K. A. SWAMY, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has sought for quashing the orders dated 6-4-1984 and 20-6-1986 passed by respondents 2 and 3 produced as Annexures ,c' and ,d' respectively. The land in question is S. No. 99 measuring 2 acres of Thirumalahalli village, maasti Hobli, Malur Taluk, Kolar District. This was granted to the grand-father of the 4th respondent on 10-4-1956. It is not in dispute that the grand-father of the 4th respondent was a person belonging to Scheduled Caste. After the grant, the grand-father of the 4th respondent sold the land in question on 1. 4-1963 to one Sri Erappa who in turn sold the land in question on 9-9-1971 in favour of one smt. Venkatamma who in turn sold it in favour of one Sri Kanagala Muniswamy under the Sale-deed dated 9-9-1371. From Kanagala Muniswamy, the petitioner has purchased the land in question under a registered Sale-deed dated 8-5-1980. ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioner is that the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of certain lands) act of 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act'), as amended by Karnataka Act No. 13/1978 came into force on 1-1-1979 and on the date of coming into force of the Act, the predecessor in title of the petitioner had perfected his title by adverse possession. Therefore, it is contended, the respondents 2 and 3 have acted illegally in setting aside the alienation and regranting the land in question in favour of 4th respondent. ( 3 ) THERE is no doubt that by the time the Act came into force, the alienees had been in continuous possession for over a period of 12 years. But this period is not sufficient to declare that the title had been perfected by adverse possession against the State on or before the Act came in to force. The prescriptive period of adverse possession as against the Slate is 30 years. But this period is not sufficient to declare that the title had been perfected by adverse possession against the State on or before the Act came in to force. The prescriptive period of adverse possession as against the Slate is 30 years. In Sunkara rajyalakshmi and others, v State of Kama- taka (1985 (1) Scale 445) the Supreme court has held that the Act"will not apply where the transferees have perfected their title in the granted land by prescription of long and continuous enjoyment before the commencement of the act, the pericd of limitation which has to be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the title has been perfected by prescription is that which runs against the State Government, and therefore it would be 30 years end not 12 years". In the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioner that the transferees had been in long and continuous enjoyment adversely for a period of 30 years, on the date the Act came into force. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in manche Gowda and others, v State of karnataka and others, reported in 1984 (2), kar. L. J. page-1. In Manchegowda's case, the Supreme Court has held as follows ;"any person who acquires such granted land by transfer from the original grantee in breach of the condition relating to prohibition on such transfer must necessarily be presumed to be aware of the prohibition imposed on the transfer of such granted land. Anybody who acquires such granted land in contravention of the prohibition relating to transfer of such granted land cannot be considered to be a bona fide purchaser for value ; and every such transferee acquires to his knowledge only a voidable title to the granted land. The title acquired by such transfer is defeasible and is liable to be defeated by an appropriate action taken in this regard. If the. Legislature under such circumstances seek to intervene in the interests of these weaker sections of the community and choose to substitute a speedier and cheaper method of recovery of these granted lands which were otherwise liable to be resumed through legal process, it cannot, in our opinion, be said that any vested rights of the transferees are affected. If the. Legislature under such circumstances seek to intervene in the interests of these weaker sections of the community and choose to substitute a speedier and cheaper method of recovery of these granted lands which were otherwise liable to be resumed through legal process, it cannot, in our opinion, be said that any vested rights of the transferees are affected. Transferees of granted lands with full knowledge of the legal position that the transfers made in their favour in contravention of the terms of grant or any law, rule or regulation governing such grant are liable to be defeated in law, cannot and do not have in law or equity,, a genuine or real grievance that their defeasible title in such granted lands so transferred is, in fact being defeated and they are being dispossessed of such lands from which they were in law liable to dispossessed by process of law. The position will, however, be somewhat different where the transferees have acquired such granted lands not in violation of any term of the grant or any law regulating such grant as also where any transferee who may have acquired a defeasible title in such granted lands by the transfer thereof in contravention of the terms of the grant or any law regulating such grant has perfected his title by prescription of time or otherwise. We shall consider such cases later on. But where the transferee acquires only a defeasible title liable to be defeated in accordance with law, avoidance of such defeasible title which still remains liable to be defeated in accordance with law at the date of commencement of the Act and recovery of possession of such granted land on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act, cannot be said to be constitutionally invalid and such a provision cannot be termed as un-conscionable, unjust end atbitrpry. The first two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are, therefore, over-ruled. " (Emphasis Supplied), in para 24 of the aforesaid Judgment with reference to perfection of title by adverse possession by the transferee on the date the Act into force is held as follows:"24. The first two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are, therefore, over-ruled. " (Emphasis Supplied), in para 24 of the aforesaid Judgment with reference to perfection of title by adverse possession by the transferee on the date the Act into force is held as follows:"24. Also in case where granted lands had been transferred before the commencement of the Act inviolation of the condition regarding prohibition on such transfer and the transferee who had initially acquired only a voidable title in such granted lands by prescription bylong and continuous enjoyment thereof in accordance with lew before the commencement of the Act, such granted lands would also not come within the purview of the present Act as the title of such transferees to the granted lands has been perfected before the commencement of the Act the title of such transferees hed ceased to be voidable by reason of acquisition of prescriptive rights on account of long and continued user for the requisite period, the title of such transferees could not be rendered void by virtue of the provisions of the Act without violating the constitutional guarantee. We must, therefore, read down the provisions of the Act by holding that the Act will apply to transfers of granted lands made in breach of the condition imposing prohibition on transfer of granted lands only in those cases where the title acquired by the transferee was still voidable at the date of the commencement of the Act and had not lost its defeasible character at the date when the Act came into force. Transferees of granted lands having a perfected and not a voidable title at the commencement of the Act must be held to be outside the pale of the provisions of the Act. Sec. 4 of the Act must be so construed as not to have the effect of rendering void the title of any transferee which was not voidable at the date of the commencement of the Act. "from the aforesaid portions of the decision in Manchegowda's case, it is clear that the Supreme Court did not hold as to against whom the title by adverse possession was required to be perfected, it is in the later decision in sunkara Rajyalakshmi's case reported in 1985 (1) SCALE, 445 this point is made clear that the perfection of title by adverse possession by the transferee must be against the State. Having regard to the aforesaid decision in Sunkara rajyalakshmi's case which is rendered in the context which applies to the case on hand, the decision in Manche Gowda's case cannot be of any assistance to the case on hand. ( 4 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I do not find any good ground to issue rule. The Petition is accordingly rejected. --- *** --- .