Judgment S. Shamsul Hasan, J. 1. The appellants are the plaintiffs in Title Suit No.135 of 1985, filed against the decree holder (who is defendant no.1 Respondent no.1 here) of Title Appeal No.77 of 1980 arising out of Title Suit No.86 of 1978 in which suit the appellants were not a party. The appeal arises out of an order passed by the trial Court refusing to injunct the Respondent from proceeding to execute the decree obtained by them in the latter suit. 2. The relevant facts are in a very short compass. The appellants, who are transferees from the widow of Brahamdeo Choudhary and his coparceners, base their claim on a deed of the year 1929 by which the ancestors of the respondents are said to have conveyed the property in dispute to the vendors of the appellants. The former suit was filed by the respondent Babulal Sah against Khadi gram Udhyog whom he claimed to be his tenant and succeeded In obtaining a decree for eviction in which the tenant assailed the title of the plaintiffs but failed. The appellants, case is that the plantiff of the former suit had no right, title or interest in the property in dispute since their ancestors transferred the same in the year 1929 to the ancestors of the vendors of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs seek the injunction on the ground that they being not the parties to the former suit the decree in that suit cannot be executed in a manner that would affect them injuriously. The trial court, as said above, rejected their prayer. Hence this appeal. 3. At the outset, I may state that serious doubts were raised by the learned counsel for the respondents regarding the identity of the land about the property involved in the former suit and the latter suit. According to the respondents, the properties in dispute are not the same. This objection was controverted by the learned counsel for the appellants by stating that in the plaint of the latter suit a boundary of the lands in dispute has been stated and due to efflux of time they could not be mentioned as some natural charges did take place. In regard to discrepancies in the plot numbers however, it was submitted that it was clerical error. Be that as it may, this point need not detain the judgment further. In regard to discrepancies in the plot numbers however, it was submitted that it was clerical error. Be that as it may, this point need not detain the judgment further. Suffice it to say that the trial court would have been well advised to examine this aspect of fact also and if the two plots in dispute as given by the respondents did not tally in the light of explanation of the plaintiff, that would have been end of the matter.1, however, propose to decide this appeal on another point altogether. In my view, the appellants are not entitled, for the reasons to be stated hereafter, to maintain a suit and protection from injurious affectation is available under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and the consequences thereafter. 4. Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code provides a protection to a party, who is not or could not be a party to a suit and the decree, from any injury intended to be affected at the bands of a decree-holder by the execution of the decree against such a party. The procedure is apparent and well-settled that once resistance is offered to the execution of the decree which is not necessarily meant resistance by breach of law and could be achieved even by informing the agents of the Courts executing the decree about the inapplicable nature of the decree, then the decree holder is entitled to file an application to the executing court who will determine the right of the parties in accordance with law. A suit to get this right determined is barred under Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code. In other words, the Code now provides that any person who apprehends any injury by the execution process has only to resist the process without resorting to a suit. Undoubtedly, these provisions have been introduced to avoid multiplicity of suit and early decision of such disputes which could not be achieved if a fresh suit is filed. 5. In the instant suit, learned counsel for the respondents, stated that when the Court officials went to execute the decree, the plaintiffs appellants resisted the execution substantially but instead of filing an application under Order XXI rule 97 of the Code, the decree-holder filed a petition for Police help. Thereafter further proceeding was stayed by an order of this Court. In the instant suit, learned counsel for the respondents, stated that when the Court officials went to execute the decree, the plaintiffs appellants resisted the execution substantially but instead of filing an application under Order XXI rule 97 of the Code, the decree-holder filed a petition for Police help. Thereafter further proceeding was stayed by an order of this Court. If this is true, then there is no manner of doubt that the execution of the decree has already been resisted and the next step was left to the discretion of the decree holder defendant respondent who could and may file an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code. If the defendent had failed to do so or continues to take no step as envisaged under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code, then the appellants could sit pretty ignoring the decree in the hands of the defendant. 6. This brings me to a question of some importance regarding the stage at which the bar to the filing of a suit as envisaged under Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code becomes operative. According to the learned counsel for the appellant until the proceeding under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code had not actually commenced, the bar to the suit will not become operative because Order XXI Rule 101 is a procedural clause which has to be followed in a matter arising out of order XXI Rule 97 of the Code and the other rules thereafter. In my view, a mere reading of Order XXI Rule 101 is sufficient to indicate the fallacious nature of the interpretation put on that clause by the learned counsel for the appellants, particularly, if compared with the relevant provision of the Code before it was transferred by amendment in the form as it stands now. I feel that it is proper to quote Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, after amendment, first :- "97. Resistance of obstruction to possession of immovable property.- (1)Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property of the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1 ). (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1 ). the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.98. Orders after adjudication.- (1) Upon the determination of the questions referred to in Rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application ; or (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. (2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days. 99. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser.- (1) Where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the court complaining of such dispossession. (2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. 100. Order to be passed upon application Complaining of dispossession.-Upon the determination of the questions referred to in Rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination.- (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant he put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application ; or (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. 101. 101. Question to be determined-All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being inforce, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. 102. Rules not applicable to transferee pen dente lite.-Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person. 703. Orders to be treated as decrees.-Where any application has been adjudicated upon under Rule 93 ot Rule 100 the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. " now it will also be proper to facilitate the examination of apparent dichotomy to cite Rule 103 of Order XXI of the Code prior to its amendment which is as follows :- "103. Any party not being a judgment debtor against whom an order is made under Rule 98, Rule 99 or Rule 101 may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the present possession of the property ; but subject to the result of such suit (if any) the order shall be conclusive. " 7. It is patent from the above quoted Order XXI Rule 101 of Code that all questions including those relating to right, title or interest arising between the parties who have invoked Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code will be determined by the Court disposing of the matter under that clause and not by a separate suit in counter distinctions to the provisions of the old Code where a suit was specifically allowed against any final order arising out of a proceeding under Order xxi Rule 97 onwards. In any event, however, the decision under Order XXI rule 97 was a pre-requisite for the filing of a suit. In any event, however, the decision under Order XXI rule 97 was a pre-requisite for the filing of a suit. By amendment, provisions similar to Order XXI rule 103 have been deleted and a bar to suits has been introduced in Order XXI Rule 101. This is indicative of the desire of the legislature to avoid multiplicity of suits and proceedings and expeditious disposal of right and claims. 8. The words "on an application" under Order XXI Rule 97 do not and cannot be interpreted to mean that the bar to the suit arises when an application is filed. This clause only means that all questions that are raised, and can be raised, under Order XXI rule 97 must be determined by the Court dealing with the application under Order XXI Rule 101 and not by a separate suit and sub-clause (2) of Order XXI rule 97 read with the contents in Order XXI Rule 101 clearly shows that any dispute of title between the decree-holder and the person not a party to the decree can only be determined under Order XXI Rules 97 or 98 or 101 and a suit is entirely precluded because sub-clause (2) of Order XXI rule 97 provides that all questions shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Order XXI Rules 97, 98 and 101. 9. I may reiretate that from reading Order XXI Rule 97 and rules 98 and 101, it is clear that the entire set of rules provide a procedure for the benefit of such persons against whom no decree is passed yet they are being subjected to the execution of the decree- It is a short cut procedure without involving a long drawn suit. In other words, there is no other procedure that a person affected by a decree to which he was not a party can resort to except to offer resistance under order XXI Rule 97 and to wait for the decree holder to seek adjudication of the dispute between the parties by following the procedure under Order XXI Rules 98 and 101. If the decree holder however, fails to take any step after resistance is offered, under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code by filing an application then there is no risk of any injury to any person who is stranger to the decree and his right is not being invaded by its execution. If the decree holder however, fails to take any step after resistance is offered, under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code by filing an application then there is no risk of any injury to any person who is stranger to the decree and his right is not being invaded by its execution. There is no question, therefore, of filing a fresh suit when the right of the parties an be effectively and properly determined in a proceeding very similar to a suit but without its procedural hurdles. The bar to the suit is absolute in terms of Order XXI Rule 101 and cannot be controlled by restrictive interpretation of the stage of its operation. Since the steps provided under Order XXI Rule 97 and 101 are the only steps available in the situation spelled out, I have no hesitation in holding that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable. Consequently, the question of granting any injunction does not arise. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision reported in air 1962 Patna 403, Janki Mohan and another V/s. Dr. S. Samaddar and others and AIR 1978 Gau 56 , Tazmul All and others V/s. Md. Ulairaja and submitted that injuries will be caused if the decree is allowed to be executed in the facts and circumstances of the case. In my view, the execution of a decree is invariably injurious to the affected party and no body can dispute the ratio of the cases. The decision reported in AIR 1952 Patna 403 (supra) ex facie, before the Code of Civil Procedure was amended in the year 1976, is against the contention on behalf of the appellant by analogy. In this decision an application was filed under Sec.151 of the Code by a stranger to the decree for the adjudication of his right to the property covered by the decree before the executing court. It was held that the application to get the right determined in the manner done was premature since that would be done udder Order XXI Rule 97 of the code alone. In this decision when Order XXI Rule 9 7 is directed to be resorted to then under the old Code a suit could be filed under Order XXI Rule 103 of the Code. In this decision when Order XXI Rule 9 7 is directed to be resorted to then under the old Code a suit could be filed under Order XXI Rule 103 of the Code. This decision, therefore, fully justified the view taken by me by analogy an application under Sec.151 of the Code being substituted by a suit. 11. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs.250/-. Appeal dismissed.