JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against an order passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting an application filed by the Petitioner who is the landlord of the accommodation in dispute u/s 21(1) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as well as the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge dismissing his appeal against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. 2. The appeal filed by the Petitioner has been dismissed on a preliminary ground without going into the merits of the controversies arising in the case. The learned Additional District Judge has held the Petitioner's application to be barred by the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act on the ground that a period of three years had not elapsed since the date of the purchase of the building under tenancy by the Petitioner. 3. The relevant facts are that the Petitioner who is admittedly the landlord and owner of the building under tenancy purchased the same from its previous owner under a registered sale deed dated October 24, 1977. The present application was filed u/s 21(1) on March 20, 1978. The allegations on which the application was founded are these. The building under tenancy was purchased by the applicant on October 24, 1977 from its previous owner for his own use and occupation. The applicant had no other accommodation available anywhere except the building under tenancy of the Respondent No. 3. The condition of the building under tenancy was poor and dangerously dilapidated. Indeed the building has reached a stage of decay that unless reconstructed it will come down on its own. The applicant required the accommodation for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction and if the building is not demolished it will not only come down any time but may also result in damage to neighboring properties. The necessity of the applicant for demolition and reconstruction of the house was such that it did not brook any further delay. 4. It is alleged that the Petitioner also fulfilled the requirements of Rule 17 of the aforesaid Rules framed under the Act. 5. The application was contested by the Respondent No. 3, the tenant, on a variety of grounds. 4. It is alleged that the Petitioner also fulfilled the requirements of Rule 17 of the aforesaid Rules framed under the Act. 5. The application was contested by the Respondent No. 3, the tenant, on a variety of grounds. It was disputed that the building was either in a dilapidated condition or the same was required for being demolished and reconstructed for personal need of the landlord. 6. The Prescribed Authority considered the material on record and allowed the application directing the release of the building in favour of the Petitioner. In the penultimate paragraph of the order he also observed that the building was required by the landlord for his personal occupation after demolition and reconstruction. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the tenant filed an appeal which has been allowed on the grounds mentioned above. 8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the first proviso to Section 21 which places an embargo on the right of the landlord to file an application until after the expiry of three years from the date of purchase of the property was not attracted to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the application was in pith and substance clearly covered by Clause (b) of Section 21(1). That being so, the appellate court committed a patent error of law and jurisdiction in throwing out the claim of the Petitioner on the preliminary ground mentioned above. 9. Counsel for the tenant, on the other band, submitted that the case set up by the Petitioner clearly fell within the purview of clause va) also of Section 21(1). That being so the first proviso to Section 21(1) was attracted and the appellate court rightly allowed the appeal. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties I am clearly of the opinion that the appellate court went wrong in dismissing the Petitioner's application as barred by the first proviso to Section 21(1) Section 21(1) insofar as it is relevant for the purposes of the present case, provides ; 21. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties I am clearly of the opinion that the appellate court went wrong in dismissing the Petitioner's application as barred by the first proviso to Section 21(1) Section 21(1) insofar as it is relevant for the purposes of the present case, provides ; 21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.-(1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely- (a) That the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust for the objects of the trust; (b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction ; Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in Clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such acquisition and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years. 11. An analysis of the Clauses (a) and (b) clearly leads to the conclusion that where a landlord applies for an order of eviction of a tenant on the ground that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction the case will be squarely covered by Clause (b). Where, on the other hand, the application of the landlord is founded on the assertion that the building is required for the personal occupation of the landlord whether in its existing form or after demolition and new construction, the case will be covered by Clause (a) of Section 21(1). Where, on the other hand, the application of the landlord is founded on the assertion that the building is required for the personal occupation of the landlord whether in its existing form or after demolition and new construction, the case will be covered by Clause (a) of Section 21(1). A building may be required for personal occupation by the landlord after demolition and new construction even if it may not be in a dilapidated condition The landlord may simply require the building for his personal occupation in whatever condition it may be, whether in its existing form or after demolition and new construction. But where the landlord comes to the court with a specific case that the existing building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction the case will be covered by Clause (b). 12. From a perusal of the averments made in the application filed by the Petitioner in the present case, there is no manner of doubt that the case is squarely covered by Clause (b). The emphasis in the application is on the fact that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is immediately required for demolition and new construction. The claim of the landlord that he needs the building for his personal occupation takes only a secondary place. 13. In any case, whether the application is covered by Clause (a) also or not, the fact remains that the Petitioner's application also falls within the purview of Clause (b). His claim under the latter clause hence could not be thrown out as barred by the first proviso. Only his claim under Clause (a) cannot be considered being barred by that proviso. It is also apparent that if the Petitioner's claim under Clause 2 (b) is allowed, the same shall be subject to Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act. 14. The order passed by the appellate court is hence liable to be quashed. The application of the Petitioner shall be treated and disposed of as one falling under Clause (b) of Section 21(1). 15. Learned Counsel for the tenant also submitted that this is a case which cannot be tried by the Prescribed Authority as it involves determination of (sic) questions of title. The application of the Petitioner shall be treated and disposed of as one falling under Clause (b) of Section 21(1). 15. Learned Counsel for the tenant also submitted that this is a case which cannot be tried by the Prescribed Authority as it involves determination of (sic) questions of title. I am expressing no opinion on this controversy as the entire matter will be at large before the appellate court which will consider and determine all the issues which may be arising in the case. 16. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, dated January 14, 1982 is quashed. The learned Additional District Judge, Badaun, will now dispose of the appeal filed by the tenant afresh according to law having regard to the observations made in this judgment. Costs shall, however, be easy.