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1986 DIGILAW 325 (DEL)

OM PARKASH v. RAJNI

1986-09-26

S.S.CHADHA

body1986
S. S. CHADHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is directed against the judgment and decree dt. Mar. , 12, 1984 of the Court of Shri M. A. Khan, Additional District Judge, Delhi dismissing the petition of the appellant for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce under S. 13 (1) (ia) of the said Act. ( 2 ) THE factual background is this. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on Jan. 22, 1980 at New Delhi according to Hindu rites and ceremonies. Both the parties cohabited at New Delhi and out of this wedlock, one male child named Kapil was born on Dec. 23, 1980 who is still alive and is living with the respondent. According to the appellant, the differences arose between the parties in the month of Jan. , 1981 and the respondent had left the house of the appellant on Feb. 15, 1981 with her son and went to her parents house with all her belongings like gold ornaments, clothes etc. Allegations of cruelty are made in paras 5, 6 and 7 of the petition in these words : "5. That the petitioner is the ly son of his parents and living with his mother and the respondent before leaving the house of the petitioner on 15-2-1981 had expressed her desire that the petitioner should live separately with the respondent to some other place although the petitioner has only his mother in his family to live with him and the sisters of the petitioner are married they are living with their husband and the father died in 1974. That this desire of the respondent really shocked the petitioner and gave mental pain to the petitioner. 6. That on 20-3-1981, the day of Holi, the petitioner was invited by his father-in-law on dinner at his residence and the petitioner went there with his maternal uncle Shri Madan Lal and when the petitioner and his maternal uncle reached at the house of his father-in-law instead of taking dinner at his in laws house the father-in-law and the whole family of the respondent argued on the differences between the petitioner and the respondent and during the arguments the father-in-law of the petitioner lost his temper and was given beating by his father-in-law and brother-in-laws at the instigation of his wife. The petitioner was rescued by the intervention of the neighbourers and by the maternal uncle of the petitioner who was with him at that time. That at that time the respondent instead of rescuing the petitioner used filthy languages for the petitioner. That this act of the respondent gave mental pain and agony to the petitioner. 7. That in the month of Apr. , 1981 the petitioner fell ill and the mother of the petitioner informed the respondent about the illness of the petitioner but the respondent did not care for the petitioner and also had not visited the house of the petitioner to know the condition of the petitioner. "it is pleaded that the respondent created and caused to be created such conditions which became so intolerable that it was impossible for the appellant to continue to live with the respondent. The petition was filed on July 1, 1981 seeking a dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce. ( 3 ) THE respondent denied the allegations of cruelty in the corresponding paragraphs of the written statement. It is denied that the respondent created or caused to be created such conditions which became intolerable or it was impossible for the appellant to continue to live with the respondent. It was also denied that there was any cruel treatment or misbehaviour by the respondent towards the appellant or it caused any physical or mental injury to the appellant. It is pleaded that with the permission of the appellant and his mother, the respondent s mother brought the respondent to her house on Feb. 15,1981 as it is customary, that the appellant allowed the respondent to live at least for about a month and agreed to bring her back to his house, that the appellant told the respondent that he needed Rs. 25,000. 00 for his business as already asked for and if she wanted to live with him at his house she should bring Rs. 25,000. 00, that the respondent s parents were unable to provide this amount and that the appellant refused to bring her back to his house. She expressed her readiness and willingness to go and live with the appellant at his house along with her child even in the written statement. Averments have been made in the written statements of several incidents but is is unnecessary to make a reference of them. She expressed her readiness and willingness to go and live with the appellant at his house along with her child even in the written statement. Averments have been made in the written statements of several incidents but is is unnecessary to make a reference of them. ( 4 ) THE trial commenced with the only issue whether the respondent was treating the appellant with cruelty. The evidence of the witnesses on behalf of the appellant and the respondent were recorded. In a lengthy judgment the entire evidence of the parties has been discussed and a conclusion arrived at that it is the appellant who is guilty of cruelty and that the respondent has not treated him with cruelty. ( 5 ) MR. G. L. Rawal, the learned counsel for the appellant took me through the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on the record. I have reproduced paras 5, 6 and 7 of the petition only with a view to express that a mass of evidence has been led on the record on pleas which were never put forward in the petition. The allegations of cruelty have been restricted to three incidents and no more. The law is well settled that no amount of evidence can be looked on a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings. No doubt cruelty is a wide concept, but it does imply that there should be specific allegations of cruelty with sufficient details so as to enable the other side to meet those allegations. They could not be brought for the first time in the statement of the witnesses. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, rightly brushed aside all that evidence after reproducing the same in the lengthy judgment. I am, therefore, confining myself to the allegations of cruelty which have been made in the petition. ( 6 ) AS regards the allegations in para 5 of the petition, the evidence of the appellant is that the respondent without any cause or reason left the house with the child on Feb. 15, 1981 and before leaving the house she categorically and unequivocablystated that she would not live with the appellant unless he separates his mother from him. The appellant deposes that the differences between them had started since about two or three months after the marriage on trivial matters, that in the month of Jan. 15, 1981 and before leaving the house she categorically and unequivocablystated that she would not live with the appellant unless he separates his mother from him. The appellant deposes that the differences between them had started since about two or three months after the marriage on trivial matters, that in the month of Jan. , 1981, the respondent desired to go to her parents house, that she also insisted upon the appellant to take a separate residence from his mother and sister and that she would not like to live with them. Of course, there is a complete denial by the respondent when she enters into the witness box. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on Jan. 22, 1980 and according to the appellant the differences started after about two or three months after the marriage, but in paragraph 4 of the petition it is stated that the differences arose between the parties in the month of Jan. 1981. When confronted with this contradiction, he admitted that differences between them arose only in the month of Jan. , 1981. The respondent actually left the matrimonial home on Feb. 15, 1981. There is evidence on the record that it is customary for the married woman to visit her parental home with the newly born child after the. 40th day of the birth of the child and the respondent left later because of the marriage of the appellant s sister which was performed on Feb. 17, 1981. Whether at the time of leaving on Feb. 15, 1981 she did say that she wanted the appellant to live separately from his mother is a question which may now be considered. Even if she had said so, this does not amount to cruelty. It is not that every time a wife says that the husband should live separately from his mother and the husband refuses to do so, it would be an unreasonable behaviour on the part of the wife and that it would amount to cruelty. A decision which affects both the parties and their children has to be taken together by the parties. It is the obligation of the parties to decide these questions by agreement, by give and take and not by the imposition of the will of the one over the other. A decision which affects both the parties and their children has to be taken together by the parties. It is the obligation of the parties to decide these questions by agreement, by give and take and not by the imposition of the will of the one over the other. The respondent expressed her willingness in the written statement even to go and live with the appellant in the matrimonial home and at the stage she did not even allege that the appellant should live separately from his mother. Again, the statement was made to a similar effect in Court. The learned Additional District Judge has considered the entire evidence of the parties to come to the conclusion that the appellant s relations with her mother-in-law were not at all bitter to induce her to demand a separate house from her and that the respondent had no reason for demanding a separate residence from him. I am also of the same view and confirm this finding. ( 7 ) THE second incident of the alleged cruelty on Mar. 2, 1981 is obviously concocted with a view to base the claim made in the petition. There could be no invitation by the father-in-law of the appellant for dinner at his residence as the father-in-law was on duty from 9 a. m. to 9. 30 p. m. on that day in his office. Shri H. P. Pardasani, R. W. 2 who is the Section Officer in the Ministry of Finance brought the records and stated that the appellant s father-in-law had attended the office from 9 a. m. to 9. 30 p. m. on Mar. 20, 1981, and that he was granted over-time allowance. Shri Madan Lal, the maternal uncle of the appellant was admittedly not invited and there was no reason why Madan Lal should go to the house of the father-in- law of the appellant. The incident of manhandling is stated in the evidence to have occurred at 7 p. m. on Mar. 20, 1981 when the appellant s father-in-law was detained in the office. ( 8 ) THE next allegation is that the respondent neglected the appellant during his illness which demanded her presence. The respondent has stated that she was not informed about the illness of the appellant in Apr. , 1981. 20, 1981 when the appellant s father-in-law was detained in the office. ( 8 ) THE next allegation is that the respondent neglected the appellant during his illness which demanded her presence. The respondent has stated that she was not informed about the illness of the appellant in Apr. , 1981. The appellant has not placed on record any evidence as to the nature of his illness or the period during which the appellant was ill or there was a compelling necessity of taking care of the appellant by the respondent. Thus there is no cogent and convincing evidence on record that the appellant either fell ill or the illness required the presence of the respondent and she failed to attend despite information to her. ( 9 ) NO other point has been urged. I, therefore, find no ground to interefere with the findings of the learned Additional District Judge. The appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.