JUDGMENT 1. ONE Smritimoyee Devi obtained from the court of the Subordinate Judge, Nadia a final decree for Rs. 4,993. 42 paise in Title Suit No. 319 of 19 53 against Syamapada Chatterjee the opposite parties 1 to 6 were the heirs and successors-in interest of said Syamapada Chatterjee. Smritimoyee Devi had filed in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Nadia Title Execution Case No. 92 of 1969 for execution of the said final decree passed in Title Suit no. 319 of 1953 against the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Syamapada Chatterjee including opposite party nos. l to 6. Opposite party no. 7, Saralabala had obtained decree in Rent Suit no. 1 of 1957 against said Smritimoyee Devi, who had filed the execution Case No. 92 of 1969. Saralabala, in execution of the said rent decree had attached the decree in Title Suit No. 319 of 1953 obtained by Smritimoyee Devi against Syamapada Chatterjee. Thereafter, saralabala was substituted as the decree-holder in said Title execution Case No. 92 of 1969 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, nadia. 2. IN the execution petition filed in Title Execution Case No. 92 of 1969, execution was prayed for against two lots of properties. Subsequently, the schedule of the said execution petition was amended by inter alia expunging lot no. 2 and by adding as lot no. 2 the land and buildingsinno. 94, Govinda Sarak being Holding No. 10, Ward No. 22 of Krishnagar Municipality measuring 6 decimals. The notices of attachment of the said properties were purported to be served. Thereafter, notices under Order 21 Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure were issued in the names of the judgment-debtors. In the sale proclamation drawn up, the value of the said Premises No. 94 Govinda Sarak being Holding No. 10, Ward No. 22 of Krishnagar Municipality was stated to be approximately Rs. 2,500/ -. On 12th February, 1973 auction sale of the property was held and the petitioners bid for Rs. 5,300/-, being the highest, was accepted. On 24th March, 1973, Ranendra Prosad, Rathmdra Prosad, Alakendu prosad and Nilima Devi, the opposite parties 2,3,4 and 5 had filed Miscellaneous Case No. 30 of 1973 under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code for setting aside the sand auction sale dated 12th February, 1973. On 27th July, 1973 the said Misc. 5,300/-, being the highest, was accepted. On 24th March, 1973, Ranendra Prosad, Rathmdra Prosad, Alakendu prosad and Nilima Devi, the opposite parties 2,3,4 and 5 had filed Miscellaneous Case No. 30 of 1973 under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code for setting aside the sand auction sale dated 12th February, 1973. On 27th July, 1973 the said Misc. Case was disposed of in terms of a solenama between the opposite parties 2,3,4 and 5 and the present petitioner. The opposite party Nos. 1 and 6 did not join in the solenama. On 1st August, 1973, the sale in favour of the petitioner was confirmed; on 27th August, 1973, he had taken possession of the property. 3. ON 17th September, 1973 the present petitioner filed an application under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code for setting aside the said sale in favour of the petitioner held on 12th February, 1973. The application was registered as Misc. Case No. 95 of 1973. The petitioner contested the said case. On 6th June, 1978 the learned Subordinate judge, Nadia dismissed the Misc. Case. He held that the application under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code by the opposite party no. 1 was barred by limitation. Processes were duly served upon the judgment debtors including the opposite party no. 1. The valuation given in the sale proclamation and the highest bid offered by the petitioner were not inadequate. According to the learned Subordinate Judge, the opposite party no. 1 had been set up by her brother, Ramendra prosad Chatterjee, who was a party to the solenama disposing of the previous application under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code filed by Ranendra Prosad Chatterjee and others. 4. ON 15th September, 1973 the learned Additional District judge, 2nd Court, Nadia allowed the Misc. Case preferred by the opposite party No. 1 against dismissal of her said application under Order 21 rule 90 of the Code. The learned Additional District Judge held that the processes had been fraudulently suppressed. There was collusion between the auction purchaser and Ranendra Prosad Chatterjee. The price for which the property had been sold was inadequate. Being, aggrieved, by he said appellate decision, the petitioner filed a Revisional application upon which the present Rule was issued. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned advocate for the petitioner, has made two-fold submissions before us. There was collusion between the auction purchaser and Ranendra Prosad Chatterjee. The price for which the property had been sold was inadequate. Being, aggrieved, by he said appellate decision, the petitioner filed a Revisional application upon which the present Rule was issued. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned advocate for the petitioner, has made two-fold submissions before us. His first submission is that the learned Additional District judge did not reverse material findings of the learned Assistant District Judge regarding service of processes of the execution case upon the applicant, Jharna Devi and did not also consider the evidence including admission made by her own witness, (P. W. 2) on the question of the valuation of the property auction sold. Mr. Roy Chowdhury's further submission was that the learned Additional district Judge had wrongly placed the onus of proof of fraud upon the auction purchaser and did not at all apply his mind to the reasonings given by the learned Assistant District Judge for holding that there was collusion between Ranendra, on the one hand, and the applicant, Jharna Devi (opposite party no. 1 herein), on the other the second submission of Mr. Roy Chowdhury was that assuming that there was any irregularity relating to service of notices and processes upon the applicant, Jharna Devi, there was no evidence of any irregularity or fraud attending the sale so far as the remaining judgment-debtors were concerned- Four of the judgment-debtors after filing a previous application under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code had entered into compromise with the auction purchaser and had withdrawn all objections to the auction sale. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in any view of the matter the sale of the right title and interest of the judgment-debtor other than that of the applicant, jharna Devi, ought not to have been set aside at the instance of the later. As using that the case of Jharna Devi about irregularity and or non-service upon her notices and processes was true, the court of appeal below could have set aside the sale only in respect of her interest in the suit property. 5. WE first take up consideration of the point as to whether the learned Additional District Judge had committed any error of jurisdiction in arriving at the finding that there were irregularity and fraud attending the auction sale dated 12th February, 1973. 5. WE first take up consideration of the point as to whether the learned Additional District Judge had committed any error of jurisdiction in arriving at the finding that there were irregularity and fraud attending the auction sale dated 12th February, 1973. The answer to the question whether Jharna Devi, the opposite party No. 1, really for the first time came to know about the said auction sale on 9th september, 1973 was closely connected with the other question whether notices and processes of the execution case were served upon her. Regarding service of notices upon Jharna Devi, the opposite party no. 1 the two courts have recorded findings contrary to each other. There was some force in the submission of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that while reversing the findings of the learned Assistant District Judge, the learned Additional District: Judge did not expressly refer to some parts of the evidence which the learned District Judge had relied upon. But sitting in revision, we ourselves cannot appraise evidence regarding service of notices and processes upon Jharna Devi (the opposite party no. 1. We may also point out that even if it be held that the learned Additional District Judge had acted illegally and with material irregularity in finding that Jharna's elder brother Ranendra had colluded with the auction purchaser and decree-holder, still acceptance by Ranendra of notices of the execution case issued in the name of Jharna Devi would not amount to valid service. There was no evidence that Ranendra had any authority from her sister, jharna Devi, to receive on her behalf such notices and summons. For the foregoing reasons, we are unable to interfere with the findings of the learned Additional District Judge that notices and summons of the execution case were not served upon Jharna Devi, opposite party no. 1. 6. AT the same time, we ore constrained to point out that the learned Additional District Judge failed to consider that the burden of Droving fraud and collusion between the opposite party No. 1s brother, Ranendra and the decree holder and auction purchaser, was upon Jharna Debi, the opposite party No. 1. Besides Ranendra, her other three brothers and two sisters were made opposite parties in the said misc. case brought by Jharna Devi. Rathindra Prosad and alokendra Prosad, who were opposite party nos. 4 and 5 in the said misc. Besides Ranendra, her other three brothers and two sisters were made opposite parties in the said misc. case brought by Jharna Devi. Rathindra Prosad and alokendra Prosad, who were opposite party nos. 4 and 5 in the said misc. case, had filed a petition of objection supporting the case of jharna Devi, the applicant under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code. They had also made allegations of fraud against their eider brother, Ranendra prosad and the auction purchaser (the petitioner herein. They had denied that they had either filed jointly with Ranendra Prosad the previous application under Order 21 rule 90 of the Code or had joined in the solenama filed in the said case. But Rathindra Prosad and Alokendra Prosad did not admittedly contest the Misc. Case No. 95 of 1973. None of the brothers and sisters of Jharna Devi, the opposite party no. 1, had testified as a witness. The opposite party nos. 3, 4 and 5 did not take oath to say that they did not receive notices and processes of the execution case or that they did not joint with their elder brother, Ranendra Prosad in filing the previous misc. Case No. 30 of 1973 under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code and did not enter into the Compromise dated 6th July, 1973. Maya Devi, who was the judgment debtor no. 7 in Execution Case no. 9 of 1969 and who did not enter into said compromise dated 6th July, 1973, neither took any step to have the sale set aside nor appeared in the misc. Case No. 95 of 1973. The opposite party nos. 3 to 6 did not also file any application or other proceeding for setting aside the said compromise dated 6th July, 1973 in the previous Misc. Case no. 30 of 1973. Therefore, they themselves did not establish any fraud Vitiating the said compromise dated 6th July, 1973 in the Misc. Case No. 30 of 1973. The learned Additional District Judge acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in holding the said compromise in the previous Misc. Case No. 30 of 1973, to be fraudulent and invalid. The said compromise on the other hand was binding upon the parties to the same. Case No. 30 of 1973. The learned Additional District Judge acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in holding the said compromise in the previous Misc. Case No. 30 of 1973, to be fraudulent and invalid. The said compromise on the other hand was binding upon the parties to the same. The learned Additional District Judge has considered as evidence of fraud the filing by the petitioner of a Vokalatnama dated 31st may, 1974 signed jointly by all the judgment debtors including Jharna devi in Execution Case no. 9 of 1969. But thereby the learned Additional district Judge committed a serious error of jurisdiction because he did not consider that Jharna Devi, the opposite party no. 1, did not challenge the genuineness of the said signatures of herself and others. In her evidence she had admitted that she had put her signature on the Vokalatnama to get back the disputed house. The letter Ext. B written by Ranendra to her lawyer also was no evidence of any collusion between Ranendra and the present petitioner. 7. THERE were serious infirmities in the finding made by the learned additional District Judge that the disputed house was sold for grossly inadequate price. None of the other judgment debtors who did not dispute service upon them of notices under Order 21 Rule 90 of the code even challenged the adequacy of the price. The present opposite party no. 1 did not produce in her Misc. Case any documentary evidence about prevailing market price of the land and buildings in the locality. Jharna Devi (opposite party no. 1) herself admitted that she had no knowledge in the matter. The other witness, P. W. 2, also admitted that he had also no personal knowledge of the value of the land and buildings. The learned Additional District Judge in his judgment referred to the statement of P. W, 8 to the effect that the market price in 1973 was Rs. 7000/8000. The property had sold for Rs. 5300/ -. Mr. Roy Chowdhury with some force has submitted that the said price could not be held as grossly inadequate. In this conection, Mr. Roy Chowdhury has relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the ease of M/s. Kayjay Industries (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Asnew Drums (P) Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1974 SC 1331 , on the question of inadequacy of price. In this conection, Mr. Roy Chowdhury has relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the ease of M/s. Kayjay Industries (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Asnew Drums (P) Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1974 SC 1331 , on the question of inadequacy of price. Krishna Iyer, J. in the said case had pointed out that mere inadequacy of price cannot demolish every court sale. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was also placed upon paragraph 8 of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Radhy shyam v. Shyam Behari Singh AIR 1971 SC 2337 . Shelat, J. laid down that mere inadequacy of price realised in an auction sale was not sufficient. A connection has to be established between inadequacy of the price and the material irregularity. 8. THE next question is whether upon the facts of this case the entire auction sale or the sale only in respect of the right, title and interest of the applicant, Jharna Devi (opposite party no. 1 herein)ought to be set aside In this case, each of the judgment debtors had specified but undivided interests in the immovable property which was auction purchased by the petitioner. Our decision must be read as limited to a case like the present one in which there had been irregularity in serving notices of the execution case only upon the judgment debtor opposite party no. 1 and the remaining judgment debtors were duly served and majority of then had entered into compromise with the auction purchaser. Unlike the facts of some of the reported cases mentioned hereinafter, the said compromise disposing of the previous application under Order 21 Rule 90 of the code filed by the judgment debtors other than the opposite party nos. and 3 was not vitiated by fraud. We have held that there was no evidence that the said compromise was not voluntary or not lawful. Since no step was taken by then to have the said compromise set aside, the opposite party nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 bad remained bound by the terms of the said solenama. As present advised, we are unable to subscribe to the extreme view that under no circumstances whatsoever an auction sale held under Order 21 Rule 84 of the Code can never be set aside in part. 2, 4, 5 and 6 bad remained bound by the terms of the said solenama. As present advised, we are unable to subscribe to the extreme view that under no circumstances whatsoever an auction sale held under Order 21 Rule 84 of the Code can never be set aside in part. On the other hand, there appears to be fair measure of unanimity among the different High Courts in India that in case immovable properties are sold by different lots, under Order 21 Rule 90 of the code the Court may set aside sale of one particular lot without setting aside the sale of the remaining lots. Such partial setting aside of sale is generally resorted to when there is material irregularity of fraud attending the sale of one lot while there was no such irregularity or fraud in respect of the remaining other lots. We are however not prepared to restrict the court's power to set aside in part an auction sale only to above class of cases. It is settled law that what passes to a purchaser at a court sale is the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor whatever that interest may be. Mulla on Civil procedure Code Edn. under the heading "what passes at a court sale under Rule 94 of Order 21 points out that Rule 13 of Order 21 shows that while applying for execution the decree holder has only to specify the judgment debtor's share or interest in the property. Rule 66 provides that sale proclamation only professes to specify the particulars prescribed by that Rule including the property to be sold and the judgment debtor's interest therein as fairly and accurately as possible. Thus, in case shares or interests of several judgment debtors are put up for auction sale, one cannot rule out the possibility of fraud or irregularity attending the sale in respect of share or interest of one judgment debtor without their being any fraud or irregularity regarding the shares and interests of other judgment debtors. 9. A Court sale has been some times described as an involuntary transfer. In case interests of several judgment debtors are auction sold, there is no legal impediment in the way of some of the judgment debtors ratifying or affirming sale of their interests in the property sold. But they must always act bonafide and lawfully and not fraudulently. 9. A Court sale has been some times described as an involuntary transfer. In case interests of several judgment debtors are auction sold, there is no legal impediment in the way of some of the judgment debtors ratifying or affirming sale of their interests in the property sold. But they must always act bonafide and lawfully and not fraudulently. In the case of Manmatha Nath v. Jiaul Haq 55 CWN 196 = air 1956 Cal. 291 (201-203), B. K. Guha, J. after considering several earlier decisions of this Court upheld the lower appellate Court's decisions setting aside sale in respect of 1/6th share of one judgment debtor and confirming the sale in respect of remaining 5/6th share. Guha, J. applied the ratio of the Division Bench devision in the case of Amulya Krishna v. Dilip Kumar 41 CWN 224 because the learned judge felt himself bound by the said decision in the case of Amulya krishna v. Dilip Kumar (supra. In Amylua Krishna v. Dilip Kumar (supra), S. N. Guha, J. and Buttley, JJ. by a short judgment upheld the submission of Mr. B. K. Mukherjee (as he then was), who appeared on behalf of the petitioner and had urged that the order of the court of appeal setting aside entire sale was wholly irregular and unsupportable, regarding being had to the position of the judgment debtors other than those whose application under Order 21 Rule 90 of the code was allowed could not have the benefit of the said application, when their application for setting aside the sale was previously rejected. The decision of the Division Bench consisting of B. K. Mukherjee (as he then was) and Sharp, JJ. in the case of Shila Pal v. Comilya banking Corporation 49 CWN 159, was not really inconsistent with the decision in Amulya Krishna v. Dilip Kumar (supra. In Shila Pal v. Komilya Banking Corporation (supra), several items of immovable properties were sold in lots. 5ale was set aside in respect of those lot which were sold at inadequate price resulting in substantial loss to the judgment debtors. There being no evidence that the judgment debtors had suffered similar loss by sale of the remaining lots, the division Bench in Shila Pal v. Comilya Banking Corporation (supra), upheld the sale of the said lots. 5ale was set aside in respect of those lot which were sold at inadequate price resulting in substantial loss to the judgment debtors. There being no evidence that the judgment debtors had suffered similar loss by sale of the remaining lots, the division Bench in Shila Pal v. Comilya Banking Corporation (supra), upheld the sale of the said lots. We respectfully agree with the Division bench decision in the case of Shila Pal v. Comilya Banking Corporation (supra) that the correct test would be whether there was material irregularity and secondly whether any injury had resulted to the judgment debtors (vide Narasimha Murty v. Official Receiver ilr (59) Madras 438. We find no reason why the same logic should not be extended to a case where was material irregularity or fraud resulting in loss to one judgment debtor without there being similar irregularity or fraud and resultant loss to other judgment debtors. 10. SUKRAWARDY, J. was a party to the decisions in the case of Rampada nag v. Kanai Rai 44 CLJ 167 and Ramesh Chandra Patranabis v, Biraja Sundari 47 CWN 351. While in the earlier case of Rampada nag v. Kanai Rai (supra), the Division Bench inter alia held that auction sale in execution of rent decree did not affect the interest of the heirs of a deceased judgment debtor because they were not brought on record but the sale of the interest of the remaining judgment debtors would stand in Rampada Nag v. Kanai Rai (supra) the Division bench had relied upon the Privy Council decision in the case of Khiarajmal v. Dain (1912) ILR 40 Cal. 45. as an authority for the proposition that a sale could be partially set aside. In Ramesh Chandra patranabis v. Biraja Sundari (supra), Suhrawardy, J. attempted to explain the earlier decision in Rampada Nag v. Kanai Rai (supra)to which he himself was a party, inter-alia, on the ground that the main ground on which the decision in Rampada Nag v. Kanai Rai (supra) case was based was that where a notice under Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code was not served on the judgment debtor, his interest would hot be affected by the sale. In somewhat same manner the decision of the Privy Council in Khiarajmal v. Dain (supra), was sought to be distinguished. In somewhat same manner the decision of the Privy Council in Khiarajmal v. Dain (supra), was sought to be distinguished. It may be noticed that in the case of Ramesh chandra Patranabis v. Biraja Sundari (supra), the court having found that the dismissal of the previous application under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code was vitiated by Fraud, the discussion as to whether a sale could be partially set aside, was not strictly necessary for the decision of the case. A Full Bench of the then Travancore and Cochin High Court in the case of Chacko Pyli v. Iype Varghese AIR 1956 Trav. Co. 147 at page 154 had, inter alia, observed that a court auction sale may be set aside in part if it is held in lots with separate particulars and proceeds. When a court sale is composite, i. e., of an entire property comprising undivided though distinct interests belonging to the various persons and what is proclaimed for sale is the entire property as though it belonged to a single owner without discriminating the separate interests with their particulars a piecemeal setting aside is not possible. A Single Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Mt. Raisunnissa and Others v. Mojibur Rahaman and Ors. AIR 1961 pat. 213 had taken the same view. 11. IN case the aforesaid Full Bench decision of the then Travancore cochin High Court laid down as an absolute proposition that except in case of auction sale of properties in lots, the court has no power to set aside in part an. auction sale, we respectfully dissent. Among other things, it would depend upon the nature of the interest claimed by the person who applies for setting aside the sale, the nature of the irregularity or fraud, if any, found in conducting the sale and also the conduct of the remaining judgment debtors. we have also pointed out that in case of a sale under Order 21 Rule 90 of the code not the entire property but only the right, title and interest of the judgment debtors pass. Therefore, there could be no legal difficulty in the way of upholding thee sale of undivided but distinct interests of some of the judgment debtors while setting aside the sale of the interest of remaining judgment debtors. Therefore, there could be no legal difficulty in the way of upholding thee sale of undivided but distinct interests of some of the judgment debtors while setting aside the sale of the interest of remaining judgment debtors. In the instant case, there was no finding of any irregularity or fraud in serving the processes and notices upon the judgment debtors other than the opposite party no. 1, Jharna Devi. Four of them after filing a previous application under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code entered into a compromise with the auction purchaser. Jharna Devi did not prove that the said compromise was vitiated by fraud or any other infirmity. Reversing the trial court's finding, the lower appellate court found that notices of the execution case were not served upon the applicant, jharna Devi, (the opposite party no. 1, herein. Effect of the said finding was that sale of he interest was invalid. In the result, upon the findings made by the lower appellate court the auction sale ought to be set aside only in respect of the interest of Jharna Devi without at the same time setting aside the safe of the interests of the remaining judgment debtors. 12. FOR the foregoing reasons, we make this Rule absolute in part, modify the order of the learned Additional District Judge, We uphold his order setting aside the sale of the interest of the opposite party no. 1. The order of the learned Additional District Judge for setting aside the auction sale in its entirely is set aside. The auction sale in respect of the interest of the remaining judgment debtors would, however, stand. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute in part.