S.S. BYAS, J.— By this application under section 482, Cr.P.C. the petitioners challenge the legality of the orders passed by the two Courts below in a proceeding under section 145. Cr.P.C. and pray for quashing the same. 2. Briefly recalled, the facts giving rise to this application are that the Station House Officer, Police Station, Sheoganj submitted a report in writing before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Exective), Sirohi stating therein that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace between the revision-petitioners and the opposite party Sama and others (twenty three in all) existed over some agricultural fields situate in Mauja Chuli. A prayer was made therein to initiate a proceeding under section 145, Cr.P.C. It was further prayed that the case was one of Emergency and as such the fields in dispute may be attached under section 146 (1), Cr.P.C. The Executive Magistrate thereupon passed the impugned order on November 1,1983, by which he attached the subject matter of dispute, and appointed the Tehsildar as Receiver and issued notices to the parties concerned to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the fields in dispute. The revision-petitioners challenged this order of the Executive Magistrate in revision before the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirohi. It was contended before him by the revision-petitioners that since no preliminary order under section 145 (1) was passed by the Executive Magistrate, the whole proceedings stands vitiated and the order of attachment is bad in law. It was argued that the order of attachment under section 146 (1), could not be passed without first passing a preliminary order under section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. The Additional Sessions Judge, replied the contentions of the revision-petitioners and up-held the order of the Executive Magistrate. Aggrieved against the said two orders of the Courts below, the revision-petitioners, by this application under section 482, Cr.P.C., invoke the inherent powers of this Court and pray for quashing the aforesaid order. 3. I have heard Mr. R.N Mathur, learned counsel for revision-petitioners and the learned public Prosecutor. The other non-petitioners, despite service of notices, did not put appearance. I have also gone through both the impugned order. 4. 3. I have heard Mr. R.N Mathur, learned counsel for revision-petitioners and the learned public Prosecutor. The other non-petitioners, despite service of notices, did not put appearance. I have also gone through both the impugned order. 4. At the fore-front of his argument, learned counsel for the revision petitioners raised the contention that an order for attachment under section 146 (1), Cr.P.C. cannot be passed without first passing a preliminary order under section 145(1) Cr.P.C It was argued that the order passed by the Executive Magistrate on May 30, 1983 does not show that the preliminary order under section 145 (1), Cr.P.C was passed first and there after the order attachment under section 146 (1), Cr.P.C. was passed on the ground of emergency. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Narain Ram v. Shankar Lal (1), Ram Prasad v. The State of Rajasthan (2), Girwardan v. Ram Prasad (3), and Asgar Ali v. State of Rajasthan. (4). It was, on the other hand, contended by the learn d Public Prosecutor that one can easily gather from the order of the Executive Magistrate dated November 1, 1983 that he did pass a preliminary order. (4). It was, on the other hand, contended by the learn d Public Prosecutor that one can easily gather from the order of the Executive Magistrate dated November 1, 1983 that he did pass a preliminary order. The contents of this order are as under :- ^^Fkkukf/kdkjh iqfyl Fkkuk fkoxat us ;g ifjokn vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 o 2 ds fo:) iz- /kkjk 145] lhvkj-ih-lh- ds rgr bl vkk; dk isk fd;k gS fd ---- geus izLrqr ifjokn dk voyksdu fd;k o ,ihih 11 dks Hkh lquk x;k rks ge Fkkukf/kdkjh dh fjiksVZ ls izFke n`f"Bok lUrq"B gS vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 o 2 ds e/; —f"k vkjkth dks ysdj fookn gSA ikVhZ la[;k 2 ds [kkrsnkjh Hkwfe ij ikVhZ la[;k 1 vkus ls jksdrs gS rFkk [kM+h Qly dks ys tkus ls jksdrs gSA fooknxzLr vjB e; vkjkth dks ysdj ikVhZ la[;k 1 o 2 ds e/; dCts ckcr~ fookn gS ftlls nksuksa gh ikfVZ;ksa esa kkfUr Hkax gks ldrh gSA fooknkxzLr vkjkth ds fookn dks ysdj iwoZ esa Hkh ikVhZ la[;k 2 ds O;fä xkao NksM+dj pys x;s Fks rFkk bl le; mijksä vkjkth dks ysdj nksuksa gh ikfV;ksa esa cM+k Hkkjh ruko cuk gqvk gSA rFkk os yksx viuk viuk gd o dCtk crkrs gS ,oa ikVhZ la[;k 1 ds O;fä la[;k 2 dks mä vkjkth esa cksbZ Qly ys tkus o izosk djus ls jksdrs gSA vr% /kkjk 146¼1½ lhvkj-ih-lh- ds vuqlkj fooknxzLr vjB ukesa ethVh;k o mldh vkjkth [kljk ua- 90] 91] 83] 86] 88] 89] 92] 93] 94] 95] 96] 104 o 105 dqy tehu 53 ch?kk 19 fcLok o vjB ukesa yqgksjksa okyksa o mldh vkjkth la[;k 17] 42] 40] 20] 19] 18] 41 o 145 jdck 36 ch?kk 5 fcLok dks dqdZ fd;k tkdj /kkjk 146¼2½ lhvkj-ih-lh- ds vuqlkj mijksä vjB ukesa etksfn;k o yqgkjksa okys rFkk mudh vkjkth dk rglhynkj] fkoxat dks vxzhe vknsk rd x`fgr ¼fjlhoj½ fu;qä fd;k tkrk gS rFkk vknsk fn;k tkrk gS fd og mä oknxzLr vkjkthokr dks vius dCts esa ys rFkk ml ij dkr dh O;oLFkk djs rFkk vk; O;; dk iwjk fglkc j[ksA vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 o 2 dks uksfVl tkjh gks fd os vius vius okLrfod dCts ds rF; ds ckjs eSa vius nkoksa dks fyf[kr dFku isk djsA i=koyh okLrq Dyse o lcwr fnukad 26-11-1983 dks isk gksA** 5. Needless to say that when the Executive Magistrate wants to take preventive action under section 145 Cr.P.C. he should draw an order under sub-section (1) which is commonly known as preliminary order. Such a preliminary order should contain the particulars that the Magistrate was satisfied as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace, the grounds of his satisfaction and a direction requiring the parties concerned to attend his Court on a date fixed by him and put-in evidence the written statement of their claims in respect of the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. The law does not prescribe that such a preliminary order should be in any particular form. It is the substance of the order which matters and not the language in which it has been drawn up where there is a preliminary order fulfilling these requirements, it does not become bad in law simply because it has not been happily worded. The importance of the preliminary order need not be stressed. A Magistrate can proceed to decide the dispute under section 145. Cr.P.C. only when he has drawn-up the preliminary order under sub-section (!). In the absence of the preliminary order, the subsequent proceedings e.g. the attachment of the subject of dispute on the ground of emergency, are without jurisdiction and erroneous in law. 6. In Narain Ram V. Shankar Lal (supra), Honble Sharma, J. (as he then was) observed as under:- "The legality of an order under sub-section (1) of Sec. 146, Cr.P.C. depends on its having been preceded by an order under sub-section (l)of Sec 145, Cr.P.C. i.e. a preliminary order. The Executive Magistrate was, therefore, not empowered to pass an order of attachment without drawing a preliminary order under the preceding section i.e. section 145, Cr.P.C." 7. In Girwardan v. Ram Prasad (supra), it was held: "The language of above provisions leaves no manner of doubt that an order under section 146 (1) can only be passed after making an order under sub section (1) of section 145. There is no restriction, wish regard to the period of time for passing such order as the language used is that any time after the order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 such order can be passed under section 145 (1). There is no restriction, wish regard to the period of time for passing such order as the language used is that any time after the order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 such order can be passed under section 145 (1). In my view, there is no restriction on the power of Magistrate that he cannot pass any order simultaneously under section 146 (l)with the order under section 145(1) the only restriction is that the order under section 146 (1) should follow and not precede the order under section 145(1), Cr.P.C." 8. In Asgar Alis case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that the order under section 145(1) must precede the order under section 146(1) Cr. P.C. i.e. the order of attachment of the subject of dispute can be passed only after a preliminary order has been drawn up under section 145(1), Cr.P.C. 9. The law, thus, casts a mandate on the Magistrate to draw-up the preliminary order under section 145(1) Cr.P.C. and thereafter to proceed further. 10. Now, a bare reading of the impugned order of the Executive Magistrate shows that he first passed an order for the attachment of the subject matter of dispute on the ground of emergency without drawing up a preliminary order under section 145(1), Cr.P.C. After passing an order for attachment of the subject-matter of dispute and the appointment of the Receiver, the Magistrate issued notices to the parties to put in their written statement. Even if the impugned order dated November 1, 1983 of the Magistrate is construed as a preliminary order under section 145(1), Cr.P.C, it was certainly passed after the order of attachment of the subject matter of dispute was passed. He has, thus, passed the order for attachment and the preliminary order in topsy-turvy way with bottom upwards and head downwards inasmuch as the order under section 146(1) was passed first and thereafter only the preliminary order under section 145, Cr.P.C. was drawn up. The learned Magistrate, in doing so, has put the vehicle in reverse gear. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be appreciated and sustained. 11. I need not deal with the question whether an order for attachment of the subject of dispute can be passed under section 146(1) simultaneously with the preliminary order under section 145(1). Cr.P.C. because the proceeding stands vitiated on account of failure of the Magistrate to pass a preliminary order. 12. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be appreciated and sustained. 11. I need not deal with the question whether an order for attachment of the subject of dispute can be passed under section 146(1) simultaneously with the preliminary order under section 145(1). Cr.P.C. because the proceeding stands vitiated on account of failure of the Magistrate to pass a preliminary order. 12. In the result, the revision is allowed and the impugned order of the Courts below are set aside. The fields in dispute are released from attachment. The case will go back to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sirohi to proceed in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above.