JUDGMENT : H.L. Agrawal, C.J. - Both the writ applications were heard together as a common question of law arises in them, and they are being disposed of by this judgment. 2. The question thai arises for determination in these applications is as to whether after the coming into force of the Orissa Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (for short' the Eviction Act') as amended by the .1983 Amending Act, the power of removal of unauthorised occupants u/s 255(6) of the Orissa Municipal Act (for short 'the Municipal Act') vested in the Executive Officer of the municipality will be deemed to have ceased. 3. The petitioners have prayed for quashing of the notices issued to them by the Executive Officer of the Puri Municipality (opp. party No. 1) to remove the coverings over the municipal drain in front of their premises within 24 hours and to restrain him from interfering with their possession. 4. The petitioners claim to have been granted licences by the Municipality for covering the public drains adjacent to their premises and to construct roofs over the same for which the Municipality was collecting licence fees since 1975 continuously. 5. According to the case of the Puri Municipality, each of the petitioners was granted annual licence u/s 255 (1) of the Municipal Act for erection of a platform over the public drain "running from the lanes on the Grand Road, Puri' on their applications which expired in March, 1986 and thereafter it was not renewed. The Municipality did not allow the platform to continue over the drain thereafter, and as per the terms and conditions of the licence, the sheds over the same were illegal. Rather, the Municipality has been collecting licence fee from the petitioners for the platforms only. On these allegations, it has been asserted or behalf of the Municipality that the Executive Officer was entitled to remove the construction covering the drain u/s 255(6) of the Municipal Act, and accordingly, the notices were issued to the petitioners (Annexures-2, 2/a, 2/b, and 2/c in O. J. C, No. 1320/86 and Annexures-3 and 3/a in O. J. C. No. 1304/86). 6. 6. It is not disputed that the petitioners were granted licences to cover the drain, but no material has been produced before the Court that any permission was accorded to the petitioners to make further construction, much less permanent construction, on that covered space. 7. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further, let us see the provisions of the Municipal Act and those of the Eviction Act. According to the preamble of the Municipal Act, it was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the Municipalities in the State of Orissa, and it covers all the fields generally relevant for enforcing the municipal laws. Section 255 empowers the municipal authorities to grant licence to the owner or occupier of any premises to put up verandahs/balconies and the like, to construct any step or drain covering necessary for access to the premises, and under Sub-section (6) of Section 255, on the expiry of the period for which such licence had been granted, the Executive Officer may, even without notice, cause all such projections or constructions to be removed and recover the cost of removal as a tax The impugned notices were issued by opposite party No 1 in exercise of this authority. 8. According to the preamble of the Eviction Act, it has been enacted to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. The definition of "public premises" and "unauthorised occupation" in the Eviction Act would be relevant for our purpose. The definition of the expression "public premises" as standing from before in the Act was amended by the 1983 Amending Act to include any premises situated with in the jurisdiction of a municipal council etc, i. e., "any premises situated within the jurisdiction of the municipal council or Notified Area Council or within the area declared by the State Government to be an industrial estate and requisitioned by the State Government". "Unauthorised occupation" has been defined in Section 2(g) of the Eviction Act in these words : "the occupation by the person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever." 9. On the basis of this definition in the Eviction Act as subsequently amended in the year 1983, it was vehemently submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the legislature, having enlarged the definition of "public premises" by bringing within its fold the premises situated within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council also, clearly intended that for eviction of any person in authorised occupation of any public premises, recourse should be taken only within the framework of the Eviction Act and not under the Municipal Act because the Municipal Act is a general Act dealing with all the problems of a Municipality and by the new Act, the legislature intended to provide a special procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants and, therefore, it being a special Act made after the commencement of the general Act, it must prevail over the general Act. This argument was advanced to take advantage of the scheme of the new Act which contemplates a complete procedure for evicting unauthorised occupants from public premises right from the stage of issuance of notice to the stage of the filing of show cause (Section 4) and hearing, followed by a right of appeal (Section 9). In the Municipal Act, however, there is no such elaborate provision. Rather, Section 255 under which the impugned action is purported to be taken does not contain any provision even for issuance of notice and it authorises the Executive Officer to take action for removal of any projection or construction put up either under a licence of a lease on expiry of the period for which the licence or the lease had been granted. In spite of that, we have seen that the Municipality has issued notices to the petitioners. 10. In spite of that, we have seen that the Municipality has issued notices to the petitioners. 10. If the legislature having made a general Act makes after- wards a special Act which is in conflict with the general Act, it must be assumed that the legislature had in mind the general Act when it made the special Act, and in that event the special enactment must override the general enactment and the latter can have full play and, in such a case, the Court should lean against repeal of the earlier Act by implementing the later Act, and unless it is absolutely clear that the operation of the former Act has to be curtailed by the latter Act, the former Act should be held to continue to be in force even though the latter Act is regarded as a special Act in some other sense. This submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners seems to be based on the maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant". Adopting this maxim, he submitted that while the Eviction Act is a special statute, the Municipal Act is a genera! statute and accordingly, the special statute is to prevail over the general statute. In support of his contention, Mr. Mohapatra relied upon the decisions reported in (i) The Corporation of Madras Vs. The Madras Electric Tramways and The Madras Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd., and (ii) Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur Vs. Thakur Manmohan Deo and Others, 11. Mr. R. K. Patra appearing for opposite party No. 1, while not disputing the proposition of Mr. Mohapatra, submitted that it is the Municipal Act which is a special statute and the Eviction Act a general statute. He relied upon the decision in the case of the (Commissioner of Labour in Mysore, Bangalore v. The Mysore Iron and Steel Works Labour Association) [AIR 1952 Mysore, 21 (FB)]. In the case of Maharaja Pratap Singh (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the Bengal Ghatwali Land Act, 1859 and the Court of Wards Act, 1870. It was held that the 1859 Act was an earlier special statute and the 1870 Act was a later general statute in relation to lease of land for erection of houses and relied upon Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell which reads as follows : "A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication. It was held that the 1859 Act was an earlier special statute and the 1870 Act was a later general statute in relation to lease of land for erection of houses and relied upon Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell which reads as follows : "A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication. Generalia specialibus non derogant, or in other words,'where there are General words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. In such cases, it is presumed to have only general cases in view, and not particular cases which have been already otherwise provided for by the special Act." 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Kaushalya Rani Vs. Gopal Singh, while considering the special period of limitation prescribed u/s 417 of the new Cr. P. C. observed that the whole Code of Criminal Procedure is indeed a general law regulating the procedure of criminal trial, but it also contains provisions specifying a bar of time for a particular class of cases which are of a special character. Such a law will be a "special law" with reference to the law generally governing the subject-matter of that, kind of relationship. A "special law" therefore means a law enacted for special cases in special circumstances in contradistinction to the general rules of the law laid down as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals, Similar is the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of (Justiniano Augusto De Piadade Barreto v. Antonia Vicente Da Fonseca and others) (AIR 1979 S. C. 984 ) where the period of limitation prescribed in local laws and special laws was discussed. It was accordingly submitted by Mr, Mohapatra that if the Executive Officer in exercise of his blanket power under Sub-section (6) of Section 255 of the Municipal Act proceeds to demolish any projection or construction, then it would be very difficult for any licensee or a lessee to show him even the extent of the offending projection or construction, and in his madness, he may commit in irreparable injury to the occupant under the scheme of the Municipal Act. 13. However, having given my anxious consideration to the scheme of the Municipal Act and the Eviction Act as well as the rival submissions made by learned counsel for both parties, correctness of which as abstract propositions cannot be doubted. It is not necessary to decide the controversy conclusively as to whether the Eviction Act in that sense is a special Act and thus would override the provisions contained In Section 255 of the Municipal Act particularly when the highest Court in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, has observed that the mere availability of two procedures will not vitiate one of the enactments. It was further observed that merely because one procedure provides the forum of a civil Court while the other provides the forum of an administrative tribunal, it cannot be said that the latter is necessarily more drastic and onerous. The municipal Act and the Eviction Act therefore have different fields to play and the scope and ambit of the Eviction Act is different than the provisions contained in the Municipal Act. Section 255(6) of the Municipal Act contemplates removal of the projection or construction etc. only in cases where a licence or lease was granted to any person for this purpose and the period for that expires. The term of the licence and the lease therefore by itself would provide a sufficient safeguard for finding out and fixing the extent of the offending projection or construction, etc 14. It was rightly submitted by Mr. Patra on behalf of the Municipality that the legislature in its wisdom has thought of a summary procedure for removal of the projection or construction, etc. over the municipal properties as the exigencies of the circumstances did not permit for prescribing a regular and lengthy forum. It was rightly submitted by Mr. Patra on behalf of the Municipality that the legislature in its wisdom has thought of a summary procedure for removal of the projection or construction, etc. over the municipal properties as the exigencies of the circumstances did not permit for prescribing a regular and lengthy forum. The licensee or the lessee would have already the knowledge or information that his occupation and possession over the projection or construction was for a fixed period and that the expiry of the said period by itself amounted to an implied notice to him to remove the projections or constructions on his own, and only on his failure to do that, the Executive Officer has to fall upon to exercise his police powers under the Municipal Act. Apart from the above distinction that I have endeavoured to point out, there is yet another lurking fallacy in the whole approach of Mr. Mohapatra and his argument is accordingly misconceived. The defini- tion of the expression "unauthorised occupation" in the Eviction Act does not help the petitioners as it covers only such cases of occupation which were allowed either by way of grant or any other mode of transfer. Allowing occupation under a licence as claimed by the petitioners cannot be said to be under a grant or transfer which expressions have well- defined meanings in law. It is well-known that in the case of a licence no interest in the property passes to the licensee, but it only makes an action or occupation lawful which otherwise would have been unlawful. Thus a licence u/s 255(1) or (2) of the Municipal Act which has expired or has been determined would not come under the definition of 'unauthorised occupation' in the Eviction Act. 15. Although the above discussions are sufficient to reach a conclusion, before doing that and parting with these cases, I may notice yet another argument that was advanced by Mr. Patra touching the question of the principle of natural justice and absence of provision of notice in Section 255(6) of the Municipal Act. It would be relevant to refer to paragraph 20 of the decision in A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, : "The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. It would be relevant to refer to paragraph 20 of the decision in A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, : "The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it... The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." On the basis of these observations it was submitted by Mr, Patra that the legislature on the facts and circumstances has committed no violation of this principle. As regards absence of a provision relating to appeal, Mr. Patra relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Patel Bava Karsan and Others, where it was held relying upon an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, that the property belonging to Government or semi-government bodies falling within a particular class would be a reasonable classification and that absence of a civil remedy would not be violative of Art, 14 of the Constitution. On these submissions, it was contended that the provi- sions of the Municipal Act are not in any way unreasonable although no such attack was made by Mr. Mohapatra on these grounds on the Municipal Act. It goes without saying that when two procedures are available, an officer may resort to that procedure which would be speedier for achieving the object, This principle has been also accepted in the decision in the case of Director of Industries, U.P. and Others Vs. Deep Chand Agarwal, Conclusions. 16. Mohapatra on these grounds on the Municipal Act. It goes without saying that when two procedures are available, an officer may resort to that procedure which would be speedier for achieving the object, This principle has been also accepted in the decision in the case of Director of Industries, U.P. and Others Vs. Deep Chand Agarwal, Conclusions. 16. To record briefly my conclusions : (i) If the legislature makes a special Act dealing with a particular subject and later makes a general Act which by Its terms include the subject of the special Act and is in conflict with the special Act, the provisions of the general Act would not override those of the special Act unless it is clear that the legislature intended to abrogate the provisions of the special Act. (ii) If the special Act is enacted later in point of time then the general Act and the provisions of the former are in conflict with the latter, it must be presumed that the legislature had in mind the provisions of the general Act (enacted earlier) when it enacted the special Act and that the provisions of the special Act are an exception to the general Act, (iii) The whole of the Orissa Municipal Act is a general law incorporating all provisions for maintenance of public health, sanitation, roads and other fields, permissible to be covered under the municipal laws, but the provisions contained in Section 255 of the said Act are special provisions for dealing with a particular class of cases of a special character. Those provisions will be a 'special law' with reference to the law governing generally the subject-matter of that kind. (iv) The provisions of the Orissa Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 do not cover the cases contemplated u/s 255(6) of the Orissa Municipal Act. (v) Absence of any provision for issuing notice or for any appellate forum does not impinge upon the validity of the said provisions. 17. In the result, the writ applications must fail and are accordingly hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances, I would make no order as to costs. S.C. Mohapatra, J. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed