JUDGMENT ANIL KUMAR SEN, J. 1. TINS appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent raises a short point as to the scope of an adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal of a claim for interim relief under section 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended by the West Bengal Industrial Disputes (Second Amendment) Act, 1980. The appeal is directed against an order dated September 17, 1984, passed by a learned Single Judge of this court in a writ proceeding which was registered as Matter No. 222 of 1984. By the order impugned, the learned Judge had dismissed the writ application and had affirmed the order of interim relief dated November 7, 1983, passed by the 7th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No.VIII-282/1982. The appellant is Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees' Co-operative Society Limited and its Assistant Secretary representing the management. 2. IT is not in dispute that Sushil Kumar Giri (hereinafter referred to as the workman) was an employee under the Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees' Industrial Co-operative Society Limited (hereinafter referred to as management). He was designated as an "In charge of raw material stores" and was drawing a total salary of Rs.1038/- per month. His services were terminated with effect from October 3, 1981, when he was served with a notice of discharge, such notice assigning no reasons whatsoever for such discharge. Such discharge raised an industrial dispute. The Government of West Bengal by an order dated September 6, 1982, made a reference to the tribunal for adjudication of the dispute as to "whether the termination of service of Sri Sushil Kumar Giri is justified? To What relief, if any, is he entitled ?" The tribunal received the reference on September 21, 1982, and fixed November 26, 1982, as the date for appearance of the parties. The parties appeared. While the workman filed their written statement on December 10, 1982, the management filed their written statement on February 15, 1983. In course of the adjudication proceeding, on September 7, 1983, the workman filed an application for an order for payment of half his salary at the date of his termination by way of interim relief. The parties appeared. While the workman filed their written statement on December 10, 1982, the management filed their written statement on February 15, 1983. In course of the adjudication proceeding, on September 7, 1983, the workman filed an application for an order for payment of half his salary at the date of his termination by way of interim relief. Such a prayer was made on the ground that for a pretty long time he had been kept unemployed by the management and he not having any other source of income, had been living on other's charity and was about to starve. Obviously the application for interim relief was made in the light of the West Bengal Amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act, incorporating section 15(2) of the said Act. This application was opposed on behalf of the management on various grounds. The first objection raised was to the effect that such a prayer not having been within 60 days from the date of reference, was barred by limitation. Secondly; it was contended on behalf of the management that the applicant not being a workman within the meaning of the said Act, the reference itself was incompetent and as such, no interim relief could be granted. Lastly, it was pleaded that the applicant was discharged because the post held by him was abolished and the Society was not in a financial position to retain him in service by offering him any alternative post. Such termination being fully justified, no interim relief should be granted which, if granted, would increase the financial hardship on the management. 3. THE tribunal by an order dated November 7, 1983, allowed the prayer for interim relief. Such relief was granted on the following terms:- "THE Society is directed to make payment of 50% of the salary Rs.1038/- per month in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal Subsistance Allowance Act, 1969, with effect from the date of filing this application, that is from 7.9.83 till disposal of this case. THE petitioner workman is hereby directed to give an undertaking supported by an affidavit stating therein that the amount to be received by him on account of interim relief would be repaid to the Society if the case is ultimately decided against him, within 7 days." 4. THE petitioner workman is hereby directed to give an undertaking supported by an affidavit stating therein that the amount to be received by him on account of interim relief would be repaid to the Society if the case is ultimately decided against him, within 7 days." 4. IN granting the aforesaid interim relief, the tribunal overruled the plea raised by the management that section 15(2)(b) lays down any rule of limitation which could bar the claim of any interim relief made beyond 60 days from the date of reference. The tribunal further found that the applicant had been able to make out a prima facie case that he was a workman within the definition of section 2(s) of the INdustrial Disputes Act, and the mere fact that he was drawing a salary of more than Rs.1,000/- would not detract from the said position when it had not been established prima facie that the applicant was being employed in any supervisory capacity. This was the order though interlocutory in nature, which was the subject matter of challenge in a writ proceedings before this court registered as Matter No. 222 of 1984. This learned trial Judge upheld the order of the tribunal by upholding the decision of the tribunal with regard to the points of objection raised by the management and overruled by the tribunal. That is the order dated September 17, 1984. Feeling aggrieved, the Society and its Assistant Secretary representing the management has preferred the present appeal. 5. MR. Sengupta appearing m support of this appeal has raised two points. In the first place, it has been contended by MR. Sengupta that section 15(2)(b) imposes a mandatory time limit of 60 days from the date of reference for grant of any interim relief so that if no such relief is granted within the said time, giving of such relief would be ultra vires the power of the tribunal. According to MR. Sengupta, both the tribunal and the learned trial Judge had misconstrued section 15(2)(b) of the Act to hold it otherwise so that in the present case the prayer for interim relief itself having been made beyond 60 days from the date of reference, the tribunal had not any jurisdiction to grant any such relief. The second point raised by MR. Sengupta, both the tribunal and the learned trial Judge had misconstrued section 15(2)(b) of the Act to hold it otherwise so that in the present case the prayer for interim relief itself having been made beyond 60 days from the date of reference, the tribunal had not any jurisdiction to grant any such relief. The second point raised by MR. Sengupta is to the effect that no order for interim relief should be made by a tribunal without a preliminary adjudication with regard to the merit of the dispute and without finding a strong prima facie case on the merits of the dispute in favour of the applicant for the interim relief. According to MR. Sengupta, in the present case though the tribunal as also the learned trial Judge were quite conscious of the aforesaid requirement, both had failed to consider the merits even for the purpose of recording a prima facie case in favour of the applicant. 6. BOTH the points thus raised by Mr. Sengupta have been strongly controverted by Mr. Dasgupta, who is appearing for the workman. According to Mr. Dasgupta, section 15(2)(b) imposes a statutory obligation on the tribunal to grant such relief as would be admissible on a reference being made on art industrial dispute. The time limit prescribed for discharge of such an obligation cannot be read as rule of limitation barring the claim of an aggrieved workman for such interim relief. So far as the second point raised by Mr. Sengupta is concerned, it has been contended by Mr. Dasgupta that having regard to the object and terms of the West Bengal Amendment, it cannot be said that the tribunal is required at that stage to hold any preliminary adjudication with regard to the merits of the dispute and record any finding of a prima facie case, far less a strong prima facie case on the merits of the dispute in favour of the party claiming the interim relief. Both the points thus raised before us, are points of law and are of some importance. In that view we propose to deal with both the points thus raised before us by Mr. Sengupta in spite of our views that it was not just and proper for this court to entertain the writ petition wherein the matter of challenge was an interlocutory order. In that view we propose to deal with both the points thus raised before us by Mr. Sengupta in spite of our views that it was not just and proper for this court to entertain the writ petition wherein the matter of challenge was an interlocutory order. Entertainment of such a writ petition has resulted in this unfortunate situation, namely, the main dispute which was under the process of adjudication, could not be decided finally between the parties and the adjudication itself had been delayed by nearly 4 years. We should remind ourselves that the Supreme Court had deprecated times without number such intervention by the High Court with ah industrial adjudication at the interlocutory stage. Such intervention in the present case has been a matter of prejudice not only for the workman but also for the management because by paying a sum of Rs.500/- per month for a few months the management could have obtained its final decision with regard to the dispute itself. 7. FOR deciding the two points raised before us, it would be necessary for us to refer to the terms of section 15(2) of the said Act. Section 15(2) is set out hereunder:- "15(2). Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a labour court or tribunal, it shall- a) after filing of statements and taking of evidence give day to day hearing and give its award, upon determination or decision in the manner specified in 17B without any delay; b) upon hearing the parties to the dispute, determine within a period of 60 days, from the date of reference under sub-section (1) of section 10 or within such shorter period as specified in the order of reference under sub-section(1) of section 10, the quantum of interim relief admissible, if any; Provided that the quantum of interim relief relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service of workman shall be equivalent to subsistence allowance as may be admissible under the West bengal Payment of Substence Allowance Act, 1969." 8. THIS provision came into force on November 30, 1981, and was brought about by the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Second Amendment) Act, 1980. Reading clause (b) as aforesaid, on its terms, we find ample substance in the contention of Mr. Dasgupta that it enjoins the tribunal to grant such interim relief as would be admissible and that within 60 days from the date of reference. Reading clause (b) as aforesaid, on its terms, we find ample substance in the contention of Mr. Dasgupta that it enjoins the tribunal to grant such interim relief as would be admissible and that within 60 days from the date of reference. The time specified is with regard to discharge of the obligation imposed on the statutory tribunal. On its terms, it cannot be read as a rule of limitation for preferring of any claim for interim relief. It is well settled now that "Where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of the act done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of these on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them." (vide Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normand in 1917 AC 170 and Chapter XII section 3 Mazwell). In our opinion, the above quotation fully answers the point raised by. Mr. Sengupta. It cannot be disputed that, section 15(2)(b) was introduced by the legislature for protecting the interest of indigent workmen when fighting a cause against the management where always the tight is between two unequals. This object can hardly be fulfilled or advanced by interpreting the clause in the manner suggested by Mr. Sengupta, namely, once 60 days expires from the date of reference, the tribunal loses all its jurisdiction to make any order of interm relief in our opinion, the teamed trial Judge has rightly pointed our various circumstances which may intervene rendering it not possible for the tribunal to abide by the time limit. if we interpret the time limit to be so absolute, as suggested by Mr. Sengupta, then, in many cases, the whole object behind this provision may be totally frustrated. Mr. Sengupta relied on "Wade on Administrate Law' in contending incidentally that even if we interpret the lime limit to be directory as for its precise compliance, still we would interpret it as mandatory for its substantial compliance. Sengupta, then, in many cases, the whole object behind this provision may be totally frustrated. Mr. Sengupta relied on "Wade on Administrate Law' in contending incidentally that even if we interpret the lime limit to be directory as for its precise compliance, still we would interpret it as mandatory for its substantial compliance. We feel no hesitation in accepting this contention of Mr. Sengupta because in our opinion the legislature intended and enjoined the tribunal to comply with the time limit substantially. But that, in our opinion, does not support the other part of the contention of Mr. Sengupta that any breach of the said obligation would take away the jurisdiction of the tribunal to make any order of interim relief any further so that any order made in such breach would necessarily be an invalid or ultra vires act on the part of the tribunal. It is true that in the present case the application for the interim relief was made beyond 6 months from the date of reference but that in our opinion is not of much consequence when sub-section (2) of section 15 does not enjoin making of an application nor provides for any limitation therefor. By the application made, the workman in the present case called upon the tribunal to do what the tribunal was otherwise required to do in law. Breach, if any, therefore was not of the workman but of the tribunal. In that view, we must override the first point raised by Mr. Sengupta and we affirm the view expressed by the learned trial Judge that since section 15(2)(b) does not provide for any rule of limitation,, the order impugned cannot be challenged on a point of limitation. 9. THE second point raised by Mr. Sengupta raises a difficult issue. That issue is what is the scope of an adjudication for grant of interim relief and what are the matters which should go in for consecration by tribunal in making an order for interim relief. According to Mr. Sengupta in making an order for interim relief, the tribunal must follow the same principle as is followed by a civil court while dealing with an application for interim relief. It is contended by Mr. According to Mr. Sengupta in making an order for interim relief, the tribunal must follow the same principle as is followed by a civil court while dealing with an application for interim relief. It is contended by Mr. Sengupta that it is necessary for the tribunal to hold a preliminary adjudication with regard to the merit of the dispute and record a strong prima facie case on such merits in favour of the applicant since no inerim relief should be admissible save and except where such a case is made out. 10. IT may be pointed out that section 15(2)(b) is applicable to West Bengal and was introduced only in the year 1981. But it is now well settled by the Supreme Court that even in the absence of a specific provision like section 15(2)(b), the tribunal possesses the authority to grant interim relief - such power emanating from section 10(4) of the said Act. IT has been held that granting such relief if appropriately related to the main dispute, would be a matter incidental and, as such, would come within the scope of the authority of the tribunal. Section 10(4) of the Act, however, imposed no specific obligation in regard to the grant of interim relief but has been construed to confer an authority to grant such relief if it is incidental leaving the entire matter to the discretion of the tribunal. Reference has been made by Mr. Sengupta to two decisions of the Patna High Court in the cases of Bihar Khadi Gramodyog Sangh v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1977 Labour and Industrial Cases 466 and Management of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Workman of Bihar State Electricity Board and Ors. 1971(1) L.L.J. 389, both decided on the basis of section 10(4) and laying down a proposition that whoever claims any interim relief before the tribunal must make out a strong prima facie case with regard to the merit of the dispute. That was a principle enunciated with reference to section 10(4) which had left the matter entirely to the discretion of the tribunal. In the present case, however, we are concerned with section 15(2)(b) which has introduced some changes. This new provision now makes it a statutory obligation for the tribunal to grant such quantum of interim relief as would be admissible and that again within 60 days from the date of reference. In the present case, however, we are concerned with section 15(2)(b) which has introduced some changes. This new provision now makes it a statutory obligation for the tribunal to grant such quantum of interim relief as would be admissible and that again within 60 days from the date of reference. The proviso further lays down that in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service the quantum of interim relief should be as prescribed by the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969. The only pre-requisite to the making of the order under this provision is to hear the parties to the dispute. Adjudication of an industrial dispute does not follow the procedure of a suit. It is not initiated upon a plaint or an application in which the party is to make out his case, even an application for interim relief is not a condition precedent for grant of interim relief under section 15(2). Adjudication starts on a reference being made to the tribunal which reference again merely sets out the dispute. Once such a reference is received by the tribunal it fixes a date of appearance and then requires the parties to file their respective cases. Until such time the respective cases are not before the tribunal, yet the provision enjoins that within 60 days from the date of reference the tribunal is required to make the necessary order for interim relief. It is quite clear, therefore, that the legislature was intending that the issue with regard to the interim relief should be adjudicated on irrespective of and even before cases of the parties touching the merit of the dispute go to the tribunal. In such a situation, it would be difficult to contemplate that section 15(2)(b) requires the tribunal to hold a preliminary adjudication with regard to the merit of the dispute and record a strong prima facie case in favour of the applicant before any order for interim relief could be made. 11. IN our opinion, there is one more reason to support the above view of ours. The Supreme Court had distinguished interim reliefs from interim awards. IN a case where the tribunal goes to make any interim award obviously that would be with regard to a part of the dispute and as such based upon a part adjudication of the dispute itself. The Supreme Court had distinguished interim reliefs from interim awards. IN a case where the tribunal goes to make any interim award obviously that would be with regard to a part of the dispute and as such based upon a part adjudication of the dispute itself. IN such a case undisputedly the tribunal is required to adjudicate the merit of the dispute under reference to the extent it is necessary to be adjudicated for the purpose of making the interim award. INterim relief, on the other hand, is an interim assistance or protection extended to a party and primarily the workman to support him in fighting the cause involved in the dispute. If we accept the contention of Mr. Sengupta and hold that even for the purpose of granting such an interim relief there should be a preliminary adjudication of the merit of the dispute and the tribunal must come to a finding that there being a strong prima facie case in favour of the party claiming the relief, he has got a good chance of success in the ultimate adjudication, then in that event that would enlarge the field of adjudication at the interim relief stage to an extent which would not be consistent with the scheme of the new provision which requires granting of an early relief. 12. ACCORDING to Mr. Sengupta when section 15(2)(b) speaks of "quantum of interim relief admissible, if any," it enjoins that the tribunal must not only decide the quantum but also the admissibility of the interim relief claimed. ACCORDING to Mr. Sengupta, the admissibility is not limited to quantum only but relates to the interim relief itself. In our opinion, Mr. Sengupta is right with regard to this part of his contention because the provision speaks of interim relief, admissible, if any. Therefore, the tribunal is required not only to determine the admissible quantum but also to determine the admissibility of the interim relief itself. The test of admissibility, however, has not been specified. Therefore, Mr. Sengupta is emboldened to contend that in determining the admissibility the tribunal is required to consider all the circumstances including the prima facie merit of the dispute under reference. We are not in a position to accept such a wide connotation for the term 'Admissible'. The test of admissibility, however, has not been specified. Therefore, Mr. Sengupta is emboldened to contend that in determining the admissibility the tribunal is required to consider all the circumstances including the prima facie merit of the dispute under reference. We are not in a position to accept such a wide connotation for the term 'Admissible'. We find that the word 'admissible' in this provision has been incorporated in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Management Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union AIR 1959 SC 1342 . In paragraph 21 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed: "There can be no doubt that if, for example, question of reinstatement and/or compensation is referred to a tribunal for adjudication, the question of granting interim relief till the decision of the tribunal with respect to the same matter would be a matter incidental thereto under section 10(4) and need not be specifically referred in terms to the tribunal. This interim relief where it is admissible can be granted as a matter incidental to the main question referred to the tribunal without being itself referred in the express terms. "In our reading, the Supreme Court indicated the test of admissibility by pointing out that the interim relief must be corelated to and must have a close bearing with the principal matter in dispute. The term 'admissible' has a definite and well recognised meaning as a legal concept used primarily with regard to evidence. It means matters which are relevant and not otherwise excluded by law. Fasted in that light, when section 15(2)(b) speaks of admissible interim relief, it speaks of such reliefs which are proximately corelated to the main relief and not foreign to the dispute under adjudication or is not otherwise saved by any regulation. Admissibility may be one of the considerations in the process of adjudication of an interim relief but ail the considerations which guide the tribunal in exercising its power in that regard are not tests of admissibility. The question, therefore, still remains as to what are the matters which must enter into the consideration of the tribunal m adjudicating a claim for interim relief. The question, therefore, still remains as to what are the matters which must enter into the consideration of the tribunal m adjudicating a claim for interim relief. In our opinion rules governing similar adjudication in a suit cannot be invoked but matters to be considered by the tribunal should be (1) admissibility, (2) any objection as to the sustain ability of the reference and (3) effect of the grant or its refusal on the employer or the workman. But for reasons given hereinbefore, we find it difficult to reconcile the consideration of the merits and/or adjudication of the prima facie case at the stage of granting the interim relief with the scheme prescribed by the statute in section 15(2)(b). In this case, we find the tribunal had dealt with all the objections raised on behalf of the management and recorded its prima facie findings on such issues in favour of the workman and even if the tribunal had not adjudged the merits of the dispute for arriving at any finding of a prima facie case in favour of the workman, that had not vitiated the order made by the tribunal granting the interim relief. Hence, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Ail interim orders stand vacated. Prayer for this stay of the order is refused. Appeal dismissed.