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1986 DIGILAW 329 (KAR)

VENKATALAKSHAMMA v. SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE

1986-08-07

K.S.PUTTASWAMY, R.S.MAHENDRA

body1986
PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the appellant who was the petitioner and is directed against the order dt. 13-11-1981 of Doddakale Gowda, J. rejecting her writ petition No. 27137 of 1981 at the preliminary hearing stage. ( 2 ) THE appellant claims to be the owner in possession of Agricultural Lands bearing S. No. 445/1 and 446/2 of Malalur village, Chickmagalur Taluk and respondent 3 herein claims to be their tenant in possession. ( 3 ) BEFORE the Land Tribunal, Chickmaglur Taluk, Chickmaglur (Tribunal), constituted and functioning under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (Act,) respondent-3 had made an application under S. 48-A (1) of the Act for conferment of occupancy rights over the said lands which is resisted by the appellant on diverse grounds. ( 4 ) ON 25-5-1979 the Tribunal allowed the application made by respondent-3 and granted him occupancy rights over the said lands, the validity of which was challenged by the appellant before this Court in W. P. 9289 of 1980. In that writ petition, the appellant had obtained an ex parte order of stay on 7-7-1980, which on an application made by respondent-3 was vacated on 28-10-1980. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the order made by this Court on 28-10-1980 vacating stay in W. P. No. 9289 of 1980, respondent-3 approached the Special Tahsildar for Land Reforms, Chickmagalur (Tahsildar) and Sub-Inspector of Police, Chickmagalur (S. I.) to give him police protection for harvesting the crops standing on the said lands dispossessing the appellant and delivering their possession to him. On that application, the Tahsildar by his letter No. L. R. F. W. P. 9285/80 dt. 11-12-1980 (Annexure-A) addressed to the S. I. directed him to give police protection to respondent-3 to harvest the standing crops on the aforesaid lands. In furtherance and compliance of that direction of the Tahsildar, the Sub-Inspector made a consequential order on 25-5-1981 (Annexure-C) injuncting the appellant not -to enter upon the aforesaid lands and not to interfere with the harvest of crops by respondent No. 3. In W. P. 27137 of 1981, the appellant challenged the said directions of the Tahsildar and S. I. as made without jurisdiction and illegal. On 13-11-1981, Doddakale Gowda, J. rejected the said writ petition at the preliminary hearing stage which is since reported in (1982) 1 Kant LJ 493 Venkatalakshamamma v. Sub-Inspector of Police. Hence this appeal. In W. P. 27137 of 1981, the appellant challenged the said directions of the Tahsildar and S. I. as made without jurisdiction and illegal. On 13-11-1981, Doddakale Gowda, J. rejected the said writ petition at the preliminary hearing stage which is since reported in (1982) 1 Kant LJ 493 Venkatalakshamamma v. Sub-Inspector of Police. Hence this appeal. ( 6 ) SRI. B. Veerabhadrappa, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that notwithstanding the interim and final orders made in W. P. 9289 of 1980 their nature and effect, the Tahsildar and the Sub-Inspector had no right to take the law into their own hands, disturb the lawful possession and injunct the appellant not to enter upon and prevent respondent-3 to harvest the standing crops. In support of his contention Sri Veerahhadrappa strongly relies on a Division Bench ruling of this Court in Siddalingaiah v. Special Tahsildar, (1976) 2 Kant LJ 278 consistently followed in all the latter cases. ( 7 ) SRI. H. Hanumantharayappa, learned counsel for respondent-3 in supporting the order of the learned Judge, contends that in the absence of an order of stay of the impugned directions of the Tahsildar and S. I. made either in the writ petition or in this writ appeal, this appeal had become infructuous and calls for dismissal on that ground without examining the merits of the order at all. In the very nature of things, it is first necessary to examine this latter contention of Sri Hanumantharayappa which goes to the very root of the matter and then the merits, if that becomes necessary. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for both sides submit that W. P. 9289 of 1980 has since been allowed, the order of the Tribunal granting occupancy rights to respondent-3 has been quashed and the matter has been remitted to the Tribunal for fresh disposal which had not so far disposed of the same. We will accept this as correct to examine the questions that arise in this appeal. But as to how the application made by respondent-3 will be disposed of by the Tribunal and what legal remedies the parties will pursue against the same and what will be the final out-come of that proceeding, without any doubt, cannot be predicted by us at this stage. We must, therefore, necessarily exclude the same from our consideration. But as to how the application made by respondent-3 will be disposed of by the Tribunal and what legal remedies the parties will pursue against the same and what will be the final out-come of that proceeding, without any doubt, cannot be predicted by us at this stage. We must, therefore, necessarily exclude the same from our consideration. ( 9 ) WE have examined the directions issued by the Tahsildar and the consequential directions of the S. I. We find that these directions are not confined for any period and will be effective till otherwise directed which had not also been done by either of the authorities. When that is so, it is inconceivable for us to hold that this appeal had become infructuous. We see no merit in this objection of Sri Hanumantharayappa and reject the same. We, therefore, now proceed to examine the merits. ( 10 ) IN rejecting the writ petition, the learned Judge had held - (1) that on the conferment of occupancy rights, it was open to respondent-3 to seek the aid of the Tahsildar and S. I. for restitution; (2) that on conferment of occupancy rights, respondent 3 was deemed to be in possession; (3) the ratio in Siddalingaiah's case had no application; and (4) that the orders/directions made by the Tahsildar and S. I. were in aid of the order of the Tribunal and therefore this court should decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. We will examine the correctness of these reasons in their order. ( 11 ) THE conferment of occupancy rights on respondent-3 even if the order of the Tribunal had been confirmed and was even in force as on 11-12-1981 and 25-5-1981 on which days the Tahsildar and S. I. issued their directions and this court rejected the writ petition of the appellant on 13-11-1981, did not mean that either the Tahsildar or S. I. could usurp the powers of the competent authorities under the Act or a Civil Court to order restitution and then physically dispossess the appellant if she was in possession and deliver possession to respondent 3. On the guise of issuing directions the Tahsildar and S. I. could not take the law into their own hands, usurp the powers and functions of the competent authorities and courts, which also could exercise their powers duly complying with law only and not otherwise. On the guise of issuing directions the Tahsildar and S. I. could not take the law into their own hands, usurp the powers and functions of the competent authorities and courts, which also could exercise their powers duly complying with law only and not otherwise. We are of the view that this ground that found favour with the learned Judge, as pointed out by the Supreme Court and this Court in Lallu v. Rao Jagdish, AIR 1968 SC 620 and M/s. Patil v. Corporation, ILR (1985) Kant 3700, with respect, was clearly unsound and illegal. ( 12 ) THE second reason given by the learned Judge is that on the conferment of occupancy rights, which has also disappeared now at least, respondent-3 was deemed to be in possession of the land. An order conferring occupancy rights cannot provide for such a declaration. The Act also does not provide for any such declaration. The conferment of occupancy rights on a tenant, even if that order stands the test of time, does not necessarily in law or fact result in that position. We are also of the view that this conclusion of the learned Judge runs counter to the principles enunciated by this Court in (Nagappa Devanna v. Venkataramana 1978 (1) KLJ 70, Balesh Ram v. Land Tribunal 1978 (1) KLR 116) and Lakshminarayana Hariyachar v. Dvl. Commr. ILR (1986) Kar. 532. With respect, we regret our inability to subscribe to this view of the learned Judge. ( 13 ) WHAT we have expressed on the first two reasons given by the learned Judge in a way also answers the third reason given by the learned Judge. When we examine the direction of the Tahsildar and the S. I. objectively and in the context of all the facts and circumstances, we are clearly of the view that they were illegal on the principles enunciated by this Court in Siddalingaiah's case. With respect, we are of the view that the learned Judge was in error in holding to the contrary. ( 14 ) WHAT we have so far expressed, in a way also answers the very last reason given by the learned Judge. With respect, we are of the view that the learned Judge was in error in holding to the contrary. ( 14 ) WHAT we have so far expressed, in a way also answers the very last reason given by the learned Judge. Even otherwise, the very last reason given by the learned Judge that the Tahsildar and the S. I. have acted in aid of the order of the Tribunal, with respect, is only an assumption and a surmise that does not flow from law or facts. At any rate, the latter events have only proved that it is only a mirage, a non-existing fact. We are also of the view that the rulings relied on by the learned Judge on this aspect do not really (Sic) as the point at all. ( 15 ) WE are of the view that the directions issued by the Tahsildar and the Sub-Inspector on the very statement made by respondent-3 in his representation to the police on 29-2-1981 (Annexure-B) was clearly without jurisdiction and manifestly illegal. We have no doubt that the learned Judge instead of rejecting the writ petition at the preliminary hearing stage on doubtful grounds, should have issued rule nisi, granted stay of the directions impugned in that writ petition and quashed them applying the principles enunciated by the Division Bench in Siddalingaiah's case, which course we must necessarily now adopt in this appeal. ( 16 ) IN the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of Doddakale Gowda, J. in W. P. 27137 of 1981 allow the said writ petition and quash the directions of the Tahsildar and Sub-Inspector (Annexures-A and C) impugned in the said writ petition with costs throughout payable by respondent-3. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/ -. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .