JUDGMENT - MOHTA V.A., J.:---This petition arises out of proceedings for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act (the LA Act) for a public purpose-- construction of Ukali-Bori Road. Notification under section 4 of the LA Act specifying certain areas in certain fields was issued on 22nd June, 1982. Notification under section 6 was issued on 15th March, 1983. Notification under section 4 was challenged in Writ Petition No. 947 of 1983 before this Court on the grounds of mala fides and notification under section 6 on the ground of absence of hearing on objections. On 23rd August, 1983, the learned Government Pleader made a statement about withdrawal of notification under section 6. On the basis of that statement, the petition was withdrawn. Following is the gist of the order: "Shri Sambre, Government leader, states that the notification under section 6 is being withdrawn. On this statement being made, Mr. Munshi seeks permission to withdraw the writ petition. Permitted to withdraw. Disposed of as such. No costs." After withdrawal of Notification under section 6, fresh hearing was granted and second Notification under section 6 came to be issued on 4th April, 1985. 2. At, this stage, we may notice certain developments which took place between the date of withdrawal of the writ petition and issuance of second notification under section 6. For the very same public purpose, fresh notification under section 4 was issued on 1st April, 1984 for acquisition of additional lands. The areas in the two notifications do not overlap though some fields are common in both. No notification under section 6 in respect of the said properties is yet issued. It appears further that process of hearing on objections in this matter is even not complete. 3. Shri Dandige, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that no notice under section 9 for the property covered by notification under section 4 dated 1st April, 1984 could be issued nor can possession be taken unless notification under section 6 is issued in accordance with law. The contention is clearly correct. Shri Sambre, the learned Government Pleader, has fairly not disputed this position and states that if any such notices are, in fact, issued, they would be withdrawn and no possession would be taken unless valid notification under section 6 is issued. This controversy thus has only academic importance. 4. The contention is clearly correct. Shri Sambre, the learned Government Pleader, has fairly not disputed this position and states that if any such notices are, in fact, issued, they would be withdrawn and no possession would be taken unless valid notification under section 6 is issued. This controversy thus has only academic importance. 4. We now refer to the challenge to the first acquisition. It is contended that the first notification under section 4 is vitiated due to mala fides and non-application of mind. Allegations of personal malice are too general and are not substantiated. We are not satisfied that there is absence of application of mind. The village map is shown to us from which it appears that there is already in existence a 10 feet width road from point B near Gaothan Bori village upto point A near Gaothan Ukhali, which adjoins a pucca road going from Mehkar to Sonari. It is in depth and its width cannot be extended unless soil on both sides is excavated extensively at heavy costs. The proposed new road is from point B to point C adjoining that very pucca road going towards Sonari. It is 40 feet in width, shorter in distance and is needed to meet the new requirement due to vehicular truck traffic for carrying sugarcane grown in the village to the new sugar factory situated on pucca road. Having regard to all this background, it does not appeal to us that there is no necessity to having another road for the villagers. 5. We now turn to the question of law of some importance raised in this petition viz. that necessary result of withdrawal of notification under section 6 is that the Government has withdrawn from the acquisition proceedings and hence notification under section 4 also stands automatically withdrawn with the result no second notification under section 6 can be issued without fresh notification under section 4. Our attention was invited to the case of (State of Madhya Pradesh others v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma and others)1, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1593 in support of the proposition. The background of the said decision is that for erection of an iron and steel plant, notification under section 4 was issued for several lands in a village. Our attention was invited to the case of (State of Madhya Pradesh others v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma and others)1, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1593 in support of the proposition. The background of the said decision is that for erection of an iron and steel plant, notification under section 4 was issued for several lands in a village. The Government thereafter issued several successive notifications under section 6 in respect of the part of the Property covered under section 4 notification and question arose whether instead of one notification, such successive notifications were permissible under section 6 as it then stood. It is observed: "There is nothing in sections 4, 5-A and 6 to suggest that section 4(1) is a kind of reservoir from which the Government may from time to time draw out land and make declarations with respect to it successively. If that was the intention behind sections 4, 5-A and 6 we would have found some indication of it in the language used therein. But as we read these three sections together we can only find that the scheme is that section 4 specifies the locality, then there may be survey and drawing of maps of the land and the consideration whether the land is adapted for the purpose for which it has to be acquired, followed by objections and making up of its mind by the Government what particular land our of that locality it needs. This is followed by a declaration under section 6 specifying the particular land needed and that in our opinion completes the process and the notification under section 4(1) cannot be further used thereafter. At the stage of section 4 the land is not particularise but only the locality is mentioned; at the stage of section 6 the land in the locality is particularised and thereafter it seems to us that the notification under section 4(1) having served its purpose exhausts itself. The sequence of events from a notification to the intention of acquire (section 4(1) to the declaration under section 6 unmistakably leads one to the reasonable conclusion that when once a declaration under section 6 particularising the area out of the area in the locality specified in the notification under section 4(1) is issued the remaining non-particularised area stands automatically released. In effect the scheme of these three sections is that there should be first a notification under section 4(1) followed by one notification under section 6 after the Government has made up its mind which land out of the locality it requires." The other decision to which our attention was drawn is the case of (Ajitsingh v. State of Maharashtra others)2, A.I.R. 1972 Bombay 177. In that case no individual notice of notification under section 4 was issued, the land owner learnt about acquisition proceedings only when notice under section 9 was received as a result he could not raise objection as contemplated under section 5-A. This Court not only quashed notification under section 6 for want of notice but on the basis of Vishnu Prasad Sharma quashed even notification under section 4, holding: "These observations have been made by Supreme Court in a case which concerns issuance of successive notifications from time to time under section 6 based upon the same notification under section 4. The judgment is, therefore, of necessity concerning such a state of facts. In the case before us, only one notification under section 6 was issued based upon the notification under section 4. We have held the notification under section 6 to be invalid but the above observations made by the Supreme Court in respect of successive notifications under section 6 do, in our opinion, apply with equal force to the facts as existing in the case before us because the reasoning and the ratio appearing in this judgment of the Supreme Court can apply to the facts before us. Even an invalid notification under section 6 would exhaust the efficacy of the notification under section 4 on which it is based. We, therefore, uphold the petitioner's contention and hold and declare that as the notification under section 6 had in fact been issued, though it has been held by us to be invalid, the efficacy of the notification under section 4 has been exhausted had no second or further notification can be issued on the basis of the said notification under section 4. We, however, want to make one thing clear. The notification under section 6 relates to lands other than the land of the petitioner with which this petition is concerned. We, however, want to make one thing clear. The notification under section 6 relates to lands other than the land of the petitioner with which this petition is concerned. Our judgment and declaration is confined only to the land of the petitioner and our judgment and declaration in no way relates to or concerns the other lands mentioned in the said notification under section 4." 6. Trust it is, Ajitsingh does support the case of the petitioner. It is a Division Bench decision and is normally binding on us. But it appears to us and we say this with great respect that the said decision is rendered per incurium. Neither the changes brought about in section 6 by Act 13 of 1967 nor the case of (Girdharilal Amratlal Shedan and others v. State of Gujarat others)3, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1408 dealing with the subject directly, were brought to the notice of the learned Judges. Section 6 after the amendment now specifically permits successive notifications from time to time under section 6 in respect of different parcels of land covered the notification under section 4, Girdharilal holds: "Counsel for the appellants next submitted that on issuing the notification dated July 18, 1961 the power of the State Government to issue a notification under section 6 was exhausted and the Government could not issue a fresh notification under section 6. There is no substance in this contention. The notification dated July 18, 1961 was invalid. By the issue of this notification, the Government had not effectively exercised its power under section 6. In the circumstances, the Government could well issue the fresh notification under section 6, dated August 14, 1964." Thus, the contention that cancellation of notification under section 6 amounts to withdrawal from acquisition and no fresh notification under section 6 can be legally issued in the absence of fresh notification under section 4 has been squarely rejected. The factual background of Girdharilal bears close similarity with the background of the case at hand as well as that of Ajitsingh. It will not be out of place to mention that the two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Girdharilal as well as Vishnu Prasad were common. Under these circumstances, reference to Full Bench is uncalled for. The factual background of Girdharilal bears close similarity with the background of the case at hand as well as that of Ajitsingh. It will not be out of place to mention that the two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Girdharilal as well as Vishnu Prasad were common. Under these circumstances, reference to Full Bench is uncalled for. It is uncalled for also because subsequent to rendering of judgment in Ajitsingh, Supreme Court has dealt with the subject and the ratio of Vishnu Prasad Sharma over again. In (State of Gujarat v. Musamigan Imam Haider Bux Razvi)4, 1976(3) S.C.C. 536 , question arose whether withdrawal of notification under section 6 realising that it is invalid does not preclude the Government from issuing fresh notification under section 6 without issuing fresh notification under section 4. When reliance was placed on Vishnu Prasad by land owners to sustain a challenge to validity of new notification under section 6 without issuance of fresh notification under section 4, the ratio of that decision was distinguished observing: "No help can be derived by the contesting respondents from the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma which turned on another point. In that case after the issue of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act, a number of notifications in respect of different items of land included in the locality specified in the notification under section 4(1) of the Act were issued under section 6." The view in Musamigam Imam Haider Bux Razvi is reiterated in the case of the (State of Gujarat v. Bhogilal Keshaolal)5, 1980(1) S.C.C. 308 . 7. In our judgment thus Ajitsingh stands impliedly over ruled and the following legal position emerges. Cancellation of notification under section 6 realising that it is defective does not amount to withdrawal of the Government from acquisition proceedings as contemplated under section 48 of the L.A. Act. It only means, the Government had not effectively exercised its powers under section 6. By proper and effective fresh exercise, new notification can be issued under that very section and law does not require its support by fresh notification under section 4. Earlier, section 4 still remains valid and is not exhausted because its purpose cannot be fulfilled but by a valid notification under section 6. 8. By proper and effective fresh exercise, new notification can be issued under that very section and law does not require its support by fresh notification under section 4. Earlier, section 4 still remains valid and is not exhausted because its purpose cannot be fulfilled but by a valid notification under section 6. 8. Under the circumstances, petition allowed partly and Rule made absolute to the extent of no land covered by second section 4 notification can be acquired unless due procedure contemplated under the L.A. Act is followed. The respondents are restrained from interfering with the possession of those lands unless and until notification under section 6 is issued after following the due procedure. Challenge to the acquisition of land covered by first notification under section 4, however, fails on merits as well as on point of law. Rule accordingly. No order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----