THE FACT M. S. H. C. CO-OP. SOCIETY LTD. v. A. J. CONSTRUCTIONS
1986-09-10
SUKUMARAN
body1986
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, Co-operative Society, was a party to an arbitration case before the 2nd respondent. It was represented through counsel. On 22-4-1985, the Arbitrator passed Ext. P2 proceedings. After referring to the anterior postings (including an adjournment made at the instance of the Arbitrator) it stated: "The attitude and nature of the Society and its counsel are not at all helpful in disposing of the case. Hence I rejected the Vakalath under R.67(8) of the Act." The proceedings are challenged by the Society in this writ petition. R.67(8) referred to in the proceedings reads: "67(8). In the proceedings before the Registrar or such other person deciding the dispute or the arbitrator, legal practitioners shall not be entitled, as a matter of right, to appear to represent parties 2. The background of the statutory rule may be briefly referred to, to appreciate the contention raised in the original petition. It occurs in Chapter IX dealing with Settlement of Disputes. The provisions virtually supplant the ordinary provisions for resolution of civil disputes through civil court, as ordinarily available under the Civil Procedure Code. The special machinery is intended to expedite the proceedings and curtail the expenses. A summary procedure is visualised under R.67(4) in relation to the recording of the evidence. These innovations, however, do not detract from the essentially judicial character of the proceedings. The proceedings start with an application accompanied by the relevant records on which the dispute is based. The application has to be served on the defendant. The Registrar can direct a party to produce a certified copy of the records on which the dispute is based and such other statements or records as may be required. The Registrar or the Administrator has the power to administer the oaths, to require the attendance of the parties and witnesses and the production of books and documents relating to the matter in dispute. He has the power to inspect any property and to summon and examine any person as a witness or issue commissions for examination of witness whose evidence is found to be necessary. The award has to be given upon the evidence recorded and after consideration of the documentary evidence produced by the parties. The award shall be given in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience.
The award has to be given upon the evidence recorded and after consideration of the documentary evidence produced by the parties. The award shall be given in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience. It has to be reduced in writing and pronounced soon after the culmination of the proceedings or on a later but notified date. 3. Some disputes may be simple ones. Some may entail complicated questions. Having regard to the special procedure provided for the arbitration, parties may be satisfied with the personal presentation of their cases supported by oral and documentary evidence where issues involved are simple enough. In disputes where the stakes are high, where the evidence is elaborate, or where legal principles are intricate, counsel's aid and advice could be sought. There is no total prohibition as against the legal practitioners appearing for, or pleading the case of, the parties to a dispute. No doubt, under R.67(8), an absolute right of appearance in such proceedings is not available for the legal practitioner. To that extent, the controlling officer, the Registrar or the Arbitrator, may be justified in given cases and situations, not to permit a legal practitioner to appear before him. Denial to a party of a right to be represented by the legal practitioner, must, however, be on a proper and careful evaluation of the nature of the dispute and other attendant circumstances, as indicated earlier. The discretion, like any other statutory discretion, has to be exercised in accordance with rational and reasonable factors. Whimsical behaviour or arbitrary approach shall be carefully eschewed. 4. It is useful to bear in mind in that connection the trends noticed here and elsewhere in relation no attempts at excluding legal practitioners from appearing and pleading the causes of the clients before judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. In very many areas where the life and career of an individual are seriously involved in a good adjudication, availability of legal counsel and aid has to be ensured so as to shield enquiry itself from an attack based on a complaint of unfairness. Some Courts have gone even to extreme lengths in dealing with situations where legal counsel is mandated. The Supreme Court of America observed that any person haled into court, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. (See Gideon v. Wainwrtght 372 U. S.345 9 L. Ed.
Some Courts have gone even to extreme lengths in dealing with situations where legal counsel is mandated. The Supreme Court of America observed that any person haled into court, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. (See Gideon v. Wainwrtght 372 U. S.345 9 L. Ed. 2nd 799 and Argeson v. Hamlin, 407 U. S.25 32 L. Ed. 2nd 530.) A civil proceeding including an arbitration dispute can have drastic consequences on the life of an individual. Providing legal counsel would be a necessary and basic attribute of fair play even in such cases. The Courts have been extremely indulgent in ensuring assistance by a legal counsel where disciplinary proceedings involving serious consequences are conducted. 5. The experience in England in excluding the legal practitioner in certain taxation proceedings, is particularly worth studying. That has been sketched vividly in the following words: "It starts, amusingly by having been exactly the opposite of what it is today. In 1880. the prohibition was enacted in S.57 (9) of the Taxes Management Act 1880, which provided: 'No barrister, solicitor, attorney, or any person practising the law (I suppose the last phrase refers to special pleaders in equity) shall be allowed to plead before the said Commissioners on such appeal for the appellant either viva voce or by writing.' Thus, the total exclusion of lawyers was the then rule. Gradually that was transformed, and the words 'viva voce' were turned into 'orally', so that today, in S. SO (5) of the Taxes Management Act 1970, it reads: "Upon any appeal the Commissioners shall (it is mandatory) permit any barrister or solicitor to plead before them either orally or in writing, and shall hear any accountant that is to say a qualified accountant. It is notable that there is a distinction drawn between the privilege thereby conferred on the legal profession as a whole to plead either orally or in writing, and on accountants, who are required to be heard but in respect of whom no reference to writing is made " (See Banin v. Mac Kinlay, (1984) 1 All E. R.1116 at 1124.) 6. Even before Tribunals or Courts (like Chose established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) objection to the appearance of legal counsel are seldom raised, notwithstanding an enabling section, S.36 (3).
Even before Tribunals or Courts (like Chose established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) objection to the appearance of legal counsel are seldom raised, notwithstanding an enabling section, S.36 (3). Presence of a counsel may be more a help than a hindrance in the identification of the real issues, in the marshalling of relevant evidence, and the focusing of arguments, in relation to the resolution of a controversy. 7. The action of the Registrar in rejecting the vakalat of the Society in the dispute has to be evaluated in the background of the above guidelines. 8. In the present case, the party respondent has not raised any objection to the society being represented by counsel. No facts justifying the invocation of R.67 (8) have been mentioned in the order. The order cannot therefore be sustained. Ext. P2 is therefore quashed. It is declared that the petitioner will be permitted to appear before the Arbitrator through counsel. 9. It is necessary to impress upon the 2nd respondent that he is expected to arbitrate and not to act arbitrarily. The attitude of the 2nd respondent it not consistent with the position he occupies, the responsibility he bears and the trust reposed in him as a statutory functionary. 10. The original petition is allowed. I do not order costs against the 2nd respondent in the belief that bis indiscretion was the result of a misapprehension of the powers conferred on him under the Rules. Allowed.