Judgment :- 1. The point which arises for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition is as to whether a person who had availed of the benefit of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, 11 of 1970, and had defaulted in payment of instalments as ordered thereunder, is entitled to invoke the provisions of the Kerala Debt Relief Act, 17 of 1977. M. P. Menon J, who heard the matter initially and whose attention was drawn to a judgment of Khalid J., as he then was, in Janardhanan Pillai v. Karthyayani Amma & others, 1974 KLT 141, held that the principle of that decision would not apply in view of the difference in the provisions of Act 11 of 1970 and Act 17 of 1977. That is bow the matter has come up before us. 2. The facts are in a very narrow compass: Petitioner is the judgment-debtor in O.S. No. 25 of 1970. He had borrowed an amount of Rs. 1,339/-and due to non-payment of the debt the above suit was instituted against him. An ex-parte decree for recovery of Rs. 1,600/- with interest at 6 percent on the principal amount was passed on 31-3-1970 by the Munsiff's Court, Pathanamthitta. The judgment-debtor has paid an amount of Rs. 718.58 in instalments till 14-1-1974. Atleast some of such payments were effected pursuant to an order of the execution court obtained by the judgment-debtor under Act 11 of 1970. However, he defaulted payment of the further instalments. The decree-holder then filed E.P. No.1 of 1979 before the Munsiff's Court, Punalur, for execution of the balance amount due as per the decree amounting to Rs. 1,700/-. The judgment-debtor claimed in bis objections that the execution petition was liable to be rejected since his liability had been wiped out in terms of Act 17 of 1977. In his evidence as RW-1, it was disclosed that he had only 74 cents of land, that some of the payments effected by him were pursuant to an order of the court under Act 11 of 1970, and that he could not pay further instalments due to lack of means The execution court rejected the objections of the petitioner-judgment-debtor for the reason that the judgment-debtor having enjoyed the benefit of Act 11 of 1970, was not entitled to claim the benefit of Act 17 of 1977. It was also observed, that the default of the judgment-debtor to comply with the terms of an order passed under Act 11 of 1970 would not entitle him to claim the benefit of Act 17 of 1977. 3. The point urged by the revision petitioner-judgment-debtor is that the definition of "debt" and "debtor" under S.2(3) and 2(4) of Act 17 of 1977, read along with S.11 thereof, enables him to claim the benefit of the latter enactment. 4. Khalid J., as he then was, in the decision reported in Janardhanan Pillai v. Karthyayani Amma & others 1974 KLT 141, noticed the difference between S.2(c) of Act 31 of 1958 and S.2(4) of Act 11 of 1970, which repealed and replaced the former. The definition of "debt" in S.2(c) of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, 31 of 1958, was in the following terms: "'Debt' means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from or incurred by an agriculturist on or before the commencement of this Act, whether payable under a contract or under a decree or order of any Court, or otherwise, and includes any debt or balance of debt due at the commencement of this Act under the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Repayment of Debts) Act, 1955, or the Travancore-Cochin Indebted Agriculturists Relief Act, 1956, but does not include " S. 2(4) of Act 11 of 1970 defines "debt" as follows: "'Debt' means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured due from or incurred by an agriculturist on or before the commencement of this Act. whether payable under a contract, or under a decree or order of any court, or otherwise, but does not include.....". Khalid J., as he then was, held that the omission of the italicised portion of the definition of debt under Act 31 of 1958 in Act 11 of 1970 was deliberate. It was held, that the balance of debt due under the repealed enactments were deliberately included in the definition of "debt" under Act 31 of 1958, whereas Act 11 of 1970, which repealed and re-enacted Act 31 of 1958, such balance of debt due under the former Act was purposefully excluded. It was held, that the balance of debt due under the repealed enactments were deliberately included in the definition of "debt" under Act 31 of 1958, whereas Act 11 of 1970, which repealed and re-enacted Act 31 of 1958, such balance of debt due under the former Act was purposefully excluded. The question which we have to consider is as to whether absence of the phrase, "debt or balance of debt due under Act 11 of 1970" in the definition of "debt" under S.2(3) of Act 17 of 1977, compels the adoption of the same reasoning as appealed to Khalid J., as he then was, in Janardhanan Pillai's case (supra). 5. We should notice some important features to appreciate the arguments which were urged by counsel for the petitioner. Act 31 of 1958 was a repealing and re-enacting statute in respect of almost the same subject as was governed by the provisions of the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Repayment of Debts) Act, 1955 and the Travancore-Cochin Indebted Agriculturists Relief Act, 1956. That enactment was replaced by Act 11 of 1970. Provisions of both the enactments related to agriculturists and debts, which were almost similarly defined in both the enactments, except for the omission of "debts or balance of debts due", under the Act, which was repealed in the case of the latter. The benefits, which were conferred on agriculturists were also similar in character viz , scaling down interest and the provision for payment of debt in instalments. In these circumstances, the omission of debts or balance of debts due under the enactment which was repealed in the latter enactment was considered by this court as deliberate, and that was the reasoning adopted by a Division Bench later in approving Janardhanan Pillai's case EFA. No. 18 of 1976. 6. We are of the opinion that the reasoning may not avail in the case of Act 17 of 1977 The definition of "debt" and "debtor" in sub-ss. (3) and (4) of S.2 of Act 17 of 1977 brings out the distinction significantly. Benefits of Act 11 of 1970 were confined only to agriculturists, whereas benefits of Act 17 of 1977 were not so confined to agriculturists alone. Non-agriculturists who would come within the definition of "debtor" in S.2(4) of Act 17 of 1977 were also entitled to the benefits of that enactment. Benefits of Act 11 of 1970 were confined only to agriculturists, whereas benefits of Act 17 of 1977 were not so confined to agriculturists alone. Non-agriculturists who would come within the definition of "debtor" in S.2(4) of Act 17 of 1977 were also entitled to the benefits of that enactment. The benefits were also substantially different in the two enactments; the former viz., Act 11 of 1970 provided only for scaling down of interest of payment of debt in instalments etc., and did not provide for wiping out the "debt" as provided in S.3 of Act 17 of 1977. The benefits were also substantially different in the two enactments; the former viz., Act 11 of 1970 provided only for scaling down of interest of payment of debt in instalments etc., and did not provide for wiping out the "debt" as provided in S.3 of Act 17 of 1977. S.3 of Act 17 of 1977 is in the following terms: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract or other instrument having force, by virtue of any such law, or in any decree or order of court, with effect on and from the commencement of this Act (a) every debt and the interest thereon payable by a debtor to a creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged; (b) no civil court shall entertain any suit or other proceedings against a debtor for the recovery of any debt or part of a debt or any interest thereon; (c) all suits and other proceedings (including appeals, revision petitions, applications for review, proceedings for attachment and execution proceedings) pending at such commencement against any debtor for the recovery of any debt shall abate: Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to (i) the sale of any movable property conducted and concluded before the commencement of this Act; (ii) the sale of any immovable property confirmed before such commencement; Provided further that where a suit or other proceeding is instituted jointly against a debtor and any other person, nothing in this section shall apply to the maintainability of such suit or other proceeding in so far as it relates to such other person; (d) every debtor undergoing detention in a civil prison in execution of any decree for money passed against him by a civil court in respect of any debt shall be released; (e) every movable property pledged by a debtor before the commencement of this Act shall stand released in favour of such debtor and the creditor shall be bound to deliver possession of such property to the debtor; (f) every mortgage executed by a debtor in favour of a creditor shall stand redeemed and the creditor shall be bound to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the debtor". It is evident from the above provision that the discharge provided for shall be effected notwithstanding any other law or any decree or order of court. It is evident from the above provision that the discharge provided for shall be effected notwithstanding any other law or any decree or order of court. S.11 of Act 17 of 1977 provides, that "The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any custom, usage or contract, or in any decree or order of a court or other authority". Similar provisions are absent in Act 11 of 1970. 7. Another important fact which we have to notice is that Act 17 of 1977 does not repeal Act 11 of 1970. Both do co-exist, and the latter enactment provides that it shall have effect notwithstanding the former or any decree or order of court. 8. If that be the position, a person, who is an agriculturist, and owes a debt under Act 11 of 1970,can successfully plead that he may be entitled to discharge of his debt under S.3 of Act 17 of 1977, if he answers the definition of a "debtor" and his liability is included in the definition of a "debt". The absence of any specific mention of debt or balance of debt due under Act 11 of 1970, will not then be material. The only question to be considered is whether he can successfully plead and prove that he falls within sub-ss. (3) and (4) of S.2 of Act 17 of 1977. The principle of the decision in Janardhanan Pillai's case (supra) as affirmed in E.F.A. No. 18 of 1976 will not, therefore, apply in view of the above circumstances. 9. We should also note the justification for the enactment of Act 17 of 1977. The preamble of that enactment provides: "WHEREAS it is expedient to provide relief from indebtedness to certain persons in the State of Kerala; BE it enacted in the Twenty-eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:" The question is whether the relief which was contemplated by Act 17 of 1977 was meant to be confined only to persons other than those who were entitled to the benefits of Act 11 of 1970. We are of the opinion that it was meant to apply to all persons who were so poor and whose indebtedness was within the comprehension of S.2(3) and (4) of the Act. We do not find any justification for holding that it was confined in its operation to such debtors as would fall within the definition of S.2(4) as had not availed of the benefits of the earlier enactment. Nor do we find any justification to hold that the provisions of Act 17 of 1977 were operative only in respect of some of the debts which would admittedly fall within S.2(3) of that enactment. Obviously, a further benefit of statutory discharge of "debts" was meant to be conferred on these who were so absolutely indigent as would not permit them to avail of the benefits even under the earlier beneficial legislation viz., Act 11 of 1970. We do not find any justification for excluding some of the persons who were comprehended by the definition of a "debtor" from the benefits of the enactment. We need only state that the observations contained in Janardhanan Pillai's case, 1974 KLT 141, do not apply to the definition of "debt" in Act 17 of 1977. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the execution court was wrong in refusing the benefit of S.3 of Act 17 of 1977 to the petitioner. We, therefore, allow this revision petition, and set aside the order of the execution court in E. P. No.1 of 1979. Naturally, therefore, the debt due from the petitioner shall be deemed to be wholly discharged in terms of S.3(a) of Act 17 of 1977. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Allowed.