JUDGMENT BALAKRISHNAN, J.: - Criminal Appeal No.55 of 1983 and Criminal Appeal No.90 of 1983 are filed by the first and second accused respectively in Sessions Case No.73 of 1982 on the file of the Sessions Court, Kottayam. Both the accused have been found guilty of an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. They are also found guilty of offence punishable under section 324 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, for causing injury to P.W.1. The periods of sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case in brief is as follows: The first accused Joy had filed a complaint before the East Police Station, Kottayam alleging that he was manhandled by deceased Ninan alias Raju. The Police had summoned the accused as well as the deceased to appear before the Sub Inspector of Police on 16.7.1982, P.W.1 Sabu and deceased Raju went to Kottayam East Police Station. They were reprimanded by the Sub Inspector of Police. At about 3.30 p.m. P.W.1 and deceased Raju went to the Private Bus Stand at Kottayam and boarded Vettom bus. This bus was plying between Kottayam and Pampadi via Puthenpally. The first and second accused had also gone to the police station on that day. They too boarded the same bus. They were sitting in the back seats of the bus. As the bus reached Mandiram junction the first accused Joy took out a knife and stabbed the deceased on the left side of the chest. Deceased Raju cried out. Then A2 also stabbed him 2, 3 times. The passengers in the bus got frightened and they came out of the bus and ran away. P.W.1 also managed to get out from the bus and tried to escape. But he was chased by the appellants. While P.W.1 was running, 2nd accused stabbed on his back with a Malappuram knife. Both the appellants entered the bus and again stabbed the deceased several times. As P.W.1 reached at some distance he saw the bus coming from the place of occurrence. He signalled the bus to stop. P.W.1 saw the deceased lying in a pool of blood inside the bus. P.W.10 was driving the bus. P.W.2, the conductor, was also inside the bus. Injured Raju and P.W.1 were taken to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam. 3. He signalled the bus to stop. P.W.1 saw the deceased lying in a pool of blood inside the bus. P.W.10 was driving the bus. P.W.2, the conductor, was also inside the bus. Injured Raju and P.W.1 were taken to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam. 3. P.W.4, the Assistant Professor of Surgery in the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, examined P.W.1 and deceased Raju at about 6 p.m. on 16.7.1982. P.W.4 noted the injuries found on the body of deceased Raju and P.W.1. Exts. P-3 and P-4 wound certificates relate to the deceased and P.W.1 respectively. P.W.4 gave Exts. P-5 and P-6 intimation to Gandhi Nagar Police Station. On the next day P.W.13 the Head-constable attached to Kottayam East Police Station got information from the Gandhi Nagar Police station regarding the incident. He proceeded to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam and recorded the first information statement from deceased Raju at about 11.15 a.m. on 17.7.1982. P.W.13 registered Crime No.175 of 1982 under sections 324and 34, Indian Penal Code. The bus involved in this case was produced by one Sunny and P.W.13 took it into custody under Ext.P-18 mahazar. On the same day P.W.13 questioned some of the witnesses. Later Ext.P-20 report implicating the 2nd accused was sent to the Court of Judicial Magistrate of 2nd Class, Kottayam. 4. Injured Raju died at 5.10 a.m. on 29.7. 1982. Ext.P-7 death intimation was sent to the Sub Inspector of Police, Gandhi Nagar Police Station. They in turn informed the Kottayam East Police Station. P.W.13 held inquest over the dead body of deceased Raju on 29.7.1982. Ext.P-21 is the inquest report. P.W.6, the Assistant Professor of Forensic Medicine conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of deceased Raju on 29.7.1982. Ext.P-8 is the post mortem certificate. On 30.7.1982 the investigation was taken over by the Circle Inspector of Police, Kottayam, P.W.14. He had only verified the investigation conducted by P.W.13. He laid the charge sheet on 15.8.1982. The appellants had surrendered before the police on 26.7.1982 and they were arrested and later released on bail. 5. On the side of the prosecution 14 witnesses were examined and Exts. P-1 to P-22 were marked. On the side of the appellants. Ext. D-1 was marked. The appellants when questioned under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, denied the guilt and alleged false implication. 5. On the side of the prosecution 14 witnesses were examined and Exts. P-1 to P-22 were marked. On the side of the appellants. Ext. D-1 was marked. The appellants when questioned under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, denied the guilt and alleged false implication. On consideration of the prosecution evidence the trial Court came to the conclusion that the appellants have committed the offences punishable under sections 302 and 324 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the findings of the trial Court are not sustainable. It was also urged that death of Raju was not caused as a result of the injury sustained by him and the medical evidence tendered by P.Ws.4 and 6 are intrinsically weak and unreliable. However, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the findings of the trial Court are correct and sustainable. 7. The main evidence of the prosecution is that of P.W.1. He deposed that along with deceased Raju he went to Kottayam East Police Station on 19.7.1982. Thereafter they went to the Private Bus Stand at Kottayam and entered Kottayam-Pampadi bus. He saw both the appellants inside the bus. The appellants were sitting in the back seat of the bus. Deceased Raju did not get a seat and he was standing. As the bus reached Mandiram junction the appellants came near the deceased and inflicted stab injuries. Seeing this, P.W.1 got out of the bus and ran away. He was chased by the 2nd accused and was stabbed once. 8. The evidence of P.W.1 was attacked on the grounds that he is interested, that he has spoken to facts which he could not have seen and that he is unreliable in the sense that he falsely denied his involvement in some previous case. There is no force in the contention that on account of the overcrowd inside the bus he could not have seen the incident that transpired inside the bus. There were only 7 or 8 standing passengers in the bus. That may not affect visibility of the incident inside the bus. It could be said that normally P.W.1 could not have seen the second attack against the deceased inside the bus when he (P.W.1) was not in the bus. There were only 7 or 8 standing passengers in the bus. That may not affect visibility of the incident inside the bus. It could be said that normally P.W.1 could not have seen the second attack against the deceased inside the bus when he (P.W.1) was not in the bus. But there is nothing to indicate that while outside the bus P.W.1 could not have seen the second attack against P.W.1 inside the bus. Even taking for granted that P.W.1 could not have clearly seen the second attack against the deceased, that by itself cannot falsify his version. Evidently he entered the same bus again and he could see the deceased inside the bus with further injuries. He could evidently have seen the appellants again entering the bus. Normally he could have inferred that the deceased was again attacked by the appellants even if it is taken that he has not seen those acts. On that score he cannot be disbelieved. Though he initially denied the fact of some previous case, when his attention was attracted to that fact he frankly admitted. No inference of unreliability could be drawn from that circumstance. It is well settled that interested evidence is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. It would be unreasonable to discard the evidence given by witnesses on the ground that it is the evidence of partisan and interested witnesses and the mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that that is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. All that is necessary is that evidence of interested witness should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable it may by itself be sufficient in the circumstances of the particular case to base conviction thereon. See Massati v. State of U.P. See Massati v. State of U.P. (1965) 1 S.C.J. 605;(1965) MLJ. (Crl.) 312: (1964) 8 S.C.R 133 ., A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 202 and Hari Obula Reddi v. State of A.P. Hari Obula Reddi v. State of A.P. (1981) MLJ. (Crl.) 201:(1981) 1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 9:(1981) 1 S.C.J. 265: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 82. 9. The evidence given by P.W.1 materially corroborates the other evidence. (Crl.) 312: (1964) 8 S.C.R 133 ., A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 202 and Hari Obula Reddi v. State of A.P. Hari Obula Reddi v. State of A.P. (1981) MLJ. (Crl.) 201:(1981) 1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 9:(1981) 1 S.C.J. 265: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 82. 9. The evidence given by P.W.1 materially corroborates the other evidence. P.Ws.2 and 3 are the members of the crew of the bus in which the incident took place. Both these witnesses were hostile. The evidence of these witnesses themselves would go to show that some incident happened inside the bus on 16.7.1982 and that deceased Raju sustained injuries in that incident. Though the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 is not by itself sufficient to connect the appellants conclusively with the incident, their evidence lends assurance to the prosecution case and the testimony of P.W.1. 10. The trial Court treated Ext.P-16 first information statement given by the deceased as dying declaration. The main evidence relied on apart from Ext. P-16 was the deposition of P.W.1 who is the injured. Certain portions of the evidence of the hostile witnesses over and above the medical evidence was also considered to support the conviction. The only attack against Ext.P-16 at the time of arguments was that the deceased who was all along in the bus itself could not have seen the injuries sustained by P.W.1 on the road, but he mentioned about those aspects also in Ext.P-16. But there is nothing to indicate that from his position in the bus the deceased could not have seen what happened to P.W.1 on the road. Anyhow he could have evidently seen P.W.1 getting out the bus and the accused chasing him. So also it is in evidence that subsequently after receiving injuries P.W.1 entered the same bus when the deceased was in it. In these circumstances the narration of the assault against P.W.1 contained in Ext.P-16 cannot be said to be false or distorted. P.Ws.1, 3 and 8 are respectively conductor, checker and driver of the bus in which the incident took place. Though they turned hostile and gave evidence in a way as to help the accused, the fact that the incident took place inside and outside the bus and P.W.1 and the deceased sustained injuries in that incident is clear from their versions also. Though they turned hostile and gave evidence in a way as to help the accused, the fact that the incident took place inside and outside the bus and P.W.1 and the deceased sustained injuries in that incident is clear from their versions also. Along with this there is the clear evidence of P.W.1 supported by the inquest, the mahazars, the wound certificate, the post mortem certificate, and the oral evidence of the persons who prepared them. All these pieces of evidence lend corroboration and assurance to Ext.P-16 and show that it is only true and correct. 11. Though P.Ws.8 to 10 were examined to prove the prosecution case, they also turned hostile to the prosecution. Prosecution relied on Exts.P-14 and P-14(a). In Ext.P-14 complaint appellant Joy alleged that deceased Raju, P.Ws.1 and 2 others had manhandled him on 13.7.1982. P.W.1, Headconstable of Kottayam East Police Station, made an enquiry about this complaint. The appellants, P.W.1 and deceased were called to the police station. Ext.P-14(a) is an endorsement made by P.W.12, the Sub Inspector of Police, Kottayam East Police Station. Ext.P-14(a) would go to show that the appellants had been to the police station on 16.7.1982. Exts.P-14 and P-14(a) would reveal that there was motive on the part of the appellants to cause injuries to the deceased and P.W.1. 12. The next item of evidence is that of P.Ws.4 and 6. P.W.4, the Assistant Professor of Surgery in the Medical College, Kottayam examined the deceased at 6 p.m. on 16.7.1982. He found as many as 11 injuries on the body of deceased Raju. Most of these injuries were not of serious nature. Ext.P-3 is the wound certificate in this regard. We are mainly concerned with injury No.4 described in Ext.P-3 would certificate. The deceased was operated upon by P.W.4. He stated that the injuries found on the body of deceased could be caused by a Malappuram knife. He also deposed that injury No.4 was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 13. Injured Raju died at 5.10 a.m. on 29.7.1982. P.W.6 an Associate Professor of Forensic Medicine conducted the autopsy. Ext.P-8 is the post mortem certificate. As many as 17 injuries were noted by P.W.6 on the body of deceased Raju. P.W.6 gave evidence on two days. On 14.1.1983 he deposed that injury No.8 described in Ext. 13. Injured Raju died at 5.10 a.m. on 29.7.1982. P.W.6 an Associate Professor of Forensic Medicine conducted the autopsy. Ext.P-8 is the post mortem certificate. As many as 17 injuries were noted by P.W.6 on the body of deceased Raju. P.W.6 gave evidence on two days. On 14.1.1983 he deposed that injury No.8 described in Ext. P-8 post mortem certificate was a grievous injury and it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of deceased. He was recalled and examined on 17.1.1983. On 17.1.1983 P.W.6 explained that he had committed a mistake while giving evidence on 14.1.1983 and the injury No.8 described in Ext.P-8 was a surgical wound. In view of this apparent mistake P.W.4 who issued Ext.P-3 wound certificate was also recalled and examined. P.W.4 explained that injuries Nos.7, 8 and 9 in Ext.P-8 post mortem certificate were surgical wounds, and injury No.4 in Ext.P-3 wound certificate corresponds with injury No.4 in Ext.P-8 post mortem certificate. The description of injury No.4 in Ext.P-3 is as follows: “Penetrating injury right chest 1 } 1 cm. and going into chest with haemothorax” Injury No.4 described in Ext. P-8 post mortem certificate is: “Infected healing wound 2.5 } 5 } 1 cm. obliquely placed on the right chest 1 cm. below the collar bone” The description of injuries in both the certificates would show that the injury was one and the same. The slight variation in the measurements of wound is only natural and probable. 14. The learned Counsel for the appellants seriously urged that the trial Court should not have recalled P.Ws.4 and 6. According to the appellants P.W.4 and 6 were recalled and examined only to fill the lacuna in the prosecution evidence and the same is not permissible in law. We are not prepared to accept this plea. Apparently P.W.6 made a mistake by stating that injury No.8 in Ext.P-8 was fatal, without knowing the same to be a surgical wound. P.W.4 and P.W.6 were recalled and examined and the subsequent evidence given by these two witnesses made the position clear that injury No.4 in Ext.P-3 corresponded with injury No.4 in Ext.P-8. Both the witnesses clearly stated that injury No.4 is the one that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 15. P.W.4 and P.W.6 were recalled and examined and the subsequent evidence given by these two witnesses made the position clear that injury No.4 in Ext.P-3 corresponded with injury No.4 in Ext.P-8. Both the witnesses clearly stated that injury No.4 is the one that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 15. The learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the death of Raju occurred not as a result of the natural or likely consequence of the injury he sustained at the hands of the appellants. P.W.6 deposed that the cause of death of deceased Raju was empyema. P.W.4 deposed that death was caused by the summative effect of the shock followed by renal failure and infection as a result of injury No.4. He also stated that injury No.4 in Ext. P-3 and Ext.P-8 was penetrating into chest cavity. He further stated that pus formation noted in Ext.P-8 must have been the result of the original injury. He also suspected injury on the spinal cord. Injured Raju died 13 days after the occurrence. He had been taken to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam with promptitude. According to the medical evidence all’ available medical help was rendered to him. Ext.P-13 the case sheet showed that the patient had developed empyema pleura on the left side of the chest and he died 2 days thereafter. 16. We have to determine whether in the circumstances of the case the appellants caused the death of the deceased or death was due to supervening cause, so unrelated to the act of the appellants that the appellants could not be held responsible. When death results from consequences naturally or necessarily flowing from the act, there need not be any hesitation in saying that the act caused death. The difficulty arises in which there are recognisable contributory causes leading to the ultimate and the Court is called upon to consider in such cases the relative strength arid effect of the different causes in bringing about the effect and then find whether the responsibility for the result could be assigned to a particular act or not as the proximate or effective cause. The question, when there are later complications, would be, whether the complications are the natural or likely consequences of the injury. The consequences are labelled as a supervening condition or disease, given a name and shown as the immediate cause of death. The question, when there are later complications, would be, whether the complications are the natural or likely consequences of the injury. The consequences are labelled as a supervening condition or disease, given a name and shown as the immediate cause of death. At the end, all death is brought about by coma, syncope or asphyxia. If the complication or development is the natural and probable consequence of the injury, it can be said that there is proximate relationship between death and the injury. If the original injury itself was fatal and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it is of no consequence that death was delayed and the immediate cause of death was some complication naturally arising from that injury. 17. In Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 12th Edn. at page 246 he has stated that: “Wounds penetrating into the cavity of the chest are generally dangerous, even when slight, because of the numerous complications by which they are so liable to be followed. The lungs are most commonly injured, but according to the direction of the weapon, the heart or the great vessels, the oesophagus and the diaphragm, may share in the damage. Penetrating wounds from external sources are much more prone to sentic infection than wounds caused by the broken ends of ribs or sternum.” 18. In an earlier decisions of this Court in Yohannan v. State Yohannan v. State (1958) K.L.T. 273, the Court had occasion to consider a similar question. That was a case where a person stabbed his wife with a pen knife. Deceased was taken to the hospital, where she died six months after the occurrence. The immediate cause of death was asthenia from cystitis and trophic changes caused by the injury to the spinal cord. There were three ulcers in the nature of bed sores on the body. It was held that the death from cystitis and bed sores was the direct result of the paralysis caused by the injury. His Lordships Justice Raman Nayar, as he then was, observed as follows: “Where without the intervention of any considerable change of circumstances the death is connected with the act of violence by a chain of cause and effects, the death must be regarded as a proximate and not too remote a consequence of the act of violence. His Lordships Justice Raman Nayar, as he then was, observed as follows: “Where without the intervention of any considerable change of circumstances the death is connected with the act of violence by a chain of cause and effects, the death must be regarded as a proximate and not too remote a consequence of the act of violence. In law it does not matter that the death is from a secondary cause so long as that secondary cause is a natural consequence of the injury. Where the intention to cause death is clearly made out it does not matter that death was caused not, in the language of the medical books, directly, but by a chain of consequences each flowing upon the other in the processes of nature and not being an unexpected complication causing a new mischief. The chain of causation is direct, and the intention to cause death being established, the accused is guilty of nothing short of murder.” 19. In a subsequent decision reported in State of Kerala v. Narayanankutty State of Kerala v. Narayanankutty (1980) K.L.T. 908, this Court held that death after 11 days due to intracerebral sepsis as a result of contract with soil was the direct and natural consequence of the injury. That was a case wherein the accused gave a blow on the head of the deceased with blunt portion of a spade and the victim had a lacerated wound in the right temporoparietal region with a depressed fracture of skull portion. Death occurred 11 days after the incident. The trial Court found that death was not as a result of the head injury sustained by the deceased. Disagreeing with the view expressed by the trial Court, this Court observed: “ences necessarily or naturally flowing from the act, and reasonably contemplated as its result. Where without the intervention of any considerable change of circumstances death is connected with the act of violence by a chain of causes and effects, death must be regarded as proximate and not too remote a consequence of the act. The cause must not only be the cause sine quo non, put it must also be a cause reasonably proximate; but the doctrine of criminal causation has reasonable limits. An injury may lead to death. Death may be instantaneous or may be delayed. The injury may lead to shock, excessive bleeding, coma, syncope etc. The cause must not only be the cause sine quo non, put it must also be a cause reasonably proximate; but the doctrine of criminal causation has reasonable limits. An injury may lead to death. Death may be instantaneous or may be delayed. The injury may lead to shock, excessive bleeding, coma, syncope etc. and cause death; in such a case injury and death have a clearly perceptible and direct nexus and there will be no difficulty in finding that death is the direct result of injury. The decision may not be so easy in a case where death is caused not directly by the injury itself but due to a complication or development or in a case where death is not instantaneous but is delayed. Where death is delayed or due to a later complication or development, Court has to consider the nature of the injury, complication or development and attendant circumstances. If the complication or development is the natural or probable or necessary consequence of the injury and if it is reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury can be said to have caused death. If, on the other hand, the chain of consequences is broken or if there is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established or the casual connection is too remote and the injury cannot be said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since casual connection is proximate.” 20. In Jayaram IN RE. Jayaram IN RE. (1967) Crl.L.J. 776:A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 205, the Court expressed the same view. In that case the accused delivered several cuts on the body of his deceased wife. The deceased was taken to the hospital. Two injuries, were found to be grievous and according to the doctor who first examined her these injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The deceased was in the hospital as an impatient for a period of 50 days. In the circumstances of that case it was held: “There had been no such considerable change of circumstances as to cut the chain of causation. The deceased was in the hospital as an impatient for a period of 50 days. In the circumstances of that case it was held: “There had been no such considerable change of circumstances as to cut the chain of causation. It would have been quite a different matter if the original injuries had healed meanwhile or ceased to be dangerous to life and the fatal complications had set in unexpectedly. The accused would then at any rate be entitled to the benefit of doubt as to the cause of death. That was not so in the case. But the mere fact that death was not immediate or shortly after the receipt of the injuries and medical men in their attempt to save life probably staved of the natural end from the injuries or a time could nor diminish the responsibility of the accused for the result of his act.” 21. In Mayne's Criminal Law of India, 4th Edn. at page 447 it has been stated: “It is indispensable that death should be connected with the act of violence not merely by a chain of causes and effects but by such direct influence as is calculated to produce the effect without the intervention of any considerable change of circumstances”. The learned commentator referring to R. v. Holland R. v. Holland (1841) 2 M and Rob 351(1904) 1 Crl.L.J. 909, observed at page 476: “The real question was whether in the end the wound was the cause of death.” 22. In Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 11th Edn. Vol. I at page 232, it is stated: “A wound may cause death either directly or indirectly. A wound operates as a direct cause of death when the wounded person dies either immediately or very soon after its infliction, and there is no other cause of death. In wounds which cause death indirectly the deceased survives for a certain period, and the wound is complicated by inflammation embolish, pneumonia, tetanus, or some other mortal disease which is a consequence of the injury. In wounds which cause death indirectly the deceased survives for a certain period, and the wound is complicated by inflammation embolish, pneumonia, tetanus, or some other mortal disease which is a consequence of the injury. Cases which prove fatal by reason of surgical operation rendered imperatively necessary for the treatment of injuries presuming that these operations have been performed with ordinarily skill and care, also fall into this category…It would be no answer to a charge of death from violence to say that there was disease in the body of the victim unless the disease was the sole cause of death.” 23. Now we turn to the present case. Deceased Raju was admitted with 7 injuries on his body. Injury No.4 alone was found to be serious and according to P.W.4 this injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the victim. Deceased was an impatient in the hospital for 13 days and according to P.W.6 the cause of death was empyema. In the Textbook of Surgery by Sangham Lal and C.P.V.Menon at page 633 empyema is defined as collection of purulant material in the plueral cavity. Ext. P-8 shows that several wounds found on the body of deceased were infected. Therefore it is clear that empyema developed because of the several infected wounds. The death of the victim was caused as a result of the injury sustained at the hands of the appellant. It is clear that the victim inspite of the medical aid succumbed to the injuries because of the later development of empyema. Empyema was only a supervening cause and the proximate and direct cause of death was the injuries by the appellants. We are unable to accept the contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the appellants that death of the deceased was not as a result of the injury inflicted by the appellants. There is direct and distinct connection between the act of the appellants and the death of the deceased and not merely unbroken chain of causes and consequences. Because of the penetrating wound in the chest the victim was prone to infection and this developed empyema. The appellants inflicted injury on the vital part of the body of the deceased. According to the medical evidence there could not have been the condition of empyema but for the multiple injuries inflicted on the injured. Because of the penetrating wound in the chest the victim was prone to infection and this developed empyema. The appellants inflicted injury on the vital part of the body of the deceased. According to the medical evidence there could not have been the condition of empyema but for the multiple injuries inflicted on the injured. We are of the view that the death of Raju was caused as a result of the injuries sustained by him at the hands of the appellants. 24. The next point that arises for consideration is whether the offence committed by the appellants fall within ‘3rdly’ of, section 300, Indian Penal Code. The appellants stabbed the deceased and P.W.1 with ‘malappuram’ knife. The deceased had as many as seven injuries. Injury No.4 was serious one and it penetrated the chest cavity. This injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The presence of supervening cause in the circumstances will not alter the culpability. There was only an interval of 13 days between the acts of the accused and the death. The mere fact that death was not immediate or shortly after the receipt of the injuries cannot diminish the responsibility of the accused for the result of the act. The Counsel for the appellants brought to our notice the decision reported in Kishore Singh v. State of M.P. Kishore Singh v. State of M.P. (1978) 1 S.C.R. 635 : (1977) 4 S.C.C. 524 :(1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 656:A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2267. Therein the Court held: “…. In view of the somewhat hesitant medical opinion with regard to the cause of death given by the three doctors and the further fact that the deceased died a month after the occurrence, we think that clause “3rdly” of section 300, Indian Penal Code, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt in this case. The evidence fulfils one of the ingredients of section 299, namely, that the appellants caused the death by doing as act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death as deposed to by the Surgeon.” 25. In the present case P.W.6 deposed that cause of death was empyema. P.W.4 stated that cause of death is the cumulative effect of the injuries sustained by the deceased and also the development of empyema. It cannot be said that there was hesitant medical opinion regarding cause of death. In the present case P.W.6 deposed that cause of death was empyema. P.W.4 stated that cause of death is the cumulative effect of the injuries sustained by the deceased and also the development of empyema. It cannot be said that there was hesitant medical opinion regarding cause of death. Both the appellants, entered the bus, pounced upon the deceased and stabbed him. Several injuries were inflicted on the deceased. There was sufficient motive on the part of the appellant. Therefore we are of the opinion that the ingredients of ‘thirdly’ of section 300, Indian Penal Code, are satisfied and the act by which death was caused was done with the intention of causing bodily injury and the same was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased. The appellants have committed the offence of murder punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code. Both the appellants were also convicted under section 324 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code for causing injury to P.W.1. 26. We find no reason to interfere with the conviction or sentence. Hence Criminal Appeals Nos. 55 and 90 of 1983 are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.