prosecution under sections 379/427 I P.C. against the accused who was an Overseer of the Jorhat Municipal Board at the relevant time. If the appellant-complainant was dissatisfied with the order of the Municipal Board or if no notice was served on him his remedy lies elsewhere. In the pre­sent case the Court has to determine whether the prosecution has been able to prove the charges against the respondent-accused. Incidentally it may also be mentioned that on perusal of the evidence of Md. Abdul Samad (P.W. 2) it transpires that before the demolition of the construction he had approached the Deputy Commissioner against the order of demolition with a petition which was forwarded to the Office of the Jorhat Municipal Board. I refrain from making any observation whe­ther the order of removal was illegal or whether any notice was served on the appellant as he may even now seek redress where. 7. Mr. A. Sarma, learned Counsel for the respondent-acc­used has contended that it is an established law as laid down by Supreme Court that normally High Court may not interfere with the judgment and orders of acquittal passed by the trial court unless it is unreasonable or it is not based on materials on record. According to Mr. 7. Mr. A. Sarma, learned Counsel for the respondent-acc­used has contended that it is an established law as laid down by Supreme Court that normally High Court may not interfere with the judgment and orders of acquittal passed by the trial court unless it is unreasonable or it is not based on materials on record. According to Mr. Sarma the crux of the matter is whether the accused is entitled to get protection under sec­tion 79 of the Indian Penal Code. Shri Sarma has urged that there was no mens rea on the part of the accused and that he acted in good faith by implementing the order passed by the competent authority. Shri Sarme has placed reliance on Nathulal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 43 . 8. In Nathulal (supra) the Supreme Court has observed that law on the subject, which came under judicial scrutiny of the Supreme Court on many occasions, is fairly well settled and it is enough to re-state the principles that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. In that case the High court set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the accused person under the provisions of the Essential Commo­dities Act, 1955. 9. It is true that it is an established law that normally High Court may not interfere with the judgment and orders of ac­quittal passed by the trial court as contended by Shri Sarma. This principle has been adopted and applied by the Supreme Court in numerous cases. FOF the present a reference to Ram Jog & Others vs. State of U. P. (1974) 4SCC 201 is sufficient. Bat this principle is applicable where there is a question of app­reciation of evidence as the trial judge has the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, where such seeing and hearing can be useful aids to the assessment of evidence. In the instant case the accused was acquitted on the ground that he was pro­tected under the law namely, under Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the evidence on record to ascertain whether the prosecution has been able to prove the charges against the accused person. 10. It is an admitted fact that the accused was an Overseer of the Jhorhat Municipal Board and that he demolished the shop in question. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the evidence on record to ascertain whether the prosecution has been able to prove the charges against the accused person. 10. It is an admitted fact that the accused was an Overseer of the Jhorhat Municipal Board and that he demolished the shop in question. In his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedures the accused has stated that 'as ordered by and in presence of an Executive Magistrate I had the shop house demolished by municipal labourers.' The materials, stores etc. were removed to the municipal office. At the time of the occu­rrence the administration of Jorhat Municipality was taken over by the Government and D. W. 1 who is an Executive Magistrate was in charge of the Municipal Board. D. W. 1 has deposed before the court that he gave order to demolish the unauthorised occu­pation on municipal land and on 6.11.78 he had the shop of the complainant-appellant demolished. He has categorically stated that the shop was demolished in his presence and that the accused was an overseer of Shillong Municipal Board at the relev­ant time. I see no reason to disbelieve the statement of D.W. 1, In cross-examination D.W. I has stated that on 5.1.79 a petition was filed before the Court and the said petition has been marked as Ext. 2. In the petition it has been stated that the accused was an overseer of Jorhat Municipality and he acted on the direction and in the presence of the executive officer of the Jorhat Municipality and as such the accused is not liable for any act­ion for the present incident. The important ingredient for con­viction under section 379 of the I. P. C. is the 'dishonest inten­tion' to take away movable property from the possession of another and under section 426 I. P. C. is the intention to cause wrongful loss or damage to any person. The accused, who was an overseer, acted nnder the orders and in presence of the su­perior officer namely, the executive officer of the Municipality who was also an executive magistrate. On behalf of the Muni­cipality a petition, Ext. 2, has been field to show that the acc­used acted under the orders of the superior authority. The accused, who was an overseer, acted nnder the orders and in presence of the su­perior officer namely, the executive officer of the Municipality who was also an executive magistrate. On behalf of the Muni­cipality a petition, Ext. 2, has been field to show that the acc­used acted under the orders of the superior authority. The evidence of the D.W. 1 and the petition (Ex.2) are sufficient to prove that the accused had no dishonest intention or intention to cause wron­gful loss or damage to the complainant-appellant. 1, therefore, hold that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under sec­tions 379 and 426 I. P. C. against the accused person. 11. The contention of Sri Sarma that mens tea, which is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence is absent in the present case and that the accused is protected under sect­ion 79 of the Indian Penal Code have considerable force. Section 76 I.P.C. and section 79 I.P.C. are analogous. The only difference between the two being that a person under sect­ion 76 I.P.C. believes himself to be bound by law to do a thing while under section 70 I.P.C. he feels justified by law in doing it. In the instant case the accused has claimed protect­ion under section 79 I.P.C. on the ground that his action was justified by law. In dealing with these two sections this court has to decide whether the right claimed by the accused person was honest and bonafide and the court need not go into legal­ity or otherwise of the right under which the accused person acted. There is not an iota of evidence to prove that there was malafide or that the accused acted dishonestly. On the other hand, the witness for the defence D.W.1 has categorically sta­ted that the demolition was done in his presence and under his orders. The accused also has stated to these fleet in his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. In Nathulal (supra) Sup­reme Court following the sound rule of construction adopted in England and also accepted in India held that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence and the law on the subject is fairly well-settled. The accused also has stated to these fleet in his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. In Nathulal (supra) Sup­reme Court following the sound rule of construction adopted in England and also accepted in India held that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence and the law on the subject is fairly well-settled. In the present case, under sections 379/426 I.P.C. mens rea on the part of the accused person would mean intention to steal and intention to cause wrongful loss or damage to the complainant and both of them are absent in the instant case. I, therefore, hold that mens rea which is essential ingredient in crime is absent in the instant case. 12. In the result, I hold that prosecution has failed to prove the charges under sections 379 and 426 I.P.C. against the accused person. I further hold that accused is entitled to get protection under section 79 I.P.C. as he acted in good faith believing that he was justified by law in demolishing the shop. 13. In the result the appeal is dismissed.