JUDGMENT K.T. Thomas, J. 1. A large area consisting of different paddy fields belonging to different persons constellated into what is called a 'padasekharam'. The Plaintiff and 30 Ors. are the owners of those different paddy fields. After the harvest season, when the padasekharam is submerged in water, the right to catch fish there from and the right to feed ducks therein were granted to the highest bidder, as a usual practice. The Defendant bid in auction those rights during the season following the second harvest in 1977 for a sum of Rs. 70,200 and paid an advance of Rs. 35,100. He executed Ext. A-1 agreement in favour of the owners of the paddy fields on 1st August 1977 agreeing to pay the balance amount in two equal instalments, the first instalment being payable on or before 31st January 1978 and the second instalment on or before 28th February 1978. The Defendant also agreed to pay a further sum of Rs. 800 to two of the owners of the paddy fields as the fishing nets were to be spread in the paddy fields of those persons. As the Defendant committed breach of the agreement, the Plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of Rs. 18,900 with interest. The Court below granted a decree for the said sum with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of suit together with costs. Hence, the Defendant has come up in appeal. 2. In the plaint it is alleged that the Defendants had paid only a sum of Rs. 17,000 out of the amount payable on or before 31st January 1978, and the balance has not been paid. Hence, a notice was issued through lawyer on 22nd May 1978. But in reply thereto, the Defendant put forward counter claims that actually amounts were due to the Defendants. Hence, the Plaintiff instituted the suit. 3. The material contentions of the Defendant in the written statement, in brief, are the following: The suit is not maintainable, and the Plaintiff cannot file the suit without the junction of all the other owners of the paddy fields in the padasekharam. The entire amount due on 31st January 1978 has been paid off, and out of the sum due on 28th February 1978, the Defendant has paid Rs. 17,000 on different dates, besides the sum of Rs. The entire amount due on 31st January 1978 has been paid off, and out of the sum due on 28th February 1978, the Defendant has paid Rs. 17,000 on different dates, besides the sum of Rs. 800 paid to the two owners of the paddy fields wherein the fishing nets were spread. As the Plaintiff and his associates (the other owners of the paddy fields) have committed breach of the agreement, the Defendant sustained huge loss which he is entitled to get from them. Because of the non co-operative attitude of the owners of the paddy fields, the Defendant had to expend large sums of money for catching fish from the padasekharam, besides the cost of construction of a sluice for dewatering purposes. The Defendant is thus entitled to get a deduction of Rs. 33,35261 from the bid amount. If the said deduction is made, it can be found that actually a sum of Rs. 32,802 is due to the Defendant on account of the damages sustained by the Defendant. For those and other reasons the Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 4. The Court below rejected the contentions of the Defendant. The learned Sub Judge found that the Plaintiff is entitled to maintain the suit as the terms of the agreement enable him to do so. The learned Sub Judge repelled the defendant's case that he has paid the sum of Rs. 17,000 as centended by him, towards the 2nd instalment due on 28th February 1978. The evidence adduced by the Defendant was held to be unreliable. Thus, a decree for Rs. 18,900 with future interest and costs was passed. 5. The first contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant was that the suit by the Plaintiff alone is not maintainable as Ext. A-1 agreement was executed in favour of 31 persons including the Plaintiff. The learned counsel referred to Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act wherein it is provided that when a person has made a promise with two or more persons, he has the right to claim performance of the contract from all the promisees jointly. The said section speaks of an exemption to the above rule if "a contrary intention appears from the contract". It is provided in Ext. The said section speaks of an exemption to the above rule if "a contrary intention appears from the contract". It is provided in Ext. A-1 that the Defendant shall pay the stipulated amount to party No. 3, who is admittedly the Plaintiff in this case, on behalf of the owners of the paddy fields in the padasekharam, and it is specifically provided therein that if the amount is not so paid, the Plaintiff will be entitled to file the suit for realisation of the sum. It is contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant that though there is such a recital in Ext. A-1, no such terms has been incorporated in Ext. B-8 (counter) agreement executed in favour of the Defendant on the same day. It is true that Ext. B-8 is silent about the right of the Plaintiff to initiate legal proceedings without the Ors. . Ext. B-8 does not appear to have been signed by a number of persons whose names are mentioned therein as executants. Thus, in effect Ext. B-8 is an incomplete document. That apart, Ext. B-8 cannot be considered de hors Ext. A-1. Both of them were executed on the same day, as between the same parties, regarding the same transaction. There is identity of subject matter as well as identity of parties, in the two documents. They are, therefore to be considered together. Vide Chattanatha v. Central Bank of India A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1866. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that stipulations in Ext. B-8 show that the Defendant is liable to pay the amount to the Plaintiff on behalf of the Ors. and the Plaintiff is given the right to acknowledge a valid discharge of the amount paid. Therefore, even if the term that the Plaintiff shall be entitled to file a suit on behalf of Ors. , has not been incorporated in Ext. B-8, it need be treated only as an inadvertant omission. In such circumstances, it is open to the Court to read such a term in the contract, even if the document evidencing the contract does not expressly stipulate such a term. , has not been incorporated in Ext. B-8, it need be treated only as an inadvertant omission. In such circumstances, it is open to the Court to read such a term in the contract, even if the document evidencing the contract does not expressly stipulate such a term. In this context it is worthwhile quoting a passage from Cheshire and Fifoot's 'Law of Contract' (10th Edition p. 125): "In addition to terms thus imported into particular types of contract, the courts may, in any class of contract, imply a term in order to repair an intrinsic failure of expression. The document which the parties have prepared may leave no doubt as to the general ambit of their obligations; but they may have omitted, through inadvertance or clumsy draftsmanship, to cover an incident contingency, and this omission, unless remedied, may negative their design. In such a case the judge may himself supply a further term, which will implement their presumed intention and, in a hallowed phrase, give 'business efficacy' to the contract. In doing this he purports at least to do merely what the parties would have done themselves had they thought of the matter. The existence of this judicial power was asserted and justified in the case of The Moorcock." (emphasis supplied) In Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. 9, 4th Edition p. 224, para 351) the position is stated thus: As a general rule, the courts will enforce not only the terms expressly agreed between the parties, but also those which are to be logically implied from those express terms ..... 9, 4th Edition p. 224, para 351) the position is stated thus: As a general rule, the courts will enforce not only the terms expressly agreed between the parties, but also those which are to be logically implied from those express terms ..... Even where a term may not be logically implied from the words used, the law admits of certain other terms to be implied as fellows: (1) terms which the parties probably had in mind but did not express; (2) terms which the parties, whether or not they actually had them in mind, would probably have expressed if the question had been brought to their attention; and (3) terms that, whether or not the parties had them in mind or would have expressed them if they had foreseen the difficulty, are implied by the Court because of the court's view of fairness or policy or in consequence of rules of law.� Unless such an implied term is overridden by express contrary intention, it is the duty of a Court of justice to use such a term as logically implied in the contract. 6. In view of the fact that an authority is conferred on the Plaintiff to initiate legal proceedings as per the recitals in Ext. A-1, we have no hesitation in reading a similar term in Ext. B-8 also as a logical corollary. Therefore, the suit filed by this Plaintiff alone is perfectly maintainable as the parties have expressed an intention to that effect in the contract between them. 7. Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that there is sufficient evidence in this case to prove that the Defendant has paid Rs. 17,000 towards the instalment due on 28th February 1978 and in support of the said contention he relies on Exts. B-6, B-6(a) and B-6(b) receipts. There is no dispute for the Plaintiff that the amounts covered by those receipts had been paid by the Defendant. But his contention is that those payments were made not towards the 2nd instalment, but towards the first instalment due on 31st January 1978. So a decision of this dispute very much depends upon the truth of the defendant's claim that he paid Rs. 17,550 towards the first instalment due on 31st January 1978 before the said date itself. Admittedly, there is no receipt or any other document to evidence the said payment. So a decision of this dispute very much depends upon the truth of the defendant's claim that he paid Rs. 17,550 towards the first instalment due on 31st January 1978 before the said date itself. Admittedly, there is no receipt or any other document to evidence the said payment. According to the Defendant, the said amount was paid by the Defendant himself directly to the Plaintiff and hence no receipt was obtained. There is no valid reason why the Defendant did not obtain any receipt for the same. Even for payments made for much lesser sums covered by Exts. B-6, B-6 (a) and B-6(b), the Defendant took care to obtain receipts. The burden is heavy on the Defendant to prove the alleged payment of Rs. 17,550, especially when the same has been stoutly repudiated by the Plaintiff. To prove the defendant's case in that regard, he relies on an account book, Ext. B-1. The learned Sub Judge rejected the said account book as one "brought about only after the receipt of the suit notice Ext. B-9". He has also remarked that on going through the said account book, it is seen that it is written in a haphazard way and at a stretch. We too have perused the said account book and we fully agree with the remarks passed by the learned Sub Judge on Ext. B-1. Another circumstance to show that there is no proof for the defendant's contention regarding payment of the said sum of Rs. 17,550 is this: When the Plaintiff issued Ext. B-9 lawyer notice on 22nd May 1978, a detailed reply was sent by the Defendant through his lawyer, which is marked as Ext. A-2. There is not even a whisper in the said reply that the Defendant had made the alleged payment of Rs. 17,550. Learned Counsel for the Appellant was not able to offer any explanation for this formidable circumstance which negatives the claim of the Defendant regarding the alleged payment. Therefore, we hold that the learned Sub Judge was perfectly right in finding that the defendant's claim of payment of Rs. 17,550 otherwise than by Exts. B-6, B-6(a) and B-6(b) is untrue. 8. An attempt is made by the learned counsel for the Appellant to show that there is an-admission in Ext. B-9 notice itself that an amount of Rs. Therefore, we hold that the learned Sub Judge was perfectly right in finding that the defendant's claim of payment of Rs. 17,550 otherwise than by Exts. B-6, B-6(a) and B-6(b) is untrue. 8. An attempt is made by the learned counsel for the Appellant to show that there is an-admission in Ext. B-9 notice itself that an amount of Rs. 17,000 had been paid towards the instalment due on 31st January 1978 and the payment was made before that date itself. A reading of Ext. B-9 notice in its entirety would convince us without doubt that the Plaintiff never made any such admission. The statement in Ext. B-9 that a sum of Rs. 17,000 alone was paid towards the instalment due on 31st January 1978 is with reference to the payments covered by Exts. B-6, B-6(a) and B-6(b). We therefore find no force in the contention of the learned counsel based on the wordings of Ext. B-9. 9. The Plaintiff-Respondent prayed for amendment of the plaint for which he filed C.M.P. 21108/86 in this Court. The amendment sought for was only to clarify that the payments towards the instalment due before 31st January 1978 were made only after the said date. As the amendment proposed only explains the pleadings already on record in the plaint, it does not amount to advancement of any new plea. Hence we allowed the said amendment application. The learned counsel for the Defendant-Appellant submitted that the Appellant does not want to file any additional written statement after carrying out the said amendment to the plaint. So, the said amendment of the plaint has no practical consequence in this case. We have considered the evidence in detail in the light of the main points urged at the time of arguments, and we find no merit in this appeal. We, therefore, confirm the decree passed by the Court below and dismiss this appeal with costs.