JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.:---The petitioner, who was minor on 2-10-1975 is major now. She has challenged in this writ petition the validity of section 16(3) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (for short the Ceiling Act). 2. Briefly, the facts are that one Gopal Khaparde, the father of the petitioner, filed a return on behalf of his family unit which included the petitioner. According to the petitioner, she was holding separate land to the extent of 30 acres which was included in the holding of the family unit in accordance with the provisions of section 4(1) of the Ceiling Act. Her challenge in this writ petition is that section 16(3) which permits the spouses to retain lands in the same proportion in which the lands were held by each spouse before the declaration of surplus is arbitrary and discriminatory since no such provision is made in respect of the lands separately held by the minor sons or minor unmarried daughters whose separate lands are included in the holding of the family unit under section 4(1) of the Ceiling Act. The contention, therefore, is that the fundamental right to equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India is thus infringed by section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act which makes hostile discrimination between the lands separately held by each of the spouses and the lands separately held by the minors. 3. The first question which needs to be examined in the instant case is whether it is open to the petitioner to challenge the validity of section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act on the ground that it infringes her fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged before me that the fundamental right to equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution relates to the basic structure of the Constitution and if there is a breach of that fundamental right to equality, the petitioner is entitled to challenge the impugned provisions notwithstanding the fact that the Amending Act No. 21 of 1975 by which the impugned section 16(3) was introduced in the Original Ceiling Act is included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and is thus made immune from the challenge on the ground of violation of the fundamental rights as provided under Article 31-B of the Constitution. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed his reliance upon the judgment of Mathew, J., as he then was, in the case of (Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v Shri Raj Narain)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299. In particular, he has placed reliance upon paras 355 and 360 of his judgment. 4. For appreciating the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to notice that in (His Holiness Kesvananda Bharati Shripadagalyau and others v. State of Kerala and another)2, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461, the Supreme Court held that an amendment made to the Constitution in exercise of its Amending power under Article 368 can be challenged on the ground that it destroys or damages the essential features or the basic structure of the Constitution. The question to be considered in the instant writ petition is whether an ordinary law made by the Parliament or the State Legislature under its law making power under Article 246 of the Constitution of India can also be challenged on the ground that it destroys or damages the basic structure of the Constitution. It is to show that it can be done that reliance is placed on behalf of the petitioner upon the aforesaid paras from Justice Mathew's judgment in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (supra). 5. It is pertinent to see that in the aforesaid case of Indira Gandhi, Chandrachud, J., as he then was, has also considered the above question. He held in para 692 in very clear terms that it would not logically follow from the majority judgment in the Fundamental Rights case that ordinary legislation must also answer the same test as a Constitutional amendment. He held that ordinary laws have to answer two tests for their validity viz. (i) the law must be within the legislative competence of the Legislature as defined and as specified in Chapter I, Part XI of the Constitution and (ii) it must not offend against the provisions of Article 13(1) and (2) of the Constitution. According to him, the 'basic structure' by the majority judgment, is not a part of the fundamental rights not indeed a provision of the Constitution. He, therefore, held that the theory of basic structure is wholly out of place in matters relating to validity of the ordinary laws made under the Constitution. According to him, the 'basic structure' by the majority judgment, is not a part of the fundamental rights not indeed a provision of the Constitution. He, therefore, held that the theory of basic structure is wholly out of place in matters relating to validity of the ordinary laws made under the Constitution. Even Justice Mathew held in para 348 of his judgment that an ordinary law cannot be declared invalid for the reason that it goes against the vague concepts of democracy, justice - political, economic and social, liberty of thought, belief and expression; or equality of status and opportunity or some invisible radiation from them. It then appears from para 360 of his judgment relied upon on behalf of the petitioner that according to him although the ordinary law even though put in the Ninth Schedule, cannot be challenged upon the general and vague grounds that their provisions destroyed or damaged an essential feature or basic structure of the Constitution such as free and fair election etc. The ordinary law which is put in the Ninth Schedule would be open to challenge on the ground that its provisions took away or abrogated all or any of the fundamental rights and, therefore, damaged or destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution if the fundamental right which is infringed constitutes the basic structure or the essential feature of the Constitution. 6. It appears to me that according to Justice Mathew, it is really speaking the Constitution Amendment inserting in the Ninth Schedule the ordinary law which is liable to be challenge on the ground that it is violative of the essential feature or the basic structure of the Constitution if the ordinary law included by it in the Ninth Schedule infringes any fundamental right which constitutes the basic structure or the essential feature of the Constitution. In fact, the above question is no more open to debate because the unanimous view of the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of (Wamanrao v. Union of India)3, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 271, paras 64, 65 is that the Constitution Amendments made upto 24-9-1973 and by which the Ninth Schedule was amended from time to time by the inclusion of the various Acts and Regulations therein are valid and cannot be challenged on the ground that they violate the basic structure or the essential feature of the Constitution but the Constitution Amendments made for including various Acts and Regulations in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution on or after 24-3-1973 are open to challenge on the ground that they or any of them damage the basic structure or the essential feature of the Constitution. 7. I may point out that view taken by Justice Chandrachud is reiterated and accepted by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer (as he then was) in the case of (Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India and others)4, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 234. He held in para 21 of his above judgment that the question of basic structure being breached cannot arise when the vires of an ordinary legislation as distinguished from a Constitutional amendment is being examined. He further observed that Kesavananda Bharati's case cannot be 'excess' for societal weal nor indeed can every breach of equality spell disaster as a lethal violation of the basic structure. It is thus clear from the above para 21 of Justice Krishna Iyer's judgment that a breach of equality clause in every case cannot lead to a violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. 8. It is, however, not necessary to consider in the instant case whether every breach of Article 14 can be said to violate the basic structure of the Constitution and particularly to use the expression of Bhagwati, J., in his dissenting judgment in (Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and others)5, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 whether conflict with a formalistic and doctrinaie view of equality before the law could violate the basic structure of the Constitution. However, in the context of the challenge to section 4 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 by which Article 31-C of the Constitution was amended for making the laws made for the enforcement of any of the Directive Principles of State Policy immune from the challenge of Articles 14, 19 and the then Article 31 of the Constitution, Justice Bhagwati in his dissenting judgment in the above case has made certain observations which are worthy of notice. He expressed the view that the equality clause in the Constitution does not speak of mere formal equality before the law but embodies the concept of real and substantive equality which strikes at inequalities arising on account of vast social and economic differentials and is consequently an essential ingredient of social and economic justice. It is thus not necessary to consider the larger question whether the fundamental right under Article 14 itself is essential feature or the basic structure of the Constitution or whether it is the equality before law as a broad egalitarian concept propounded by Bhagwati, J., which is an essential feature of the Constitution. The reason is that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is not at all open to him in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Wamangao v. Union of India and others (supra). 9. It is, therefore, necessary to refer to the conclusions of the Supreme Court in Wamanrao's case cited supra. They are as follows: (1) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 31-A into the Constitution with retrospective effect and section 3 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which substituted a new Clause (1), sub-clauses (a) to (e), for the original Clause (1) with retrospective affect, do not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution of its basic structure and are valid and Constitutional, being within the constituent power of the Parliament. (2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, introduced Article 31-B into the Constitution which reads thus : 31-B. x x x x x x x In Keshvananda Bharati, 1973(Supp.) S.C.R. 1 decided on April 24, 1973 it was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure. We hold that all amendments to the Constitution which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are valid and Constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent Constitutional amendments except to say that if any Act or Regulation included in the Ninth Schedule by a Constitutional amendment made on or after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 31-A, or by Article 31-C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitution Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the Ninth Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Article 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose. (3) Article 31-C of the Constitution, as it stood prior to its amendment by section 4 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in Kesvananda Bharati. Article 31-C, as it stood prior to the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, does not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. 10. It is held by the Supreme Court in Wamanrao's case that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which introduced Article 31-A into the Constitution with retrospective effect and section 3 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 Which substituted a new Clause (1), sub-clauses (a) to (e), for the original Clause (1) with retrospective effect, do not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure and are valid and Constitutional. Article 31-A(1) which protects laws relating to agrarian reforms from the challenge of Articles 14, 19 and the then Article 31 of the Constitution is thus valid. Article 31-A(1) which protects laws relating to agrarian reforms from the challenge of Articles 14, 19 and the then Article 31 of the Constitution is thus valid. The Supreme Court has further held that the Maharashtra Amendment Act No. 21/1975, which was inserted in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 and admittedly is law relating to agrarian reforms is protected by Article 31-A and is, therefore, immune from challenge under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Since the said Act No. 21 of 1975 stood protected by Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution the Supreme Court did not in terms consider the question whether the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 inserting in the ninth schedule the Maharashtra Amendment Act No. 21 of 1975 so as to give it the protection of Article 31-B of the Constitution is violative of the essential feature or the basic structure of the Constitution. It is, however, clear that since the Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1975 is protected by Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution all its provisions including section 16(3) are immune from the challenge of Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. What is, however, more material for the purpose of this petition is the conclusion No. 2 in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wamanrao's case, referred to above. The Supreme Court has laid down therein that although it did not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent Constitutional amendments (i.e. made on or after 24-4-1973), according to it, if any Act or Regulation included in the Ninth schedule by a Constitutional amendment made on or after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 31-A, or by Article 31-C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, he challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional amendment by which that Act or Regulation was put in the Ninth Schedule, on the ground that he amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Article 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose. It is thus clear that since the Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1975 is protected by Article 31-A(1) as held by the Supreme Court in Wamanrao's case, the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 by which the said Amending Act was inserted in the ninth schedule of the Constitution is not open to challenge on the ground that it damages or destroys the basic or essential feature of the Constitution as reflected in Article 14, 19 or 31. 12. In this regard, it is also pertinent to see the observations in the majority judgment of the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills case (supra). The Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act by which the scope of Article 31-C was enlarged so as to make the laws for enforcement of any of the Directive Principles of State Policy, immune, from the challenge of Articles 14, 19 and 31 was challenged in the said case. In dealing with the submissions of the Attorney General that for the same reasons for which Article 31-A of the Constitution was upheld by the Supreme Court, Article 31-C as amended should also be upheld, the Supreme Court observed that Article 31-A was looked upon as a contemporaneous practical exposition of the Constitution. It was inserted by the very first Amendment which was passed in 1951 by the same body of persons who were the members of the Constituent Assembly. It was thus a contemporaneous practical exposition of the intendment of the Constitution. 12-A. The Supreme Court further held in Minerva Mills (supra) case that if by the Constitutional Amendment, the application of Articles 14 and 19 is withdrawn from a defined field of legislative activity, which is reasonably in public interest, the basic framework of Constitution would remain unimpaired. The above principle laid down by the Supreme Court is fully applicable to the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976, which inserted Act No. 21 of 1975 because the provisions of the Act No. 21/1975 are clearly relating to the defined field of legislative activity viz. the lowering of the ceiling limit of the agricultural lands and are in public interest. It cannot, therefore, be said that the above Constitution Amendment Act, inserting Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1975 in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution is violative of the essential feature or the basic framework of the Constitution. the lowering of the ceiling limit of the agricultural lands and are in public interest. It cannot, therefore, be said that the above Constitution Amendment Act, inserting Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1975 in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution is violative of the essential feature or the basic framework of the Constitution. It is thus clear that the challenge raise by the petitioners in this case is not open and stands covered by the above judgments. 13. Lastly, before I part with the case, I may also refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s. Bharat Coking Ltd. another)6, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 239 in which it is held that where the law is protected by Article 31-C prior to its amendment, it stands protected by it irrespective of the fact that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The view taken is that if the law to further the Directive Principles has necessarily to be non-discriminatory or has to be based on a reasonable classification, then such law does not need any protection such as that afforded by Article 32-C because it is then valid without any aid of Article 31-C. It, therefore, repelled the contention raised on behalf of the Article 31-C has to be necessarily non-discriminatory. It observed that if Article 14 is not offended by any law no one need give any immunity to it from an attack based on Article 14. The same principle would apply to the law relating to agrarian reforms protected by Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, even assuming that section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act is violative of Article 14, it still stands protected by Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution. 14. However, even if the challenge under Article 14 is open, I do not think that the provisions of section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The object of introducing the concept of the family unit in section 4 by the Amending Act 21 of 1975 was to prohibit mala fide transfers in the name of minor children by their father or mother with a view to defeat the provisions of the Ceiling laws. It is that object which is sought to be served by section 16 of the Ceiling Act. It is that object which is sought to be served by section 16 of the Ceiling Act. Normally the father or the mother while making choice of retention would retain the best piece of land which may be either separately or jointly held by each of them or by the minor sons or minor unmarried daughters. There is, therefore, no reason for any apprehension that the separate land of the children would, therefore, be deliberately given as surplus land in the ceiling case. It may be that in some particular cases people may not behave in the normal way as stated above resulting in injustice to the minors in such cases but then it is an inevitable consequence of the social legislation meant for subserving the common good by securing equitable distribution of agricultural land. The aforesaid challenge that section 16(3) is violative of Article 14 must, therefore, fail and is rejected. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. There would, however, be no order as to costs in this petition. Petition dismissed. -----