JUDGMENT - D.N. MEHTA, J.:---The petitioner herein Mrs. Milan Kalidas Raikar has filed this Writ Petition praying for a writ of habeas corpus in respect of her husband Kalidas Kashinath Raikar and impugning the order of detention dated 9-6-1986 under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (No. 52 of 1974), hereinafter referred to as "the COFEPOSA Act", as also the Declaration dated 11-7-1986 issued under section 9(1) of the said Act. 2. The Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu issued an order of detention dated 9-5-1986 against the said Kalidas Kashinath Raikar, hereinafter referred to as "the Detenu" detaining him in the Central Jail, Aguada, with a view to preventing him from abetting the smuggling of goods and also with a view to preventing him from engaging in transporting smuggled goods. This order was served on the detenu on 26-6-1986. Inasmuch as detenu was well-conversant with the English language, no translations were furnished to him. 3. The Additional Secretary to the Government of India issued a Declaration under section 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act against the detenu as he was of the view that the detenu was likely to abet the smuggling of goods into and through the coast of Goa which was an area highly vulnerable to smuggling and was likely to engage to transporting smuggled goods in Patim and Mapusa which also was an area highly vulnerable to smuggling. The Declaration was served on the detenu on 19-7-1986. 4. Mr. Karmali, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the detenu submitted that the order of detention dated 9-6-1986 passed by the Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu was without any basis in fact and for that reason the order was defective. Mr. Karmali pointed out that the order of detention had been passed by the Detaining Authority with a view to preventing the detenu from abetting the smuggling of goods. This ground would fall within the purview of section 3(1)(ii) of the COFEPOSA Act. The second purpose for which the order of detention was passed was to prevent the detenu from engaging in transporting smuggled goods. This purpose would fall within the purview of section 3(1)(ii) of the COFEPOSA Act. Mr. This ground would fall within the purview of section 3(1)(ii) of the COFEPOSA Act. The second purpose for which the order of detention was passed was to prevent the detenu from engaging in transporting smuggled goods. This purpose would fall within the purview of section 3(1)(ii) of the COFEPOSA Act. Mr. Karmali took us in minute details through the grounds dated 9-6-1986 furnished by the Detaining Authority and submitted that the grounds did not disclose that the detenu had abetted the smuggling of goods. 5. Mr. Karmali secondly submitted that even if this Court came to the conclusion that the detenu had abetted the smuggling of goods, it could not be said that the detenu had engaged himself in transporting smuggled goods and on that ground also the order of detention was bad. 6. Mr. Bhobe, the learned Public Prosecutor for the respondents has taken us through the statements of various persons recorded by the Customs Officers under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) and submitted that there was sufficient basis to come to the conclusion that the detenu had abetted the smuggling of goods. 7. With regard to the second ground urged by Mr. Karmali, Mr. Bhobe submitted that it was true that in the grounds it was not mentioned that prior to the incident in question the detenu had engaged himself in transporting smuggled goods. However, there was sufficient evidence to show that prior to the date of the incident, which was on the night between 17-2-1986 and 18-2-1986, the detenu had made clandestine and surreptitious effects to arrange for transporting smuggled goods and had thereby engaged in smuggling the contraband. Mr. Bhobe contended that the impugned order of detention did not suffer from any defect and, therefore, the Court ought to uphold the said order as also the detention of the detenu. 8. We shall now consider two submissions made by Mr. Karmali. 9. On a perusal of the grounds furnished to the detenu which span over 29 typed pages, it appears that on the night between 17-2-1986 and 18-2-1986 the Prevention Officers of Marmugao Customs House received certain secret information that smuggled foreign goods had been imported at Calvim, Goa, and thereafter had been removed by trucks to Mapusa and Honda and from thereon were destined for Bombay. The detenu was the owner of a motor truck bearing No. GDS 6619 and on the night when the contraband was smuggled this truck was used for transporting it from Calvim to Mapusa. The said truck was traced by the Custom Officers at Mapusa fish market on 19-2-1986. It also appears from the grounds that at the time when the goods were loaded from the shore into the truck, the detenu was present and supervised the loading and left the place after the loading operation had been completed. On these facts, the Detaining Authority came to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the detenu for the purpose of preventing him from abetting the smuggling of goods and also with a view to preventing him from engaging in transporting smuggled goods. 10. According to Mr. Karmali, from a recital of the above facts culled out from the grounds of detention furnished by the Detaining Authority, it could not be stated that the Detenu had abetted the smuggling of goods Mr. Karmali contended that from the facts stated heretofore, the most that could be stated was that the detenu had transported smuggled goods. Mr. Karmali submitted that the smuggled goods had been brought by an Arab dhow which had come close to the coast of Goa but had not touched the coast of Goa. The smuggled goods had been transhipped from the Arab dhow to the barges and thereafter the contraband had been landed at Calvim. Mr. Karmali argued that the act of smuggling had taken place at mid-sea and no sooner had the contraband goods been transhipped from the Arab dhow to the barges, the smuggling activity had come to an end. If the smuggling activity had come to an end, then it could not be said that the Detenu had abetted the smuggling. Hence, according to Mr. Karmali, the ground on which the order of detention was based was defective and disclosed non-application of mind. 11. Now, with regard to Mr. Karmali's submission that the smuggling of the contraband took place at mid-sea at the time when the smuggled goods were transhipped from the Arab dhow to the barges, we are unable to accept this argument. Karmali, the ground on which the order of detention was based was defective and disclosed non-application of mind. 11. Now, with regard to Mr. Karmali's submission that the smuggling of the contraband took place at mid-sea at the time when the smuggled goods were transhipped from the Arab dhow to the barges, we are unable to accept this argument. The word "smuggling" has been defined under Clause (39) of section 2 of the Customs Act, 1962, where it is stated :- "2 (39) "smuggling", in relation to any goods, means any act or omission which will render such goods liable to confiscation under section 111 or section 113." section 111 has Clauses (a) to (p). We are however, concerned with only the first three i.e., Clauses (a), (b) and (c). Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 111 of the Customs Act are in the following terms:- "111. The following goods brought from a place outside India shall be liable to confiscation:--- (a) any goods imported by sea or air which are unloaded or attempted to be unloaded at any place other than a customs port or customs airport appointed under Clause (a) of section 7 for the unloading of such goods; (b) any goods imported by land or inland water through any route other than e route specified in a notification issued under Clause (c) of section 7 for the import of such goods; (c) any dutiable or prohibited goods brought into any bay, gulf, creek or tidal river for the purpose of being landed at a place other than a customs port." Therefore, any goods could be said to have been smuggled when they were imported by sea or air and unloaded or attempted to be unloaded at any place other than a customs port or customs airport and further when the goods were smuggled into any bay, gulf, creek or tidal river for the purpose of being landed at a place other than a customs port. 12. We are, therefore, of the view that the goods were smuggled when they were landed on the shore of Calvim and it could not be stated that the smuggling activity ended at mid-sea at the time when the goods were transhipped from the Arab dhow to the barges. Mr. 12. We are, therefore, of the view that the goods were smuggled when they were landed on the shore of Calvim and it could not be stated that the smuggling activity ended at mid-sea at the time when the goods were transhipped from the Arab dhow to the barges. Mr. Karmali appears to be justified in his submission that the further act of placing the contraband or loading them in trucks would not be smuggling but would be transporting the goods for its onward journey. The smuggling activity came to an end no sooner the goods were landed on the shore at Patim. Mr. Karmali is, therefore, justified in his submission that it could not be stated that the detenu had abetted the smuggling of goods. The detenu could be said to have transported the smuggled goods in the motor truck belonging to him. 13. Mr. Bhobe has taken us through the statements of various persons recorded by the Customs Officers under section 108 of the Customs Act. Mr. Bhobe firstly drew our attention to the statement of Sadguru Rama Parab appearing in para 12 of the grounds wherein he had stated :- "..........at about 1.30 a.m. on 18-2-86 they all noticed the trawlers with contraband goods passing by; that immediately they proceeded in the Fiat car to the landing point at Patim; that the packages of contraband goods brought by the fishing travellers, 'Sri Ram' and 'Bhil Manjeri' were unloaded on shore at Patim, which were further transported away in trucks No. GDS-6527 and GDS-6619 (belonging to the detenu); that he is aware that the packages of contraband goods transported in truck GDS-6527 were finally stored in the Panchayat farm and that the same were handed over in the custody of Shri Krishnarao A. Rane; that he has seen you (detenu) present at the site of landing at Patim; that he had engaged the services of Shri Gajanan Chodankar for conveying messages and also to take him to various places on hired motorcycle in connection with the said landing of contraband goods........................................." 14. Mr. Mr. Bhobe then drew our attention to an extract from the statement of one Sunil Sanvalaram Natekar in which the said Natekar stated :- "that packages of contraband goods unloaded from fishing trawler 'Bhil Manjeri' and the remaining packages from 'Sri Ram' were loaded in the truck GDS-6619; that arrangements of transport of both the trucks i.e. GDS-6527 operated by Shri Dilip Swar and truck No. GDS-5619 owned by you (detenu) was done by him with the help of Shri Nana Marathe of Pernem..............." 15. Mr. Bhobe then relied on the statement of one Shri Dilip Swar who stated :- "that on Sunil Natekar's request he (Swar) along with Sunil Natekar had met Shri Kalidas Raikar (detenu) on 14-2-1986 at the latter's residence at Nachinol and told him that he had given his truck for the job to Sunil Natekar and that he can give his truck also for the same (purpose); that on his (Swar's) word you had agreed to provide your truck for transportation of smuggled goods.........." 16. Finally, Mr. Bhobe relied on the statement of the detenu himself recorded by the Customs Officer under section 108 of the Customs Act wherein it was stated by the detenu that he was the owner of the truck bearing No. GDS-6619; that he knew a person by name Nana Marathe of Pernem who requested the detenu to give his truck on hire to transport smuggled goods for which job he would get Rs. 5000/- and that accordingly, he (the detenu) had given necessary instructions to his Driver Tukaram Mandrekar to go with Nana Marathe; that Marathe came to the detenu's house on 18-2-1986 at about 2.30 A.M. and took his truck No. GDS-6619 which was driven by Tukaram Mandrekar who told the detenu that he was taking the truck to Patim where the loading was to be carried out; that soon after the truck had left, the detenu followed the same on his scooter KLE-2245; that the contraband goods were brought in two fishing trawlers; that the detenu saw the goods being loaded in truck GDS-6527 at Patim; that among the persons present at Patim were Sadguru Rama Parab, Nana Marathe, Narahari Halankar and the detenu; that at Patim the detenu supervised the loading of contraband goods in his truck GDS-6619; that after the loading of the truck was completed, the Detenu, returned home that as per the arrangements, the detenu instructed his Driver Tukaram Mandrekar to take the truck of contraband goods to the petrol-pump at Dhuler, Mapusa, and park it over there close to the petrol pump. 17. From these statements, Mr. Bhobe argued that it became apparent that the detenu was not only engaged in transporting the smuggled goods but was actually present at Patim/Calvim where they were landed and, therefore, it could be said that the Detenu had abetted the smuggling of goods. 18. Now it appears to us that on a reading of all the 37 grounds furnished to the detenu, it becomes apparent that the services of the detenu had been requisitioned only for the purpose of the truck owned by him which was to be used for transporting the contraband from the shore to Mapusa. It is correct that the detenu was present at Patim, but that was only for the purpose of supervising the loading of the contraband goods into his truck. Mr. Karmali was, therefore, correct when he submitted that the detenu was concerned only with transporting of the smuggled goods and it could not be stated that the detenu had abetted the smuggling of goods. We are, therefore, of the view that the first ground on which the Detaining Authority had based the order of detention was not supported by the facts taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority. 19. With regard to the second submission of Mr. We are, therefore, of the view that the first ground on which the Detaining Authority had based the order of detention was not supported by the facts taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority. 19. With regard to the second submission of Mr. Karmali that the Detaining Authority was in error in stating that the Detenu was engaged in transporting smuggled goods, the submission in based on good grounds. On a perusal of the grounds furnished by the Detaining Authority to the detenu, it becomes clear that the first and only time the detenu had permitted his truck to be used for transporting contraband goods was on the night of 17/18-2-1986. No previous or subsequent instances have been cited or referred to. It is pertinent to point out that under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, five categories have been set out under which the Detaining Authority could base its order of detention. The said five categories are :- "(i) smuggling goods, or (ii) abetting the smuggling of goods, or (iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or (iv) dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or (v) harbouring persons engaging in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods." 20. It is significant that in the first two categories the word "engaged" has not been used, but the word has been used only in categories (iii), (iv) and (v). The word "engaging" is a word of substantial import or significance and it conveys that the person was occupied or employed in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. To our mind, a stray incident of transporting or concealing or keeping would not justify the Detaining Authority basing its order under Clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. The word "engaged" conveys a consistent pattern or course of conduct and does not embrace within its purview a stray incident. This was the view which we had taken in Criminal Writ Petition No. 13 of 1986 (Smt. Shashikala Krishnarao Rane v. The Union of India others)1, decided on 3-10-1986. The word "engaged" conveys a consistent pattern or course of conduct and does not embrace within its purview a stray incident. This was the view which we had taken in Criminal Writ Petition No. 13 of 1986 (Smt. Shashikala Krishnarao Rane v. The Union of India others)1, decided on 3-10-1986. We find support for our view in a judgment of a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of (R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka)2, reported in 1980 Cri.L.J. 165 wherein Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "This takes us to the third contention urged for the petitioner that the order of detention was not in conformity with Clause (iii) of sub-section (1). The order just provides that "with a view to preventing him from keeping smuggled goods." It was urged that the Detaining Authority has not stated that the detention was necessary with a view to prevent the detenu from engaging in keeping smuggled goods. It seems to us that there is a good deal of substance in this contention. Clause (iii) could be invoked only to prevent a person from engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. The Detaining Authority must be satisfied that it is necessary to prevent a person from engaging in such objectionable activities. The meaning of the word "engage" as found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is "hold fast (attention), employ busily". There is thus a lot of difference between the activities of just "keeping" and "engage in keeping" and the Detaining Authority obviously has not applied its mind." We are, therefore, of the view that the grounds submitted by the Detaining Authority to the detenu discloses only a stray incident of transporting of smuggled goods. The grounds do not convey, even impliedly, that the detenu was engaged in transporting i.e., engaged in a consistent pattern of conduct of transporting smuggled goods. We, therefore, accept the submission of Mr. Karmali that the second part on which the detention order has been based also does not find support in the facts which the Detaining Authority took into its consideration. We are of the view that both the grounds, on which the order of detention is based, do not find support in the facts or documents which were placed before the Detaining Authority and hence, the order of detention is vitiated and must be struck down. 21. We are of the view that both the grounds, on which the order of detention is based, do not find support in the facts or documents which were placed before the Detaining Authority and hence, the order of detention is vitiated and must be struck down. 21. We, therefore, find that this is a fit case where the order of detention ought to be set aside and the detenu freed. 22. There will, therefore, be a writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of the detenu. The order of detention dated 9-6-1986 and the consequent declaration dated 11-7-1986 are hereby set aside. Order accordingly. -----