Judgment :- 1. Revision petitioner is the plaintiff in O. S.98 of 1975 of the Munsiff's Court, Kayamkulam. Plaintiff filed the suit for partition claiming 7/18 shares in the property. As there is a mortgage in favour of the first defendant in respect of 80 cents of land for Rs. 599/- plaintiff offered to pay proportionate mortgage amount. First defendant claimed the mortgage amount and the second defendant claimed absolute rights over the property on the basis of a gift deed. The trial court held that the gift deed has not taken effect during the life time of the donor and the suit was decreed granting partition and redemption. 2. Preliminary decree was passed on 20-12-1976. Defendants 1 and 2 filed A. S.59 of 1976. The appeal was dismissed on 26-10-1979. They filed S. A. 42 of 1980 before this Court. The Second Appeal was also dismissed on 1-3-1985. As per the preliminary decree the plaintiff applied for passing the final decree. First defendant (respondent herein) filed I. A. 297 of 1986 under Order VIII R.9 C. P. C. for receiving additional written statement claiming value of improvements. Plaintiff opposed the petition contending that the petition is not maintainable as the preliminary decree has already been passed adjudicating the dispute between the parties and that the court has only to consider matters directed by the preliminary decree at the final decree stage. In other words, plaintiff contended that nothing new could be urged in the preliminary decree. 3. The learned Munsiff allowed the petition on payment of Rs. 75/- as costs. Revision petitioner challenges the above order contending that where a plea was available to a party and not urged is the written statement cannot be allowed to be set up in the final decree proceedings. It is contended that the first defendant is estopped from claiming the value of improvements as he did not raise it at all during any stage of the trial or even before the appellate courts. 4. It is contended that the first defendant is estopped from claiming the value of improvements as he did not raise it at all during any stage of the trial or even before the appellate courts. 4. Order VIII R.9 provides that no pleading subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by way of defence to a set-off or counterclaim shall be presented except by the leave of the Court and upon such terms as the court thinks fit, but the court may at any time require a written statement or additional written statement from any of the parties and fix a time for presenting the same. It is open to the defendant to file additional written statement under circumstances envisaged under Order VIII R.9. Admittedly the suit has been decreed and the appeal and the second appeal were dismissed. As subsequent pleadings can be allowed only when the suit is pending it is difficult to accept the contention that additional written statement can be filed during the final decree proceedings. 5. A preliminary decree determines the rights of the parties and without filing appeal against it the rights determined cannot be challenged at the time of passing the final decree. In the case in hand appeal was filed against the preliminary decree and having lost it second appeal as S. A. 42 of 1980 was filed. The second appeal was dismissed on 1-3-1985. At no point of time when the case was pending before the trial court or before the first appellate court or before this Court any attempt was made to claim value of improvements. Counsel submitted that as respondent contended that the property is not at ail partible value of improvements was not claimed. Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that even it that be so the respondent could have alternatively pleaded for the value of improvements and as that has not been done it is futile to request the permission of the court to receive additional written statement. Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that even it that be so the respondent could have alternatively pleaded for the value of improvements and as that has not been done it is futile to request the permission of the court to receive additional written statement. In this context it is useful to refer to the decision rendered in AIR 1963 S. C. 992 (Venkata Raddy v. Pethi Reddy) wherein it is held as follows: "A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made, the decision of the court arrived at the earlier stage also has a finality attached to it. It would be relevant to refer to S.97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. This provision thus clearly indicates that to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree." Thus the position is very clear that the rights determined by a preliminary decree could be set aside only in appeal. If a party has not filed appeal against a preliminary decree he cannot challenge its correctness in an appeal filed by him against the final decree. S.97 C.P.C. provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. As already pointed out, in the instant case the revision petitioner filed Appeal and Second Appeal and his attempt to set aside the preliminary decree did not succeed. As already pointed out, in the instant case the revision petitioner filed Appeal and Second Appeal and his attempt to set aside the preliminary decree did not succeed. Contention which the revision petitioner could have urged in the suit or atleast in the appellate court cannot be urged for the first time in the final decree proceedings. 6. Explanation.4 to S. H makes the position abundantly clear that it is not open to a party to urge a ground for the first time when he could have urged that ground earlier. The claim of value of improvements is a.matter which might and ought to have been taken in the defendant's written statement in the suit. Having not done so it is not open to the revision petitioner to claim value of improvements when the matter is pending for passing the final decree. The contention of the revision petitioner that at any stage he can file additional written statement if the court allows it is not tenable. 0.8 R.9 C.P.C. provides that no pleadings subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by way of defence to a set off or counter claim shall be presented except by the leave of the Court. Claim of value of improvement even if it is conceded to be a counter claim can only be made when the suit was pending before the trial court, or at least when the case was pending before the appellate courts. As value of improvements was not claimed the preliminary decree is silent with regard to it and the petitioner cannot attempt to reconcile it with the highly belated pleading regarding value of improvements. For the reasons stated above I find that the court below ought not have allowed I. A. 297 of 1986. The order of the court below in I.A. 297 of 1986 is hereby set aside and the petition is dismissed. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed. There is no Older as to costs.