ORDER 1. This is a writ petition filed by the tenant. It arises out of a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment filed by opposite party No. 3 Smt. Neera Kapoor. The suit was filed in 1983 claiming arrears of rent from 16-6-81 to 21-9-1982 amounting to Rs. 455/- along with a prayer for ejectment. The premises in question are governed by the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This suit was decreed ex parte on 13-4-83. This decree was set aside on 21st Jan. 1984 and the case was fixed for hearing on 8-3-1984. On this date the case was adjourned and 12-4-1984 was fixed on which date on account of lawyers' strike it was adjourned to 18-5-84. On this date the petitioner applied for supply of copies of plaint etc. and the case was fixed for 12-7-84, on which date the Presiding Officer was on leave and the case was posted for 17-8-84. On 17-8-84 petitioner moved an application seeking permission to deposit rent and along with it a tender was furnished mentioning details regarding payment of rent from 16-6-81 to 16-8-84. The details were mentioned in the following manger : (i) Rent/Damages from 16-6-81 to 16-8-84 @ Rs. 25/- P. M. Rs. 950.00 (ii) Lawyers fee on Rs. 755.00 valuation of suit @ Rs. 7.50 Rs. 57.00 (iii) Court-fees Rs. 94.00 (iv) Amount of interest Rs. 157.00 (v) Misc. expenses Total 50.00 ___________ Rs. 1309.00 ___________ On the permission of the Court the said amount was deposited next day i.e. 18-8-84. It also transpires that further deposit had been made subsequently during the pendency of the suit, the details of which are as follows : Date of deposit Period of rent Amount of Rent. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 27-9-84 7-11-84 15-12-84 18-2-85 15-4-85 17-8-84 to 16-10-84 17-10-84 to 16-12-84 17-12-84 to 16-1-85 17-1-85 to 16-3-85 17-3-85 to 16-5-85 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 2. It may be mentioned that on 4-9-84 opposite party No. 3 who is the landlord moved an application under 0. 15 R. 5 C.P.C. to strike of the defence of the petitioner. This application was heard ultimately on 30-4-85. The defence was struck off and the learned Munsif proceeded to record the evidence and ultimately decreed the suit on 30-4-85. It may be mentioned that on 4-9-84 opposite party No. 3 who is the landlord moved an application under 0. 15 R. 5 C.P.C. to strike of the defence of the petitioner. This application was heard ultimately on 30-4-85. The defence was struck off and the learned Munsif proceeded to record the evidence and ultimately decreed the suit on 30-4-85. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the order went up in revision which was filed on 13-5- 85. This revision on transfer came up for hearing before VI Additional District Judge, Sitapur. The learned Judge was pleased to dismiss the said revision on 19-2-86. This is how this writ petition is before this Court. 3. At the admission stage notice was accepted on behalf of opposite party No. 3 by Sri D. K. Tribedi who was allowed three days' time to file counter affidavit and petitioner was allowed three days' time thereafter to file rejoinder affidavit and ultimately thereafter the petition was directed to be listed for disposal. The Court further ordered that till the next date of listing the impugned order will not be executed. 4. Instead of passing the formal order of admission I proceeded to hear the learned counsel for the parties on merits as counter and rejoinder affidavit-have been exchanged between the respective parties. 4A. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the averments and cross averments made by the respective parties. 5. It may at the very out set be stated that even during the pendency of the revision the petitioner had deposited amount of rent. The learned Judge while dismissing the revision has recorded a finding that petitioner was present before the trial court at the time of examination of witnesses but he did not avail the opportunity of cross examination. It has also been held by him that deposit was not made on the first date of hearing and the subsequent deposits had also not been made regularly and interest had also not been deposited. The delay was not duly explained nor prayer was made to that effect. The dispute raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this writ petition lies in a very narrow ambit. It was vehemently urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that findings were perverse and the striking of the defence of the petitioner was a very harsh punishment. The dispute raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this writ petition lies in a very narrow ambit. It was vehemently urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that findings were perverse and the striking of the defence of the petitioner was a very harsh punishment. He placed reliance on the case decided by a learned Single Judge on 15th Oct. 1984 Shatroghan Prasad v. 1st Addl. District Judge, 1985 Lucknow LJ 3. It has been held by the learned Single Judge that defence was not required to be struck off mechanically on petitioner's lapse in depositing the pendentelite rent every month. The matter, no doubt, is within the discretion of the trial court to strike of the defence but in passing that order the Court has to take into consideration all the attending circumstances of the case and it cannot strike of the defence merely on the ground that there was default on the part of the defendant in making the deposit as required by O. 15 R. 5 C.P.C. if, the defendant otherwise appears to be keen to deposit the arrears. The learned Judge in his judgment in Shatroghan Prasad's case (supra) placed reliance on the following cases : 1. Jagannath v. R. C. Srivastava, 1982 All WC 623 2. Shri Chand v. District Judge, 1982 All LJ 1438. 3. Jawahar Lal v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1981 All 384 . 4. Raghunath v. 1st Addl. Dist. Judge, (1983) 1 All Rent Cas 124 5. Sultan Ahmad v. Govardhan Das (1983) 1 All Rent Cas 161 6. Bimal Chand Jain v. Gopal Agarwal, AIR 1981 SC 1657 . 6. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents urged that the petitioner had not deposited the rent on the first date of hearing and, therefore, the order passed by the Courts below calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution. He pointed out that the findings recorded both by the trial court and the appellate court were based on appreciation of record and the finding is based on appreciation of the evidence, as such a contrary view cannot be expressed by this Court with respect to the default committed by the petitioner in depositing the rent on the first date of hearing. He placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Siya Ram v. District Judge, Kheri, (1984) 1 All Rent Cas 410 . 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the entire facts and circumstances brought on the record. In the instant case it is not disputed that suit for ejectment and arrears of rent was filed on 20-12-1983 and an ex parte decree had been passed on 13-4-83. The application under O. 9 R. 13 C.P.C. had been moved on 12-8-83 and the same was allowed on 21-1-84. The case was fixed for hearing on 8-3-84 but it was adjourned and case was fixed for 12-4-84 but in view of strike of lawyers hearing could not take place and case was adjourned to 18-5-84. On that date the petitioner prayed for supply of certain copies. This was allowed and the case was fixed for 12-7-84. On 12-7-84 the Presiding Officer was on leave and the case was fixed for 17-8-84. On this date the petitioner moved an application for depositing the rent. The money was deposited on 18-8-84 amount of which has already been mentioned above. On 4-9-84 application under O. 15 R. 5 C.P.C. had been moved. On 30-4-85 the defence of the petitioner was struck off. The case thereafter was proceeded in presence of the petitioner and his counsel. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall, save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognisable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits : Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may on a previous application made by him in this behalf have directed. 8. It has not been stated in the petition that while presenting the application under Order 9 R. 13 C.P.C. the entire decretal amount had ben deposited. 8. It has not been stated in the petition that while presenting the application under Order 9 R. 13 C.P.C. the entire decretal amount had ben deposited. If that had been done the case of the petitioner would have been on a very strong footing. The question, therefore, to be decided is whether the suit was liable to be dismissed in view of non compliance of S. 20(4) of the Act, and defence could not be struck off under O. 15 R. 5 C.P.C. 9. It may be observed that Order 15 Rule Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 1976 and following explanation was added : "The expression 'first hearing' means the date for filing the written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the date mentioned." 9A. It is also worthwhile to mention that explanation as also added by Act No. 28 of 1976 to S. 20(4) of the Act. The said explanation is as follows : "The expression 'first hearing' means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant." 9B. The insertion of these explanations by the U. P. State Legislature explains the expression 'first hearing'. It would not be out of place to mention that the Courts in their decision have given out meaning to the expression. It may be mentioned that the intention of the Legislature was clearly to clarify the law and, therefore, by explanation the expression 'first hearing' was duly explained. This fictional meaning given to the expression occurring in S. 20(4) of the Act was different from the fictional meaning given to the expression occurring in O. 15 R. 5 C.P.C. In my opinion when a Legislature specifically stops in to undo the effect. of judicial interpretation and provides a particular expression with special meaning different from the interpretation and meaning given earlier then it would not be open to a court to say that the same meaning ought to prevail even after the legislative amendment has been incorporated. The words in the statute are precise and unambiguous, it is, therefore, not necessary to expound those words by giving different interpretation. The Court also cannot add or subtract the words unless the context otherwise requires. The words in the statute are precise and unambiguous, it is, therefore, not necessary to expound those words by giving different interpretation. The Court also cannot add or subtract the words unless the context otherwise requires. In view of actions taken on various dates having been mentioned above it is abundantly clear that money has not been deposited by the petitioner on the 'first hearing'. I find myself in agreement with the finding recorded concurrently by the Courts below. The subsequent rent during the pendency of the suit payable as damages had also not been regularly tendered but it was being deposited by the petitioner whimsically. I have, therefore, no reason to disagree with the findings recorded by the revisional court. There is also nothing on the record to hold that the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse in any manner. 10. Learned Counsel pointed out that the view expressed by Hon'ble K. N. Goyal, J. in the Full Bench decision of Siya Ram's case (supra) was not a good law and, therefore, he made a reference for decision to a larger Bench in the case of Mohan Lal Gupta v. Shambhoo Nath Gupta (1985) 2 All Rent Cas 25. 1 have very carefully gone through this decision. In my opinion, the dispute related to the question whether the deposit was conditional or unconditional. The allied question recommended for consideration of the Full Bench is whether the absence of Presiding Officer on a date and consequent adjournment of actual framing of issues would also entitle a tenant to postpone the deposit till that date. In the said judgment the learned Judge nowhere has doubted the correctness of the Full Bench case of Siya Ram (supra). The decision, therefore, propounded in Siya Ram's case holds the field till any new subsequent decision overrules the same or expresses a contrary view. 11. In view of aforesaid discussion the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. In special circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their own costs.