H. I. AGRAWAL, C. J. ( 1 ) IN this application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the question that falls for our consideration is as to whether the nature of dispute between the parties could be said to be a dispute "touching the business of a Co-operative Society" within the meaning of Section 68 (1) of the Orissa Cooperative societies Act, 1962 (shortly stated, "the Act" ). ( 2 ) THE relevant facts, briefly stated, are these : the petitioner was working as Head Clerk in the Dodsworth Khaliikote co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. (O. P. No. 1) (to be referred to as "the Society")which was registered under the Act. The petitioner was put under suspension on 16-1-1972. In the meantime, the Board of Directors of the Society was superseded by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Berhampur Division, and thereafter his services were terminated on 31-3-1973 by the Administrator as a disciplinary measure. Ultimately, this led to an industrial dispute and a reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal by its award dated 20-12-1976 answered the reference in favour of the petitioner and ordered for reinstatement of the petitioner with full back wages. ( 3 ) THE petitioner submitted his joining report to the Administrator on 4-7-1977 in terms of the award, but it was not accepted. The petitioner was also not paid his back wages. At this stage, under Section 72 (1) of the Act a winding up order dated 27-7-1977 was passed against the Society on the ground of losses and Liquidator was appointed to take charge of the Society. Since the petitioner had been paid only Rs. 1,517. 92 towards his subsistence allowance, and nothing for the period from 16-1-1972 to 28-7-1977, i. e. , the date on which the Liquidator took charge, he filed a case before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa, (O. P. No. 2) under Section 33c (2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, claiming rs. 14,257. 64 as arrear dues. 1,517. 92 towards his subsistence allowance, and nothing for the period from 16-1-1972 to 28-7-1977, i. e. , the date on which the Liquidator took charge, he filed a case before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa, (O. P. No. 2) under Section 33c (2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, claiming rs. 14,257. 64 as arrear dues. The opposite party-Society did not dispute this claim but raised the question of maintainability of the proceeding before the labour Court on the ground that in the absence of leave of the Registrar as required under Section 121 (2) of the Act, the proceeding was not maintainable, opposite party No. 2 held that since the petitioner instituted the proceeding long after the appointment of the Liquidator without leave of the Registrar, the same was hit by Section 121 (2) read with Explanation I to Section 68 of the Act, as, according to O. P. No. 2, the amount due to the petitioner under the award would be one touching the business of the Society. The petitioner has, therefore, come up with the present writ petition to quash the impugned order dated 19-1-1978 (vide Annexure-1) passed by the Labour Court. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that O. P. No. 2 has completely misdirected himself in applying the provision of Section 121 (2) of the Act which has no application to the facts of the case. ( 4 ) SECTION 121 of the Act provides a bar of jurisdiction of Courts. Subsection (2) thereof deals with the situation where the Society is being wound up and it reads thus :"121. (2) While a Society is being wound up, no suit or other legal proceedings relating to the business of such Society shall be proceeded with, or instituted against, the liquidator as such or against the Society or and member thereof, except by leave of the Registrar and subject to such terms as he may impose. "the expression "relating to the business of such Society brings us to the provision of Section 68. For our purpose, the relevant provision is only sub-section (1)and the First Explanation, which reads as follows :"68. "the expression "relating to the business of such Society brings us to the provision of Section 68. For our purpose, the relevant provision is only sub-section (1)and the First Explanation, which reads as follows :"68. Dispute which may be referred to arbitration.----- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for thet ime being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, management the business of a Society, other than a dispute regarding the disciplinary action taken by a society of its committee against a paid servant of the Society and any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of an apex Society, shall be referred to the Registrar if the parties thereto are among the following, namely : (a) the Society, its committee, past committee, any past or present officer, any past or present agent, any past or present servant or the nominee, heir or legal representative of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the Society or the liquidator of the Society ; or (b) a member, past member or a person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member of the Society or of a Society which is a member of the Society ; or (c) a surety of a member, past member or a deceased member whether such surety is or is not a member of the Society ; or (d) any other Society or the liquidator of such Society. Explanation I-A. Claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a surety by or to a person or Society or a liquidator mentioned in sub-section (a) to (d) shall be a dispute touching the business of the Society within the meaning of this section, even in case such claim is admitted and the only point in issue is the ability to pay and the manner of enforcement of payment. "the question raised before us is no longer res integra and has fallen for decision in several cases before various High Courts including our own. The earlier decisions in point of time which were cited are Deccan Merchants Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Dalichand Jugra Jain and Ors. [ air 1969 SC 1320 ] and Co-operative central Bank Ltd. and On. v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal [ air 1970 SC 245 ]. In the first case Deccan Merchants Co-op. Bank Lid. v. M/s. Dalichand jugra Jain and Ors. Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Dalichand Jugra Jain and Ors. [ air 1969 SC 1320 ] and Co-operative central Bank Ltd. and On. v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal [ air 1970 SC 245 ]. In the first case Deccan Merchants Co-op. Bank Lid. v. M/s. Dalichand jugra Jain and Ors. (supra), before the Supreme Court, the main point was whether the dispute could be referred by the Registrar for arbitration under sub-section (1)of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. It was contended that the dispute which related to title and recovery of possession of the premises by eviction of the occupiers was not within the purview of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Act and that the reference by the Registrar was, therefore, incompetent. The Supreme Court observed :". . . WE can hardly imagine that it was the intention of the Legislature to deprive tenants in buildings owned by Co-operative Societies of the benefits given by the Rent Act. It seems to us that the Act was passed, in the main, to shorten litigation, lessen its costs and to provide a summary procedure for the determination of the disputes relating to the internal management of the Society. But under the rent Act a different social objective is intended to be achieved and for achieving that social objective it is necessary that a dispute between the landlord and the tenant should be dealt with by the Courts set up under the Rent Act and in accordance with the Special provisions of the Rent Act. This social objective does not impinge on the objective underlying the Act. It seems to us that the two Acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Act, should apply. . . "in Co-operative Central Bank's case (supra), a dispute having arisen between certain Co-operative Central Banks in the State of Andhra Pradesh and their workmen, a reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal. An objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the ground that under Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, the dispute was to be referred for decision to the Registrar. The Tribunal and the High Court rejected the objection of the Banks to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. An objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the ground that under Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, the dispute was to be referred for decision to the Registrar. The Tribunal and the High Court rejected the objection of the Banks to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court following their earlier dictum in Deccan Merchants case (supra) said :"one other limitation on the word 'dispute' may also be placed and that is that the word 'dispute' covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee. . . . . . . . . "and held :". . . . . . . . . WE must proceed on the basis that Section 61 of the Act requires reference of a dispute to the Registrar only if the dispute is capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee, and further the dispute between the Co-operative Society and the employee touches the business of the Society in the sense explained by this Court in that case. "the Court further held :"it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service of the workman employed by the Society cannot be held to be a dispute touching the business of the Society. . . . . . . . . " ( 5 ) FOLLOWING the above decisions and the principles enunciated in these two decisions and also referring to some other authorities of different High Courts, a Bench of this Court in the case of the Workmen of the Orissa Police Co-operative syndicate v. State of Orissa and Ors. [ (1982) 53 CLT 279 (Ori)] categorically laid down that an industrial dispute does not come within the purview of the disputes contemplated by Section 68 of the Act. ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH in view of the above decisions which clinch the issue it does not appear very much necessary to refer to any other decision, since some other authorities were also cited and the matter is of frequent occurrence, I would refer to some of them. Kailasam, J. (As he then was ). in the case of Kasturbanagar Co-op. House construction Society v. K. Soundarajan and Anr. Kailasam, J. (As he then was ). in the case of Kasturbanagar Co-op. House construction Society v. K. Soundarajan and Anr. [ air 1968 Mad 67 ] dealing with an analogous provision of the Madras Act held that the provision of the co-operative Societies Act was limited and related only to such dispute touching the business and arising between the Society and its servant. And a claim for retrenchment compensation by a retrenched employee of the Society is no doubt a dispute between the Society and its servant, but at the same time it is not a dispute touching the business of the registered Society. Industrial disputes, such as, retrenchment compensation, gratuity, etc. , are not contemplated within the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act. Such disputes are governed by the industrial Disputes Act which provide a special machinery to decide them. Similar is the view expressed by a Division Beach of the Patna High Court in the case of Bihar State Co-op. Marketing Union Ltd. v. The Registrar, co-op. Societirs, Bihar and Anr. [ air 1974 Pat 77 ] to which I was also a party. Dealing with the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935, containing almost parallel provisions, it was held that dispute in relation to the service conditions of the servant employed by a Society could not be held to be a dispute touching the business of the Society. This decision was followed by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Umakant Pal and Ors. v. Banchanidhi swain and Anr. [1986 Lab. IC 288]. ( 7 ) FROM the above discussion I would hold that the expression 'business' has not been used as understood in common parlance. It has been used rather in a narrow sense and is referable to actual trading and business activities by the society. Sub-section (1) of Section 68 itself provides a key for this view where some disputes, such as "dispute regarding the disciplinary action taken by a society or its Committee against a paid servant of the Society and any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of an apex Society" will not be covered under the pale of Section 68. The nature of the dispute between the petitioner and the opposite party is one based on the award of the Industrial Tribunal relating to the petitioner's service matters, i. e. , his reinstatement, payment of his wages, etc. , and it cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the Society. Rather, the award has come into existence only on account of the disciplinary action taken by the society against the petitioner which has already been exempted from the purview of arbitration under sub-section (1) of Section 68. It has, therefore, to be resolved under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act itself. A dispute of this nature, i. e. , between a Co-operative Society and its own workmen, cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of a Co-operative Society as it does not relate to the actual business of the Society and thus is not capable of being resolved by the Registrar. ( 8 ) NO decision taking a contrary view was cited on behalf of the opposite parties, nor any submission was made which could detract me from following the principle enunciated in the above decisions and take a different view in the matter. ( 9 ) FROM the above discussion, the inevitable result that follows is that the writ application must succeed. It is accordingly allowed and the order of the labour Court in Annexure-1 is hereby quashed. It is held that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's application in question and decide the same on merits. The matter, therefore, has to go back to opposite party No. 2 for disposal of the petitioner's application on merits in accordance with law. ( 10 ) SINCE the petitioner has suffered long on account of the wrong attitude taken by opposite party No. 2 in spite of authoritative decisions of the Supreme court and various other High Courts, I award costs to the petitioner. Hearing fee is, however, assessed at Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred fifty) only. K. P. Mohapatra, J. I agree. Writ application allowed. .