FAROOQ HASAN, J.—This appeal has been presented against the judgment dated 30.11.77 passed by the Sessions Judge, Bharatpur in Sessions Case No. 40/77 whereby the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondents from all the charges levelled against them. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that Rampershad (PW-1) lodged a report at P.S. Kumher on 8.3.77 at 10 AM. It was alleged in that report that on 6.3.77 at about 10 AM the informant and his father Roopkishore were harvesting the mustard crop in their Khalyan At that time, the accused-respondents Pooran, Laxman and Brijwasi went to the Khalyan of the informant armed with spade and lathis with the intention to commit murder of Roopkishore. Brijwasi gave threatening to his father that Roopkishore is a great litigant and he had instituted a lot of cases against them (accused) and as such they are facing a lot of trouble. Therefore, we will finish Roopkishore today. After this threathing accused Laxman and Brijwasi caught hold of Roopkishore and Pooran gave a spade blow on the head of Roopkishore. As Roopkishore was falling down, Laxman gave another blow on the person of Roopkishore which hit him on the back. Roopkishore started bleeding from his head injury. It has been further alleged that Pw-1 Rampershad raised an alarm. Lehricharan and others who were present nearby the scene of occurrence came to the spot. Brijwasi also raised a lathi to inflict a blow on the person of Roopkishore but it was caught hold of by Rampershad, and thus the above eye witness and Rampershad saved Roopkishore from further beating. The accused respondents thinking that Roopkishore might have died, ran away. 3. On this report the police registered a case under Sec. 307/34, IPC. Roopkishore expired on 9.3.77 at 4.30 P.M. and, therefore, the case under Sec. 307, IPC was converted to Sec. 302, IPC. After completing the investigation, a challan was filed against the accused-respondents in the court of Addl. Munsif & Judicial Magistrate (1), Bharatpur, who committed the accused to the Court of Sessions on 30.4 77. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges against the accused to which they did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution produced as many as 13 witnesses in support of the charge framed against the accused. Munsif & Judicial Magistrate (1), Bharatpur, who committed the accused to the Court of Sessions on 30.4 77. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges against the accused to which they did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution produced as many as 13 witnesses in support of the charge framed against the accused. Then the statements of the accused u/s. 313, Cr.P.C. were recorded who denied the allegations levelled against them by the prosecution witnesses. It was further alleged by the respondents that because of jealousy and strained relations the witnesses have deposed against them. After hearing arguments, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondents from all the charges levelled against them. Hence, this appeal. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. The learned P.P. Mr. R. Alvi and the learned counsel for the complainant made the following submissions:- 1. That the learned Sessions Judge committed error in acquitting the accused-respondents on the ground that the report of the incident was lodged after a long delay. Rampershad (PW-l) has satisfactorily explained the delay in his statement as well as in the report itself wherein it has been stated that he could not lodge the report earlier because he was attending his father in the hospital at Bharatpur and that he regularly attended him. The condition of the injured remained serious throughout, and, therefore, it was not possible for the informant to leave his father alone in the hospital. 2. That the lower court has erred in not believing the reliable and trustworthy witnesses of the prosecution. 3. That the lower court has wrongly appreciated the prosecution evidence and has committed an error in drawing adverse inference for the non-production of one Bhikki, who is admitted to be present at the spot by the prosecution witnesses. 4. That the lower court has committed an error in disbelieving the prosecution story on the ground that the F.I.R. was sent to the Magistrate concerned after a long delay. 5. That inconsistency in the prosecution version may occur but that by itself is not sufficient to throw out the prosecution case. 6. That though the witnesses of recovery of the blood stained spade (Fawra) turned hostile but still the evidence of recovery of the Fawra can be relied upon on the basis of the statement of the Investigation Officer. 7. That inconsistency in the prosecution version may occur but that by itself is not sufficient to throw out the prosecution case. 6. That though the witnesses of recovery of the blood stained spade (Fawra) turned hostile but still the evidence of recovery of the Fawra can be relied upon on the basis of the statement of the Investigation Officer. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand argued that the delay in lodging the report has not been explained satisfactorily and that the eye witnesses are not only related to the deceased but are inimical towards the accused, which has been admitted by the eye witnesses in their cross-examination. The delayed despatch of F.I.R. to the concerning Magistrate is a serious infirmity and it casts a great doubt on the prosecution version. He has further submitted that it has been admitted by the prosecution witnesses that Bhikki whose house is just near the place of occurrence also appeared at the spot, but he has not been produced by the prosecution. As such, the adverse inference drawn by the learned Sessions Judge cannot be said to be bad in law. He also submitted that the recovery of the spade has not been proved. The recovery has been made from an open land accessible to all. It has been stated that the spade was blood stained, but there was no such mention in the recovery memo which makes the recovery doubtful. Moreover, the recovery was made after 18 days of the occurrence, and the spade was sent to the Serologist after 26 days. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the deceased sustained injury by a blunt object The prosecution witnesses have alleged that the injury was caused by Fawra. Looking to the statements and the allegations there was no reason to use the blunt side of the spade in a case where the offender was having a sharp object, and as such it should be presumed that the sharp side of the weapon was used. Because of this reason the prosecution evidence becomes doubtful. The learned counsel lastly submitted that the appeal is against the judgment of acquittal, which is based on good reasonings. Therefore, interference in the judgment of acquittal is not possible. 8. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the entire record. 9. Because of this reason the prosecution evidence becomes doubtful. The learned counsel lastly submitted that the appeal is against the judgment of acquittal, which is based on good reasonings. Therefore, interference in the judgment of acquittal is not possible. 8. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the entire record. 9. It is an admitted fact that the occurrence took place on 6 3.77 at 1.30 P.M. and the report was lodged on 8 3.77. ft is thus clear that there is a delay in lodging the report. It has also been contended on behalf of the prosecution that the informant was of tender age at the time of occurrence. It was difficult for him to leave his father on the death bed and to rush for lodging the report. We have gone through the statement of PW-1 Rampershad wherein he has admitted that he along with Ramdayal. Durga Pershad, Kewalram and other persons took the deceased to the hospital. It has been further admitted by PW-1 Rampershad that Lehricharan also visited the hospital. PW-3 Lehricharan also admitted that Rampershad, Kewalram and mother and wife of the deceased were also attending the deceased on 7.3.77. PW-1 Rampershad has also admitted before the trial court that his brother Rajendra Pershad also came in the hospital on the day of occurrence in the evening and he (PW-1 Rampershad) narrated the whole incident to Rajendra Prasad, who is a Government servant in police department, and was posted in Bharatpur city, at Mathura Gate Police Outpost. PW-5 Ram Dayal has stated that one police man from Mathura Gate also came to see the condition of the deceased. This statement of Ramdayal is corroborated from the entry in Roznamcha of Mathura Gate Police Outpost. It has also been stated that a letter from the doctor who was attending the deceased was received at the said police outpost, wherein it was desired that a dying declaration of Rookishore be recorded immediately. Alongwith letter (Ex. P-7) a constable was sent to the hospital and the Medical Officer Incharge of the ward was requested to report whether the patient is in a position to give statement or not, and on this the Medical Officer of the Ward reported that the patient was semi-conscious and was unable to give statement. This report is marked as C-D on Ex. P-7. This report is marked as C-D on Ex. P-7. It is thus clear that the explanation given by Rampershad in lodging the report after two days cannot be held to be satisfactory. He was not the only person who was attending his father Roopkishore in the hospital. Report (Ex. P1) is a typed report which starts as under:- ^^fuosnu gS fd vkt fnukad 6-3-77 fnu ds djhc 10 cts dh ckr gSA** This shows that this report was got typed on the day of incident, because in this report the word "vkt" has been used. At the bottom of this report (Ex. P-l) there is an over-writing on the date, and it appears that 6.3.77 was changed and 7.3.77 was typed If it is admitted that the report was typed on 7.3.77, still it was lodged on 8.3.77. It is thus clear that the report was lodged completely after one day. PW-1 Rampershad has stated that initially he wrote part of the report on 7.3.77 and the other part on 8.3.77, and after completing it he went to the typist and got the report typed. This shows that Ex. P-l has been copied by a handwritten report, which has not been brought on record. PW-1 Rampershad has stated that after the report was typed he torn out the original report which was hand-written. We fail to understand as to why the report was written in two phases. This explanation of the informant that he remained busy in attending his father is not plausible because of the circumstances mentioned above. In criminal cases there should not be any inordinate delay in lodging the report of the incident. This is so because a coloured version may not be inserted in the report and the police should be set in motion immediately, so that the police may also know the real facts of the incident. In Ramji Surja V. State of Maharashtra (1) it has been observed by the Honble Supreme Court that attempt of the prosecution to explain the delay has failed in the instant case, since there are several different versions about the lodging of information with the police outpost. Extra-ordinary delay in giving the first information to the police in the present case, which has not been properly explained, cannot but be viewed with suspicion. Extra-ordinary delay in giving the first information to the police in the present case, which has not been properly explained, cannot but be viewed with suspicion. The reason given by the prosecution for the inordinate delay in reporting the incident to the police outpost is hardly convincing. 10. We have observed in the case before us that the explanation given by the informant for the delay in lodging the report is not convincing and plausible. There were a lot of persons including the brother, mother and grand-mother of the informant who could have lodged the report at the police station, specially when the brother of the informant Rajendra Pershad, who also met the informant in the hospital on the day of incident, is an employee of the police department. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the delay has not been explained in this case, and the same is fatal to the prosecution. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge was justified in excluding the same. 11. On the basis of Ex. P-l the F.I.R, Ex. P.2 was chalked out on 8.3.77 at 10 A.M. This report was received in the court of Addl. Munsif & Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Bharatpur on 25.3.77. There is the endorsement marked X-Y on Ex. P-2 in this respect. It is thus clear that the despatch of Ex P-2 was not in accordance with Sec. 157, Cr.P.C. and in view of the decision taken in the case Ishwarsingh V. State of U.P. (2) it can be safely concluded that the extraordinary delay in sending the F.I.R. is a circumstance which provides a legitimate basis for suspecting that the F.I.R. was recorded much later than the stated date and hour affording sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and embellishments and set up a distorted version of the occurrence. In order to satisfy ourselves we called for the Receipt Register of the court of Addl. Munsif & Judicial Magistrate (1), Bharatpur. In that register, receipt of Ex. P.2 is shown on 25.3.77. Therefore, it cannot be doubted that Ex. P.2 was not received on 25.3.77. We are afraid to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the complainant to the effect that even after delay in lodging the report and despatching the F.I.R. to the concerning Magistrate, the whole case of the prosecution cannot be thrown out. Therefore, it cannot be doubted that Ex. P.2 was not received on 25.3.77. We are afraid to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the complainant to the effect that even after delay in lodging the report and despatching the F.I.R. to the concerning Magistrate, the whole case of the prosecution cannot be thrown out. The cases referred to by the learned counsel are not based On the facts similar to the case in hand. Even in those cases this rule is made absolute that the report should be lodged without any delay and that the F.I.R should be despatched to the concerning Magistrate u/s. 157, Cr.P.C. at the earliest. 12. The learned Sessions Judge after considering the entire evidence of the prosecution came to the conclusion that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses is not trustworthy, and the learned Sessions Judge has given reasons for the same In the judgment of acquittal interference is possible only when the view taken by the lower court is perverse and is not borne out by the evidence on record and is not reasonably possible. Generally the High Courts do not reverse the finding of acquittal by taking a different view of the evidence. For this observation, we find support from the case Ganesh Bhawan Patel V. State of Maharashtra (3). Generally the High Courts do not reverse the finding of acquittal by taking a different view of the evidence. For this observation, we find support from the case Ganesh Bhawan Patel V. State of Maharashtra (3). We would like to reproduce the relevant observations of this case, which are as under:- "Although in an appeal from an order of acquittal the powers of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions are as extensive as in an appeal against an order of conviction, yet as a rule of prudence, it should always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." Where two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court should as a matter of Judicial caution, refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the court below. In other words, if the main grounds on which the court below has based its order acquitting the accused, are reasonable and plausible, and cannot be entirely and effectively dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the acquittal. Where in prosecution for offence of murder, the evidence of material prosecution witnesses were found to be unsafe to be acted upon, when considered in the light of the all-pervading circumstances there was inordinate delay in recording informers statement (on the basis of which the F.I R. was registered) and further delay in recording the statement of material witnesses in view of these circumstances it could be said that the prosecution story was conceived and constructed after a good deal of deliberation and delay in a shady setting, highly redolent of doubts and suspicion. For an appeal against acquittal of accused in such a case, the all vitiating circumstances had not been effectively dispelled by the High Court except by a blind acceptance of the ipse dixit of the Sub-Inspector concerned in preference to the testimony of the informer, the conviction of the accused by the High Court was not justified." 13. We have also gone through the statements of the prosecution witnesses specially the eye-witnesses. It has been claimed by the respondent that the eye-witnesses were having jealousy with the respondent and that their relations with the eye witnesses are strained. This contention of the respondent finds support from the statements of the eye witnesses. PW-1 Rampershad in his statement admitted that PW-5 Ramdayal filed a suit/complaint "DAVA" against the respondent and in that suit his father and brothers were the witnesses. It has been further admitted by PW-1 Rampershad that the respondent Brijwasi has also filed a suit/complaint "DAVA" against his father and others. PW-3 Lehricharan in his statement admitted that a case filed by respondent Brijwasi is pending against him. In that case his wife is also an accused. PW-5 Ramdayal has admitted in his statement that a case filed by Brijwasi was pending against him. He further stated that he also filed a case against the respondent Brijwasi at the instance of Roopkishore (deceased). Similarly, PW-10 Durgaprasad also admitted in his statement that the respondent filed a complaint against his three sons and wife, which is pending It is thus clear that the eye witnesses cannot be held to be independent witnesses and because of this reason the non-production of Bhikki is fatal to the prosecution. When admittedly Bhikki was present at the spot, we find no reason on record for his non-production. It was the duty of the prosecution to have produced him as a witness, because he can be said to be independent witness Therefore, a presumption can be drawn against the prosecution that in case Bhikki would have been produced as a witness, he would have stated something against the prosecution or would not have supported the prosecution story. 14. The contention of the learned counsel that the deceased sustained injury by blunt object, while the case of the prosecution is that the blow was given by Fawra. 14. The contention of the learned counsel that the deceased sustained injury by blunt object, while the case of the prosecution is that the blow was given by Fawra. which has a sharp side, It was the case of the prosecution that the respondents went on the spot with intent to commit murder of Roopkishore. In these circumstances, the easiest method of inflicting fatal blow would have to use the sharp side of the Fawra and not its blunt side This is also a circumstance which makes the prosecution case doubtful. Moreover, its recovery has not been proved, because the witness for the recovery turned hostile. Secondly, in the recovery memo, it has not been mentioned that the Fawra was blood stained. Therefore, the report of the Serologist cannot be read against the respondents. PW-1 Rampershad deposed before the trial court that at the time when his father was standing on a short-distance from the cot, Pooran inflicted a Fawra blow on his head, and on sustaining the injury his father fell down. PW-1 Rampershad has admitted that at the place where his father fell down, the wound started bleeding, and then the injured was removed from the ground to the cot. Blood was found on the cot and on the guilt, but no blood was found at the place where the deceased fell down. This is also a circumstance to disbelieve the testimony of Rampershad (PW-1). 15. After going through the entire evidence and the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, we do not find any reason to interfere with the finding arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge. 16. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The accused-respondents are on bail and they need not surrender. Their bail bonds are cancelled.