V. Chandra Chudan v. A. Basha — 1986 DIGILAW 339 (MAD)

JUDGMENT SRINIVASAN, J. 1. The petitioner in this application and his wife filed a suit O.S. No. 9312 of 1984 on the file of the XI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras for damages for malicious prosecution against the first respondent herein. The second respondent is the counsel appearing for the first respondent in the said suit. The first respondent filed an application C.M.P.No.2428 of 1985 before the learned Principal City Civil Judge, Madras for transferring the aforesaid suit from the file of the XI Assistant Judge to the file of some other Judge. In support of the said application, the first respondent filed an affidavit, the relevant portion of which runs as follows: - “2. I submit that the suit is pending on the file of the XI Asst. City Civil Judge. The present XI Assistant City Civil Judge, Mr. Sampath Kumar, has been handling this matter. After vacation, and framing of issues on 7.10.1985, it was taken up for trial on 5.11.1985. On 5.11.1985 it was posted to 27.11.1985. The suit is based on the allegation of malicious prosecution of the plaintiffs before the Metropolitan Magistrate and has claimed damages of Rs.10,000/- against me. While the suit is being defended by me, I found to my surprise two days prior to trial on 5.11.1985 the first plaintiff, V. Chandrachudan, had been conversing with the said Presiding Judge within the Court premises at about 5.30 p.m. Though it had not given me any suspicion at that stage, it had roused my apprehension on 5.11.1985, when the learned Judge has shown an undue interest in placing this matter for 27.11. 1985 for trial, when many part-heard matters are in the file and many earlier suits are pending disposal. Further, the first plaintiff, P. Chandrachudan, challenged that, he would secure a decree at the hands of this Hon’ble Court before the end of this month. This assertion made on the corrider in front of the City Civil Court gave me an impression that I would not get the justice at the hands of the Presiding Officer, Mr. Sampathkumar by reason of some personal acquaintance with the first plaintiff which had been seen by me personally. Furthermore, I am also informed by my counsel Sri N. Krishna Mitra, that almost all his cases have been deliberately decided against him thereby exhibiting that he has personal animosity against my counsel as well. Sampathkumar by reason of some personal acquaintance with the first plaintiff which had been seen by me personally. Furthermore, I am also informed by my counsel Sri N. Krishna Mitra, that almost all his cases have been deliberately decided against him thereby exhibiting that he has personal animosity against my counsel as well. In these circumstances, I an obliged to apply for a transfer of the above case from the file of the present XI Asst. City Civil Judge to some other Court as I apprehended that I may not get justice in the hands of presiding officer, Mr. Sampathkumar.” 2. Alleging that the aforesaid averments in the said affidavit constituted ‘Criminal Contempt of Court’ the,-present application is filed with the sanction of the Advocate-General. Though the transfer petition was ultimately not pressed because the suit was administratively transferred to the Court of the XIX Assistant Judge along with 41 other suits, the question remains whether the respondents are guilty of contempt of Court by filing the affidavit containing the aforesaid allegations against the X: Assistant Judge. It is no doubt true that the petitioner has wrongly alleged in the application for contempt that the application for transfer of suit was not pressed because the first respondent was not bold enough to face the enquiry in the transfer application. It is also true that the petitioner has not in this application for Contempt referred to the factum of administrative transfer of the suit even before the application for transfer was heard. That will not in any way be relevant for deciding the matter in issue. 3. Both the respondents have filed counter affidavits contending that the averments in the affidavit filed in support of the transfer C.M.P. are true and that making such allegations does not involve any contempt of Court. The second respondent has stated in his counter affidavit that if the affidavit filed in the transfer application is a false one, it would constitute an offence under Secs.191 and Secs.192, Indian, Penal Code, and no contempt application can be entertained. We think it better to reproduce some portions of the second respondent's counter affidavit hereunder:- “(2). At this stage, I respectfully submit that the above application is filed under Sec.10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1972. We think it better to reproduce some portions of the second respondent's counter affidavit hereunder:- “(2). At this stage, I respectfully submit that the above application is filed under Sec.10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1972. A perusal of the said section indicates that no High Court can take cognizance of contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. I respectfully submit that even assuming without conceding that the averments made by the first respondent in his affidavit filed in support of Tr.C.M.P.No.2428/85 on the file of the Court of the Principal City Civil Judge, Madras, were false, the said allegation would as well form the subject-matter of offence as contemplated under Secs.191 and Secs.192 of the Indian Penal Code. Hence, there is a “specific embargo under the proviso to Sec.10 of the Contempt of Courts Act from entertaining any action for contempt where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Hence, I respectfully submit that the above application itself is misconceived, does not lie and is not maintainable in law.” 3. I state that as counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, I indicated to him that it is better in his own interest to have some other counsel engaged for appearance before that particular learned Judge (Thiru Sampathkumaran) by reason of the fact that series of cases in which I appeared before him had been decided in a prejudicial way. In fact a disclosure of a possibility of prejudicial result by reason of my appearance to a client is within the limitations of professional ethics as the interest of the litigant As a paramount one for the counsel and any knowledge about affectation of interest by the prejudice-borne out by any presiding Officer, which has been explicitly displayed by disposal of cases in earlier matters, could not be kept outside the purview of a client for deciding either to change the counsel or to retain a counsel. In the said circumstances, the factum of disclosure to the first respondent of the same had been done. In the said circumstances, the factum of disclosure to the first respondent of the same had been done. His apprehension that he might not get fair justice by reason of his personal visual knowledge of the acquaintance of the Presiding Officer and the petitioner herein and the further assertion made by the petitioner to him on 5.11.85 about the decree being obtained against the 1st respondent in the suit, was divulged to me, which was considered in the light of such disclosure which I did in my professional capacity as an Advocate and I advised him to change the Advocate or have the suit transferred. The averments in the affidavit of the 1st respondent in the Transfer Application were made on his instructions. If there had been even an iota of doubt as to the veracity of the 1st respondent, it was open to the petitioner to move the Court of the Principal City Civil Judge before the transfer petition is decided under the provisions of Or.19, R.2, C.P.C., to exercise his right of cross-examination of the 1st respondent. He however did not do so. I submit the petitioner did not prefer the remedies available to him under Jaw, if he has such concrete evidence that the affidavit of the 1st respondent was false inclusive of seeking permission to prosecute the 1st respondent for having filed a false affidavit by invoking the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. 4. I submit that the petitioner has no personal knowledge about the preferential conduct and treatment displayed by the then XI Asst. Judge in matters in which I appeared as counsel before him when he was the XI Asst. Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras as Rent Controller and later as XIX Asst. Judge, XVIII Asst. Judge, XVII Asst. Judge and XI Asst. Judges, Thiru Sampathkumaran was a practising lawyer in the office of Mr. Chandran Jayapal, a close friend and collegue of mine, who is no more now. The prejudice he has developed as a junior of that counsel and he has displayed the same even after he had joined the Subordinate Judicial Service. Judge, XVII Asst. Judge and XI Asst. Judges, Thiru Sampathkumaran was a practising lawyer in the office of Mr. Chandran Jayapal, a close friend and collegue of mine, who is no more now. The prejudice he has developed as a junior of that counsel and he has displayed the same even after he had joined the Subordinate Judicial Service. In the face of such a conduct, there was no need or occasion for me in my personal capacity to make a complaint or otherwise raise a row except to place it before the clients whose matters come up for disposal before the concerned presiding officer requiring the clients in their own interest to make alternate arrangement. If after such disclosure, the clients had preferred to have disposal through me before the said presiding Officer, I did not for a moment shirk in the conduct of the trial or enquiry and getting any verdict given in such matters duly communicated to them. The clients have also pursued the matter further by way of appeal or revision. I most respectfully submit that such a conduct on my part as a practitioner could not in the eye of law amount to indictment of the Presiding Officer of the Court or would be within the realm of the allegation now made of holding the Court in terrorem.” 4. The second respondent has also filed a supplemental counter affidavit in which he has given a list of cases in which he appeared before the concerned Judge and the decision went against his clients. 5. Mr. N. Sivamani, appearing for the second respondent argued on behalf of both the respondents though the first respondent has engaged a separate counsel. His first argument is that the petition for contempt cannot be entertained because of the proviso to Sec.10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Sec.10 of the Act reads thus: “10. 5. Mr. N. Sivamani, appearing for the second respondent argued on behalf of both the respondents though the first respondent has engaged a separate counsel. His first argument is that the petition for contempt cannot be entertained because of the proviso to Sec.10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Sec.10 of the Act reads thus: “10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts: - Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself: Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 6. According to the learned counsel, the affidavit filed in the transfer application would give rise to an offence under Secs.191 and Sec.192 of the Indian Penal Code if the averments therein are false. Since it is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code , it will be governed by the proviso to Sec.10 of the Contempt of Courts Act and the present application for Contempt is not sustainable. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The proviso will be applicable only to cases where the offence is punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code. The language is quite clear inasmuch as it says that “where such-contempt is an offence punishable.” The proviso will not apply to a case where it is punishable as any other offence under the Indian Penal Code. This has been laid down by the Supreme Court as early as in 1952 in Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras (1952)1 MLJ. 736: 1952 S.C.R. 425: 1952 S.C.J. 137: 65 L.W. 514: A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 149.In that case, the Supreme Court considered the language of Sec.2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1926, which was the same as that found in the proviso to Sec.10. The Supreme Court observed as follows: - “This contention, though somewhat plausible at first sight, does not appear to us to be sound. The Supreme Court observed as follows: - “This contention, though somewhat plausible at first sight, does not appear to us to be sound. In our opinion, the sub- Section referred to above excludes the jurisdiction of High Court only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of a Subordinate Court are punishable as Contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided for in the Penal Code. This would be clear from the language of the sub section which uses the words” Where such contempt is an offence. “and does not say” Where the act alleged to - constitute such contempt is an offence. Again, the Supreme Court observed: “It seems, therefore, that there are offences which are punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate Courts can sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of Criminal Law in such cases, the legislature deemed it proper to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec.2(3) , Contempt of Courts Act, but it would not be correct to say that the High Court's jurisdiction is excluded even in cases where the act complained of, which is alleged to constitute a contempt, is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code.” 7. The next contention of Mr. Sivamani is that the provisions of Sec.6 of the Contempt of Courts Act will come in aid of the respondents. Sec.6 of the Act reads thus: “Complaint against Presiding Officers of Subordinate Courts when not contempt. A person shall not be guilty of contempt of Court in respect of any statement made by him in good faith concerning the presiding officer of any subordinate Court or: (a) any other Subordinate Court, or (b) the High Court, to which it is subordinate, Explanation-In this section, Subordinate Court means any Court Subordinate to a High Court.” As essential requisite for invoking this section is good faith. We find that there is no good faith on the part of the respond dents in making the allegations against the learned XI Assistant City Civil 3udge in the affidavit filed in support of the petition for transfer. We find that there is no good faith on the part of the respond dents in making the allegations against the learned XI Assistant City Civil 3udge in the affidavit filed in support of the petition for transfer. The specific allegation in paragraph 2 of the affidavit is that two days prior to 5.11.1985, the first plaintiff was seen by the first respondent herein conversing with the said presiding Judge within the Court premises at about 5.30 p.m. It is pointed out by the petitioner in this application that 3.11.1985 was a Sunday and there was no occasion for the petitioner or the Presiding Judge to be in the Court premises at about 5.30 p.m., on. that day. The first respondent does not explain in any manner as to how he happened to be in the Court premises on a Sunday to see the peritioner and the presiding Judge conversing with each other. It is quite obvious that the allegation is not only false, but it is only a product of the ingenuity of the respondents in order to buttress the application for transfer. When it was pointed out to Mr.Sivamani that 3.11.1985 was a Sunday, he tried to explain the averment in the first respondent's affidavit by saying that it could have been a typographical error. No such explanation was given by the parties at any time. In fact, the allegation is reiterated in the counter affidavit of the first respondent in the present application in paragraph 6 wherein he says that two days prior to the date of hearing on 5.11.1985 fixed for trial, the petitioner was conversing with the Presiding Officer in the Court premises at 5.30 p.m. Even assuming that the words “two days prior to 5.11.1985” are capable of being construed as referring to 2.11.1985, it happens to be a Saturday, which is again a holiday. We have no doubt in our mind that this allegation made in the affidavit filed in support of the transfer application is nothing but absolute falsehood that negatives any good faith on the part of the respondents. We have no doubt in our mind that this allegation made in the affidavit filed in support of the transfer application is nothing but absolute falsehood that negatives any good faith on the part of the respondents. The other allegation made in paragraph 2 of the affidavit filed in support of the transfer application that the first respondent was informed by his counsel the second respondent that almost all his cases have been deliberately decided against him, thereby exhibiting that the Judge had personal animosity-against the counsel, shows that the application for transfer has been filed at the instance of the counsel and the allegations made in the affidavit are only made on his instructions. In the circumstances, the respondents are not entitled to claim the protection of Sec.6 of the Act. 8. The next contention of Mr. Sivamani is that the allegations made in paragraph 2 of the affidavit filed in support of the application for transfer would not constitute contempt of Court. According to him, the allegations are directed only against the individual concerned and not “The Court” as such. The learned counsel contends that the definition of “Criminal Contempt” as found in Sec.2(c) is not satisfied in this case. Reliance is placed upon the decision in Brahma Prakash v. State of U.P. Brahma Prakash v. State of U.P. (1953) 2 MLJ. 231: 1953 S.C.R. 169: where the Supreme Court had to consider whether a resolution passed by a Bar Association as against two named Judicial Officers would constitute “contempt of Court”. Muzaffarnagar District Bar Association passed a resolution that the two named Judicial Officers were thoroughly incompetent in law, did not inspire confidence in their Judicial work, were given to stating wrong facts when passing orders and were overbearing and discourteous to the litigant public and the lawyers alike. Apart from the said defects which were common to both the officials, other defects were separately catalogued as against each of them. The Bar Association sent copies of the resolution to the Premier, Chief Secretary, the Commissioner and the District Magistrate for suitable action. Apart from the said defects which were common to both the officials, other defects were separately catalogued as against each of them. The Bar Association sent copies of the resolution to the Premier, Chief Secretary, the Commissioner and the District Magistrate for suitable action. While holding that, the members of the executive of the Bar Association were not guilty of contempt of Court, the Supreme Court observed as follows: - “As regards the first part of the resolution, the allegations are made in general terms that these officers do not state facts correctly when they pass orders and that they are discourteous to the litigant public. These do not by any means amount to scandalising the Court. Such complaints are frequently heard in respect of many subordinate Courts and if the appellants had a genuine grievance, it cannot be said that in ventilating their grievances they exceeded the limits of fair criticism. The only portion of the resolution to which ‘prima facie’ objection can be taken is that which describes these officers as thoroughly incompetent in Jaw and whose judicial work does not inspire confidence. These remarks are certainly of a sweeping nature and can scarcely be justified. Assuming, however, that this portion of the resolution is defamatory, the question arises whether it can be held to amount to contempt of Court. To answer this question, we have to see whether it is in any way calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice in these Courts, or in other words, whether such statement is likely to give rise to an apprenension in the minds of litigants as to the ability of the two judicial officers to deal properly with cases coming before them, or even to embarrass the officers themselves in the discharge of their duties. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that whether or not the representation made by the appellants in the present case is calculated to produce these results, is to be determined solely and exclusively with reference to the language or contents of the resolution themselves; and that no other fact or circumstances can be looked into for this purpose, except perhaps as matters which would aggravate or mitigate the offence of contempt, if such offence is found to have been committed. It may be that plea of justification or privilege is not strictly speaking available to the defendant in contempt proceedings. The question of publication also in the technical sense in which it is relevant in a libel action may be inappropriate to the law of contempt. But, leaving out cases of ‘ex facie’ contempt, where the question arises as to whether a defamatory statement directed against a Judge is calculated to undermine the confidence of the public in the capacity or integrity of the Judge, or is likely to deflect the Court itself from a strict and unhesitant performance of its duties, all the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the statement was made and the degree of publicity that was given to it would undoubtedly be relevant circumstances. It is true as the learned counsel for the respondent suggests that the matter was discussed in the present case among the members of the Bar, and it might have been the subject-matter of discussion amongst the officers also to whom copies of the resolution were sent. No doubt, there was publication as is required by the law of libel, but in contempt proceedings that is not by any means conclusive. What is material, is the nature and extent of the publication and whether or not it was likely to have an injurious effect on the minds of the public or of the judiciary itself and thereby-lead -to-interference with the administration of justice.” We are unable to see how this decision helps the respondents. It is evident that the decision turned on the facts of that case. Even in that case, the Supreme Court has pointed out that where the allegations tend to create an apprehension, in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice, or if the allegations are likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his official duties, it will be sufficient to constitute ‘contempt of Court’. 9. Mr. Sivamani next referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra 1972 MLJ. (Crl.) 583: (1972) 2 S.C.J. 561: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 989, and relied upon the observations in paragraph 8 of the judgment. 9. Mr. Sivamani next referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra 1972 MLJ. (Crl.) 583: (1972) 2 S.C.J. 561: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 989, and relied upon the observations in paragraph 8 of the judgment. In the said paragraph, the Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision in Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 1970 MLJ. (Crl.) 425: (1970) 2 S.C.J. 35: A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 221 and set out the principles laid down in the said case as follows: -- “1. It will not be right to say that the committals for contempt for scandalizing the Court have become obsolete. 2. The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice. 3. It is open to any one to express fair, reasonable and legitimate criticism of any act or conduct of a Judge in his judicial capacity or even to make a proper and fair comment on any decision given by him. 4. A distinction must be made between a mere libel or defamation of a Judge and what amounts to a contempt of the Court. The test in each case would be whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the Judge or whether it is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by his Court. It is only in the latter case that it will be punishable as contempt. 5. Alternatively the test will be whether the wrong is done to the judge personally or it is done to the public. To borrow from the language of Mukherjea, 3. (as he then was) (1953)2 MLJ. It is only in the latter case that it will be punishable as contempt. 5. Alternatively the test will be whether the wrong is done to the judge personally or it is done to the public. To borrow from the language of Mukherjea, 3. (as he then was) (1953)2 MLJ. 231:1953 S.C.J. 521: 1953 S.C.R. 1169: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 10, the publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of ‘the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties.” In our view, in the present case the allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the application for transfer are undoubtedly calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by the XI Asst. Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court pointed out that the impugned statement was made in an application to the Sessions Judge for transfer of proceedings to another Court on the basis of an allegation that the Magistrate was on friendly relations with the complainant and even enjoyed his hospitality, sometimes alone and sometimes in the company of another Judge, who is also on friendly relations with the complainant. The Supreme Court held that the aforesaid allegation would not constitute contempt of Court. It is also pointed out by the Supreme Court that in the garb of a transfer application a person cannot be allowed to commit contempt of Court by making allegations of a serious and scurrilous; nature scandalising the Court and imputing improper motives to the Judge trying the case. 10. The next decision relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents is of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. MuraliDhar Emperor v. MuraliDhar (1916) I.L.R. 38 All. 284. That was a case under Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code. We are unable to find anything in the said decision to support the contentions of the respondents. 11. Mr. 10. The next decision relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents is of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. MuraliDhar Emperor v. MuraliDhar (1916) I.L.R. 38 All. 284. That was a case under Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code. We are unable to find anything in the said decision to support the contentions of the respondents. 11. Mr. Sivamani relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Perspective Publications v. State of Maharashtra Perspective Publications v. State of Maharashtra (1970) 2 S.C.J. 35: 1970 MLJ. (Crl.) 425: A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 221,which were quoted in Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra 1972 MLJ. (Crl.) 583: (1972) 2 S.C.J. 561: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 989 already referred to. In that case also, we find that the principles laid down in (1953) 2 MLJ. 231: 1953 S.C.J. 521: 1953 S.C.R. 1169: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 10, have been reiterated. We have already referred to the said decision. 12. Lastly, Mr. Sivamani relies upon the decision in State v. Harihar Shukla State v. Harihar Shukla 1976 Crl.L.J. 507 wherein a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that a libellous allegation made against a Judge in connection with his judicial function will not ipso facto and necessarily result in committing contempt of his Court and that they will so result only if they, in the circumstances, have a tendency or are calculated to interfere with the course of justice, or to scandalize the Magistrate concerned and lowering him generally in the eyes of the public and affecting the dignity of his Court. It is held that a mere libellous allegation regarding the conduct of a presiding officer of a Court, made to a superior authority which does not have the aforementioned tendency, will not amount to contempt of Court. Far from helping Mr. Sivamani, this decision is only laying- down the principle of law with which we agree and if the tests prescribed in the said decision are applied, the respondents are clearly guilty of contempt of Court. 13. In our opinion, the tone, temper and the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the application for transfer, impute malice, dishonesty, bias and partiality against the XI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, and cast aspersions on his integrity. 13. In our opinion, the tone, temper and the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the application for transfer, impute malice, dishonesty, bias and partiality against the XI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, and cast aspersions on his integrity. It is of utmost importance that there should be effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of • justice and, so it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, in order to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. “It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage” as pointed out by Frankfurter, J., in Offutt v. US. Offutt v. US. (1954) 348 U.S. 11. 14. In R. Subba Rao v. Advocate-General R.Subba Rao v. Advocate-General A.P., 1981 MLJ. (Crl.) 340: (1981) 2 S.C.C. 577 : 1981 S.C.C. (Crl.) 566: (1981) 2 S.C.R. 320 : (1981) 2 S.C.J. 27: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 755 the Supreme Court had to consider the notice issued by a litigant who lost his case before the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, making scurrilous allegations against the said Judge and calling upon him to pay a sum of Rs.30,000/- by way of damages. While dealing with the nature of the allegations made in the said notice. The Supreme Court observed thus:- “We agree with the High Court that the tone, temper and contents of the notice, particularly of the passages extracted earlier, which impute malice, partiality and dishonesty to the Subordinate Judge in the Judicial adjudication of the aforesaid suits against the appellant, constitute a deliberate attempt to scandalise the Judge, to terribly embarrass him and to lower the authority of his office and the Court. The act and conduct of the appellant in issuing this notice, therefore fell squarely within Sub-clause's (i) and (ii) of the definition of Criminal Contempt given in Sec.2(c) of the Act.” Again the Supreme Court observed that, “Unfounded imputation of mala fides, bias, prejudice or ridiculing the performance of a Judge or casting aspersions on his inrtegrity as has been done by the appellant in the notice in question-are always considered to mean scandalising the Court, and lowering the authority of his Court by bringing him and his office into disrespect and disrepute.” At the end of the judgment, the Supreme Court pointed out “the amplitude of the words” due course of justice “used in Sec.13 is wider than the words” due course of any judicial proceeding “or” administration of justice “used in Sub-cl.(ii) or (iii) of Sec. 2(c) and that if the act complained scandalzies the judicial officer in regard to the discharge of his judicial functions, it thereby substantially interferes or tends to interfere with the” due course of justice “which is a facet of the broad concept of the” administration of justice“. And as such, is punishable under Sec.13”. 15. The second respondent has filed a supplementary affidavit wherein he has given a list of cases in which the concerned Judge had held against his clients. The affidavit does not show whether the decisions of the concerned Judge in the said cases were found to be unsustainable by the higher Courts. Just because a counsel lost some cases before a particular Judge, it does not mean that the Judge is prejudiced against the said counsel. Even the allegations made in the application for transfer only says that “almost all the cases of the second respondent were deliberately decided against him”. This impliedly means that all the cases in which he appeared were not decided against him and some cases were decided in his favour. In the supplementary affidavit, the second respondent has referred to the transfer of one suit of the year 1977 from the file of the XI Assistant Judge to some, other Court. It is not stated that the said suit was transferred on the basis of a finding that the concerned Judge was always holding against the second respondent. In the supplementary affidavit, the second respondent has referred to the transfer of one suit of the year 1977 from the file of the XI Assistant Judge to some, other Court. It is not stated that the said suit was transferred on the basis of a finding that the concerned Judge was always holding against the second respondent. Another instance of transfer is also referred to in the said supplementary affidavit, but significantly it is not stated whether the said transfer was on an application made by the party. It could very well have been transferred administratively as the suit filed by the petitioner was transferred. We are not convinced with the explanations given in the counter affidavits of the two respondents. We have no hesitation in holding that both the respondents are guilty of contempt of Court inasmuch as they had filed the application for transfer supported by an affidavit containing scurrilous and false allegations against the Presiding Judge, before whom the suit filed by the petitioner was pending. We must point out that legal practitioners are not merely agents of parties pleading a particular case, but are officers of Court, expected to assist in the administration of justice, and to sustain unimpaired dignity of Court's, by all means in their power. 16. At the end of the arguments, the respondents tendered apologies. We are inclined to accept the said apologies in view of the fact that the suit filed by the petitioner was transferred administratively and there was no occasion for the respondents to obtain an order on the basis of the false affidavit filed in support of the application for transfer. Hence, we do not award any punishment to the respondents and let them off with a warning at any repetition of the offence would be dealt with severely. This application is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Apology accepted.