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1986 DIGILAW 300 (KAR)

A. JALAJAKSHI D. ALWA v. MEENAXI NAIK BY L.

1986-07-23

K.S.PUTTASWAMY, R.S.MAHENDRA

body1986
PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) WHETHER a living spouse can claim conferment of occupancy rights as a tenant of the other living spouse; to an agricultural 'land under the Karnataka land Reforms Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 10 of 1962) ('the Act') is the short and interesting question that arises for our determination in these cases. In order to appreciate the question it is first necessary to notice the facts as set out or as admitted by the appellants. ( 2 ) LANDS bearing Sy. Nos. 79/2, 79/7 and 77/3 measuring 69 cents, 10 cents and 1 acre 17 cents respectively of kariangala Village, Buntwal Taluk, are agricultural lands. "smt. A. Jatajakshi D. Alwa, ppellant in Writ Appeal No. 1718 of 1980, a resident of Ammunje village buntwei Taluk, Dakshina Kannada District, had married one A. Deva Alwa of the same village and was living with him till the latter died in the year 1979. ""on or about 21-10-1975, the appellant made an application under section 48-A (1) of the Act before the land Tribunal, Buntwal ('lt, Buntwal') for conferment of occupancy rights over the said lands describing her husband as her land lord and that she was his tenant for 25 years. On 17-10-1978 the LT, buntwal considered the maintainability of the said application and rejected the same as not maintainable under the act (Exhibit-A ). in Writ Petition No. 1086 of 1980, the appellant challenged the said order of that Tribunal before this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. On 11-3-1980, Kudoor, j. rejected the same (This decision kudoor, J. has been reported in 1980 (2) kar. L. J. 60 - Editor. Aggrieved by the said order of Kudoor, J. the appellant has filed Writ Appeal No. 1718 of 1980 before us :" ( 3 ) KALINGARAJ Urs of Amchawadi village, Aradhanahalli Hobii, Chamarajnagar taluk, Mysore District, who is the appellant in W A. No. 173 of 1981 is the husband of Smt. Krishnarajammanni who is respondent-3. Land bearing Sy. No. 603/1 of Amchavadi village measuring 2 acres 4 guntas is an agricultural land. Land bearing Sy. No. 603/1 of Amchavadi village measuring 2 acres 4 guntas is an agricultural land. On 7-10-1974 the appellant made an application under Section 48-A (1) of the Act before the Land Tribunal chamarajnagar Taluk (LT, Chamarajnagar) for conferment of occupancy rights over the said land describing respondent-3 as the land lord of the said land and that he was the tenant of his wife from 1972- 73 to 1974-75 (vide the certified copy produced in Writ Petition No. 96 of 1977 ). The appellant does not dispute that the said land was originally owned by one Nanjundaswamy who had mortgaged the same with possession to respondent-3 on 29-12-1971 and that on 17-4-1973 the said Nanjundaswamy sold the same to respondent-4 subject to the mortgage in favour of his wife. He also does not dispute that respondent-4 has redeemed that mortgage. "after a series of proceedings the detailed nanation of which is not very necessary the Tribunal overruling the objections of respondent-4 on 28-6-79 allowed the application made by the appellant and granted him occupancy rights over the said land. In Writ Petition no. 8860 of 1979, respondent-4 challenged the said order of the Tribunal before this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. On 1-1-1981 bhimiah, J. (as His Lordship then was) has allowed the same and has quashed the order made by the Tribunal. Hence, this appeal by the appellant before us. " ( 4 ) SRI P. Vishwanatha Shetty, learned advocate, has appeared for the appellant in W. A. No. 1718 of 1980. Sri H. Hanumantharayappa, learned Advocate, has appeared for the appellant In Writ appeal No. 173 of 1981. Sri S. Rajendra babu, Government Advocate, has appeared for the authorities in both these 'cases. Sri Ashok Harnahalli learned advocate, has appeared for respondent-1 in W. A. No. 1718 of 1980 and Sri T. R. Subbanna, learned Advocate, has appeared for respondent-4 in W. A. No. 173 of 1981. Sri M. Gopalakrishna Shetty, an Advocate of this Court who is not appearing for any of the parties, also intervened and supported the stand taken by the learned Advocates for the appellants on the maintainability of the applications before the Tribunal on which aspect we heard these appeals first. Sri M. Gopalakrishna Shetty, an Advocate of this Court who is not appearing for any of the parties, also intervened and supported the stand taken by the learned Advocates for the appellants on the maintainability of the applications before the Tribunal on which aspect we heard these appeals first. But, before noticing and examining the same, it is necessary to deal with a contention urged by Sri henumantharayappa in W. A. No. 173 of 1981. ( 5 ) SRI Hanumantharayeppa, at the threshold contends that respondent-4 had not urged any contention on the maintainability of the application of the appellant before the learned Judge or the Tribunal and, therefore, the same should not be permitted to be urged before us for the first time in the appeal. ( 6 ) WE are of the view that this objection of Sri Hanumantharayappa is without any merit for more than one reason. Firstly, the objection urged by respondent-4 which does not involve any investigation of facts is a pure question of law which affects the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate the application. Secondly, we find that respondent-4 had urged the same in his writ petition and at the hearing before the learned Judge though not as clearly and pointedly as is now urged before us. For these reasons, we reject this preliminary objection urged by Sri Hanumantharayappa and proceed to examine the common question first. ( 7 ) SRIYUTHS Vishwanatha Shetty and Hanumantharayappa contend that the applications made by the appellants for conferment of occupancy rights under the Act were maintainable before the tribunals and, therefore, their claims require to be examined on merits. ( 8 ) SRIYUTHS Rajendra Babu, Ashok harnahally and Subbanna contend that the applications made by the appellants who were admittedly the members of the families' of their alleged land lords, were not maintainable under the Act and the view expressed by Kudoor, J. was sound and correct. ( 9 ) WE have erlier noticed that the lt, Buntwal found that the application made by the appellant in Writ Appeal no. 1718 of 1980 was not maintainable and rejected the same in limine. Before this Court, the appellant in that appeal seriously disputed the same. In that view, Kudoor, J. examined this very contention and had concurred with the tribunal, however giving elaborate reasons in support of his own conclusion. 1718 of 1980 was not maintainable and rejected the same in limine. Before this Court, the appellant in that appeal seriously disputed the same. In that view, Kudoor, J. examined this very contention and had concurred with the tribunal, however giving elaborate reasons in support of his own conclusion. En Writ Appeal No. 173 of 1981 Bhimiah, j. (as His Lordship then was) had not examined the question and had not expressed on the question one way or the other. ( 10 ) THE uniform Act with the sweeping amendments effected by the karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1973 (Karnataka Act 1 of 1974) ('amending Act') has been enacted with the primary object of abolishing absentee landlordism, conferring ownership rights on tenants and imposing ceilings on land holdings and other incidental matters. ( 11 ) THE Act comprehends two kinds of tenancies and they are (i) contractual tenants and (ii) deemed or statutory tenancies. ( 12 ) SECTION 2 of the Act defines certain terms for purposes of the Act. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Nandalal and another v State of Haryana and others (A/ft 1980 Supreme Court 2097), the definition of certain terms in the Act are artificial definitions and they are deliberately defined in a different way only to achieve the purposes of the Act. The statement of objects and reasons of the Amendment bill that ultimately became act No. 1 of 1974 also declares the same (see pages 43 to 47 of the mysore Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill of 1972 (LA Bill No. 21 of 1972 ). ( 13 ) THE definitions that are relevant for our purpose are (i) to cultivate (ii) to cultivate personally, (iii) Family, (iv) land (v) Land lord (vi) tenancy and (vii) tenant defined in Section 2 (10), (11), (12), (18), (20), (33) and (34) of the act. But, for the proper understanding, we will read them as land, landlord, tenancy, tenant, to cultivate, to cultivate personally and family and ascertain their true import also first. ( 14 ) SECTION 2 (18) of the Act defines 'land' as 'agricultural land, that is to say land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto and inculdes horticultural lend, forest land, garden land, pasture land, plantation and tope but does not include house-site or land used exclusively for non-agricultural purposes'. ( 14 ) SECTION 2 (18) of the Act defines 'land' as 'agricultural land, that is to say land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto and inculdes horticultural lend, forest land, garden land, pasture land, plantation and tope but does not include house-site or land used exclusively for non-agricultural purposes'. The thrust of the Act is on agricultural lands as defined in this section. ( 15 ) SECTION 2 (20) of the Act defines the term 'land lord' as 'a person who had leased land to a tenant and includes a person entitled to receive rent from a tenant'. Section 2 (33) defines the term 'tenancy' as 'the relationship of land lord and tenant'. Section 2 (34) defines the term 'tenant' as 'an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from a land lord'. The enumeration of the different types tenants in the same section is not very material for our purpose. Section 2 (33) defines the term 'tenancy' as 'the relationship of land lord and tenant'. Section 2 (34) defines the term 'tenant' as 'an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from a land lord'. The enumeration of the different types tenants in the same section is not very material for our purpose. ( 16 ) THE terms 'to cultivate', 'to cultivate personally' and 'family' are defined in Section 2 (10), (11) and (12) of the Act as here under :"2 (10) "to cultivate" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means to till or husband the land for the purpose of raising or improving agricultural produce whether by manual labour or by means of cattle or machinery or to carry on any agricultural operation thereon ; and the expression "uncultivated" shall be construed correspondingly ; explanation :- A person who takes up a contract to cut grass, or to gather the fruits or other produce of any land, shall not on that account only be deemed to cultivate such land ; (11) "to cultivate personally"means to cultivate land on tine's own account- (I) by one's own labour, or (ii) by the labour of any member of one's family or ; (iii) by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share, under the personal supervision of oneself or by member of one's family ;explanation-I - in the case of an educational, religious or charitable institution or society or trust, of a public nature capable of holding property, formed for educational religious or charitable purpose, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally if such land is cultivated by hired labour or by servants under the personal supervision of an employee or agent of such institution or society or trust ; explanation II- In the case of a joint family, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally if it is cultivated by any member of such family; (12) ''family" means- (a) in the case of an individual who has a spouse or spouses, such individual, the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and unmarried daughters if any ; (b) in the case of an individual who has no spouse such individual end his or her minor sons and unmarried daughters ; (c) in the case of an individual who is a divorced person and who has not remarried, such individual and his minor sons and unmarried daughters whether in his custody or not and (d) where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons and unmarried daughters". On a combined reading of these and other definitions noticed earlier, three things emerge and they are (i) that in respectof agricultural lands, there should be a tenancy created by a land lord or owner of that land in favour of another person who is the tenant, (ii) that the tenant must cultivate the tenanted land on his own account, and (iii) that a speuse who lives with the other spouse or the wife who lives with her husband or vice-versa being a member of the 'family' defined in the Act only cultivates for and on behalf of the other spouse only. ( 17 ) WHAN a husband or a wife cultivates the land of his wife or husband or vice-versa under the artificial definitions of the Act, then such person does not cultivate the land of the other on his or her own account independently but cultivates the same for and on behalf of the other only. The tenancy of one spouse is treated as the tenancy of the other spouse also. So also the cultivation of tenanted lands by one spouse is treated as the cultivation by the other spouse. The Act in its wisdom does not recognise a tenancy between a husband and wife and vice-versa, though the common law and other laws may so recognise the same with which we are not concerned Whatever be the position in cpmmon lew or other laws of the country with which we are not concerned in these cases the position under the Act is that there can be no tenancy between a husband and wife and viceversa at any rate while that married status exists between them as in the present eases. ( 18 ) IN the absence of a tenancy between two independent persons under the Act, there cannot be any conferment of occupancy rights under the Act. In other words a husband or wife or viceyersa can neither claim tenancy and conferment of occupancy rights under the act on the basis that his wife or her husband or vice-versa was the land lord or tenant of the agricultural land under the Act. ( 19 ) ON a detailed and critical examination of the provisions of the Act, on this very question, Kudoor, J. had expressed thus :"7. ( 19 ) ON a detailed and critical examination of the provisions of the Act, on this very question, Kudoor, J. had expressed thus :"7. From a combined reading of the provisions hereinabove referred to, it is obvious that a tenant who is entitled to, be registered as an occupant under Sec. 45 must be a 'tenant' within the meaning of clause (34) of section 2 (A) of the Act. The basic and essential ingredients of the expression 'tenant' is that he or she must be an agriculturist and cultivates personally the land he or she holds on lease from a Iand lord. The person who does not cultivate personally the land he or she holds on lease from a land lord would not become a 'tenant' within the meaning of the Act so as to entitle htm or her to be registered as an occupant under Section 45 of the act. if the land he or she holds on lease from a land lord is cultivated on his or her own account either by his or her own labour qr by the labour of any member of his or her family or by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share under his or her personal supervision or any member of his or her family would constitute personal cultivation. Thus, it is clear that the land held by a member of the family on lease from a land lord is cultivated by the labour of any member of the family or by hired Iabour or by servants under the personal supervision of any member of the family, it would become the personal cultivation of the member holding the tease hold. 8. Tenancy a relationship between the land lord and tenant, is essentially a contractual relationship between the land lord and the tenant holding different interest in the demised land. The land lord and tenant are two different legal entitles haying different jural relationship. Their interest in the demised land is different and distinct, one is based on the ownership or the right to lease out the land and receive rent and the other to hold the demised land during the continuance of the lease subject to the conditions stipulated thereunder. Their interest in the demised land is different and distinct, one is based on the ownership or the right to lease out the land and receive rent and the other to hold the demised land during the continuance of the lease subject to the conditions stipulated thereunder. The provisions of the Act are essentially aimed at to put an end to the relationship of land lord and tenant and confer ownership on tenants in respect of the lease hold lands in their possession by determining the interest of the owner or the land lord as the case may be in the said land. In that view of the matter it is difficult to accept the contention that a wife could claim tenancy right under her husband or vice-versa when both of them are the members of the 'family' within the meaning of the Act and the cultivation of the land by his or her own labour or by the hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share, under his or her personal supervision would result in the deprivation of the ownership of the land by one or the other ". We are in respectful agreement with these views. ( 20 ) WE are of the view that if the above construction is not placed husbands and wives whoare living together, as in the present cases, will resort to making applications that are naturally conceded by the other and thus defeat the objects of the Act. We are of the view that both on principle and authority, the same should be avoided by us. ( 21 ) ON the foregoing discussion we hold that the applications made by the appellants were not maintainable and called for their rejection in limine On which ground we should affirm the orders under appeal. On this view all other questions do not require our examination and therefore, we decline to examine and decide them. ( 22 ) IN the light of our above discussion, we hold that these writ appeals ere Iibble to be dismissed. We therefore dismiss these writ appeals. But, in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout. --- *** --- .