JUDGMENT : S.C. Mohapatra, J. - These two Civil Revisions between the same parties relate to a house, the land on which it stands and the adjacent landed property in Cuttack town. The parties being the same and the questions involved being inter-related, both the Civil Revisions are heard analogously and disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The predecessor-in-interest of the Petitioners filed Title Suit No. 55 of 1959 for title and permanent injunction in respect of the land and house in his possession. Opposite party filed House Rent Control Case No. 1 of 1960 for evicting the predecessor-in-interest of the Petitioners under the House Rent Control Act then in force. The suit is now pending in the trial court after remand by this Court. Eviction having been directed by the House Rent Controller, Execution Case No. 13 of 1974 is pending. An application u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, filed by the judgment-debtor challenging the executability of the decree and an application under Order 21, Rule 29, Code of Civil Procedure, filed for stay of the Execution Case having been dismissed, endeavour in a second round of attack in 1981 to avoid the eviction order has been frustrated. Like a drowning man catching at a straw, the judgment-debtor tried to defend his possession of the house in another front by filing an application for ad interim injunction during the pendency of the suit to restrain the decree-holder Defendant from interfering with his possession on the basis of the order of eviction in H.R.C. Case No. 1 of 1960. Having failed in the trial court, he approached the appellate court to become un-successful in that forum also. Hence Civil Revision No. 548 of 1981 has been filed to get the order of ad interim injunction. Civil Revision No. 570 of 1981 has been filed to make the execution proceeding dormant. The judgment-debtor Plaintiff has left this mortal world vanquished in the litigations to be substituted by his legal representatives in these two Civil Revisions. 3. The decree-holder in this case is not an individual. It is the Managing Committee of Sri Jagannath Temple, Puri clothed with Statutory power to effectively manage the temple by Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954 (Orissa Act XI of 1955). 3. The decree-holder in this case is not an individual. It is the Managing Committee of Sri Jagannath Temple, Puri clothed with Statutory power to effectively manage the temple by Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954 (Orissa Act XI of 1955). The order of eviction under the House Rent Control Act is not for own use of the landlord but on account of misconduct of the tenant. 4. In the background of the salient facts, it is to be considered: (a) Whether application u/s 47, CPC in the Execution Case should me allowed to be entertained? (b) Whether the Court should exercise the Judicial discretion in granting the ad interim injunction in the suit? (c) How can the interests of both the parties be protected? 5. Mr. B.H. Mohanty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Executing Court exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity in rejecting the second application u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, in the facts and circumstances of this case since the first application was not decided on merits. I am not able to appreciate the submission of Mr. Mohanty in this case. In the execution of an order of eviction by the House Rent Controller under the special statute, the facts found by the Tribunal cannot be interfered with. The present case does not come within that category. It is not brought to my notice that the statutory authorities under the House Rent Control Act had no jurisdiction to order eviction or that on the facts found, the ingredients of eviction are not satisfied. It is only where the order is a nullity, the Executing Court would have jurisdiction to interfere. Accordingly I am satisfied that the Executing Court is justified in rejecting the application u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure. 6. The appellate court has dismissed the appeal against refusal of the prayer for ad interim injunction in view of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which reads as follows: 41 Injunction when refused: An injuction cannot be granted- (a) xx xx xx (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; (c) to (j) xx xx xx 7. This Court had occasion to consider the question of granting the prayer for ad interim injunction by courts where execution proceedings for eviction arising out of orders under House Rent Control Act were pending. In a decision reported in Shri R.S. Patel v. Shri B.K. Gupta and Anr. 41 (1975) C.L.T. 882, one of the questions was whether the Court of Munsif where the execution proceeding was pending is subordinate to the court of Subordinate Judge in which the ad interim injunction was sought for in a pending suit. Relying upon an earlier Division Bench decision reported in Narayan Misra Vs. Surendranath Das and Others it was held that Court of Munsif is not subordinate. In a decision reported in Smt. Nalinibala Das and Anr. v. Smt. Geeta Bose and Ors. 50 (1980) C.L.T. 63, it was held: With the amendment of the Code in 1976, the Patna amendment of Order 39, Rule 1 of the 1908 Code running counter to the terms of the amended Code has been deleted and at present there is no impediment for the Subordinate Judge to grant injunction against the Munsif. The present case is distinguishable on this question since the suit and the Execution Case both are in the courts of the Munsifs. 8. Mr. C.R. Nanda, the learned Counsel for the opposite party relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Cotton Corporation of India Limited Vs. United Industrial Bank Limited and Others, and submitted that the decision in Smt. Nalinibala Das and Anr. v. Smt. Gita Bose and Ors. 50 (1980) C.L.T. 63 (supra) being contrary to the principle decided by the Supreme Court is no more binding. He submitted that even assuming that the Patna amendment has been deleted, Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act will have its own force. The contention of Mr. Nanda finds full support from Cotton Corporation of India Limited Vs. United Industrial Bank Limited and Others. Independent of any provision as in the Patna amendment, Supreme Court was considering whether in view of Section 41(b) the Court will have jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. United Industrial Bank Limited and Others. Independent of any provision as in the Patna amendment, Supreme Court was considering whether in view of Section 41(b) the Court will have jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. Discussing the Legislative intention behind Section 41(b), it held: ...the Court is precluded from granting an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction. In view of the clear dictum of the Supreme Court there is no scope for the Court of Second Munsif, Cuttack to grant ad interim injunction whereby the execution proceeding in the court of First Munsif which is of co-ordinate jurisdiction cannot be prosecuted and accordingly, in exercise of revisional power, the judicial discretion ought not to be exercised for granting the injunction. 9. The Court is not, however, helpless in the matter to pass any other temporary order to protect the interest of both the parties. Order 39, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, gives wide power to Court to make such other order as it deems fit where the Defendant threatens to dispossess the Plaintiff from the disputed property, even if no injunction can be granted. The relevant portion of Order 39, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, reads as follows: 1. Cases in which injunction may be granted. Where in any suit, it is proved by affidavit or otherwise. (a) xx xx xx (b) xx xx xx (c) that the Defendant threatens to dispossess the Plaintiff or otherwise causes injury to the Plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging alienation sales removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of the Plaintiff or causing injury to the Plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the Court cannot grant injunction in exercise of Power under Order 39, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, in view of the statutory bar u/s 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, it does not become a silent spectator where circumstances demand and it may make such other order as it may think fit which power is vested in the Court by the provision itself. 10. Plaintiff claims title to the property where from he is to be evicted on the finding that he was a statutory tenant under the Defendant by the authorities under the House Rent Control Act. Original Plaintiff and after him the Petitioners are now under the threat of being dispossessed in execution of the decree. This Court has remanded the suit for fresh trial appreciating that a fair case has been made out by the Plaintiff to be raised in the suit. In the decision reported in Smt. Nalinibala Das's case 50 (1980) C.L.T. 63 (supra) eviction of the widow of the deceased tenant with another was considered to constitute irreparable injury. In Shri R.S. Patel's case 41 (1975) C.L.T. 882 (supra), on the facts of that case it has been held that execution of an order of eviction does not amount to committing any injury of any kind. It has not, however, been considered if the execution of the order of eviction amounts to a threat to dispossess. 11. From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the trial court had no jurisdiction to restrain the Defendant from prosecuting the execution proceeding even in a case where the Plaintiff has a fair case to raise and is being threatened to be dispossessed. The Court can, however make such other order as it thinks fit. During pendency of an execution proceeding, it is open to a decree-holder to take possession of the property from the judgment-debtor out of Court and on that basis move the executing Court to record satisfaction of the decree. The decree-holder may take possession through Court either himself or through authorised agent. When there are several ways in which the decree can be satisfactorily executed, it will not be unjustified for a Court to find out a way by which the decree would be executed, and all the same the judgment-debtor will not be dispossessed. The decree-holder may take possession through Court either himself or through authorised agent. When there are several ways in which the decree can be satisfactorily executed, it will not be unjustified for a Court to find out a way by which the decree would be executed, and all the same the judgment-debtor will not be dispossessed. This can be done in case the disputed property remains custodia legis. The property being in charge of the Court, the Defendant can report satisfaction of the decree and on that basis the execution case can be dosed on full satisfaction. The trial court shall appoint the Petitioners as joint receivers to continue in possession in that capacity on the condition that they shall deposit Rs. 500/- (five hundred) in the second week of every month beginning from the month of February, 1986 till disposal of the suit. They shall deposit such amount as the Court shall determine to be equivalent to the arrear of rent till the end of January, 1986, in such equal monthly instalments as would be directed by the Court. The trial court shall deal with the Petitioners as receiver appointed by it and shall deal with the defaults as it thinks proper. On conclusion of the suit in the trial court, direction shall be given to the Petitioners for complying with the consequential order. In view of the long pendency of the suit, all efforts should be made for disposal of the suit by the end of October, 1986. 12. In the result, both Civil Revision Nos. 548 and 570 of 1981 are disposed of subject to the aforesaid directions. No costs.