S. S. CHADHA, J. ( 1 ) LAND measuring 65 bighas 16 biswas belonging to the petitioner situate in the revenue estate of village Moradabad Pahari, adjacent to village Mohammadpur Munirka and Vasantpur, Delhi was acquired all with land of other owners for the Planned Development of Delhi pursuant to a notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued on October 24, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), Award No. 1559 with respect to an area of 837 bighas 3 biswas including the area belonging to the petitioner was announced on May 3, 1983. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 2,500/- per bigha for the land of the petitioner. Not being satisfied with the award of the Land Acquisition Collector, the petitioner made a written application under S. 18 of the Act to the Collector requiring that the matter be referred for determination of the compensation by the Court. The learned Addl. District Judge to whom the reference was forwarded, determined the compensation and enhanced it at the rate of Rs. 3,000/- per bigha. The petitioner then filed a regular first appeal in this Court claiming assessment of compensation for his acquired land at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per bigha. The appeal was partly accepted on Jan. 31, 1978 by a Division Bench of this Court (V. S. Deshpande and H. L. Anand, JJ.) and the compensation was enhanced to Rs. 3,500/- per bigha plus the usual solatium and interest on the enhanced compensation. ( 2 ) ANOTHER regular first appeal, being R. F. A. 522/71 "bansi and others v. U. O. I. " arose out of the same Award No. 1559 and covered by the same notification under S. 4 of the Act dated Oct. 24, 1961. In that case, on a reference to the Court, the learned Addl. District Judge assessed the market value of the land at the rate of Rs. 3,500/- per bigha. In the appeal, the appellant in that case claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 4,500/- per bigha but on an application for amendment they were allowed amendment of the claim to Rs. 10,000/- per bigha. The appeal was disposed of on Oct. 11, 1984 by another Division Bench of this Court (Avadh Behari and G. C. Jain, JJ ). The market value of the land in village Moradabad Pahari as on Oct. 4,500/- per bigha but on an application for amendment they were allowed amendment of the claim to Rs. 10,000/- per bigha. The appeal was disposed of on Oct. 11, 1984 by another Division Bench of this Court (Avadh Behari and G. C. Jain, JJ ). The market value of the land in village Moradabad Pahari as on Oct. 24, 1961 was fixed at Rs. 10,000/- per bigha basing on another judgement in L. P. A. 81/79 "justice A. N. Bhandari v. U. O. I. ", decided on May 1, 1980 by Prakash Narain and Sultan Singh, JJ. ( 3 ) THE averment of the petitioner is that the land of the petitioner and those of the appellants in R. F. A. 522/71 are not only adjoining and contiguous but they are also the same areawise, topographywise and use wise. Besides this, the lands covered by the two cases were notified on the same date under S. 4 of the Act i. e. October 24, 1961 and were finally acquired under the same Award i. e. 1559. The contention is that the market value of the land noticed and acquired on the same date is to be paid on the same market value as it is the Government which is buying such land in the form of compulsory acquisition and the land owners should not be discriminated and penalised. The petitioner further submits that he came to know about the decision in R. F. A. 522/71 - "bansi and another v. U. O. I. " holding the market value as Rs. 10,000/- per bigha in the revenue estate of Moradabad Pahari as on October 24, 1961 a few days before the filing of the present application and thereafter the petitioner contacted his counsel who drafted the application and filed the same. The application is under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to determine/asset s the market value of the petitioner s land totally measuring 65 bighas 16 biswas in the revenue estate of Moradabad Pahari to be Rs. 10,000/- per bigha as on October 24, 1961 and to permit the petitioner to pay the deficient court-fee so as to be in conformity with the amount determined of the market value of the petitioner s land as on October 24, 1961. This application is for disposal after notice and hearing. 10,000/- per bigha as on October 24, 1961 and to permit the petitioner to pay the deficient court-fee so as to be in conformity with the amount determined of the market value of the petitioner s land as on October 24, 1961. This application is for disposal after notice and hearing. ( 4 ) WE may notice certain statutory provisions at this stage. Bill No. 63 of 1984 further to amend the Act was introduced in the Lok Sabha on August 6, 1984. It was proposed to insert Section 28-A for redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. The statement of objects and reasons say that considering that the right of reference to the Civil Court under S. 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is usually exercised only by the comparatively affluent land-owners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties. It is proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference Court under S. 18 of the Act. Section 28-A without any change was inserted by S. 19 of Act 68 of 1984. Section 28-A without any change was inserted by S. 19 of Act 68 of 1984. It reads :- 28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.- (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under S. 4, Sub-Section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the Award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court : provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this subsection, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-S. (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-Section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, requirethat the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Ss. 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under S. 18. " ( 5 ) THE most firmly established rules for construing an enactment are those laid down by the Barons of the Exchequer in Hydon s case (1584) 3 WR 16 : 76 ER 637 which were accepted by the Supreme Court in "bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar", (1955) 2 SCR 603 . " ( 5 ) THE most firmly established rules for construing an enactment are those laid down by the Barons of the Exchequer in Hydon s case (1584) 3 WR 16 : 76 ER 637 which were accepted by the Supreme Court in "bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar", (1955) 2 SCR 603 . It is permissible to have regard to all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, such as the history of the statute, the reason which led to its being passed, the mischief which it intended to suppress and the remedy provided by the statute for curing the mischief. The intention of the legislature in the new provision after S. 28 of the Act as 28-A which came into force with effect from Sept. 24, 1984 is to give equal compensation to all persons whose lands had been compulsorily acquired by the Government under the same award and same notification under S. 4 of the Act. The purpose is to remove anomalies in the determination of compensation by the Collector and the Court in some cases, that is, to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested persons. It provides for an additional remedy to all aggrieved persons whose land has been acquired to call upon the Collector to pay compensation at the rate determined by the Court in another case. It would give an opportunity to the Collector to re-determine the amount of compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. It gives a further relief to seek re-determination of the compensation by the Court if any one has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation for similar land acquired under the same award. ( 6 ) IN "bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh", AIR 1985 SC 1576 , a question of law relating to the interpretation of S. 30. Sub-S. (2) of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984 came up for consideration. It was ruled :- ". . . . . . ( 6 ) IN "bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh", AIR 1985 SC 1576 , a question of law relating to the interpretation of S. 30. Sub-S. (2) of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984 came up for consideration. It was ruled :- ". . . . . . IT must be remembered that this was not a dispute, between two private citizens where it would be quite just and legitimate to value when the law, in so many terms, declares confine the claimant to the claim made by him and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed though even in such case there may be situations where an amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant as for instance where an amount is claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here was a claim made by the appellants against the State Government for compensation for acquisition of their land and under the law, the State was bound to pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of the market value of the land acquired and if according to the judgements of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, the market value of the land acquired was higher than that awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge, there is no reason why the appellants should have been denied the benefit of payment of the market value so determined. To deny this benefit to the appellants would be tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire the land of the appellants on payment of less than the true market value. There may be cases whereas for instance, under agrarian reform legislation, the holder of land may, legitimately, as a matter of social justice, with a view to eliminating concentration of land in the hands of a few and bringing about its equitable distribution, be deprived of land which is not being personally cultivated by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with payment of little compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment of the true market value when the law, in so many terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value. The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far as possible except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be and irretrievably prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen. . . . . . "the Supreme Court has held that it would not be fair and just to deprive the holders of their land without payment of the true market value when the law, in so many terms, declares that they shall be paid such market value. The petitioner moved the application to redetermine and re-assess the market value of the petitioner s land totally measuring 65 bighas 16 biswas in the revenue estate of Moradabad Pahari to Rs. 10,000/- per bigha as on October 24, 1961, as the High Court has I determined the value of the adjoining and continuous land in R. F. A. 522/71 at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per bigha. The respondents stand is that the principle of determination of compensation on equal rate of market value for all lands covered by the same Section 4 notification is applicable in situations as recognised by the legislature by way of Section 28-A of the Act and not otherwise. In other words, according to the respondents, the petitioner cannot invoke Section 28-A of the Act. ( 7 ) INHERENT power of the Court is invoked by the petitioner to remedy the injustice done to the petitioner for non-payment of the market value of the land as compensation. On the other hand, the submission of Shri S. P. Sharma, the learned counsel for the respondents is that inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised when there is an express provision of law applicable to the case and power to review is circumscribed by the provisions of O. 47 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance is heavily placed on "p. N. Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji", AIR 1970 SC 1273 . It was ruled there that it is well settled that the power to review is not inherent power and that it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. ( 8 ) NO Court has any inherent power to invest itself with jurisdiction not conferred on it by law. It was ruled there that it is well settled that the power to review is not inherent power and that it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. ( 8 ) NO Court has any inherent power to invest itself with jurisdiction not conferred on it by law. It is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction over these proceedings. The inherent power of a Court cannot be exercised where there is an express provision of law applicable to the case. The Legislature in its wisdom by inserting S. 28-A in the Act ordained the re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. The petitioner cannot approach the Collector, as according to respondents, that provision is not attracted. We proceed on this basis without expressing our opinion. The petitioner cannot be deprived of his land without payment of true market value of the land which has been differently determined in R. F. A. 522/71. The quantification of the market value of the land as true compensation is Rs. 10,000/- per bigha in R. F. A. 522/71 whereas in this case it is assessed at Rs. 3,500/ -. It may be that this Court determinedcompensation differently because of the evidence placed on the record in each case and did not commit any error itself. But the mandate is to pay true value of the acquired land particularly when the other owners of the adjoining and contiguous land have been paid the true value of the land quantified in R. F. A. 522/71. Such a situation falls outside the ambit of the cases contemplated by O. 47 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure cases and circumstances always arise which are not in the contemplation of the legislature and not covered by the express provisions of the statute. The Court may find its conscience is aroused and without the exercise of inherent power the ends of justice would be frustrated. We feel the justice has to be done in this case. ( 9 ) WHERE as case falls within the class of cases contemplated by O. 47 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court cannot have inherent power of review apart from the provisions of the aforesaid rule. We feel the justice has to be done in this case. ( 9 ) WHERE as case falls within the class of cases contemplated by O. 47 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court cannot have inherent power of review apart from the provisions of the aforesaid rule. If a case really falls outside the ambit of the classes contemplated by the rules, the Courts have exercised inherent powers to review their orders, judgements and decrees There are express provisions relating to the setting aside ex parte decisions and restoration of suits, appeals dismissed in defaults contained in O. 9 R. 9, O. 9 R. 13 etc. This Court has taken the view that the Court has inherent power apart from O. 9 R. 9, O. 9 R. 13 etc. in such cases of restoring suits and setting aside the ex parte decree as are not covered by those provisions "hari Chand v. Mohinder Nath", 1969 Ren CR 749 (Del ). Where a suit is dismissed in default by mistake or otherwise, under circumstances which did not justify such dismissals in default, the Courts have exercised inherent power to restore the suit as such a case is not covered by O. 9 R. 9. In case falling outside the ambit of S. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court will have inherent power to stay the trial of the suit if it is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. See "vijay Kumar v. Manohar Lal", AIR 1979 Delhi 1 and mehar Chand v. Jagdish Chand Gupta", AIR 1970 Delhi 219. The Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 and to impose penalty for disobedience of the injunction not covered under Order 39 Rule 2. In "manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal", AIR 1962 SC 527 , it was held :- ". . . . In "manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal", AIR 1962 SC 527 , it was held :- ". . . . We are of opinion that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order XXXIX C. P. C. There is no such expression in S. 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code. It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression if it is so prescribed is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of S. 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. " ( 10 ) THE right to receive compensation arises when the land of a person is acquired. The determination of the compensation for the acquired land is the duty of the Court under the Act. The Court is required to compute and quantify the true market value of the acquired land on the principles enacted in the Act. This Court has determined the market value differently in two cases. Section 28-A of the Act gives a mandate to give and pay equal compensation to all persons whose land has been compulsorily acquired by they Government under the same Award and same notification under S. 4 of the Act. The intention is to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for similar quality of land to different interested persons. The ends of necessity persuade us to invoke our inherent jurisdiction to reopen the assessment to which we hereby do for redetermination of the market value of the acquired land. The intention is to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for similar quality of land to different interested persons. The ends of necessity persuade us to invoke our inherent jurisdiction to reopen the assessment to which we hereby do for redetermination of the market value of the acquired land. ( 11 ) THE petitioner has placed on record a copy of the judgement in R. F. A. 522 of 1971 "bansi v. Union of India", The khasra numbers covered in Bansi s case are stated in the application. The khasra numbers of the acquired land of the petitioner are also mentioned. The site plan of the khasra numbers in the appeal of the petitioner and those covered by R. F. A. 522/71 have been shown in delineated in pink and yellow respectively in the site plan. In the corresponding paragraph, the respondents do not deny it and merely state it is a matter of record. It is admitted case that lands in both the appeals were acquired under the same S. 4 notification and the same amount. The site plan shows that almost all the acquired land of the petitioner is adjoining and contiguous to the land which is the subject matter of R. F. A. 522/71. The market value of the petitioner s land measuring 65 bighas 16 biswas in the revenue estate of Moradabad Pahari as on Oct. 24, 1961, the date of the notification under S. 4 of the Act, is assessed at Rs. 10,000/- per bigha. In addition, the petitioner will be entitled to solatium at the rate of 15% and interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of possession till payment. The petitioner is directed to pay the deficit court-fee on the payment of which the modified decree sheet would be drawn. The petitioner is also awarded costs to the extent of the court-fee paid. Ordered accordingly.