Girija Nandan Singh v. State of Bihar — 1986 DIGILAW 335 (PAT)

JUDGMENT : N.P. Singh, J. The petitioner has challenged the validity of the ORDER :of his removal from the post of Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Department, by the State Government, in this writ application. 2. In the year 1980 the petitioner was posted as Superintending Engineer in the Irrigation Department. The petitioner was deputed to the Department of Minor Irrigation by an ORDER :of the State Government. He joined as the Superintending Engineer, Minor Irrigation, Hazaribagh Circle, on 15.11.1981. The petitioner was also holding the additional charge of the Minor Irrigation Circle, Daltonganj. As the Superintending Engineer the petitioner placed ORDER :s for supply of P.V.C. pipes, for Rs.113.02 lacs on 18.3.1982, 19.3.1982, 26.3.1982. According to the petitioner, the then Irrigation Minister Shri Ramesh Jha was pressing the petitioner to buy H.D.P. pipes instead of P.V.C. As the petitioner did not obey the dictate of the Minister Irrigation, on 20th July, 1982, he was reverted from the Department of Minor Irrigation to the parent Department of Irrigation. The petitioner filed a writ application (C.W.J.C. No. 3513 of 1982) before this Court challenging the ORDER :of reversion to the Irrigation Department which was dismissed by this Court. An application for grant of Special Leave to Appeal was filed before the Supreme Court, in which leave to appeal is said to have been granted. However, the petitioner handed over charge of the Hazaribagh Circle to Shri J.N. Pandey respondent No.4. 3. Some questions were raised on the floor of the Assembly in respect of the ORDER :s placed by the petitioner and the respondent No.4 for supply of P.V.C. and H.D.P. pipes respectively because of which a vigilance enquiry was instituted. The report of the Vigilance Department was submitted indicating lapses on the part of the petitioner and respondent No.4. A legislative committee also submitted a report in respect of misuse of the fund of the State by the petitioner and respondent No.4 on the floor of the Assembly, a statement was made by respondent No.3, the Chief Minister, that the petitioner shall be suspended. The petitioner on 10.4.1985 filed an application (C.M.P. No. 35536 of 1985) before the Supreme Court for restraining the State Government from suspending the petitioner. On 10.9.1985, the Supreme Court passed an ORDER :directing the State Government to conclude the departmental enquiry to be initiated against the petitioner within six months from that date. The petitioner on 10.4.1985 filed an application (C.M.P. No. 35536 of 1985) before the Supreme Court for restraining the State Government from suspending the petitioner. On 10.9.1985, the Supreme Court passed an ORDER :directing the State Government to conclude the departmental enquiry to be initiated against the petitioner within six months from that date. By a letter dated 17.9.1985, the Special Secretary, Irrigation Department, called for an explanation in respect of the charges mentioned in that letter and directed the petitioner to submit his explanation within ten days. On 28.9.1985, the petitioner submitted his explanation. On 12.10.1985, an ORDER :was issued by the Department of Irrigation, suspending the petitioner till the conclusion of the departmental proceeding. On 18.10.1985, the Slate Government initiated a departmental proceeding against the petitioner. The petitioner filed a writ application (C.W.J.C. No. 5410 of 1985) before this Court for quashing of the ORDER :of suspension which was not entertained as an application in connection with his suspension filed on behalf of the petitioner was pending in the Supreme Court. Thereafter the petitioner filed Special Leave petition (No. 59 of 1986) before the Supreme Court, for quashing the ORDER :of suspension. 4. The charges framed against the petitioner on 18.10.1985, were served on the petitioner on 7.2.1986 when his appeared before the inquiring officer. The petitioner stated before the inquiring officer that as the charges were more or less identical to the charges which had been served by letter dated 17.9.1985 aforesaid, in respect of which the petitioner had already submitted his explanation, that very explanation be treated as his written statement of defence. On the next day (11.2.1986), the petitioner again appeared before the inquiring officer and parties were heard. Ultimately, the enquiry report was submitted on 27.2.1986 which was considered by the State Government and an ORDER :dated 5.4.1986 removing the petitioner from the service of the State Government was passed. The Supreme Court was informed in Special Leave Petition No. 59 of 1986 about the ORDER :of removal passed against the petitioner. The Supreme Court on 6.5.1986 adjourned the case sine die and gave the petitioner an opportunity to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the ORDER :of his removal on such ground as the petitioner may be advised. 5. The Supreme Court on 6.5.1986 adjourned the case sine die and gave the petitioner an opportunity to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the ORDER :of his removal on such ground as the petitioner may be advised. 5. According to the petitioner, he placed ORDER :s for supply of P.V.C. pipes worth Rs.113.02 lacs with a firm at Patna, because of the urgency for the supply of the pipes in question but he has become a victim of the bias of Shri Ramesh Jha, the then Minister of Irrigation and Shri Bindeshwari Dubey, the present Chief Minister, Bihar, who has been prejudiced against the petitioner by respondent No.4 Shri Jagdish Pandey, who happens to be his Samdhi (the daughter of the Chief Minister is married to the son of Shri Jagdish Pandey). It is said that the departmental proceeding has been conducted not only against the principles of natural justice but also against Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rule') which requires each charge to be established by evidence produced on behalf of the department. It was pointed out that, in the instant case, no witness has been examined to prove the charges levelled against the petitioner and the petitioner has been found guilty only on the basis of the vigilance report and the report of the question and calling attention motion committee of the Bihar Legislative Assembly (hereinafter referred to as 'the Legislative Committee'). 6. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State. In the said counter affidavit, it has been stated that while the petitioner was posted as the Superintending Engineer, Hazaribagh Circle, Minor Irrigation, he placed ORDER :s for supply of P.V.C. pipes worth Rs.113.02 lacs with a Patna Firm without publication of notice inviting tenders. It has been pointed out that the notice inviting tender for supply of P.V.C. pipes was published in the issue of Searchlight, a daily newspaper; published from Patna, on 5.3.1982 and in a daily newspaper published from Calcutta on 9.3.1982, although the date mentioned in the notice for opening the tender was 5.3.1982. The petitioner, according to the respondents, without waiting for the publication of the notice, issued tender document to a Patna Firm whose tender was opened on 5.3.1982 and finalised on 6.3.1982. The petitioner, according to the respondents, without waiting for the publication of the notice, issued tender document to a Patna Firm whose tender was opened on 5.3.1982 and finalised on 6.3.1982. In the notice inviting tender it had been specifically mentioned that no bill of quantity (B.O.Q.) will be sold on the date of receiving tender i.e. 5.3.1982. As such the sale of tender documents had been closed on 4.3.1982 prior to the publication of the tender notice in the newspaper. In the notice which was published on 5.3.1982, the tenders had been invited for supply or P.V.C. pipes worth Rs.10 lacs only but after having accepted the tender of Patna Firm on 6.3.1982, the petitioner placed ORDER :for supply of P.V.C. pipes worth Rs.113.02 lacs on 18.3.1982, 19.3.1982 and 26.3.1982. This, according to the respondents, was not and against all norms and procedures prescribed by the State Government for inviting tenders and allotment of work ORDER :but also against the decision of the Stare Government to purchase such pipes on the rates fixed by the Director General of Supply and Disposal, Government of India (hereinafter referred to as 'the D.G.S.D.'). It is said that M/s Jindal Paper Mills who are manufactures of P.V.C. pipes and are approved supplier at D.G.S.D. rates requested the petitioner on 5.3.1982 by telegram to extend the date so that they can supply P.V.C. pipes required by the Department of D.G.S.D. rate which request was also made by a letter dated 5.3.1982. On 17.3.1982, the petitioner wrote a letter to M/s Jindal Paper Mills requesting the latter to quote the rates within a week. According to the procedure prevalent in the State of Bihar, a Contractor who is an approved supplier of D.G.S.D. rate is not required quote the rate, rather the department is required to give supply ORDER :s, rates having been approved by the Government of India. The petitioner having asked M/s Jindal Paper Mills to quote the rate within a week by his letter dated 17.3.1982 for supply of P.V.C. pipes, placed ORDER :s with the Patna Firm on 18.3.1982, 19.3.1982 and 26.3.1982 for Rs.113.02 lacs. The rate approved by the petitioner for supply of P.V.C. pipes offered by the Patna Firm was 43% to 85% higher than the D.G.S.D. rate which caused the State Government loss of Rs.26.98 lacs. The rate approved by the petitioner for supply of P.V.C. pipes offered by the Patna Firm was 43% to 85% higher than the D.G.S.D. rate which caused the State Government loss of Rs.26.98 lacs. As the supply ORDER :for more than a crore of rupees was given to a Patna Firm without publishing the tender notice in the newspapers it became a subject-matter of public criticism and ultimately a departmental proceeding was initiated. According to the Respondent-State, although charges were framed on 18.10.1985 but they could not he served all the petitioner on the addresses known to the department and they were ultimately served on 7.2.1986 when the petitioner appeared before the inquiring officer, as already mentioned above. The departmental proceeding, according to the respondents, was concluded within the time limit fixed by the Supreme Court. 7. A separate counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No.3, the Chief Minister, Bihar, denying the allegation of bias made against him by the petitioner. It has been stated that the decision to initiate departmental proceeding had been taken in the interest of administration and not at the initiative of Shri Jagdish Pandey (respondent No.4). It has also been stated that about the misuse of the public fund, questions had been raised on the floor of the Assembly and objections had been raised by the Accountant General Auditor General. It has been pointed out that the petitioner has alleged the same mala fide in the present writ application which he had alleged before the Supreme Court in C.M.P. No. 35536/1985 while challenging his ORDER :of suspension, but the Supreme Court on 10.9.1985 simply directed that the departmental enquiry against the petitioner be completed within a period of six months from that dale; the ORDER :of suspension, however, was not interfered with by the Supreme Court. 8. First I propose to examine the grievance made on behalf of the petitioner about the departmental proceeding as to whether it has been conducted in breach of the principles of natural justice and Rule 55 of the Rules aforesaid. 8. First I propose to examine the grievance made on behalf of the petitioner about the departmental proceeding as to whether it has been conducted in breach of the principles of natural justice and Rule 55 of the Rules aforesaid. At the outset I must say that normally a departmental enquiry could not have been concluded in such a short time, but on behalf of the State it was pointed out that in view of the time limit fixed by the Supreme Court to conclude the departmental proceeding within a period of six months from 10.9.1985 and the attitude adopted by the petitioner in not receiving the copy of the charges till 7.2.1986 the inquiring officer was left with no option but to peruse the materials on the record and to proceed on the basis of the admitted facts. Our attention was drawn to ORDER :sheet of the inquiring officer and it was pointed out that the charges framed against the petitioner on 18.10.1985 could not be served on the petitioner by his known address and it was served only on 7.2.1986 when the petitioner appeared before the inquiring officer. It was submitted on behalf of the State that although charges were framed against the petitioner under 12 heads but the primary charge was that the petitioner placed ORDER :s for supply of P.V.C. pipes to a Patna Firm, for an amount of Rs.113.02 lacs without inviting tenders from intending suppliers, and the petitioner approved the rates for supply, 43% to 85% higher than the D.G.S.D. rates which caused a huge financial loss to the State. It was pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the allegation that the petitioner placed ORDER :s for supply of P.V.C. pipes with a firm at Patna for an amount of Rs.113.02 lacs was not disputed by the petitioner in his show cause filed before the inquiring officer. The rate at which payment was to be made was higher than the D.G.S.D. rates was also not disputed. It was further pointed out that the advertisement inviting tender was for the first time published in one of the newspaper, only on 5.3.1986, the date fixed for opening the tender was also not in dispute. The learned Advocate General drew our attention to the explanation of the petitioner dated 28.9.1985 (Annexure 9') which is his written statement in the departmental proceeding. The learned Advocate General drew our attention to the explanation of the petitioner dated 28.9.1985 (Annexure 9') which is his written statement in the departmental proceeding. In this background, according to the Advocate General, the inquiring officer could have recorded his finding on the basis of admitted facts as there was hardly any scope for adducing oral evidence in support of that charge. 9. From the statements made in the writ application it appears that the allegation that the notice inviting tender was published, in one of the dailies published from Patna, on 5.3.1982 the date fixed for opening the tender and the said notice was published in a daily from Calcutta on 9th March 1982 has not been disputed by the petitioner. That was not disputed even during the course of argument by Mr. Shanti Bhusan. The fact that ORDER :s for supply of P.V.C. pipes were placed with the Patna Firm amounting to Rs.113.02 lacs on 18th March, 1982, 19th March, 1982 and 26th March, 1982 is also admitted. Similarly, that the rates offered by the Patna Firm for supply of P.V.C. pipes was 43% to 85% higher than the D.G.S.D. races is also not in dispute. In this background, the only controversy remains as to whether for placing ORDER :s with Patna Firm for supply of P.V.C. pipes, in the manner mentioned above, it can be held that there was an administrative lapse on the part of the petitioner for which he can be punished in a departmental proceeding. 10. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that he had sent the tender notice for publication in the newspaper by his letter dated 19.2.1982 but if that notice was published only on 5.3.1982 and 9.3.1982 for that the petitioner cannot be held responsible. It was also urged that from a reference to the notice inviting tender it shall appear that copy of that notice had been forwarded to the Chief Engineer, Minor Irrigation, Bihar, Director of Industries, Chotanagpur Division and to "all main suppliers" for information and wide publication. It was submitted that it will be presumed that all persons interested in submitting their tenders would have known about the last date for purchasing papers relating to bill of quantity for filing tenders and opening thereof. It is difficult to accept this submission on behalf of the petitioner. It was submitted that it will be presumed that all persons interested in submitting their tenders would have known about the last date for purchasing papers relating to bill of quantity for filing tenders and opening thereof. It is difficult to accept this submission on behalf of the petitioner. It has been repeatedly pointed out by the Supreme Court that while awarding contracts all the norms prescribed for wide publicity and advertisement should be strictly followed so that no person can make a grievance that he did not get an opportunity to make an offer. In the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India (AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1628) in resrect of the duty imposed on a Government while entering into contracts or issuing licences, which is all the more applicable to the public servants, it was observed as follows: "It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largesse including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, lincences etc. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largesse including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, lincences etc. must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and nondiscriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory." Again in the case of Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1992), while impressing that the Government must act in public interest while settling any public property the sale object being to raise the highest revenue, it was observed as follows: "Where any governmental action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest discussed above and is found to be wanting in the quality of reasonableness or lacking in the element of public interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. It must follow as a necessary corollary from this proposition that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the State; such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. The Government, therefore, cannot for example give a contract or sell or lease out its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of course there are other considerations which render it reasonable in public interest to do so." The aforesaid mandate equally applies while awarding contract in respect of supply of any article to the Government where the object of the authority awarding the contract should be to make purchases of articles of good quality at the cheapest available rates so that the public exchequer is not put to unnecessary loss which will ultimately have to be borne out by every citizen of the State. Recently in the case of Ram and Shyam Co. Recently in the case of Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana (AIR 1985 Supreme Court 1147) it was pointed out by the Supreme Court as follows:- "The law in now well-settled that the Government need not deal with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly and without discrimination and without unfair procedure.......An unilateral offer, secretly made, not co-related to any reserved price made by the fourth respondent after making false statement in the letter was accented without giving• any opportunity to the appellant either to raise the bid or to point out the falsity of the allegations made by the fourth respondent in the letter as also the inadequacy of his bid. ...........How an uncontrolled exercise of executive power to deal with socialist property in which entire community's interest was sacrificed so as to cause huge loss to the public exchequer would have gone unnoticed but for the vigilance of the appellant.......... acceptance of an offer secretly made and sought to be substantiated on the allegations without the verification of their truth, which was not undertaken, would certainly amount to arbitrary action in the matter of distribution of State largesse which by the decisions of this Court is impermissible." 11. The relevant part of Rule 159 of Bihar Public Works Department Code is as follows:- "159. Tenders, which should always be sealed, should invariably be invited in the most open and public manner possible, whether by advertisement in the Government Gazette, or local newspapers or by notice in English or in Hindi posted in public places." Form the notice inviting tender it does not appear that even it was directed to he pasted on the notice board in the offices of the different circles for which the P.V.C. pipes were being purchased by the petitioner. There is no statement, in the written statement of the petitioner or in the writ application, that apart from sending copy of that notice to the Chief Engineer, Minor Irrigation, Director of Industries, Bihar and "to main supplier" which expression is not very clear to me, any publicity was given in respect of inviting tender for supply of P.V.C. pipes, I failed to understand as to how only three firms learnt about the supply of P.V.C. pipes who could obtain bill of quantity prior to 5.3.1982 and even submitted their tender, which were to he opened at 3.30 P.M. on 5.3.1982. The inquiring officer has observed that out of the three firms two were the firms owned by the same person. In view of the fact that in the notice inviting tenders it had been clearly stated that no bill of quantity (B.O.Q.) shall be sold on the date of receiving tender, a person, having seen the advertisement in the Searchlight on 5.3.1982 could not have submitted his tender on 5.3.1982, he cause that was the date fixed for receiving the tenders and for opening the same. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not explain as to why the date for inviting tenders was not extended when it was discovered that the notice inviting tenders had been published in one of the newspapers, only on 5.3.1982, the date fixed for opening the tenders. The learned counsel said that the petitioner after having sent the notice inviting tenders to press was not required to see every day's newspaper to find out whether tenders had bee n published or not. In my opinion, once the petitioner had issued advertisement in newspapers inviting tenders for supply of P.V.C. pipes, according to the procedure prescribed by the State Government and one of the norms approved by Courts, it is not open to the petitioner to take a stand that publication of the notice inviting tenders at least even in one of the papers before sale of bill of quantities was closed, was not a must. In the present case except the copy of notice is alleged to have been sent to some of the offices and to "main suppliers" no publication was given by any other mode. Who are those "main suppliers" has not been disclosed. In the present case except the copy of notice is alleged to have been sent to some of the offices and to "main suppliers" no publication was given by any other mode. Who are those "main suppliers" has not been disclosed. Once an officer is entrusted to act on behalf of the State for making purchases or disposal, he is required to take all precautions and measures so that the interest of the State is not jeopardized and no one complaints that he was not given an opportunity to submit tender for the supply in question. This is all the more important when the financial stakes are high as in the present case. 12. It appears that one Jindal Paper Mills which manufactures P.V.C. pipes and is an approved supplier at D.G.S.D. rates approached the petitioner by telegram dated 5.3.1982 after having seen the advertisement for extending the date so that they can supply P.V.C. pipes required by the department at D.G.S.D. rates. Same request was repeated by latter dated 5.3.1982. On 17.3.1982, the petitioner wrote a letter to M/s Jindal Paper Mill requesting the latter to quote their rate within a week. According to the procedure a contractor who is approved supplier at D.G.S.D. rates, is not required to quote the rate, rather the department is required to give ORDER :for supply, rates having been approved by the Government of India. The most remarkable thing is that by a letter dated 17.3.1982 having requested the aforesaid M/s Jindal Paper Mills to quote the rate within a week, the petitioner placed ORDER :only next day i.e. 18.3.1982 for P.V.C. pipes for an amount of Rs.47.24 lacs, another ORDER :on 19th March, 1982 for Rs.44.25 lacs and third ORDER :on 26th March, 1982 for Rs.22.53 lacs with the Patna Firm. This fact is also not in dispute in the present case. The learned counsel again could not explain as to why the petitioner should not have waited after M/S Jindal Paper Mills was directed to quote rate for supply of P.V.C. pipes within one week from 17.3.1982. It is an admitted position that the supply of P.V.C. pipes at D.G.S.D. rates would have been lower by 43% to 85% to the rates approved by the petitioner is respect of the Patna Firm. It is an admitted position that the supply of P.V.C. pipes at D.G.S.D. rates would have been lower by 43% to 85% to the rates approved by the petitioner is respect of the Patna Firm. The 1earned counsel simply stated that the petitioner knew M/s Jindal Paper Mills although an approved contractor of the Government of India, was not serious and as such the petitioner placed the ORDER :with the Patna Form so that the work may not suffer. There is no statement in the written statement filed on behalf of the petitioner or in the writ application that immediate supply of the pipes was required to fight any drought or any calamity when the normal procedure could have been bye passed. In my view, the conduct of the petitioner cannot be held to be bonafide. In normal course, on 5.3.1982 itself, the petitioner should have extended the date for inviting tender and should have given opportunity to all suppliers intending to submit their tenders so that the supply could be made on a more competitive rates. 13. Apart from that, it is also mysterious that tenders had been invited for supply of P.V.C. pipes worth Rs.10 lacs but the ORDER :was placed with the Patna Firm for an amount of Rs.113.02 lacs. No reasonable explanations was furnished on behalf of the petitioner before us is respect of this aspect of the matter except that in the notice it had been mentioned that amount of supply was liable to be varied. 14. On behalf of the petitioner it was pointed out that no witness was examined on behalf of the State to prove any of the charges levelled against the petitioner and the finding of the inquiring officer is based only on the vigilence report and the report of the legislative committee. Reference in this connection was made to the case of Central Bank of India v. P.C. Jain (AIR 1969 Supreme Court 983) where it was pointed out that in a departmental proceeding witnesses on behalf of the department should be examined in presence of proceedee who should be given an opportunity to cross-examine. Reliance was also placed on the case of Amalendu v. Dist. Traffic Supdt" N.E. Rly. Reliance was also placed on the case of Amalendu v. Dist. Traffic Supdt" N.E. Rly. (AIR 1960 Supreme Court 992) in support of the contention that the finding that the charges have been proved cannot be based only on the report of earlier enquiry by some other authority or committee. In my view, in the present case, it cannot be held that the departmental enquiry has been vitiated because of non-examination of the witnesses. The finding, as mentioned above, is based on acts and omissions which are not in dispute. The controversy is and in respect of drawing inferences on the admitted facts. Can it be said that on the facts mentioned above, the inquiring officer was not justified in coming to the conclusion that there has been a gross dereliction of duty on the part of the petitioner? 15. In the case of State of A.P. v. C. Venkata Rao (AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2131), it has been pointed out that while considering the question whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court need not be applied. As such where there is some evidence which may include admission of officer concerned, which the authority entrusted with the duty of holding the enquiry, has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charges levelled against him, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. Again in the case of State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1512), it was pointed out that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophistiscated rules of evidence under the Evidence Act may not apply. "Ail materials which are logically probative for a pradent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility." In the case of K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India (AIR 1984 Supreme Court 273), it was pointed out as follows: "32. The basic concept is fair play in section administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial. The concept of fair play in. action must depend upon the particular lis, if there be any, between the parties. The basic concept is fair play in section administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial. The concept of fair play in. action must depend upon the particular lis, if there be any, between the parties. If the credibility of person who has testified or given some information is in doubt, or if the version or the statement of the person who has testified, is, in dispute, right of cross-examination must inevitably form part of fair play in action but where there is no lis regarding the facts but certain explanation of the circumstances there is no requirement of cross-examination to be fulfilled to justify fair play in action. When on the question of facts there was no dispute, no real prejudice has been caused to a party aggrieved by as ORDER :, by absence of any formal opportunity of cross-examination per se does not invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at fairly. This is more so when the party against whom an ORDER :has been passed does not dispute the facts and does not demand to test the veracity of the version of the credibility of the statement. 33. The party who does not want to controvert the veracity of the evidence from or testimony gathered behind his back cannot expect to succeed in any subsequent demand that there was so opportunity of cross-examination specially when it was not asked for and there was no dispute about the veracity of the statements. Where there is no dispute as to the facts, or the weight to be attached and isputed facts but only on explanation of the facts, because of opportunity to cross-examination does not create any prejudice in such cases." (Emphasis added) In the instant case, on the admitted facts mentioned above, the inquiring officer could have come, to the conclusion that there has been a gross dereliction of duty on the part of the petitioner while placing ORDER :s for an amount exceeding rupees one crore, against the norms and rules not only prescribed by the State Government but even by Courts. 16. From the enquiry report it shall appear that the inquiring officer has appreciated the materials on record in an objective manner like a quasi judicial authority. In that connection it may be pointed out that out of 12 charges he has exonerated the petitioner of charge nos. 16. From the enquiry report it shall appear that the inquiring officer has appreciated the materials on record in an objective manner like a quasi judicial authority. In that connection it may be pointed out that out of 12 charges he has exonerated the petitioner of charge nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 saying that either they have not been substantiated or were baseless. Although he has made reference to the vigilance report and the report of the legislative committee, in his report, but his conclusion in respect of charge nos. 3, 11 and 12 are not based on those reports only but also on the admission of the petitioner, in his written statement. Chage nos. 3, 11 and 12 related to placing ORDER :of P.V.C. pipes with the Patna Firm without publication of the notice inviting tender in any newspaper, at a cost of Rs.113.02 lacs and at rates 43% to 85% higher than the D.G.S.D. rates. It is well known that even if some of the charges are established the ORDER :of dismissal/removal cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the case of State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan (AIR 1963 Supreme Court 779), it was pointed out as follows : "If the ORDER :may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that ORDER :because in respect of some of the findings but not all .t appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice." Again in the case of Railway Board, New Delhi v. N. Singh (AIR 1969 Supreme Court 966) the same view was reiterated. 17. It is well known that this Court while examining the enquiry report or any ORDER :of removal based on such enquiry report does not act as it Court of Appeal and it cannot substitute its own opinion for the view expressed by the inquiring officer or the disciplinary authority. 17. It is well known that this Court while examining the enquiry report or any ORDER :of removal based on such enquiry report does not act as it Court of Appeal and it cannot substitute its own opinion for the view expressed by the inquiring officer or the disciplinary authority. Of course if this Court is of the opinion that no reasonable man could have come to the conclusion arrived at by the inquiring officer or the disciplinary authority it may interfere with such ORDER :of removal. Similarly, if the High Court is of the view that the conclusion: arrived at by the disciplinary authority is based on evidence then certainly it can interfere. In the present case, the finding of the inquiring officer is based on admitted facts so far the main charge are concerned. This Court always extends its hand to help an officer who has been punished by adopting a procedure which is against statutory rules or against the principles of natural justice. But, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the view that neither there has been any breach of any statutory rule nor of any principles of natural justice. 18. It was then submitted that the petitioner has been singled out for the proceeding and punishment whereas persons against whom more serious, charges had been levelled in connection with the purchase of the H.D.P. pipes at a much higher rate have been left out. In this connection pointed reference was made against Shri Jagdish Pandey (Respondent No.4). It was pointed out that as he happens to be the Samdhi of the present Chief Minister, he has escaped the punishment. From the records it was pointed out that respondent No. 4 had been also suspended but was later reinstated, after Shri Bindeshwari Dubey became the Chief Minister of Bihar. It is true that in the vigilance report very serious allegations for misuse of fund to the tune of serveral lacs of rupees have been made against Shri Jagdish Pandey (Respondent No.4). But this Court cannot quash an ORDER :of removal passed against the petitioner on the ground that another person who was also alleged to be responsible for misuse of public fund while awarding contracts and making purchases has been left out by the State Government. But this Court cannot quash an ORDER :of removal passed against the petitioner on the ground that another person who was also alleged to be responsible for misuse of public fund while awarding contracts and making purchases has been left out by the State Government. The ORDER :of dismissal of the petitioner has to stand or fall on its own merit and not on the ground that no action has been taken against a person against whom the allegation similar to the petitioner had been made. 19. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that the petitioner has become a victim of the bias and the prejudice of the present Chief Minister in ORDER :to protect Shri Jagdish Pandey (Respondent No. 4). In this connection reference was made to the well known JUDGMENT : of the Supreme Court in the case of Partap Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 72). But what was the clash of interest between the petitioner and respondent No. 4 has not been explained. No satisfactory answer was given as to how by starting a departmental proceeding and later passing ORDER :of removal against the petitioner, respondent No. 4 has been saved. It is not one of those cases where the dispute is as to whether it was the petitioner who had placed the ORDER :s for an amount of Rs.113.02 lacs for supply of P.V.C. pipes or the respondent No.4. It is an admitted position that it was the petitioner who had placed the ORDER :. It appears that later respondent No. 4 succeeded the petitioner and he is said to have placed further ORDER :s for supply of H.D.P. pipes which has caused further loss to the State Government. That could have formed the subject-matter of a separate departmental proceeding against respondent No.4. But, in my view, merely by initiating a departmental proceeding against the petitioner, respondent No.4 has not been saved. 20. Mr. Venu Gopal appearing on behalf of the Chief Minister pointed out that the vigilance report as well as the legislative committee report had been submitted showing involvement of the petitioner and respondent No. 4 in placing ORDER :s for supply of pipes for different circles, before Shri Bindeshwari Dubay became the Chief Minister, when he was not even a member of the Legislative Assembly. He further submitted that action against the petitioner was taken after question regarding misuse of public fund was raised on the floor of the Assembly. About exonerating Shri Jagdish Panday (respondent No.4) it was stated that as he had placed ORDER :s on D.G.S.D. rates the matter was not pursued. As I am not concerned as to why proceeding was not initiated against respondent no. 4 I do not consider it necessary to examine whether the explanation furnished in respect of respondent No.4 can be accepted. But so far the petitioner is concerned having held that there was no infirmity in the ORDER :of removal due to breach of any principles of natural justice or contravention of Rule 55, that ORDER :cannot be held to be invalid on the ground that the proceeding had been initiated against the petitioner, because of alleged malice of the Chief Minister. In this background, it is difficult to hold that when the petitioner was suspended or departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner it was a result of bias of the present Chief Minister. 21. On behalf of the petitioner it was stated that the legislative committee report purported to have been submitted on 16.1.1985 was really submitted after respondent No.3 became Chief Minister but the date of the report was ante dated. I do not consider it necessary to examine this allegation which does not have direct bearing on the case, apart from the question whether the Court should make any such enquiry. 22. In the result, this writ application fails and it is dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, then will be no ORDER :as to costs. Application dismissed.