JUDGMENT : Agrawal, C.J. - This application has been referred to a Division Bench by a learned Single judge of this Court for an authoritative decision of the question as to whether the period during which the proceeding u/s 18-8 (inserted by the amending Act 54 of 1975) of the Orissa Money- Lenders Act, 1939 (for short, 'the Act'),was pending before the appropriate authority should be, excluded from the period of limitation for filing a suit for recovery of loan. 2. The petitioner is a registered money-lender under the Act. On 11-4-1975 he had granted a loan of Ks. 800/- to the opposite party under a handnote. On 12-1-1977 he filed an application before the Subdivisional Officer, Puri, for grant of a certificate u/s 18-B of the Act. According to the provisions of Section 18-B, the State Government may by a notification require the money-lenders carrying on business in any local area to produce before the prescribed authority all records relating to their business including documents evidencing advance of loans with a view to determine if the transactions exceeded the amount for which the money-lender had obtained the registration certificate and then to pass an order declaring the particulars of the transactions that are within the amounts as specified in the said certificate The certificate in the above proceeding was granted to the petitioner by the Subdivisional Officer on 27-11-1978 declaring the transaction in question within the specified limit. On the very next day, i.e, 28-11-1978, the petitioner filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif, Puri, against the opposite parties for recovery of the loan. 3. One of the pleas taken by the opposite parties was that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. Although the trial Court decided all the other issues in favour of the petitioner including the genuineness of the handnote, it dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. The petitioner, having failed in the lower appellate Court also, has filed the present revision application. 5. The petitioner claims exclusion from the period of limitation for filing the suit of the time which was spent in obtaining the certificate from the Subdivisional Officer u/s 18-B on the basis of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, which reads as follows : "In computing the period of, limitation for any suit of which notice has been . 5. The petitioner claims exclusion from the period of limitation for filing the suit of the time which was spent in obtaining the certificate from the Subdivisional Officer u/s 18-B on the basis of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, which reads as follows : "In computing the period of, limitation for any suit of which notice has been . given, or for which the previous consent or sanction required, in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded." 6. Apparently, in Sub-section (2), a provision is made for excluding only that time which is taken for obtaining the consent of the Central Government or any other authority for instituting any proceeding, such as, Under Sections 86 and 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Undisputedly, no such consent is required for a money-lender for instituting a suit- But the learned counsel for the petitioner, on a reference to Sub-section (8) of Section 18-B which reads as follows : "No Court shall entertain any claim in respect of any loan advanced prior to the date of the order referred to in Sub-section (2) unless the particulars thereof are contained in the said order and all suits in respect of such claims shall stand abated." submitted that since the Court could not have entertained the claim in respect of the loan in question, the plaintiff-petitioner was entitled to wait till an order under Sub-section (2) was passed regarding the handnote in question. He also referred to Rule 11 of Order 7, Civil Procedure Code, in this connection and submitted that the plaint was bound to be rejected in the absence of the relevant order passed u/s 18-B(2). 7. The question that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the exclusion of the time spent in prosecuting the application for grant of the required certificate under the Money-Lenders Act. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on reading both the Acts together, the Court should hold that it cannot be the intention of the legislature to compel a plaintiff to prosecute a futile action. In this connection, he also referred to the following observation of the judicial Committee in the case of Bassu Kuar and Ors. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on reading both the Acts together, the Court should hold that it cannot be the intention of the legislature to compel a plaintiff to prosecute a futile action. In this connection, he also referred to the following observation of the judicial Committee in the case of Bassu Kuar and Ors. v. Dhum Singh (15 Indian Appeals, 211) : "...It would be an inconvenient state of the law if it were found necessary for a man to institute a perfectly vain litigation under peril of losing his property if he doe's not. And it would be a lamentable state of the law if it were found that a debtor who for years has been insisting that his creditor shall take payment in a particular mode, can, when it is decided that he cannot enforce that mode, turn round and say that the lapse of time has relieved him from paying at all." On the basis of certain observations made by a. Bench of this Court in the case of Sankar Kumar Bhattar and Ors. v. Tahasildar cum-Revenue Officer, Basta and Ors. (AIR 1976 Orissa, 103), a case under the provisions of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, to the effect that "The meaning of the word 'entertain' may in certain cases mean merely 'to receive or accept/and not to a later stage subsequent to such reception", the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on the facts of the present case also it should be held that the plaint if filed by the petitioner could not have been received or accepted by the trial Court. 9. Reliance upon the above observations in my view is entirely misplaced as there was no bar for the petitioner to institute the suit in question. The bar for not en entertaining any claim under Sub-section (8)of Section 18-B did not debar the petitioner to institute the suit within the prescribed period of limitation, and, therefore, it is difficult to accept this submission inasmuch as the above observations cannot be said to be a decision laying down any proposition in a conclusive nianner because in the same breath it was observed by the learned Judge who delivered the judgment for the Court that giving such a meaning "would depend upon the entire scheme of the statute in which that expression occurs and the legislative purpose underlying that scheme. In the context, the expression 'to entertain any suit' may mean not only to fight but also to deal with the suit till its final determination." 10. We find that in several other cases arising out of the above provisions of the Money-Lenders Act itself, there are observations which go against the petitioner. R. N. Misra, J. (as he then was) in the case of Narayan Choudhury v. Koka Das and Anr. [(49(1980) CLT 524)] while dealing with the question of limitation expressed in these words; "...But since the statute intended to regulate the business of money-lending and the amending statute came for the purpose of imposing a greater restriction and control, to exclude appeal from the operation of the amending provision may defeat the legislative intention. An opportunity, however, must be given to the money-lender to comply with the statutory requirement within a reasonable time to be fixed by the Court before an order of abatement can be passed." and gave the plaintiff an opportunity to comply with the statutory requirement as provided u/s I8-B within a reasonable time. A similar view was also takan by another learned Judge of this Court in the case of Batakrshna Kar v. Laxman Lanka, [51(1981) CLT 219]. P. C. Misra, J. in the case of Harihar Pati Vs. Dyetary Khhtoi and etc., made the following observation : "...There may also be cases, where even though all requisites have been submitted before the specified authority, the matter might be lying with the specified authority without being disposed of in which case the money-lender cannot wait for obtaining the order and then file the suit as the limitation for filing of the suit will not be extended." The observations made in the above-mentioned decisions go directly against the contention of the petitioner's counsel. All that can be said is that in the absence of the order u/s 18-B of the Act, the suit may ultimately abate or fail. But this Court has permitted the plaintiffs even at the second appellate stage to supply the requisite order within a reasonable time, and in no case the time spent for obtaining the certificate was allowed to be added to the prescribed period of limitation for filing the suit. 11. Before parting with the case, however, .I must also answer the other argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. Before parting with the case, however, .I must also answer the other argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. He submitted that the bar for the Court to entertain any claim would be a bar even to receive the plaint itself. The word 'entertain' has fallen for interpretation in a number of cases with reference to the dictionary meaning as well as other corres- ponding statutes, viz, Order 21, Rule 90, C. P. C. namely, (1) AIR 1962 All, 424, (2) 543,(3) AIR 1963 Allahabad, 320 and (4) AIR 1974 Allahabad, 104, and the consistent view in all these cases is that under such limitation a Court is able to entertain a suit in its inception; but is unable to decide it on the merits owing to some difficulty not in jurisdic- tion but in procedure, i e., while the Court cannot refuse to take an application not backed by certain pre-conditions, it cannot judicially consider it. It may refer to the following passage in Kundan Lal's case (AIR 1962 Allahabad, 547) without introducing the facts of the case in' detail where such a view has been taken. "The expression 'entertain' does not mean the same thing as the filing of the application or the admission of the application by the Court. The dictionary meaning of the word 'entertain' is to deaf with of to take a matter into consideration. A Court hearing an application under Rule 90, Order XXI, C. P. C., can only be said to entertain the application when it is actually disposing of the application on the merits. It, therefore, follows that the mere filing of the application by the judgment debtor would not be its entertainment by the Court, and therefore, what is contemplated by the proviso to Rule 90, Order XXI, CPC, is that conditions which are prescribed by the proviso have to be complied with by the judgment debtor before the Court comes to dispose of the application on the merits." The Supreme Court has also taken the same view in the case of Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works Ltd. Vs. Asstt. Commr. Sales Tax, Kanpur and Another, and Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs. Punnu Sahu (Dead) through Legal representatives, . 12. The decision in Samarth Transport Co. Asstt. Commr. Sales Tax, Kanpur and Another, and Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs. Punnu Sahu (Dead) through Legal representatives, . 12. The decision in Samarth Transport Co. (P.) Ltd. v. The Regional Transport Authority (AIR 1961 SC 92) relied upon by the learned counsel for-the petitioner does' not help him as the words 'refused to entertain' in Section 68-F(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act were held only to mean that the authority cannot dispose of the application on merits but can reject it as not maintainable. The decision in S. C. Chatterjee v. Sankalparani Mandal (75 Calcutta Weekly Notes, 928) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is entirely on different facts, namely, allowing the time spent for obtaining the copy of judgment for filing a Letters Patent Appeal. 13. As a result of the above discussion, it must be held that the suit for recovery of the loan by a money-lender has got to be filed within the prescribed period of limitation' and he cannot be permitted to exclude the tine spent by him for obtaining the certificate u/s 18-B of the Act, but at the same time the Courts must grant reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff in appropriate cases to obtain and file a copy of such certificate before recording an order of abatement or dismissal of the suit on that account. 14. This application, therefore, must fail and is hereby dismissed, but in the circunstances of the case, I make no order for costs. B.K. Behera, J. 15. While I agree with my Lord, the Chief justice who has lucidly interpreted the scope and applicability of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act and Section 18-B of the Orissa Act, I would add a new words in support of the same conclusion. 16. The word 'consent' appearing in Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act would mean assent or permission and the expression 'sanction' occurring therein would mean authorisation. The Orissa Act does not provide for obtaining consent or sanction of any authority before the institution of a suit by a money-lender. The compliance of Section 18-B(2) of the Act would not amount V*o obtaining consent or sanction envisaged in Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act. The Orissa Act does not provide for obtaining consent or sanction of any authority before the institution of a suit by a money-lender. The compliance of Section 18-B(2) of the Act would not amount V*o obtaining consent or sanction envisaged in Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act. In the absence of any provision contained in the Act barring the institution of a suit and the registration thereof without compliance of Section 18-8(2) of the Act, there is no bar to the institution of a suit by a money-lender before or without obtaining the particulars mentioned therein. 17. Sub-section (8) of Section 18-B of the Act provides that no Court shall 'entertain' any claim in respect of any loan advanced prior to the date of the order preferred to in Sub-section (2) unless the particulars thereof are contained in the said order and all suits in respect of all such claims shall stand abated. The mere fact that a suit has been entered in the register of the Court is not conclusive to show that it has been entertained. The question as to whether it is entertainable may be raised at a later stage and the Court may then decide not to entertain the suit. The expression' entertain' does not mean the same thing as the institution of the suit or its registration by the Court. It is entertained when the Court proceeds to consider it on merits for adjudication. The expression 'entertain' occurring in Sub-section (8) of Section 18-B' of the Act does not bar the institution of a suit although at a later stage, the suit may not be enter- tained for non-compliance of the provision contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 18-B of the Act. 18. The view taken with regard to the requirements of Sub-sections (2) and (8) of Section 18-B of the Act in this revision would find support in the observations made and principles laid down in 57(1984) CLT 290 (supra) and 54(1984) CLT 406, Chittaranjan Misra and Ors. v. Banamali Misra and others. 19. The suit instituted by the petitioner was thus barred by the law of limitation. Final Result : Dismissed