Judgment B.D. Agrawal, J. 1. M/s. Amrit Banaspati Company Limited is a Company registered under the Companies Act engaged in the manufacture of Banaspati oil at Ghaziabad. The trade effluent is discharged by the Company through Darsna drain/sewer. On March 27, 1981, the Company applied for the consent to the State of U. P. for the Prevention and Control and Water Pollution under section 26 read with section 25 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Inspection was made and the report submitted on June 8, 1981. On July 7, 1981, the Board gave consent valid for period of one year commencing from April 1, 1981. This was communicated to the Company under the covering letter dated July 9, 1981, which specified :- "1. A time bound programme for treating the trade/domestic effluent for the installation of the complete treatment unit may please be submitted to this Board within a month from the date of receipt of this letter. The treatment works have to be placed in such a manner so that they are completed in all respect by March, 1982 as stipulated under consent condition No. 11 of the enclosed consent order. 2. PLEASE submit the composition details of the trade/domestic effluents for all these parameters which have been given in item No. 22 of the consent seeking application. Pending to the clarifications of the above replies, the consent order is hereby enclosed. The replies of the above paras may please be submitted within one month from the date of receipt of this letter". 2. Letter dated September 7, 1981, was issued by the Technical Officer, Board, to the Company insisting upon the due compliance to the conditions incorporated in the consent order and asking for a detailed report showing the progress made in this respect within the 10th day of each month. On April 1, 1982, it appears, the Company applied to the Board seeking consent to the discharge of the effluent; the application was received on April 7, 1982, and the consent asked for was declined by order passed on August 2, 1982. On April 1, 1982, it appears, the Company applied to the Board seeking consent to the discharge of the effluent; the application was received on April 7, 1982, and the consent asked for was declined by order passed on August 2, 1982. On March 7, 1983, the Regional Officer, Board, wrote to the Company complaining that the requisite steps to stop the pollution had not been taken and that a time bound programme must be submitted r,n this respect and this was followed by the complaint filed on December 6, 1983,, in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad. The Chief Judicial Magistrate recorded the statement of Surya Nath Pandey, Legal Assistant, Board, and passed the impugned order thereafter on December 14, 1983, whereunder the accused have been summoned for offence under section 44 of the Act. 3. LEARNED counsel for the applicants has raised the following contentions directed against the impugned order :- I- the allegations contained in the complaint or the material placed before the court below do not disclose the required ingredients to proceed under section 47 read with section 44 of the Act ; II- there is no previous sanction of the Board as contemplated under section 49 (1) of the Act to call for cognizance of the offence being taken against the accused applicants ; III- the application for consent made by the Company is not disposed of yet by the Board or an officer duly authorised in this behalf within the meaning of Section 12 (2) of the Act and hence no offence can be said to be committed; and IV- the provisions introduced under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) (Amendment) Act, 1978 (Central Act 47 of 1978) are inapplicable in relation to this State. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Taking up the contention No. I first it will be noticed that the Act has, for its object, provision for the prevention and control of water pollution and the maintaining or restoring of wholesomeness of water. The State Board is constituted under section 4. Section 25 provides for restrictions on new outlets and new discharges, laying down that no person shall, without the previous consent of the State Board, bring into use any Dew or altered outlet for the discharge of sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well. The State Board is constituted under section 4. Section 25 provides for restrictions on new outlets and new discharges, laying down that no person shall, without the previous consent of the State Board, bring into use any Dew or altered outlet for the discharge of sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well. The provision made in Section 26 is for the existing discharge of sewage of trade effluent and for consent in that connection. The requirement for consent of the Board laid down in Section 25 is attracted as well to the case of existing discharge of sewage or trade effluent provided for under section 26. Contravention of the provisions of Sections 25 or 26 is punishable under section 44 with imprisonment for a term not less than six months but which may extend to six years and with fine. Section 49 (1) lays down that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act except on a complaint made by, or with previous sanction in writing of the State Board, and no court inferior to that of a Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under the Act. Section 47, which is material, reads as follows :- 47. Offences by companies.-"(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was incharge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of, the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly : Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence w as committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offense. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly." 5. UPON reference to the complaint it will appear that it is directed against the Company and 15 other persons. It is relevant to reproduce the material averments made in the complaint concerning the criminal liability of the accused persons. These are to be found contained in paragraphs 16 to 19 of the complaint, which read as under :- "16. That the accused persons from 2 to 14 are Partners, Directors and the Manager of M/s. Amrit Banaspati Ghaziabad as mentioned in this complaint who are incharge of day to day business of Company and are responsible for not obtaining the consent of Board and for the treatment of their highly polluting trade effluent so as to conform to the standard laid down by the Board. The accused persons are deliberately avoiding to abide the provisions of sections 24 and 25 read with section 26 of the Act for which they are punishable respectively under sections 43 and 44 of the 'Act' far which not only the company but its directors, partners and managers and all other responsible officers of the accused company responsible for the conduct of its business are also liable in accordance with the provisions of sec. 47 of the 'Act'. 17. That all the partners, directors and managers of the company are responsible for continuous commissioning of offence under section 44 of this 'Act' because the formalities for obtaining consent under Act and the constructions of effluent treatment plant can be taken up only when these senior partners of the Company resolve to do so offence mentioned in the complaint is being continuously committed against the society at large, animals and aquatic life in particular because of their personal monetary gains. It is therefore prayed that all the directors and manager of the company should be summoned and punished according to law, 18. It is therefore prayed that all the directors and manager of the company should be summoned and punished according to law, 18. That in ascertaining the responsibility of the directors and partners of the company a natural test to be applied and tried by this Hon'ble Court is as to who could be benefitted by delaying or avoiding the construction of the effluent treatment plant and by not applying for consent. The second relevant test is as to who are these person or persons who will decide that consent under section 25/26 should be obtained or not and treatment plant should be constructed or should not be constructed. It is respectfully submitted that the directors and partners of the company are the persons responsible for this act and therefore they are liable to be proceeded against according to law. 19. That all the, directors and partners of the factory are liable for the offence being committed by the factory as the formalities for obtaining consent under the provisions of the Act such as construction of proper treatment plant etc. are policy matter and cannot be taken up in hand without the direction of the high dignities of the factory. Thus all the members of the Boards of directors of M/s. Amrit Banaspati Company Limited factory alongwith others are liable for the offence committed under section 44 by not obtaining the consent of the Board as required by section 25/26 of the Act." 6. UNDER section 47 (1) reproduced above where the offence is committed by a Company the liability is of every person who at the relevant time was incharge of and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company as well as the Company. The proviso to sub-section (1) Contains an exception depending upon proof that the offence was committed without the knowledge of such person or that he exercised due diligence to prevent the commission thereof. Sub-section (2) is overriding containing the non-obstante clause and provides, inter alia, that the director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company shall also be liable if it is proved that the offence was committed with his consent or connivance or attributed to any negligence on his part. These are thus material ingredients required to be looked into where the offence alleged is against the Company. These are thus material ingredients required to be looked into where the offence alleged is against the Company. Provision corresponding to this contained in other acts has received judicial interpretation from time to time. In R. K. Khandelwal v. State, 1964 AWR 436 a learned single Judge observed in the context of section 277 Drugs Act, 1940 :- " There can be directors who merely lay down the policy and are not concerned with the day to day working of the Company. Consequently, the mere fact that the accused person is a partner or director of the Company, shall not make him criminally liable for the offences committed by the Company unless the other ingreiients are established which make him criminally liable." This was dealt with by the Supreme Court in connection with Section 23C of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, in Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D. N. Mehta, AIR 1971 SC 2162 . It was observed in relation to Section 23C (1) (corresponding to Section on 47 (1) of the Act) that the provision is highly penal as it makes a person who was incharge and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business vicariously liable for an offence committed by the Company. Therefore, in accordance with well settled principles this section should be construed strictly. Their Lordships dealt with the interpretation to be placed on the expression 'a person incharge and responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the company in sub-section (i) and observed :- "6. What then does the expression "a person incharge and responsible for the conduct of the affairs of a company mean' ? it will be noticed that the word 'company' includes a firm or other association, and the same test must apply to a director-in-charge and a partner of a firm in-charge of a business. It seems to us that in the context a person 'incharge' must mean that a person should be in over all control of the day to day business of the company or firm. This inference follows from the wording of Section 23C (2). 7. It mentions director, who may be a party to the policy being followed by a company and yet not be incharge of the business of the company. Further it mentions manager, who usually is in charge of the business but not in overall-charge. This inference follows from the wording of Section 23C (2). 7. It mentions director, who may be a party to the policy being followed by a company and yet not be incharge of the business of the company. Further it mentions manager, who usually is in charge of the business but not in overall-charge. Similarly the other officers may be incharge of only some part of business" The view taken in 1964 AWR 436 (supra) was approved. 7. IN State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand, 1981 AWC 295 the question arose in relation to Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, concerning a firm which is also a company as per definition including in Section 47 we are concerned with. Their Lordships cited with approval the earlier view expressed in Girdhari Lal Gupta (supra) and laid down that the partner of a firm is also liable to be convicted for an offence committed by the firm if he was incharge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm or if it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any neglect on the part of the concerned partner. IN Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, AIR 1983 SC 67 the case arose from offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Respondent no. 1 was the manager of the Company and respondents 2 to 5 were the directors of the company, including the company. The main clause of the complaint in that case was to the effect:- "That the accused no. 3 is the Manager of accused no. 2 and accused nos.4 to 7 are the Directors of accused no. 2 and as such they were incharge of and responsible for the conduct of business of accused no. 2 at the time of sample " 8. THE Magistrate therein summoned all the respondents for being tried for violating the provisions of the Adulteration Act. Their Lordships laid down guideliness for purposes of adjudicating on applications made under section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure and observed that the proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. Their Lordships laid down guideliness for purposes of adjudicating on applications made under section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure and observed that the proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. THE test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or substracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of the powers under section 482. In paragraph 15 of the reported decision it was stated :- "So far as the Manager is concerned, we are satisfied that from the very nature of his duties it can be safely inferred that he would undoubtedly be vicariously liable for the offence; vicarious liability being an incident of an offence under the Act. So far as the Directors are concerned, there is not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed by the Directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. In these circumstances, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the argument of the High Court that no case against the Directors (accused nos.4 to 7) has been made out ex facie on the allegations made in the complaint and the proceedings against them were rightly quashed." For purposes of Section 47 (1) of the Act to be invoked the Court has to consider prima facie whether there are allegations Contending that the person accused in the complaint was incharge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. The word 'and' is significant denoting, as it does as conjunction, that both these factors of the person concerned being over all incharge of and responsible to the company have to co-exist (see also M. R. Sherwani v. State, 1967 AWR 17; Manmohan v. State of U. P., 1975 ALJ 10. The Hoard of Directors may lay down the policy, but that does not make them over all incharge of the company's affairs. The Hoard of Directors may lay down the policy, but that does not make them over all incharge of the company's affairs. A Director may be the party to a policy being laid down and followed by a company but he may not be incharge of the business of the company. Manager is normally incharge of the business no doubt but he may not be in over all charge thereof. The unfortunate feature of the present case is that as will appear from paragraphs 16 to 19 of the complaint reproduced above, the partners, directors and the manager have been clubbed together without at all realising that no vicarious liability may be fixed under the Act in this manner. There is absolutely no specification nor any line of demarcation. For all the partners (it is not known how may there be partner in the company as the present), Directors and the Manager the uniform averment made in [paragraph 16 is that they are incharge of it to do business of the company and are responsible for not obtaining sanction of the Board. In paragraph 17 it is repeated over again that all the partners, Directors and Manager are responsible for continuous commission of offence under section 44. In paragraph 19 the averment is that these are policy matters, which cannot be taken up without the Director of high dignities of the company. In substance none of the accused arrayed as nos.2 to 14 is specified as being in over all incharge of the business of the company nor is the responsibility referred apart from saying that the policy has to be laid by the 'Directors and partners of the factory'. These averments do not specify or rarrate what is required to be done necessarily to attract sub-section (1) of Section 47. 9. NOR do we find in these averments the allegations to attract sub-section (2) of Section 4''. I put it specifically to the respondents' learned counsel to point me out the factors required by section 47 (2) from the complaint. There was inability on his part evidently since the averments are aimed at subsection (1) of Section 47 alone though intact they fall even to fulfil the requirement under that sub-section In paragraph 16 it is found stated that the accused persons are deliberately avoiding to abide by the provisions of sections 25/26 of the Act. There was inability on his part evidently since the averments are aimed at subsection (1) of Section 47 alone though intact they fall even to fulfil the requirement under that sub-section In paragraph 16 it is found stated that the accused persons are deliberately avoiding to abide by the provisions of sections 25/26 of the Act. The prayer made is for all the Directors and Manager of the Company being summoned without any allegation specifically to denote consent or connivance or neglect on their part individually. No such specification is found contained in the statement recorded of the Law Assistant under section 200 of the Code either. The statement is dated 6th December, 1983 and the only relevant sentence in this respect contained in this statement is to the effect that the consent was refused on August 2, 1982, and thereafter there was no effort made on the part of the Industry to obtain the consent. This clearly is inapplicable to fasten vicarious liability upon the Company's officers. My attention was drawn also to the authorisation given by the Board on October 31, 1983 to the member/Secretary for making application under section 33 (1) of the Act. Section 33 (1) contemplates that if the Board apprehends that the water is likely to be polluted by reason of the disposal of any matter therein the Board may apply to a Court for restraining the person who is likely to cause such pollution and from so causing. In this authorisation too there is no apportionment of vicarious liability and all that is said is that the Industry and the entire Board of Directors, Manager and others responsible for the business of the company are indictable under sections 43/44 of the Act. In this too as in the complaint, therefore, there is no apparent application of mind on behalf of the Board to crux oF the matter for invoking section 47. Looking into the Contents appearing from the complaint, referred to above, the learned counsel found it difficult to maintain that there is in them the requisite element of consent, connivance or neglect on the part of a particular Director, Manager or other Officers of the Company as such required for the purpose of section 47 (2) of the Act. 10. IN the impugned order the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate did not consider this material aspect of the matter in its correct perspective. 10. IN the impugned order the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate did not consider this material aspect of the matter in its correct perspective. It is observed that inspection was carried out on November 23, 1983, when it came to notice that polluted effluent continues to be discharged without the consent of the Board and that accused nos.2 to 14 are responsible for this because the application for the purpose came to be moved when the "Partners or Directors" resolved that the consent of the Board be obtained. There is no finding nor an observation to the effect that these accused persons are in over all charge of business of the company nor it is said that any one of them and if so, who has been negligent or as to with whose consent or connivance the contravention of the Act continues. In K. N Modi v. State of U. P., 1984 AWC 726 which also arose from the prosecution initiated under the: Act, a learned Single Judge found that there was no averment in the complaint about the person, who at the time the offence was committed was incharge of and was responsible for the business of the company. The filing of the complaint as against 11 persons without knowing the number and attempting to do so could not be sustained. In paragraph 15 of the reported decision, the observation made is : "To bring sub-section 2 of Section 47 into operation, it was necessary for the complainant to have asserted that this offence had been committed by the directors with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any neglect on their part. The complaint does not disclose anywhere that the offence for which the complaint had been lodged had been committed with the consent or connivance of the directors or the same was attributable to any neglect on their part. If individual employees have committed any offence, without the knowledge of the company, there is no reason why the company or its directors should be made an accused." 11. If individual employees have committed any offence, without the knowledge of the company, there is no reason why the company or its directors should be made an accused." 11. RELIANCE was placed also on the decision of the Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. I. K. Nargia, AIR 1979 SC 1977 arising from a similar provision made in section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in which the Supreme Court remarked that in such a case it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the offence [has been committed with the consent or connivance or is attributable to any neglect on the part of such person. An unreported decision of another Single Judge in M/s. Ansal Papers v. State of U. P., (Cr. Misc. Application No. 3277 of 1984 decided on May 24, 1985) cited for the respondents proceeded on the interpretation of the allegations contained in the complaint giving rise to that application and it is submitted with respect that the decision does not take into consideration the consistent view of the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of the provisions corresponding to section 47 of the Act. 12. IN regard to contention no. 2, the submission for the applicants is that in according sanction to the initiation of the prosecution, the Board did not apply its mind to the vital issue concerning the individual criminal liability of the directors, managers and other officers; For the respondents it was argued that this is a case initiated upon a complaint made by the Board itself and hence no question of according prior sanction by the Board to the initiation of the prosecution arose. Section 49 (1) of the Act lays down, so far as material, that no court shall ake cognizance of any offence under this Act except on a complaint made by or with previous sanction in writing of the State Board. If, therefore, this be a case of complaint made by the Board itself, no question of previous sanction would arise. The proceeding before the Chief Judicial 1 Magistrate was initiated by a complaint wherein the complainant figures as the (sic) through the legal assistant. It is also signed by the legal assistant for and on behalf of the Board. If, therefore, this be a case of complaint made by the Board itself, no question of previous sanction would arise. The proceeding before the Chief Judicial 1 Magistrate was initiated by a complaint wherein the complainant figures as the (sic) through the legal assistant. It is also signed by the legal assistant for and on behalf of the Board. IN paragraph 25 referred to for the applicant it is recited no doubt that the Board has decided to launch prosecution against the company for not obtaining the consent of the Board under section 25 read with section 26 of the Act and that for this Sri S. N. Pandey had been empowered to file a complaint on behalf of the Board. This should not be taken to mean, in my view, that the complaint is not by the Board but by an Officer instead under the delegated authority conferred by the Board. The Board has after all to function through certain officers who constitute its limbs and we have consequently to look into the substance rather than the form in which the proceedings were initiated. On the practical side moreover this make little difference because irrespective of whether this is considered a previous sanction accorded by the Board or a complaint filed by the Board itself on 6th of December, 1963, the relevant averments to attract section 47 as against the accused nos.2 to 14 are not to be found contained therein as has been discerned upon the analysis made in the above. Regarding contention no. 3, it was urged for the applicants that consent of the Boad was sought in writing on April 1, 1982 which was received in the office of the Board on 7th of April, 1982, but there has been no decision taken thereupon by the Board so far and hence the application for the purpose be deemed to be pending. Since the application for consent is pending still, it is added, there may not be said to be a contravention made of the relevant provisions by the company or its officers. This overlooks that the consent asked for on April t/7, 1982 was refused by order dated August 2, 1982. The order Issued is under the signature of the Member/Secretary. Since the application for consent is pending still, it is added, there may not be said to be a contravention made of the relevant provisions by the company or its officers. This overlooks that the consent asked for on April t/7, 1982 was refused by order dated August 2, 1982. The order Issued is under the signature of the Member/Secretary. The submission before me is that there is no authority delegated to the Member/ Secretary to pass order according or refusing consent on application mace under sections 25/26 of the Act. Section 12 (2) lays down that the Member/Secretary shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be prescribed or as may from time to time be delegated to him by the Board or its Chairman. Along with the supplementary counter-affidavit filed in this court the respondent (sic) delegation made by the Board in favour of the Member/Secretary thereby authorising him to make orders such as are necessary and required upon under Sections 25/26 of the Act. It is argued that the respondents do not give the date when this delegation was made by the Board, and, if it is subsequent to August 2, 1982, it can be of no avail. This would be a matter for the trial Court to probe; into. Prima facie there is the order declining consent to the impugned discharge of trade effluent of the company in the manner prayed for, it is upto the Magistrate to consider upon evidence if this refusal is ineffective in law. 13. LEARNED counsel for the applicants) urged also that the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) (Amendment) Act, 1978 (Central Act 44 of 1978) is inapplicable in relation to this State. In the parent Act as will appear from sections 25 and 26, the restriction placed is on discharge of sewage or trade effluents into a stream or well. The expression stream is defined in section 2 j of the Act. In the parent Act as will appear from sections 25 and 26, the restriction placed is on discharge of sewage or trade effluents into a stream or well. The expression stream is defined in section 2 j of the Act. By sections 12 and 13 of the Amendment Act of 1978 the words ' sewer or on land ' have been added meaning thereby that ever since the amendment Act coming into force on December 12, 1978 the restraint extends also to the discharge of sewage or trade effluents into a sewer or on the land, besides the stream or the well covered under the provisions of the parent Act itself The words 'seven' is also defined under the Amendment Act by the addition of clause (gg) of section 2 of the parent Act as amounting any conduit pipe or channel, open or closed, carrying sewage or trade effluent. The contention for the applicant has; been that since the discharge impugned in the instant case is into the Dasna drain/sewer, this may be impeached unless it was shown that the Amendment Act of 1978 is applicable in relation to this State. In the State List Entry 17 is to the effect : "Water, that is to say, water supplier, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, water storage and water power subject to the provisions of Entry 56 of List. I". Entry 56 of the Union List reads as under : "Regulation and development of hater-State rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest." 14. CERTAIN State Legislatures, it appears, resolved that the matter forming the subject matter of the parent Act be regulated in those States by the Parliament by law. The Parliament passed the Act-Central Act 6 of 1974 accordingly which became applicable to the States the legislature whereof had passed such resolution. This came into force on March 23, 1974 in those various States (not including U. P.) and the Union territory. It is not in dispute that in the U. P. the Legislative Assembly resolved to adopt the parent Act on August 6, 1974 ; a resolution to the same effect was passed by the Legislative Council on 7th August, 1974. This came into force on March 23, 1974 in those various States (not including U. P.) and the Union territory. It is not in dispute that in the U. P. the Legislative Assembly resolved to adopt the parent Act on August 6, 1974 ; a resolution to the same effect was passed by the Legislative Council on 7th August, 1974. The Act, therefore, consequently became applicable to this State in consequence of the adoption thus made. vide Article 252 (1) of the Constitution. Subsequently the parent Act was amended, as mentioned above, by the Central Act 44 of 1978. The Amendment Act came into force on 12th December, 1978. The preamble thereof recites : "Whereas, in pursuance of clause,1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, had been passed by Parliament ; And whereas from the practical experience gained in the working of the aforesaid Act it is considered necessary to make certain amendments thereto ; And whereas, in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution read with clause (2) thereof, resolutions have been passed by the Legislative Assemblies of the States of Assam, Haryana, and West Bengal to the effect that the said Act should be amended by an Act of Parliament for the purpose hereinafter appearing." 15. THE contention for the applicants before me is that the Amendment Act 44 of 1978 has not been adopted in (this State-since it is argued that there was no resolution passed by the State Legislature in the matter on or after 12th December, 1978. On 12th of May, 1978, the Legislative Council and on August 30, 1978 the Legislative Assembly had resolved. No doubt, as submitted for the respondents, that the principal Act be amended, but then the question remains whether the Amendment Act passed by the Parliament was keeping in view the resolution passed by the legislature of this State. In the preamble reproduced above, there is reference to the Legislative Assemblies of the States of, Assam, Haryana and West Bengal, but significantly there is no reference so far Uttar Pradesh is concerned. From the preamble, therefore, it is not reflected that the Amendment Act. as passed by the Parliament acting on the resolution of the Houses of the Legislature of this Slate as well. From the preamble, therefore, it is not reflected that the Amendment Act. as passed by the Parliament acting on the resolution of the Houses of the Legislature of this Slate as well. Article 252 (2) of the Constitution envisages that any Act passed by Parliament under clause (1) may be amended or repealed by an Act of Parliament passed or adopted in like manner but shall not, as respects any State to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act or the Legislature of that State. THE manner laid down in clause (1) is that if the legislatures of two or more states resolved that the matter be regulated in such States by Parliament by law, it shall be lawful for Parliament to pass such an act for regulating that matter accordingly. This appears necessarily to contemplate an Act passed by the Parliament on such resolutions passed by the Legislatures of the States. In the absence of any such indication, it may not be assumed that the Parliament has passed the Act, acting on the resolution of the concerned State Legislature. THE State Legislature is empowered undoubtedly under clause (2) to adopt an Amendment Act, which the Parliament has passed in relation to other State acting under clause (1) but that would require necessarily, a resolution of both Houses of the Legislature subsequent to the Amending Act coming into force. No such resolution of the State Legislature, U. P. passed after 12th December, 1978, has been brought to the notice of this Court. THE contention of the counsel for the applicants on this score is that without force, but I do not feel it necessary to express final opinion on this aspect the reason being that according to the respondents' complaint the Company's trade effluents are being discharged into a stream which is covered under section 2 j) of the parent Act itself. It is argued in this connection that in the: complaint the averment is that the discharge is in stream through Dasna drain/sewer which is a stream as defined in sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act and also that in it application which the Company made for consent of the Board, the amendment made is that the discharge is done into a stream described as Dasna drain. In face of these averments even if it were assumed that the; Central (Amendment) Act, 1978, has so far not become applicable to this State (which indeed is a serious matter for the State Government to consider in order that the salutory object of this beneficial legislation is not defeated), in so far as the facts hereof prima facie are concerned, the prosecution against the Company does not get vitiated on this account. 16. AGAINST the impugned order made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the applicants have filed an application under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure and also a revision both of which were heard together. The question arising also is which of these two proceedings may lie in the facts and circumstances of the case. In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 the police had submitted final report under section 173 of the Code after investigation. The Judicial Magistrate accepted the report ; a revision against this order was dismissed by the Sessions Judge. The informant, thereafter, lodged complaint ; the trial Magistrate dismissed this as not disclosing a case to proceed with ; the Sessions Judge, however, accepted revision filed by the complainant ; summons were issued, thereafter, to the accused by the Magistrate. The High Court dismissed the revision filed by the accused (in limine) being of the view that the order was interlocutory. It is in the light of these ' peculiar facts ' of that case that the Supreme Court held that the order summoning the accused was not an interlocutory order but a matter of moment which decided an important aspect of the trial. This was reaffirmed by their Lordships in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharastra, 1978 AWC 96 SC. 17. IN the case of Madhu Limaye (Supra), the appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground chiefly that the allegations made by him against Sri Antuley were in relation to what he had done in his personal capacity and not on his capacity of discharging his functions as a Minister. This, in other words, was not a ground directed against the controversy upon its merits ; it was instead a ground going to the root of the matter but not founded on the merits of the case. IN the event of the objection being sustained, the prosecution will undoubtedly have been concluded. This, in other words, was not a ground directed against the controversy upon its merits ; it was instead a ground going to the root of the matter but not founded on the merits of the case. IN the event of the objection being sustained, the prosecution will undoubtedly have been concluded. Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court placed the order framing charge against the accused under section 500 IPC in the category of an intermediate order neither interlocutory nor final. It was held that he test formulated by the Federal Court in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, AIR 1949 FC 1 could not be applied literally and it could not be held that such an order is interlocutory, merely because it is not final. Referring to Mohan Lal v. Magan Lal Thacker's case, AIR 1968 SC 733 the real point of distinction was noticed as under in the words of Shelat, J. : "As observed in Ramesh v. Gendalal Motilal Patni, AIR 1966 SC 1445 the finality of that order was not to be judged by co-relating that order with the controversy in the complaint viz. whether the appellant bad committed the offence charged against him therein. The fact that the controversy still remained alive is irreleven;." 18. IT is in this context that Untwalia, J. laid down in Madhu Limaye that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) ". This has not been regarded an authority for the proposition that framing of the charge is not an interlocutory order and that it is in every case an intermediate order as not to fall within the ambit of interlocutory order-see observations of Hon'ble Desai, J. in the concurring judgment in V. C. Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 962 at p. 1003. See also K. K. Sachdeva v. Rakesh Kumar Jain, 1983 AWC 632 . See also K. K. Sachdeva v. Rakesh Kumar Jain, 1983 AWC 632 . The order made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate is impugned in the present not on its merits alone i. e. on ground that there is no material to make out the ingredients required to implicate the accused nos.2 to 14, but also upon pleas going to the root of the matter, namely, that the Amending Act 44 of 1978 is inapplicable to this State and in consequence the insertion made in section 25/26 of the parent Act covering the discharge into a sewer is not attracted and further that there is no sanction of the Board granted within the meaning of section 49 (1) after the proceedings have initiated. The order summoning the accused may not in these circumstances be classed as a mere interlocutory order ; it is of matter of moment in the background of an important aspect of the trial. In my opinion, there fore, the revision lies against the impugned order and since the revision is maintainable which is a specific remedy provided under the Code, the application invoking the inherent jurisdiction is redundant. 19. FOR the discussion made in the above, the Criminal revision succeeds and is allowed in part accordingly. The application made under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure is dismissed. The Court below shall proceed according to law against the accused no. 1, the Company. If, however, the prosecution can, at any stage, produce evidence which satisfies the court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed, have also committed offence, the Court may take cognizance against them and try them along with the Company.