Judgment R. N. Thakur, P. B. Prasad, JJ. 1. The sole appellant has been convicted under Sec.302 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution case as stated by PW 7 is that in the night of 16-8-1976 at about 11 p. m. there was some scuffle and quarrel in between P. W.7 and her husband deceased Razaque due to some domestic affairs. At that very time this appellant along with his father and mother came there and they started throwing the articles belonging to the informant and the deceased articles belonging to the informant and the deceased. Deceased Razaque objected on which it is said that nooruddin father of this appellant and his wife Khaliqun Nisha caught hold of hand of the deceased and this appellant gave a dagger blow in the abdomen of the deceased. The deceased fell down and became unconscious. Thereafter the deceased was taken to the hospital where he was operated upon and then the deceased came to his sense. 3. On 17-8-1976 on receipt of O. D, slip, P. W.8 who was Police Officer attached to Chapra town Police Station came to the hospital in the morning, He found the deceased unconscious, therefore, recorded the statement of Mina who is P. W.7 and her statement is Ext.2 on the basis of which formal MR was recorded and a case was instituted. It is further said that in course of investigation the deceased made a dying declaration on 19-7-1976 at 2.20 pm which is ext.5 and was recorded by P. W.9. Subsequently on 23-7-1976 the deceased razaque died in the hospital itself. 4. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against this appellant as well as his parents. 5. In the trying court 9 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution and one witness was examined on behalf of the appellant to prove his age, the appellant denied the allegation. 6. The learned trying court after considering the entire evidence acquitted both the parents of the appellant and convicted the appellant under Sec.302 of the Indian Penal Code as stated above. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the learned trying court did not appreciate the evidence properly and, therefore, came to the wrong conclusion. 6. The learned trying court after considering the entire evidence acquitted both the parents of the appellant and convicted the appellant under Sec.302 of the Indian Penal Code as stated above. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the learned trying court did not appreciate the evidence properly and, therefore, came to the wrong conclusion. He should not have relied upon the dying declaration which does not contain the signature of the deceased. He has also argued that on the date of occurrence the appellant was minor one. Therefore, the trial is not in accordance with the law under the Children Act. 8. The fact that deceased Razaque died is not controverted or disputed. Besides oral evidence, there is medical evidence of P. W.5 as well from which it will appear that there was injury on his person and he died out of that. Now the important question that comes for consideration is whether this appellant caused the said injury. 9. Out of 9 witnesses, P. Ws.1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are eye-witnesses but p. Ws.1, 2, 3 have not supported the prosecution version. Therefore, they were declared hostile and were cross-examined by the prosecution. PW 6 has not been relied upon by the trying court for the reason that he has not stated the facts which he had not stated before the investigating officer. Thus, there remains the evidence of P. Ws, 4 and 7 only to support the prosecution case. As stated above p. W.7 is the informant who is non-else than the wife of the deceased. PW.4 is not named in the First Information Report. According to the evidence of the witnesses including the informant their articles were thrown out in the angan from the room and blood had fallen from the injury. But the investigating officer p. W.8, says that he did not find any article or any blood at the place of occurrence. The learned trying court has met this point by saying that PW 8 visited the place of occurrence next morning, therefore, by that time these things might have been removed by the appellant. This explanation of the trying court is not reasonable and cannot be accepted, as there is no positive legal evidence in support of this explanation. 10. The learned trying court has met this point by saying that PW 8 visited the place of occurrence next morning, therefore, by that time these things might have been removed by the appellant. This explanation of the trying court is not reasonable and cannot be accepted, as there is no positive legal evidence in support of this explanation. 10. As regards dying declaration is concerned, P. W.9 who recorded the dying declaration has admitted that Ext.5 does not contain the signature of the deponent. P. W.7 admits that she was present when the statement of the deceased was being recorded by the magistrate. The magistrate has said in the court that the Doctor was not present at the time when the statement of the deceased was being recorded. But there is nothing on Ext.5 to indicate that the Doctor was not available in the hospital. In that view of the matter specially when it does not contain the signature of the deponent it will not be safe to rely on this piece of document. According to Ext.5 the deceased was given three dagger blow by this appellant which is neither the case in the F. I. R. nor in the court. 11. As stated above P. W.4 is not named in the FIR and the evidence of p. Ws.4 and 7 is not corroborated by the objective finding of the investigating officer. 12. In view of all these it does not appear to be safe to hold the appellant guilty as the evidence does not appear above board. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to get benefit of doubt in the facts and circumstances appearing in the case. As the appeal succeeds on merit itself we need not discuss the point raised by the appellant that the appellant was minor at the time of commission of offence. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the State has lastly argued that the case should be remanded back. The occurrence took place in the year 1976 and this appeal is being disposed of in the year 1986 alter 10 years. The quality of the evidence we have already issused above. In that view of the matter, no useful purpose will be served in remanding the case even if we hold that the case is fit to be remanded on the question of minority. 14. In the result the appeal is allowed. The quality of the evidence we have already issused above. In that view of the matter, no useful purpose will be served in remanding the case even if we hold that the case is fit to be remanded on the question of minority. 14. In the result the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence passed by the trying court is set aside. The appellant is discharged from the bail bonds. Appeal allowed.