JUDGMENT : H.L. Agrawal, C.J. - Both the revision applications have been referred to the larger Bench by a learned Judge of this Court who entertained some doubts in the correctness of the decision inter-parties reported in AIR 1981 Orissa 29. 2. The applications are by the defendant The Berhampur Municipality through its Executive Officer brought an action against the petitioner in the Court of the Munsif, Berhampur, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1905.36 as arrears of house tax, etc., for three years, namely, 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77, at the rate of Rs. 158.78 per quarter. The petitioner contested the claim on various grounds including the right of the plaintiff to get a decree on the basis of the new rates of assessment on the ground that it was unenforceable in law for non- compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 147(2) of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (shortly stated as 'the Act). 3. The trial Court dismissed the suit for the first two years, i. e., 1974-75 and 1975-76, on the ground that the plaintiff should have included that claim in an earlier suit, (T. M. S. No 30 of 1976) as the cause of action had already arisen. But it decreed the suit for the year 1976-77 and passed a decree for Rs. 635.12 Both the parties filed appeals in the Court below but they failed. The plaintiff, however, left the matter at that stage but the defendant- petitioner has carried the matter to this Court in C. R. No. 666 of 1981 against the dismissal of his appeal. Before coming to this Court, he had made a futile attempt by filing a review application which led him to file C. R. No. 665 of 1981. 4. Obviously, if the petitioner succeeds in his main application (C. R. No. 666/81), then the other application (C. R. No. 665/81) would automatically become infructuous. Otherwise also, it was rightly conceded that if the petitioner fails in his main application, then this application would also fail. Therefore, I am not adverting to any further details of that application. 5. Undisputedly, the petitioner is the owner of a building bearing Holding No. 406 in Ward No. 13 within the jurisdiction of the Berhampur Municipality. Admittedly, he had made some additions to the said building. Therefore, I am not adverting to any further details of that application. 5. Undisputedly, the petitioner is the owner of a building bearing Holding No. 406 in Ward No. 13 within the jurisdiction of the Berhampur Municipality. Admittedly, he had made some additions to the said building. The plaint does not contain any specific particulars save and except the allegation of default in the matter of payment of the taxes. But the question arose on the allegations made in the written statement. It was pleaded that the claim by the Municipality was on the basis of enhanced rate of taxes done u/s 147(1) of the Act on different dates and the same were not valid because no "valid or proper" notice u/s 147(2) of the Act was issued to the defendant prior to the order of enhancement. 6. The trial Court took the view that Section 147(2) had no application as the additions had been; done by the petitioner "without the permission and approval of the Municipality". The lower appellate Court, however, on reference to Ext. 5, the notice purported to have been issued u/s 147(2), has held that the plea of the petitioner was unfounded. It may be stated that the earlier suit of the plaintiff mentioned above had ultimately come to this Court at the instance of the petitioner where the same plea, namely, infraction of the requirement of notice u/s 147(2), was raised and was allowed by this Court and the judgment is reported in A|R 1981 Orissa 29. 7. In the earlier case, a preliminary objection which was raised by Shri R. C. Misra appearing for the plaintiff was that in view of Section 102, C. P. C, the second appeal was not maintainable and the second appeal was treated as a Civil Revision. Surprisingly, this time Shri Misra raised a preliminary objection just to the contrary and submitted that not a Civil Revision but a second appeal would lie. Apart from the fact that the plea is barred by the principle of estoppel, on merits also the submission is entirely misconceived. The suit is of a civil nature and obviously cognisable by Courts of Small Causes. Apart from the fact that the plea is barred by the principle of estoppel, on merits also the submission is entirely misconceived. The suit is of a civil nature and obviously cognisable by Courts of Small Causes. A simple prayer in the plaint that till the final payment of the decretal dues "the schedule property may be charged to be sold to realise the decretal amount", would not change the nature of the suit and bring it within any of the exceptions mentioned in the schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. In the case of Corporation of Municipal Commissioner, Ranchi v. Mt. Mungia (AIR 1932 Patna 220), it has been clearly held that the suit by the Municipality to recover arrears of Municipal taxes is cognisable by Small Cause Courts. The preliminary objection, therefore, has got no substance and is rejected. 8. Since the petitioner's case is fully and squarely supported by the earlier decision, let us examine the doubts that have been indicated in the referring order as also the pleas those have been advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff. 9. Strong reliance was placed by him on the notice (Ext.5) and on this basis he submitted that there has been a full compliance of the legal requirement. Before referring to the notice, let us notice the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act. "147 Amendment and alteration of list: (1) The Executive Officer may, at any time, alter or amend the assessment list in any of the following ways : xx xx xx (b) by revaluing or reassessing any holding the value of which has been increased by additions or alterations to buildings ; xx xx xx (2) The Executive Officer shall give at least one month's notice to any person interested, of any alteration which he proposes to make under Clause(a), (b), (c) or (d) of Sub-section (1) and of the date on which the alteration will be made. (3) The provisions of Sections 153, 154, 155 and 156 applicable to objections, shall, so far as may be, apply to any objection made in pursuance of a notice issued under Sub-section (2) and to any appeal made under Clause (f) of Sub-section (1). xx xx xx No doubt, the notice, Ext. (3) The provisions of Sections 153, 154, 155 and 156 applicable to objections, shall, so far as may be, apply to any objection made in pursuance of a notice issued under Sub-section (2) and to any appeal made under Clause (f) of Sub-section (1). xx xx xx No doubt, the notice, Ext. 5, is purported to have been issued u/s 147(2) of the Act read with Section 152(2) thereof and it reads as follows : Berhampur Municipality Notice Under Sections 147(2) and 152(2) of the O. M. Act, 1950. TO SRI GADI NARAYAN MURTY. Take notice that by virtue of the powers vested with the Executive Officer u/s 147(1) of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, the assessment of your holding bearing assessment No. 9095 of Ward No. 13 situated in Hanuman Bazar street Is proposed to, be fixed as shown below with effect from the first day of July 1972 for the reasons given below. In case you are dissatisfied with the proposed assessment you may prefer an appeal to the District Magistrate, Ganjam, Chatrapur (Under Section 153 of O. M. Act, 1950) within 30 days from the date of receipt of this notice........." No doubt, it is true that the first part of the notice informed the petitioner what tax had been proposed to be levied In respect of his Holding, but it did not invite any objection to the proposed enhancement. Rather, it directed the petitioner to prefer an appeal to the District Magistrate. In view of this express direction in the notice, it was rightly submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Ext. 5 did not satisfy the letter and spirit of the scheme of Section 147(2). The whole purpose of the statutory notice is to provide an opportunity to the owner to object the proposal for increase/enhancement of the taxes, keeping in view the principles of natural justice. The issuance of the notice by the Municipal authorities is a sine qua non for the purpose of effecting any increase in the rate of tax. This principle has been fairly settled by a long line of decisions of the Patna High Court with reference to the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act which until very recently was applicable to the State of Orissa as well, and the provisions are in pari materia with those in the Orissa Act. 10. This principle has been fairly settled by a long line of decisions of the Patna High Court with reference to the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act which until very recently was applicable to the State of Orissa as well, and the provisions are in pari materia with those in the Orissa Act. 10. In the case of Abdul Kadan Khan v. Chairman, Puri Municipality, (AIR 1943 Patna 76), Harries, C. J. observed as follows : "...It appears to me that giving of notice of the proposed assessment and the date upon which the alteration will be made is a condition precedent to the right of the Municipality to make the alteration or addition. Unless such notice is given the alteration or addition cannot, in my view, be made......" There again, Courtney-Terrell, C. J.-, in the case of Lachminarayan Das v. Chairman, Cuttack Municipality, (AIR 1936 Patna 322) said : "...The effect of Sub-section (2) of Section 107 is to make the issue of at least one month's notice of the proposal to make an alteration a condition precedent to the making of the alteration itself. Where no such notice has been given the fact that the Municipality had already gone into the matter of the merits of the objection to the increased assessment is not a bar to the plaintiff's suit for consideration of validity of such assessment on merits." In this case it was further observed that in the absence of notice, the fact that the Municipality had already gone into the matter of the merits of the objection to the increased assessment would not create a bar to the suit for consideration of the validity of such assessment on merits. After the coming into force of the Patna Municipal Corporation Act which contains a similar provision in Section 139, Ramaswami, C. J. speaking for the Bench in the case of Messrs Rastogi Brothers v. Patna Municipal Corporation and others, (AIR 1960 Patna 172), rei erated the position and held that the Executive Officer could not alter the assessment without giving a notice to the occupier and without giving him an opportunity of being heard before making the order of fresh assessment. 11. 11. Confronted with this situation, learned counsel for the plaintiff raised yet another equally abortive argument under the pale of Section 156 of the Act which provides a bar for suits and reads as follows : "156". Bar of suits :_(1) No objection shall be taken to any assessment or valuation nor shall the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act. (2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying an order in respect of assessment or valuation or liability to assessment or taxation, shall contain the grounds and be final and binding ; xx xx xx It was submitted that in view of this legal bar, the orders in respect of the assessment passed by the statutory authority under the Municipal law were final and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to examine its correctness. This point is concluded by a long line of decisions. The leading and oft-cited case of Mask & Co. (AIR 1940 P. C. -105) has laid down that "the first principle which must be kept in view is that the Civil Court is a Court of plenary jurisdiction and is competent u/s 9 of the CPC to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred". Proceeding further, it was observed : " It is settied-law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Proceeding further, it was observed : " It is settied-law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well-settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure." A full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Patna Municipal Corporation v. Ram Bachan Lal (AIR 1961 Patna 142) faced with a somewhat similar situation, on reference to various decisions laid down as follows : "...To put it in other words, a jurisdictional fact must not only appear to a local authority to exist but it must, in fact, exist according to the findings of the Civil Court or the High Court in order that the authority can be held to have acted within its jurisdiction." The Supreme Court also in the case of Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana (AIR 1961 S.C. 1547), while considering certain provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act in relation to levy of terminal tax on salt following the principles of the Judicial Committee in the Mask & Co. (supra) held that a suit in Civil Court would always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, and it was observed that in cases where provisions of a particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted. 12. Mr. Misra, however, referred to the case of Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corporation (AIR 1977 S. C. 9V5). 12. Mr. Misra, however, referred to the case of Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corporation (AIR 1977 S. C. 9V5). That was a case where a suit was filed for recovery of certain amount on the ground that the Municipal authorities were not entitled to recover the amount by way of octroi duty and penalty and the defendants raised the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. That decision is entirely distinguishable on facts as the Civil Court could not determine and decide as to what would be the correct quantum of the valuation, but a jurisdictional question, which makes the assessment invalid on account of non-observance of certain mandatory provisions, stands entirely on a different footing. In this very case in paragraph 14 it has been observed: "...Such provisions, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.'' 13. Coming back again to Section 147 of the Act, Sub-section (3) thereof merits a closer scrutiny. It speaks of two things. Firstly, that the provisions of Sections 153, 154, 155, and 156 shall apply to any objection made in pursuance of a notice issued under Sub-section (2), thus, clearly contemplating that 'the person interested' has to make an objection in pursuance of the notice issued under Sub-section (2) and that he has got a right of filing an appeal contemplated under Clause (f) of Sub-section (1). The direction in the notice (Ext. 5) to the petitioner instead to file straightway an appeal, therefore, is destructive of the very object and purpose of the notice contemplated by the legislature and denied him to place his objection before the assessing authority where he could raise all questions of facts under Sub-section (2). Even the filing of an appeal would not cure the infirmity as already indicated and held in the decision in AlR 1936 Patna 322 (supra) In the case of Commissioner of Patna City Municipality v. Bishmbhardeo Narain (AIR 1937 Patna 586), where the notice under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act instead of being served u/s 107 (2). Even the filing of an appeal would not cure the infirmity as already indicated and held in the decision in AlR 1936 Patna 322 (supra) In the case of Commissioner of Patna City Municipality v. Bishmbhardeo Narain (AIR 1937 Patna 586), where the notice under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act instead of being served u/s 107 (2). Analogous to Section 147(2) of the Orissa Municipal Act was served u/s 115(2) of the same Act, and although in pursuance of the said defective notice the assessee appeared before the Committee, it was held that the same did not cure the defect of non-service of the notice u/s 107(2). 14. In that view of the matter, the issuance of a notice u/s 147(2) of the Municipal Act giving one month's notice to the person interested of any alteration of the assessment list proposed to be made under any of the clauses of Sub-section (1) is a condition precedent for ultimately effecting the alteration, and thus it is a jurisdictional fact. The question of compliance or non-compliance of this legal requirement therefore can be raised and decided in a civil suit. 15. No other point was urged regarding the incorrectness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge in AIR 1981 Orissa 29, nor did the learned counsel for the opposite party raise any question regarding the correctness of the said decision save and except that in view of the safeguards provided in the Statute itself, the person dissatisfied has got a complete machinery provided in that Act itself and therefore in view of the bar created for a civil suit, the matter should be confined to the four corners of the Municipal Act alone. This argument is completely misconceived. 16. On a review of the decisions referred to above, I find myself in complete agreement with the views taken by R. N. Misra, J. (as he then was) in AIR 1981 Orissa 29, and hold that the Courts below have acted with material irregularity in exercise of their jurisdiction and committed serious error of law in decreeing the suit on the basis of the enhanced amount of tax. I would accordingly allow Civil Revision No. 666 of 1981 and set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. I would accordingly allow Civil Revision No. 666 of 1981 and set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. I would however not deprive the Municipality of its legitimate dues calculated at the old rate since the enhancement alone is subject to objection. I therefore, send back the case to the trial Court with a direction to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff at the rate of tax existing prior to the enhancement. 17. For the reasons indicated earlier, Civil Revision No. 665 of 1981 is dismissed. No costs. R.C. Patnaik, J. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed