Judgment :- 1. The property in question belonged to one Kathirkutty. The said Kathirkutty had filed an application O.A. 356/63, before the Lard Tribunal, Moovattupuzha, under S.16 and 17 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act for resumption of land for personal cultivation from the respondents herein. Kathirkutty died during the pendency of the proceedings before the Land Tribunal. In the meantime Kathirkutty had transferred his interests in the property to the respondents herein, as is seen from the gift deed, dated 17-1-1967 (Ext.A2). On the death of Kathirkutty, the respondents filed IA No. 52/67 in OA 356/65 seeking an order impleading them as the additional applicants enabling them to prosecute the proceedings, OA. 356/65. The said application was opposed by the petitioner. Some of the contentions raised by the petitioner are. that the gift deed is not valid, that the petitioners are not the legal heirs of the deceased applicant and that the right of resumption under S.16,17 is a personal right and hence the same will not survive even to legal representatives. After considering the various aspects of these contentions the Land Tribunal held thus: "These two questions cannot be properly adjudicated in this interlocutory application. I am leaving the question regarding the validity of the gift deed open. So also the question whether the right of the applicant would survive to his legal representatives is also left open. The respondent will be at liberty to agitate this question by filing an additional written statement if he so chooses. With the above reservations this interlocutory application is allowed and petitioners are impleaded as applicants 2 to 4". That is how the petitioners became parties to the OA 356/65 mentioned above. 2. The Land Tribunal dismissed the petition. The petitioners there-upon filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. The Land Tribunal, after considering the various contentions raised by the parties allowed the application. The said order was challenged before this Court, as is seen from OP 2020 of 1974. 3. This court disposed of the Original Petition entering the following findings: "One of the contentions raised by the counsel for the petitioner is that the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority proceeded to consider the issue as though respondents 1 to 3 agitated their cause as legal representatives of deceased Kathirkutty, the original petitioner. 3. This court disposed of the Original Petition entering the following findings: "One of the contentions raised by the counsel for the petitioner is that the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority proceeded to consider the issue as though respondents 1 to 3 agitated their cause as legal representatives of deceased Kathirkutty, the original petitioner. As a matter of fact that is not true. Even respondents 1 to 3 have no case that they constitute or exhaust the legal representatives of the deceased. Apparently one among them who is the son of the surviving son cannot at all be considered as the legal representative during the life time of his father. Counsel for respondents 1 to 3 has fairly conceded that he has no case that respondents 1 to 3 sought to pursue the proceedings in their capacity as the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner, but only as the transferees - in-interest of the original petitioner in favour of those persons is not a matter considered either by the Tribunal or the Appellate Authority. That being the position. I do not think that Exts. P1, P2 and P11 orders and judgment could be sustained. The proper course for the Tribunal would be to consider whether, after the death of Kathirkutty, the original petitioner, respondents 1 to 3 who got themselves Impleaded as petitioners 2 to 4 in the proceedings before the Tribunal, would be able to continue the matter on the ground that they are entitled to seek resumption. In order to enable "the Tribunal to do this Exts.P1. P2 and P11 orders and judgment are quashed". 4. This court accordingly quashed the orders under challenge. Not only that, this court issued a further direction, which reads: "In view of the specific allegation made in Para.16,18 and 21 of the objections filed by the petitioner I think that the Tribunal should go into the question regarding the lands possessed by the petitioner as well as respondents 1 to 3. As contended by respondents 1 to 3 the question whether the petitioner is entitled to question the validity of the gift deed, Ext. P8, also would be gone into by the Tribunal. The parties will be at liberty to adduce supplemental oral and documentary evidence found necessary for the purpose of substantiating their respective contentions. As contended by respondents 1 to 3 the question whether the petitioner is entitled to question the validity of the gift deed, Ext. P8, also would be gone into by the Tribunal. The parties will be at liberty to adduce supplemental oral and documentary evidence found necessary for the purpose of substantiating their respective contentions. On the basis of the evidence placed before it the Tribunal shall pass appropriate orders on all questions in dispute between the parties". 5. After the remand, the Land Tribunal passed an order dismissing the petition which by that time had been treated by the parties as one under S.16 alone The Appellate Authority before whom the said order was challenged, allowed the appeal; and it is against the said order, the tenant-respondent in the O.A., has filed this Civil Revision Petition. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that application under S.16 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act for resumption by the respondents is not maintainable because, as conceded by them, they are prosecuting the proceedings which originally had been initiated by Kathirkutty, only in their capacity as transferees-in-interest of Kathirkutty. The transferee-in-interest or in other words an assignee or transferee of an interest in property from a party to a legal proceeding is not a legal representative. It has been so held by a Full Bench of this court in Goutami Devi v. Madhavan Sivarajan (AIR 1977 Ker. 83). The counsel for the petitioner therefore is well founded in his submission that the respondents cannot claim relief in their capacity as legal representatives of deceased Kathirkutty in view of the findings in the judgment of this court disposing of O.P. No. 2020 of 1974. 7. The main and perhaps the only question that arises for consideration in this revision petition is whether the respondents who claim to be the transferee-in-interest from Kathirkutty who had initiated the proceedings under S.16 of Kerala Land Reforms Act, are competent to pursue the said proceedings the whole-bog? The answer depends upon the interpretation of S.16 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The answer depends upon the interpretation of S.16 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. S.16 reads: " Resumption for personal cultivation from tenant holding more than ceiling area:- A landlord (other than a sthani or the trustee or owner of a place of public religious worship who requites the holding bona fide for cultivation by himself, or any member of hit family, may resume from hit tenant, who is in possession of land exceeding the ceiling area, the whole or portion of the holding, subject to the condition that, by such resumption, the total extent of land in the possession of the landlord is not raised above the ceiling area and the total extent of land in the possession of the cultivating tenant is not reduced below the ceiling area. Explanation I.- In this section, reference to the ceiling area in relation to the landlord or the tenant shall, where such landlord or tenant is a member of a family, be construed as references to the ceiling in relation to that family. Explanation II.- The provisions of S.82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of this section and S.16A, provided that if no date has been notified under S.83, the date of the application for resumption shall be deemed to be the date notified under S.83." 8. A landlord who invokes this provision should establish that he requires the holding bona fide for his own cultivation or the cultivation of another member of his family. He should also satisfy all other requirements envisaged under that Section. It is unnecessary to discuss those 'other requirements' here because, for the disposal of the issue now before me such a discussion is not necessary. A similar provision like the one in hand came up for consideration before the Supreme Court (See ruling in Shantilal v. Chimanlal (AIR 1976 SC 2358). After considering the previous pronouncements interpreting similar provisions the Supreme Court has held thus: "In our considered opinion on face of the wordings of S.14 (1) (3) of the Delhi Act, the view expressed in Phool Rani's case (AIR 1973 SC 2110) as stated above, is not correct. After considering the previous pronouncements interpreting similar provisions the Supreme Court has held thus: "In our considered opinion on face of the wordings of S.14 (1) (3) of the Delhi Act, the view expressed in Phool Rani's case (AIR 1973 SC 2110) as stated above, is not correct. If the law permitted the eviction of the tenant for the requirement of the landlord "for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family; then the requirement was both of the landlord and the members of his family. On his death the right to sue did survive to the members of the family of the deceased landlord. We are unable to take the view that the requirement of the occupation of the members of the family of the original landlord was his requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the members on his death. After the death of the original landlord the senior member of his family takes his place and is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his occupation and the occupation of the other members of the family. Many of the substituted heirs of the deceased landlord were undoubtedly the members of his family and the two married daughters and the children of a deceased daughter in the circumstances could not be held to be not members of the family of the deceased landlord." The right recognised under S.16 therefore is more than the personal right of the landlord. On his death the right to resume land under S.16 therefore survives to the other members of the family and his legal representatives. It should in this connection be remembered that the right of the members of the family to resume land for cultivation from the tenant is a statutory right. It therefore follows that on the death of Kathirkutty, the right to sue for resumption in fact survives to the members of his family and the laid members or any one of them is competent to continue the proceedings for resumption. 9. It therefore follows that on the death of Kathirkutty, the right to sue for resumption in fact survives to the members of his family and the laid members or any one of them is competent to continue the proceedings for resumption. 9. Relying on the dictum of this court in Gopalan Nair v. State of Kerala (1980 K.L.T. 259), the learned counsel for the respondents, however submits that the right of the landlord to file an application for resumption under S.16 is something more than a personal right and therefore the right to continue the proceedings after his death, survives to his legal representatives. There cannot be any dispute about this in view of the aforesaid decision of this court. 10. In the present case the position however, is different. It is true that the respondents, at least some of them can claim to be the legal representatives of deceased Kathirkutty. However, in the application seeking orders enabling them to get themselves impleaded as additional petitioners, they have conceded that they want to pursue the proceedings (OA) in their capacity, not as legal representatives of deceased but only as transferees-in-interest of the deceased. So, the question immediately would arise; are they competent to pursue the proceedings under S.16 on the death of the deceased as transferees-in-interest of the deceased. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that they are competent to continue the proceedings and in support of this argument he relied on the following passage from the decision is Gopalan Nair v. State of Kerala (1980 KLT 259). "Viewed in this background the resumption under S.16, though primarily designed to meet the landlord's requirement of personal cultivation, is something more than a right personal to him or a right for personal enjoyment only: it is property which he is permitted to acquire on payment of the compensation fixed under S.20." The learned counsel laid emphasis on the sentence "It is property which he is permitted to acquire on payment of the compensation fixed under S.20". According to the learned counsel'it' qualifies the right of resumption under S.16 and therefore the respondents who are the donees under the gift deed are equally competent to initiate proceedings for resumption under S.16. According to the learned counsel'it' qualifies the right of resumption under S.16 and therefore the respondents who are the donees under the gift deed are equally competent to initiate proceedings for resumption under S.16. I do not think that the word 'it' in that sentence in the judgment in Gopalan Nair's case namely " it is property which he is permitted to acquire on payment of the compensation fixed under S.20" pressed into service by the counsel to sustain his plea aforesaid, conveys the meaning that the right of the landlord to initiate proceedings for resumption of land is interest in property and therefore the same is a transferable right. Further discussion in this regard in the judgment is relevant. In this connection it is enough if I extract the following passage: "If a landlord resumes land for personal cultivation and fails to cultivate it "without reasonable excuse" within three years, the Section allows the tenant to gel it back. Suppose the landlord becomes physically disabled. That is a reasonable excuse, and restoration is ruled out in such a case. The landlord can then pass on the land resumed to others by gift or sale, or if he dies, it devolves on his heirs." Alongside it is relevant to consider the scheme of S.16. A landlord desiring to resume land under S.16 shall make an application in From 1 and all persons who have interest in the land to be resumed, including a kudikidappukaran, shall be made parties to it (Vide R.7). Column 6 of the Farm is also relevant. As per this, the landlord is bound to give particulars (including survey number, class and the extent) of other lands in the possession of the applicant or his family or in which they have interest as landowner or intermediary or as mortgagee in possession. (Particulars to be shown separately under each head). Similarly column 7 is also relevant. Per Clause.7 the name and address of the cultivating tenant and the total extent of land in his possession and their particulars (as far as known) require to be given in the application. This is to be followed by a declaration. The right of resumption is subject to the conditions stipulated in S.16. Similarly column 7 is also relevant. Per Clause.7 the name and address of the cultivating tenant and the total extent of land in his possession and their particulars (as far as known) require to be given in the application. This is to be followed by a declaration. The right of resumption is subject to the conditions stipulated in S.16. Going by the stipulation, on resumption, the total extent of the land in the possession of the landlord shall not be raised above the ceiling area and the extent of land in the possession of the tenant shall not be reduced below the ceiling area. By Explanation.) to S.16, it is made clear that the ceiling area in regard to the landlord or tenant shall, where the landlord or tenant is a member of a family, be construed as reference to the ceiling area in relation to that family. It is thus clear from the scheme of this section that the right under the Section can be agitated only by the landlord or members of his family including their legal representatives and not by their assignees or transferees. If the assignees are found entitled to agitate the rights envisaged under S.16, the very object with which it was enacted namely, to protect the interest of certain small families, will be defeated. The respondents therefore cannot pursue the OA after the death of Kathirkutty. 11. As already held the right to resume land under S.16 is a right that survives on the death of the applicant to the other members of the family and also to his legal representatives but not to the transferees-in-interest. It is true that some of the donees are legal representatives of the deceased. But they have no case, they want to pursue the proceedings in that capacity. On the other hand the definite case, as discernible from the judgment in OP 2020 of 1974 is, that they want to continue the proceedings not in their capacity as the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner bat only as transferees-in-interest from him. 12. It therefore follows that on the death of Kathirkutty, the petition stands abated. 13. In the light of what is stated above, it is unnecessary to consider the various other aspects, the counsel for the parties particularly the respondents, pressed into service. They are left open. 12. It therefore follows that on the death of Kathirkutty, the petition stands abated. 13. In the light of what is stated above, it is unnecessary to consider the various other aspects, the counsel for the parties particularly the respondents, pressed into service. They are left open. The CRP for the reasons stated above, is allowed but in the circumstances no order as to costs.