JUDGMENT 1. - This is a Civil Misc. Appeal under Section 39(i)(iv) of the Arbitration Act against the order of learned Additional District Judge, Ajmer in civil case Ne. 60/71 (21 of 1972) setting aside the award given by the arbitrator. 2. A suit was filed by the plaintiff appellant against the respondents, in which an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was filed by the respondents. This application was accepted and the matter was referred to the arbitrator as mentioned in the high purchase agreement. This application was accepted on 28-2-1962. It is not very relevant to go into the details that an appeal was filed by the appellant against this order in this court, which was rejected and the application to grant leave was also dismissed. Thereafter the plaintiff appellant filed a claim with the Arbitrator on 14-2-1971. The arbitrator passed the award on 10-9-1971 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant for Rs. 21,161.42p. and also awarded interest at rate of 6% p.a. on the original amount of Rs. 19,660.55p., which was the principal amount from 6-1-1960 till recovery of the amount. An application was made by the arbitrator for making the award rule of court, along with an application for condoning the delay. Notice was issued to the opposite parties inviting objections. The opposite parties challenged the award on various grounds. The learned lower court, therefore, framed as many as 10 issues arising out of the objections. For the purpose of this appeal Issue Nos. 3(a) & (b), 4 and 5 are the only relevant issues. Issues No. 3 and 4 relate to point of limitation and issue No. 5 relates to awarding future interest. 3. Learned Counsel for the appellant Shri B.L. Mandhana has contended that the learned lower court has seriously erred in deciding the objections raised by the opposite parties that the claim filed by the appellant before the arbitrator was time barred and, therefore, the arbitrator could not have entertained this claim. He has also pointed out that the rulings quoted in the judgment of learned lower court relate only to the point that provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the arbitration proceedings. He has urged that these rulings are not relevant as there is no dispute between the parties on this point. He has also pointed out that the rulings quoted in the judgment of learned lower court relate only to the point that provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the arbitration proceedings. He has urged that these rulings are not relevant as there is no dispute between the parties on this point. He has, however contended that the objection regarding the claim of the appellant being time barred, was never raised before the arbitrator and it was raised for the first lime in the court of learned Additional District Judge by way of objections filed for setting aside the award. It has been urged that since this objection was not raised by the opposite parties before the arbitrator, it cannot be raised for the first time in the court of learned Additional District Judge. He has further urged that the learned trial court has erred in holding that it was the duty of the arbitrator to have himself considered this point of limitation even though it was not raised by the respondents before him. 4. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties Shri J.P. Goyal and Shri J.K. Dhingara appearing for the respondents have supported the judgment of learned Additional District Judge and have urged that under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is the duty of the court to take note of the point of limitation and decide the same, even though none of the parties may have raised this point before the court. It has, therefore, been contended that the learned lower court has committed no error in setting aside the award on the point of limitation. 5. I have heard the rival contentions of learned Counsel for both the parties and have also gone through the record. 6. It is admitted that the objection about the claim filed by the appellant being time barred was not raised before the arbitrator and it was raised for the first time before the learned Additional District Judge by way of objections raised by the respondents. 6. It is admitted that the objection about the claim filed by the appellant being time barred was not raised before the arbitrator and it was raised for the first time before the learned Additional District Judge by way of objections raised by the respondents. My attention has been drawn to the case of Firm Madan Lal Roshan Lal v. Hukam Chand AIR 1967 SC 1030 , in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the arbitrator's award on both facts and law is final and court cannot review his award and correct any mistake in his adjudication unless objection to legality of award is apparent on face of it. When the arbitrator has given no reason for award, nor there is any legal proposition as basis of award, contention that there are errors of law on face of award must be rejected " In the case of N. Chellappan v. Kerala S.E. Board, AIR 1975 SC 230 their Lordships have held that error of law was no ground for setting aside the award. In this case, it has been defined that error apparent on the face of record means that when erroneous proposition of law is stated in the award and which is made basis of the award, then alone the award may be set-aside or remitted on the ground of error of law apparent on the face of record. It has been further stated that the Umpire as the sole arbitrator was not bound to a give a reasoned award and if in passing the award he makes a mistake of law or of fact, that is no ground for challenging the validity of the ward. In the case of Union of India v. Himatsinghka Timer Ltd. AIR 1964 Cal. 91 , it was held that where the point as to the claim of the party having been time barred had been debated before the arbitrator who held that the claim was alive and not time barred but no reason was given either in the award or in any connected paper, there is no error of law apparent on the face of the award. It was held that the award cannot be held to be bad on account of (sic) is objection. In the case of Union of India v. Salween T. and C. Co., AIR 1964 Cal. It was held that the award cannot be held to be bad on account of (sic) is objection. In the case of Union of India v. Salween T. and C. Co., AIR 1964 Cal. 240 , it was held that there was no error of law appearing on the face of the award when it could not be said that the Arbitrator had on the face of the award stated any proposition of law that a claim which was barred by limitation had not been given effect to by the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator was to judge all facts and all legal contentions advanced by the respective parties. He could go right or wrong. The award was not bad on the ground of limitation of claim made by the respondents." 7. It will therefore, be evident from the law noted above that even when a plea of limitation was raised before the arbitrator and it was wrongly decided, still the award was held not to be liable to be set-aside on this ground. In the present case no plea of limitation was raised by the respondents before the arbitrator and it has been raised for the first time only by way of objections raised for setting aside award. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents have drawn my attention to the ruling of Central Cooperative Bank v. State of Rajasthan 1977 WLN (UC) 344 , in which this court held that even though objection of limitation was not raised before the Deputy registrar, it was the duty of the Registrar to take note of law and it was for the claimant to prove his claim to be within limitation. In the case of Ismail v. Hansraj AIR 1955 Raj 153 , this Court held that the expression "or is otherwise invalid" in Section 80(c) covers all objections to an award on the ground of invalidity from any cause what so ever and does not refer to the invalidity of the kind referred to in the preceding clauses of the section." 9. These rulings cited by learned Counsel for the respondents are evidently of no help to the respondents. These rulings cited by learned Counsel for the respondents are evidently of no help to the respondents. Learned Counsel for the respondents have failed to cite any law in which it has been held that when objection of limitation was not raised before the arbitrator still the same can be raised for the first time during raising objection in the court when award has been filed for making the same rule of the court. The proceedings under the Arbitration Act are of special nature. The proceedings under the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 are carried on before the Officers appointed by the Government of Rajasthan, who know the various propositions of law laid down in the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, etc. but under the Arbitration Act, a arbitrator may be a teacher or Sarpanch or a Panch who does not know even the ABC of law and cannot be expected to take notice of point of limitation or other legal propositions on his own unless the same had taken up or raised before him by the party, which wants to invoke the provisions in his favour. In the case of Moti Lal v. Lal Chand , it has been held that the modes laid down under Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act were not exhaustive and that the provisions of Limitation Act including Section 3 were applicable to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. There is no dispute about this proposition and I have already mentioned in the beginning that there is no dispute between the parties that the provisions of limitation Act do apply to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. In this case since the dispute about limitation was not even raised before the Arbitrator and there is no reference to the same in the award, it cannot be said that there is any mistake apparent on the face of the award so as to call for any interference by this court. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the learned lower court has erred in holding that the Arbitrator was duty bound to have considered the point of limitation on his own, even though it was not raised before him by the respondent at any time during the proceedings. 10. The next point to be considered is regarding interest awarded to the appellant, on which issue No. 5 has been framed. 10. The next point to be considered is regarding interest awarded to the appellant, on which issue No. 5 has been framed. In Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukam Chand (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the arbitrator has power to award interest pendente lite. When it is implied term of reference in the suit that the arbitrator would decide dispute according to law and would give such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the court could give if it decided the dispute, arbitrator can award pendente lite interest. In this case the plaintiff appellant had filed copy of the plaint itself before the arbitrator by way of putting up his claim, in which a prayer for interest during the pendency of the proceedings till recovery was made. The Arbitrator, therefore, awarded interest at rate of 6% from the date of filing of suit till recovery of amount awarded. The arbitrator was, therefore, entitled to have awarded the interest from the date of filing of the suit till the award was made rule of the court by the learned lower court, but as per the provisions of Section 29 of the Arbitration Act, it is for the court to award interest from the date of decree till the date of recovery of the amount. Therefore the award to this extent is modified and the interest will be allowed to the appellant in terms of the award only from the date of filing of the suit till the award is made rule of the court by the learned lower court. 11. In view of this appeal is allowed as indicated above. The order of learned Additional District Judge, Ajmer is set-aside and the award given by the arbitrator is made rule of the court with the modification mentioned above. 12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal allowed. *******