ORDER 1. By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the order dated 31-1-75 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Mainpuri in a revision under S. 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (for short the Act), filed by Hari Singh and others (respondent No. 2 etc), against the petitioner, which was allowed and the name of the petitioner was ordered to be expunged. 2. Shorn of details facts leading to the present petition are that plots in Khata Nos. 669 to 679 were recorded in the basic year in the name of contesting respondents and the petitioner filed an objection under S. 9-A(2) of the Act claiming co-tenancy rights alleging that she was the daughter of one Munnu alias Beni, who was co-tenant in this Khata along with the contesting respondents and on his death his widow Smt. Tulsa succeeded his interest and after her death the petitioner as daughter, succeeded as co-tenant. She claimed ? share. 3. The claim of the petitioner was contested by the contesting respondents 2 to 16, the other respondents, however, did not contest the claim. It was denied that the petitioner was the daughter of Munnu alias Beni, rather she was the daughter of Jai Lal and sister of Mithu Lal. 4. The Consolidation Officer decided the case in favour of the petitioner and the appeal by the contesting respondents was dismissed, whereas the revision filed by them was allowed by the impugned order. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation being an order of reversal he failed to set aside the finding recorded by the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and further the trial Court having special advantage of watching demeanour of witnesses, particularly how they responded to the questions put to them while in witness box and after considering it that the oral evidence was relied upon. Whereas the Deputy Director of Consolidation just criticising some portion of the statement, preferred not to rely upon them and has erred in rejecting the testimony of the P.Ws. in favour of the petitioner just on the ground that they appear to be interested or related to the petitioner. Whereas the Deputy Director of Consolidation just criticising some portion of the statement, preferred not to rely upon them and has erred in rejecting the testimony of the P.Ws. in favour of the petitioner just on the ground that they appear to be interested or related to the petitioner. He totally lost sight of the fact that in such situation where actually the petitioner wanted to prove that she was the daughter of Mannu alias Beni and Smt. Tulsa, in view of S. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, where the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person or the other and the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship of any person, who as a member of the family or otherwise has special means of knowledge on the subject, is relevant fact. Further the inability of the petitioner to tell about her age and age of her parents and other family members has been made a sheet anchor of the respondents' case and to disbelieve the petitioner on that account forgetting totally the enormous percentage of illiteracy and ignorance prevalent, particularly amongst ladies. Reliance was placed on Parasnath Rai v. Tileshra Kuer, 1965 All LJ 1080. Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622 , Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Naraini Bai, AIR 1983 SC 114 , Bhagwan Ram v. Prabhu Ram 1983 All LJ 637. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has correctly rejected the testimony of the P. Ws. and the findings recorded by him are findings of fact, that in view of S. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, the statement of witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioner to prove that she was the daughter of the last male tenant, has correctly been held to be inadmissible and that no ground for interference has been made out. He placed reliance on Dalgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra, AIR 1959 S.C. 914 , Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia, AIR 1984 SC 898 and Hari Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1020 . 7. He placed reliance on Dalgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra, AIR 1959 S.C. 914 , Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia, AIR 1984 SC 898 and Hari Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1020 . 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the moot point for consideration is that as to what should be the extent and standard of appreciation of oral evidence by the revisional Courts exercising appellate power when actually the statements of witnesses have been considered and relied upon in detail by the trial Court. In this connection suffice it to say that the trial Court has advantage of watching the demeanour of witnesses and that the appellate Court does not enjoy the advantage which the trial Court had in having witnesses before it and in observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. In such cases the general rule is that the findings of fact rendered by the trial Court should be permitted to prevail by the appellate Court unless it becomes apparent that some special feature of the evidence of a particular witness has escaped notice of the trial Court or that there is sufficient balance of improbability to disbelieve its opinion as to where the credibility lies. In the instant case the Deputy Director of Consolidation completely lost sight of these judicial principles and has erred in rejecting the testimony of the witnesses without recording any finding as to which special feature in the statement of witnesses has escaped attention of the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), (See AIR 1973 SC 2622 and AIR 1983 SC 114 ). 8. The next point for consideration is as to whether the statement of PWs could have been rejected just on the ground that they appear to be interested in the petitioner or they were her relations when actually the fact to be proved was whether the petitioner was daughter of the last male tenant or not. Ordinarily the findings recorded as to whether the petitioner was daughter of her father or the last male tenant, would be a finding of fact but where actually the finding of fact has been rendered completely losing sight of the relevant principles contained in the Indian Evidence Act whereby the statement of a witness is made admissible or inadmissible, such finding cannot be said to be finding of fact. It is well known principle that credibility of a witness is a question of fact whereas admissibility of a particular evidence is a question of law. In the instant case the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in rejecting the testimony on the ground that they were inadmissible under S. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. 9. Section 50, however, provides that where a Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another, the opinion expressed by conduct, as to the existence of such relationship of any person who, as a member of the family or otherwise, has special means of knowledge on the subject is a relevant fact. A bare reading of Section 50 makes it abundantly clear that in such situation where the relationship of one person to another has to be ascertained, the statement of those witnesses who have got special means of knowledge as a member of the family or otherwise would be relevant fact. The principles of relevancy has been discussed in the case of Dalgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra, AIR 1959 SC 914 (supra). In view of the principles explained in that case, the statements of all the petitioner's witnesses were relevant under the circumstances even though they might be related to the petitioner or closely acquainted to her. 10. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the finding rendered by the Dy. Director of Consolidation that the petitioner was not a daughter, is a finding of fact and in the exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution the same cannot be interfered with. To substantiate it he placed reliance on Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia, AIR 1984 SC 898 (supra) and Hari Singh v. State of U.Y. ( AIR 1984 SC 1020 (supra). The mistake has been committed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in holding that the statements of witnesses examined by the petitioner were irrelevant and inadmissible and further no reliance has been placed upon them as they appeared to be related, closely acquainted and interested with the petitioner. As pointed out earlier, I need not further emphasise, that the admissibility of a particular evidence is a question of law whereas oredibility of an evidence is a question of fact. As pointed out earlier, I need not further emphasise, that the admissibility of a particular evidence is a question of law whereas oredibility of an evidence is a question of fact. I am in respectful agreement with the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in these two cases but at the same time I am of the opinion that these observations are not relevant here inasmuch as the statement of PWs have been rejected and consequently a finding has been recorded and the mistake was committed about the admissibility and after carefully reading the entire judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation it becomes crystal clear that he did not make a judicial approach to the problem. 11. Now the last point for consideration is that (on page 2 of the certified copy of the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation and on page 33 of the paper book) the Deputy Director of Consolidation has assigned much importance to the mistake committed by the petitioner in mathematical logic about her age as compared to the age of her parents. Smt. Tulsa was her mother and the petitioner stated that Smt. Tulsa, if alive, would have been 50 to 60 years of age. She gave her own age as 50 years when examined on 19-11-69 and in view of these facts she would be a little less in age than her mother, hence it was inferred by Deputy Director of Consolidation that she cannot be the daughter of Smt. Tulsa. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has lost sight of the fact that looking to the disability, ignorance, illiteracy and a number of other deficiencies with which an Indian lady suffers, particularly in the rural areas, it is not proper to criticise and reject the statement of a person who has no sufficient knowledge about mathematics. Common knowledge goes that even well read person can commit mistakes if they have to enter the witness box and if they are called upon to recite about their own age as compared to the age of their parents and family relations and if all that is calculated, would lead to irresistible inference that they have committed blunders. Common knowledge goes that even well read person can commit mistakes if they have to enter the witness box and if they are called upon to recite about their own age as compared to the age of their parents and family relations and if all that is calculated, would lead to irresistible inference that they have committed blunders. I do not think, that in this regard, the social condition in the country side has much advanced and it is very rare to trace out illiterate and semi-literate witnesses hailing from rural areas, who could state true facts with mathematical exactitude. 12. In Bhagwan Baksh Singh v. Mahesh Baksh Singh, AIR 1935 PC 199 , their Lordships of the Privy Council were pleased to observe that "the evidence of Indian witness on the question of age is notoriously often very vague and unreliable and it is unsafe to base a finding on such evidence." Similar view was taken by other courts in the country. I am of the view that no such noticeable advancement has been made in rural areas in this regard so as to enable me to take a contrary view than what was taken as was evident by the observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council. 13. In the instant case the Deputy Director of Consolidation was exercising revisional power which was more comprehensive and conterminus with the appellate court and with special feature that the order passed by him was an order of reversal - A number of findings recorded by the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) have not been reversed by him. I am further of the view that the protection afforded by law to a pardanashin lady is not simply because she observed Parda but the fact is that she led a secluded life and suffers from a number of disabilities and hence law extends its protection to her. I am of the view that similar protection is available to pardanashin ladies, should be extended to all those persons who suffer from old age, infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy and mental deficiency (See also Parasnath Ram v. Tileshra Kuer, 1965 All LJ 1080) (supra). 14 In view of the discussions made herein-before, the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed. 15. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. 14 In view of the discussions made herein-before, the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed. 15. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 31-1-1975 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed and the case is remanded back to him for deciding it afresh in accordance with law and in the light of observations made above. There shall, however, no order as to costs.