Judgment S. S. VYAS, J. ( 1 ) BY this application under S. 482, Cr. P. C. , the petitioners challenge the legality of the orders passed by the two Courts below in a proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. , and pray for quashing the same. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY recalled, the facts giving rise to this application are that the Station House Officer, Police Station, Sheoganj, submitted a report in writing before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Executive), Sirohi stating therein that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace between the revision-petitioners and the opposite party Sama and others (twenty three in all) existed over some agricultural fields situate in Mauja Chuli. A prayer was made therein to initiate a proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. It was further prayed that the case was one of emergency and as such the fields in dispute may be attached under S. 146 (1), Cr. P. C. The Executive Magistrate thereupon passed the impugned order on 1-11-1983, by which he attached the subject matter of dispute, appointed the Tehsildar as Receiver and issued notices to the parties concerned to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the fields in dispute. The revision-petitioners challenged this order of the Executive Magistrate in revision before the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirohi. It was contended before him by the revision-petitioners that since no preliminary order under S. 145 (1) was passed by the Executive Magistrate, the whole proceeding stands vitiated and the order of attachment is bad in law. It was argued that the order of attachment under S. 145 (1), could not be passed without first passing a preliminary order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. The Additional Sessions Judge repelled the contentions of the revision-petitioners and upheld the order of the Executive Magistrate. Aggrieved against the said two orders of the Courts below, the revision-petitioners, by this application under S. 482, Cr. P. C. , invoke the inherent powers of this Court and pray for quashing the aforesaid orders. ( 3 ) I have heard Mr. R. N. Mathur, learned counsel for the revision-petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor. The other non-petitioners, despite service of notices, did not put appearance. I have also gone through both the impugned orders. P. C. , invoke the inherent powers of this Court and pray for quashing the aforesaid orders. ( 3 ) I have heard Mr. R. N. Mathur, learned counsel for the revision-petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor. The other non-petitioners, despite service of notices, did not put appearance. I have also gone through both the impugned orders. ( 4 ) AT the forefront of his arguments, learned counsel for the revision-petitioners raised the contention that an order for attachment under S. 146 (1), Cr. P. C. cannot be passed without first passing a preliminary order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. It was argued that the order passed by the Executive Magistrate on May 30, 1983 does not show that the preliminary order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. was passed first and thereafter the order for attachment under S. 146 (1), Cr. P. C. was passed on the ground of emergency. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Narain Ram v. Shanker Lal, 1977 Raj LW 421; Ram Prasad v. State of Rajasthan, 1983 Rajasthan LR 751; Girwardan v. Ram Prasad, 1984 Rajasthan LR 602 and Asgar Ali v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 Raj LW 571. It was, on the other hand, contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that one can easily gather from the order of the Executive Magistrate dt. 1-11-1983 that he did pass a preliminary order. The contents of this order are as under :- ( 5 ) NEEDLESS to say that when the Executive Magistrate wants to take preventive action under S. 145, Cr. P. C. , he should draw an order under sub-sec. (1) which is commonly known as preliminary order. Such a preliminary order should contain the particulars that the Magistrate was satisfied as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace, the grounds of his satisfaction and a direction requiring the parties concerned to attend his Court on a date fixed by him and put in evidence (sic) the written statement of their claims in respect of the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. The law does not prescribe that such a preliminary order should be in any particular form. It is the substance of the order which matters and not the language in which it has been drawn up. The law does not prescribe that such a preliminary order should be in any particular form. It is the substance of the order which matters and not the language in which it has been drawn up. Where there is a preliminary order fulfilling these requirements, it does not become bad in law simply because it has not been happily worded. The importance of the preliminary order need not be stressed. A Magistrate can proceed to decide the dispute under S. 145, Cr. P. C. , only when he has drawn up the preliminary order under sub-sec. (1 ). In the absence of the preliminary order, the subsequent proceedings, e. g. , the attachment of the subject of dispute on the ground of emergency are without jurisdiction and erroneous in law. ( 6 ) IN Narain Ram v. Shankar Lal, (1977 Raj LW 421) (supra), Honble Sharma, J. (as he then was) observed as under : -"the legality of an order under sub-s. (1) of S. 146, Cr. P. C. * depends on its having been preceded by an order under sub-s. (1) of S. 145, Cr. P. C. , i. e. a preliminary order. The Executive Magistrate was, therefore, not empowered to pass an order of attachment without drawing a preliminary order under the preceding section i. e. S. 145, Cr. P. C. " ( 7 ) IN Girwardan v. Ram Prasad, (1985 Cri LJ 2) (Raj) (supra), it was held"the language of above provisions leaves no manner of doubt that an order under S. 146 (1) can only be passed after making an order under sub-s. (1) of S. 145. There is no restriction with regard to the period of time for passing such order as the language used is that any time after the order under sub-s. (1) of S. 145 such order can be passed under S. 145 (1 ). In my view, there is no restriction on the power of Magistrate that he cannot pass any order simultaneously under S. 146 (1) with the order, under S. 145 (1) the only restriction is that the order under S. 146 (1) should follow and not precede the order under S. 145 (1), Cr. In my view, there is no restriction on the power of Magistrate that he cannot pass any order simultaneously under S. 146 (1) with the order, under S. 145 (1) the only restriction is that the order under S. 146 (1) should follow and not precede the order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. " ( 8 ) IN Asgar Alis case (1985 Cri LJ 1982) (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that the, order under S. 145 (1) must precede the order under S. 146 (1), Cr. P. C. , i. e. , the order of attachment of the subject of dispute can be passed only after a preliminary order has been drawn up under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. ( 9 ) THE law, thus, casts a mandate on the Magistrate to draw up the preliminary order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. , and thereafter to proceed further. ( 10 ) NOW, a bare reading of the impugned order of the Executive Magistrate shows that he first passed an order for the attachment of the subject matter of dispute on the ground of emergency without drawing up a preliminary order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. After passing an order for attachment of the subject-matter of dispute and the appointment of the Receiver, the Magistrate issued notices to the parties to put in their written statement. Even if the impugned order dt. 1-11-1983 of the Magistrate is construed as a preliminary order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. , it was certainly passed after the order of attachment of the subject matter of dispute was passed. He has thus passed the order for attachment and the preliminary order in topsyturvy way with bottom upwards and head downwards inasmuch as the order under S. 146 (1) was passed first and thereafter only the preliminary order under S. 145, Cr. P. C. , was drawn up. The learned Magistrate, in doing so, has put the vehicle in reverse gear. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be appreciated and sustained. ( 11 ) I need not deal with the question whether an order for attachment of the subject of dispute can be passed under S. 146 (1) simultaneously with the preliminary order under S. 145 (1), Cr. The learned Magistrate, in doing so, has put the vehicle in reverse gear. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be appreciated and sustained. ( 11 ) I need not deal with the question whether an order for attachment of the subject of dispute can be passed under S. 146 (1) simultaneously with the preliminary order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. , because the proceeding stands vitiated on account of failure of the Magistrate to pass a preliminary order. ( 12 ) IN the result, the revision is allowed and the impugned orders of the Courts below are set aside. The fields in dispute are released from attachment. The case will go back to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sirohi, to proceed in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. Revision allowed.