Judgment :- 1. The appellants are the plaintiffs in a suit for declaration of title and recovery. The case of the plaintiffs is that the suit property originally belonged to two brothers by name Perumal and Koshy. They held this and other properties as tenants-in-common. Perumal died in 1948 possessed of his share in the properties and leaving Ext. A10 Will under which he devised the suit property, as per B schedule, to his grand daughter Mary who is the second plaintiff, the first plaintiff being Mary's mother. The properties in the A schedule were devised to his other grand daughter by name Ammini. He also bequeathed to his wife Annamma the right to enjoy the usufruct of the properties in A and B schedules during her life. On 30-1-1962 the surviving brother Koshy entered into an agreement with Ammini and Mary under which a physical partition between him of the one part and Ammini and Mary of the other part was effected in regard to all the properties held in common by the two brothers. Under that agreement the suit property, comprising 3 acres and 81 conts, was given absolutely to Mary, the second plaintiff. It is further stated by the plaintiffs that during 1952 the defendant-respondent was let into possession of the suit property as a tenant by the surviving brother Koshy and Perumal's wife Annamma. This is in effect admitted by the defendant in Ext. AS dated 31-5-1961, which is an application to fix fair rent under Act 4 of 1961, where he has stated that he has been holding the suit property as a tenant since 1952. The plaintiffs contend that, since the properties held in common by the two brothers came to be physically partitioned between Perumal's heirs and Koshy under Ext. B1 dated 30-1-1962, and since the defendant was let into possession of the suit property by Koshy together with Annamma, the latter having a mere limited interest to enjoy the usufructs during her life, the defendant can, if at all, only look to Koshy to the extent of his moiety, and the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the suit property which belongs to Mary absolutely. 2. The defendant contends that he is protected under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 by virtue of the lease granted to him in 1952. 2. The defendant contends that he is protected under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 by virtue of the lease granted to him in 1952. The claim of tenancy was referred by the trial court under S.125 (3). The Land Tribunal found, as a matter of fact, that the defendant was let into possession of the suit properly by Koshy and by the holder of a limited interest, namely, Annamma. This is what the Tribunal says: "Therefore it is very clear that the original lease was granted by the full owner and also by the limited owner jointly and there is no question of the lease being granted by a limited owner only." (emphasis supplied) The trial court dismissed the suit after incorporating the finding of the Tribunal. The lower appellate court confirmed that decree. The appellate court, however, disagreeing with the Tribunal, held: "There is also no evidence to show that the lease to the defendant was granted by the life-estate holder Annamma." So stating the plaintiff's prayer for recovery of possession was held to be unsustainable. 3. The question really is whether the defendant was put into possession of the suit property by Koshy and Annamma, (the latter having only a limited interest) as found by the Tribunal, and, if so, whether, subsequent to Ext. B1 agreement between Koshy and Perumal's successors, the defendant was entitled to claim fixity in regard to the suit property. 4. In this connection, l must refer to an argument sought to be developed at the bar on behalf of the defendant-respondent on the question of the defendant's status as a tenant prior to 1952. Relying upon certain observations of the trial court in O. S. No. 85 of 1963, counsel contends that the defendant was let into possession of the suit property in 1952 not by Annamma and Koshy, as found by the Tribunal, but by Perumal and Koshy. If this argument were to be accepted, the defendant would have a formidable case, for both Perumal and Koshy were tenants-in-common of all the properties including the suit property. 5. I have carefully gone through the judgment in O. S. No. 85 of 1963. There is nothing in that judgment which gives any indication of the person who granted the defendant any right in regard to the suit property. 5. I have carefully gone through the judgment in O. S. No. 85 of 1963. There is nothing in that judgment which gives any indication of the person who granted the defendant any right in regard to the suit property. All that that judgment says is that the defendant was right in his contention that since 1952 he has been a lessee of the property. In the present case it has been specifically pleaded by the plaintiffs that Perumal died in 1948 and that the defendant was put into possession of the suit property by Koshy and Annamma. The defendant has not questioned the correctness of the plaint averment that Perumal died in 1948. On the other hand he merely says that he does not know when Perumal died. If what is contended at the bar on behalf of the defendant that it was Perumal who let in the defendant as a tenant is right, it is indeed strange that the defendant did not know whether or not Perumal was dead in 1948 as stated by the plaintiffs. If Perumal died in 1948, the defendant can have no case that it was Perumal who granted him any right in 1952. The defendant has no case that he had any right in the suit property prior to 1952. PW1 is the husband of Mary. He has testified to the effect that Perumal died in 1948. He produced Ext. Al certificate, issued by the Vicar of Marthoma Church, Thuruthikadu, to the effect that Perumal was buried in the church cemetery on 26-7-1948. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be concluded that Perumal died in 1948 and tot subsequently. In the circumstances, the defendant became the lessee only under Koshy and Annamma. This conclusion is consistent with the Tribunal's finding. The lower appellate court had no evidence whatsoever to differ from that finding. The Tribunal's finding was based on the pleadings of the parties and the documents produced before it. In the circumstances, the lower appellate court erred in law in doubting the correctness of the plaint allegations regarding lease. 6. It is settled law that a co-owner cannot grant a lease so as to bind the other co-owners. As stated by the Privy Council in Byjnath v. Raomodean, (1874) 1 I.A. 106 (as quoted in A.I.R. 1926 Cal. In the circumstances, the lower appellate court erred in law in doubting the correctness of the plaint allegations regarding lease. 6. It is settled law that a co-owner cannot grant a lease so as to bind the other co-owners. As stated by the Privy Council in Byjnath v. Raomodean, (1874) 1 I.A. 106 (as quoted in A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 714 (F.B )): " A person taking an interest from persons who have an undivided interest in the properly takes subject to the rights of the other co-sharers who are not bound by the transaction, namely, that if the property comes to be partitioned, the rights of the other co-sharers not bound by the lease, as it is in the present case, would not be affected by the grant of the lease." In Woodfall's Law of Landlord and Tenant, it is stated: "...If one of two joint tenants made a lease of the whole, his moiety only would pass." "... Each tenant in common could at common law make a lease in respect of bis own share alone...." (Vol. I. Para.1-0130 and 1 0134). Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, 2nd Edn. says in Para.182: "As a general rule, no cotenant has, by virtue of the relation of cotenancy, any authority to bind bis companions in interest by any contract, whether relating to the joint property or otherwise. Therefore, neither can, in the absence of special authority so to do make a valid leasing of the moiety of his companions. " The rationale of this principle is what is stated in American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol. 20, Para.95: "Since there is, merely by reason of the existence of a cotenancy, no agency relationship between the con tenants ... one cotenant cannot ordinarily transfer or dispose of the interest of another cotenant in such manner as to be binding, unless duly authorised to do so" 7. There is no case and there is no evidence whatever that Koshy bad been authorised by Mary to grant any lease affecting her moiety. Ext. A10 shows that Annamma had no right in the suit property, apart from a life interest to enjoy usufructs. Annamma died in 1971. The defendant's claim of fixity is based on S.13 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. Ext. A10 shows that Annamma had no right in the suit property, apart from a life interest to enjoy usufructs. Annamma died in 1971. The defendant's claim of fixity is based on S.13 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. However, S.3(1) (vi) of that Act specifically provides that tenancies created by persons having only a life interest or other limited interest are excluded from the provisions of Chap.2 of the Act. The second proviso to that Section says: "Provided further that the provisions of this Chapter other than S.53 to 72S shall apply to tenancies falling under clauses (v) and (vi) so long as the mortgage or, as the case may be, the life interest or other limited interest subsists." Accordingly whatever right the defendant obtained by reason of the lease granted by Koshy and Annamma, his right in respect of the suit property, which was allotted absolutely to Mary, the second plaintiff under Ext. B1, terminated on the death of Annamma. The defendant, therefore, has no further right in regard to the suit property, although he may still be entitled to enforce his claim against Koshy or his successors to the limited extent of Koshy's moiety in the properties which he held in common with Perumal. 8. In the circumstances, the suit for declaration and recovery ought to have been decreed as prayed for. I set aside the decrees and judgments of the courts below, and decree the plaintiff's suit. The quantum of mesne profits, if any, to which the plaintiffs are entitled, shall be determined in the execution proceedings. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. In the circumstances of this case, I make no order as to costs.