JUDGMENT D. S. Bajpai, J, - Lallan Singh has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, inter alia, praying for quashing the detention order dated 25th June, 1985, passed by the District Magistrate, Sitapur, contained in Annexure 1 to the writ petition, as also the subsequent order dated 2nd July, 1985, passed by the State Government approving the said order of detention contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition. The District Magistrate, Sitapur, has exercised his powers under sub-sec. (3) of S. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (Act No. 65 of 1980) to be referred to as the Act for brevity, and the State Government thereafter confirmed the said order of detention subsequently under S. 3(4) of the said Act. 2. The grounds of detention as supplied to the detenu by the District Magistrate are contained in Annexure 2 to the writ petition and they are, as translated into English, as under : "1. That on 14th December, 1984, at about 7 p.m. within village Ballai, Majre Balai Deeh, P. S. Kamlapur, district Sitapur, you along with other colleagues as named therein and three other persons not named therein, all with lathis, sticks and a gun, as also a country made revolver with ammunition, reached the house of Vishram, son of Kalika Pasi, resident of the said village, with the object of committing dacoity at his place. You and your colleague Parsadi were armed with guns, while other colleagues armed with country made revolvers with ammunition. On the calling of Vishram some of the persons residing in the village arrived and they challenged you and your colleagues whereupon the dacoits opened three fires on the villagers with a view to create terror and panic amongst them. Due to the pressure of the village people you could not loot any property and while making random fires, escaped. One of the colleagues of the detnu, Hari Lodh, was badly beaten by the villagers and he succumbed to his injuries after some time at the spot where he was caught hold of. An F.I.R. was lodged at the Police Station Kamlapur at 10.45 p.m. on the basis of which crimes Nos. 288 and 270 under Sections 395/397 of the Penal Code and S. 25 of the Arms Act respectively were registered. A charge-sheet was submitted after investigation. An F.I.R. was lodged at the Police Station Kamlapur at 10.45 p.m. on the basis of which crimes Nos. 288 and 270 under Sections 395/397 of the Penal Code and S. 25 of the Arms Act respectively were registered. A charge-sheet was submitted after investigation. In this way, you along with your colleagues at the above time, date and place tried to commit dacoity at the residence of Vishram and fired with the gun to create fear amongst the villagers as a consequence of which a feeling of insecurity, terror and panic has been created amongst the villagers and the case is pending trial. 2-A. That on 24-12-84 at about 11 p.m. in the night in village Saidapur, Police Station Kamlapur, District Sitapur, you along with 20-21 accomplices committed dacoity in the house of Onkar Nath son of Sri Lalta Prasad Srivastava after climbing the boundary wall of the house. Four accomplices entered Onkar Nath's kothri, 5-6 colleagues entered the kothri of Smt. Shanti Devi and 3-4 accused were on the roof, while two accused were in the compound and 5-6 accused were near about the said house. You and your colleagues started beating Smt. Shanti Devi with dandas and making inquiries about the place where valuables were kept. When Onkar Nath's wife, Smt. Rani Devi, reached that roof of the house, you people pushed her as a consequence of which she fell down on the ground and sustained injuries. On hearing the noise certain people belonging to the village arrived on the spot, amongst them being Gauri Shanker and Santosh who were possessed of licensed rifle and gun respectively who challenged you people and fired. As a consequence you people while firing left towards the eastern side while carrying the looted property in which Sunder and Lotan sustained injuries. The villagers were panic stricken and lost their courage. An F.I.R. was lodged by Onkar Nath Srivastava on 25-12-84 at 10.45 a.m. at the Police Station Kamlapur on the basis of which crime No. 277 under Sections 395/397 of the Penal Code was registered. It was because of your terror that Onkar Nath Srivastava could not name you in the F.I.R. After investigation the charge-sheet has been submitted which is pending trial. 3. It was because of your terror that Onkar Nath Srivastava could not name you in the F.I.R. After investigation the charge-sheet has been submitted which is pending trial. 3. That on the night of 19/20-12-84 at about 10 p.m. you along with 10-12 colleagues reached village Narayanpur, Majre Mangupur, Police Station Kamlapur armed with gun and country-made revolver and committed dacoity at the house of Munni Lal son of Durga Prasad Pasi after jumping in the house from the back side and caught hold of Munni Lal and started beating him. On the alarm raised by Munni Lal and others, a large number of village people collected and challenged you whereupon to create fear amongst/them you people fired. You and your accomplices tied Munrli Lal and womenfolk, as also children, and lodged them there and went away when village people could not do anything on account of fear. A feeling of insecurity and terror spread in the village. An F.I.R. was lodged by Munni Lal at Police Station Kamlapur on 20-12-84 at 12.30 in the afternoon on the basis of which crime No. 273 under Sections 395/397 of the Penal Code was registered. After investigation charge- sheet has been submitted and the case is pending trial. Your identification parade has to take place but the witnesses Munni Lal and others because of fear did not turn up on one pretext or the other on the dates fixed for identification parade. Ultimately, when the identification took place on 25-6-85 none could identify you because of fear as a consequence of which report under S. 169 of the Criminal P.C. has been submitted and you could not be charge-sheeted. The District Magistrate pointed out in the grounds that since the detenu has been released in other cases and was in jail in connection with crime No. 273 under Sections 395/397 of the Penal Code in view of failure of identification, he could be released on bail any moment and all these grounds led him to believe that the detenu, if not detained, would participate in activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order. 4. We have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondents at some length. 4. We have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondents at some length. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has made two-fold contention in regard to the three grounds of detention that are said to have led to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in passing the impugned order of detention; firstly, that the grounds mentioned therein do not, in any view of the matter, fall within the purview of disturbance or likely breach of public order and, secondly, that the grounds as such on which the District Magistrate has recorded his satisfaction are vitiated inasmuch as the material considered by him (and therefore by the State Government) was not relevant to his subjective satisfaction that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 5. The expression "public order" has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court time and again since the decision of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 and thereafter in the case of Pushkar Mukerjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 852 wherein the Court held that every act of assault or injury to specific persons would not lead to public disorder. Since every contravention of law affected order, but before it could be said to have affected public order it must affect community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder, the Court was pleased to hold, would not necessarily suffice for an action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which would affect public order comes within the scope of the.Act. Suffice to say that it was after considering the various pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court up to Ajay Dixit v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 18 that a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Dixit v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (Habeas Corpus Writ Petn. No. 11151 of 1984) decided on 1st August, 1985, held that : "Public order generally means peace and tranquillity of the community at large. It is an expression of wide connotation which signifies that the state of tranquillity prevails amongst the members of the society." 6. No. 11151 of 1984) decided on 1st August, 1985, held that : "Public order generally means peace and tranquillity of the community at large. It is an expression of wide connotation which signifies that the state of tranquillity prevails amongst the members of the society." 6. It will not be out of place to point out that the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhena Hembram v. District Magistrate, West Dinajpur, AIR 1975 SC 1804 are not attracted in the instant case since the Court has been consistently of this view "that an activity affecting public order would embrace an act which has the potentiality to affect public peace and tranquillity .....If it has the potentiality of disturbing the even tempo of the life of the community it would affect public order. However, even if an activity amounts to serious breach of law like murder, dacoity or robbery but if it does not create terror and panic, it does not affect the even tempo of the life of the community. The offence of the crime, however reprehensible, cannot be said to affect public order" (emphasis supplied). 7. Looked from the settled principles of law to bring the grounds within the ambit of disturbance of public order, we do not find that in either of the three grounds mentioned in the impugned detention order there is any indication that the even tempo of life was, in any way, disturbed or that it affected public order even though we might agree that the three incidents indicated were grave assaults on law and order inasmuch as armed dacoities are said to have been committed by the detenu and a large number of his accomplices. The first incident as narrated in the F.I.R. Annexure Al, does not state that any terror was spread in the community so as to affect the even tempo of life and we hold that simply because a dacoity took place, it cannot be disturbance of public order but it was a case pertaining to law and order. Similarly, in the F.I.R. of the second incident, Annexure A7, no statement of any public disorder having taken place finds mention and we have no hesitation in holding that it was nothing but at the most a case under Sections 395/397 of the Penal Code awaiting its verdict at the trial. Similarly, in the F.I.R. of the second incident, Annexure A7, no statement of any public disorder having taken place finds mention and we have no hesitation in holding that it was nothing but at the most a case under Sections 395/397 of the Penal Code awaiting its verdict at the trial. Likewise, in the third incident, the F.I.R. of which is Annexure A13, there is nothing to indicate that there was a public disorder as that tested on the anvil of the settled law. It could not be said, much less held, that it was a case pertaining to public disorder. We have no hesitation in holding that the three incidents mentioned in the impugned order are disruptive of law and order and not of public order. 8. Reference may be made to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Jatindra Nath Biswas v. State of West Bengal, 1975 Cri LJ 1068 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1215 ) in which two distinct offences of dacoity in two houses came up for consideration. In one dacoity bombs and lethal weapons were used, house was looted, inmates were beaten, and the dacoits kept the villagers at bay by bomb outrage. Such acts, of violence were stated to have infused panic and terror in the minds of peace loving people of the locality. It was held that those activities affected the tempo and even flow of public life of the locality because when the villagers came they were scared away by bomb outrage, and activities were said to have infused panic and terror in the mind of the locality. These features were held to constitute a disturbance of public order. In the other dacoity, deadly weapons were used, inmates assaulted and properties looted. In consequence of those acts the people of the locality became very much panicky and peace and order of the locality was completely disturbed. It was observed that those facts simply mentioned that the people of the locality became very panicky and peace and order was completely disturbed. The Court then went on to hold that it was necessary to state some activity other than the raid on the individual's house to lend assurance to the fact that the District Magistrate found the public order disturbed. The offence was held to be a cause of law and order and not of public order. 9. The Court then went on to hold that it was necessary to state some activity other than the raid on the individual's house to lend assurance to the fact that the District Magistrate found the public order disturbed. The offence was held to be a cause of law and order and not of public order. 9. In the present case, it was the village people in the offence dated 14-12-84 who even succeeded in capturing a dacoit Hori Lodh while the dacoits could do no more than fire at village people without causing injury to any one. The fact stated in the ground is that the dacoits fired with a view to create terror and panic among the villagers, but that did not happen. In the offence dated 18-12-84 the dacoits injured only two village people and left with looted property, while the people were described to have become panic stricken and to have lost courage. In the offence dated 19/20-12-84, the stated facts only indicated that dacoits fired to create terror and then went away. These facts, we hold, are similar to those in the second dacoity considered in the case of Jatindra Nath Biswas (supra), hence in our opinion did not constitute disturbance of public order. 10. The learned Additional Government Advocate urged that it was a case affecting public order and that the detention order as also the order of confirmation of detention passed by the State Government were within the ambit of the Act and for that purpose he placed reliance on the case Parimal Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1653 where the Court was pleased to hold that the acts alleged to have been committed by the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Line of demarcation between cases affecting public order and those affecting law and order has to be made on the basis of facts of each and every case and this case does not at all help the learned Additional Government Advocate since we have already held that the crimes attributed to the detenu are not prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. As pointed out by us hereinabove, the principles adopted have been aptly enunciated by the learned Judges of this Court in the Full Bench decision of Ashok Dixit v. State of U.P. (supra), which we need not repeat and which, as held by us earlier, do not bring the instant case within the ambit of disturbance of public order. 11. In respect of the second ground of attack, the only material contained in the various annexures to the counter-affidavit and considered by the District Magistrate is the terror of the petitioner which struck the victims and the witnesses on account of which they were not prepared either to give evidence (in the first case wherein the petitioner was named) or to identify the petitioner in the identification parades (in the remaining two cases). It is stated in a general way that the witnesses are so afraid that they are not prepared to give evidence. Nobody said, in any of the cases, that the terror created by the petitioner and his associates had disturbed the peace and tranquillity of the village people as a community. The material therefore was not relevant for the District Magistrate to arrive at his subjective satisfaction that the petitioner was likely to act in future in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 12. We notice that the petitioner also claimed Rs. 20,000/- as damages for the so- called illegal detention of the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner did not address any argument on this matter during the hearing of the writ petition. We would, however, mention that the claim for damages for wrongful detention under the National Security Act is not maintainable in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case Kamlakar Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1983) 4 SCC 443 at p. 447 (para 5) : ( AIR 1984 SC 211 at p. 213, para 5). 13. In the result, we hold that none of the grounds in the detention order have any nexus with public order and they are not of a nature as to lead to any apprehension that even tempo of the community would be disrupted. 13. In the result, we hold that none of the grounds in the detention order have any nexus with public order and they are not of a nature as to lead to any apprehension that even tempo of the community would be disrupted. We, accordingly, hold that the detention order under S. 3(2) of the Act dated 25-6-85 passed by the District Magistrate, Sitapur, contained in Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition is illegal and also declare the order of the State Government passed under S. 3(4) of the Act on July 2, 1985 confirming the said detention by Annexure 3 to the writ petition as illegal, and quash them. 14. The petition is, accordingly, allowed. The petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required in connection with some other case.