JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---This is a writ petition arising out of the proceedings under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, 'Act'). 2. The petitioner, according to him, was working with the respondent from 1-4-1976 on the power machine and gas. Further, according to him, he has illegally dismissed from service by the respondent with effect form 6-4-1980. He raised an industrial dispute about his illegal dismissal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, "ID Act"). There was a settlement arrived at on 30-7-1980 between the parties by which the respondent agreed to take back the petitioner in service from 1-8-1980 and also agreed to pay the back wages and to give him continuity of service. It is the case of the petitioner that on 1-8-1980 and even thereafter when he went to join his duties he was not allowed to do so by the respondent. He therefore, filed an application under sections 28 and 30 of the Act before the Labour Court claiming that his dismissed from service with effect from 6-4-1980 should be declared as an unfair labour practice and that he should be directed to be reinstated in service with full back wages and continuity in service. The said case before the Labour Court was registered as U.L.P. Complaint Case No. 183 of 1980. However, on 21-8-1981 the petitioner withdrew the said complaint as and on the same date filed a fresh complaint case before the Industrial Court, Nagpur. Since the said complain case before the Industrial Court was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed therefore he filed an application for condonation of delay registered as Miscellaneous Application (ULPN) No. 23 of 1981. The ground given for condonation of delay was that the petitioner was bona fide prosecuting the complaint case in the Labour Court which was withdrawn on 21-8-1981 since the learned Judge of the Labour Court pointed out that the Labour Court would not have jurisdiction in that matter in view of the settlement between the parties. 3. The learned Industrial Court held that the complaint case filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court was in regard to his dismissal with effect from 6-4-1980 which he had prayed to be set aside. 3. The learned Industrial Court held that the complaint case filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court was in regard to his dismissal with effect from 6-4-1980 which he had prayed to be set aside. It was thus an unfair labour practice covered by item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act whereas the complaint case filed by him before the Industrial Court was under item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. Since according to the Industrial Court the cause of action in the previous case was different it was not open to the petitioner to claim condonation of delay on the ground that he was bona fide prosecuting the case in a Court of wrong jurisdiction. It, therefore, dismissed the application of the petitioner for condonation of delay. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition in this Court. 4. In my view the impugned order of the learned Industrial Court can not be sustained. In the first place it has to be seen that the exclusion of time is not claimed on the ground under section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 that the petitioner was prosecuting the remedy in the Court which had no jurisdiction. The application is for condonation of delay on the ground that it is a sufficient cause within the proviso to section 28 of the Act. The whole approach of the learned Industrial Court in this regard is thus erroneous. 5. It would be clear from the complaint of the petitioner in the Labour Court that although he had asked for the relief of setting aside his dismissal with effect from 6-4-1980, the said complaint principally based upon the fact that the respondent had agreed to reinstate him with effect from 1-8-1980 as per the settlement before the Conciliation Officer. Since the petitioner was not reinstated with effect from 1-8-1980 although he went to join his duties on that date and even thereafter, he was perhaps advised that he should challenge his dismissal on the said ground before the labour Court. It is only when he realised in the said proceedings that the proper forum in this regard is the Industrial Court and the proper relief to claim is to complain about the unfair Labour practise due to the failure of the respondent to implement the settlement that he filed the instant complaint clear case before the Industrial Court. It is only when he realised in the said proceedings that the proper forum in this regard is the Industrial Court and the proper relief to claim is to complain about the unfair Labour practise due to the failure of the respondent to implement the settlement that he filed the instant complaint clear case before the Industrial Court. It is thus that perhaps on wrong legal advice, the petitioner claimed a wrong relief upon the same set of facts. The delay in prosecuting the case before the Labour Court was thus due to sufficient cause and is, therefore, condoned. The most legalistic and hypertechnical view taken by the learned Industrial Court in this regard is set aside. 6. Another reason given by the learned Industrial Court is that even the complaint case before the Labour Court filed on 30-8-1980 was barred by time. In this regard also the approach of the learned Industrial Court is not correct. In fact the substance of the allegations in the complaint case before the Labour Court was that he was to be reinstated in service with effect from 1-8-1980 as per the settlement arrived at on 30-7-1980 and since the respondent failed to reinstate him despite the said settlement his dismissal should be set aside and he should be reinstated in service. Before filing the case before the Labour Court, the petitioner had made attempts to join the duty on 1-8-1980 and thereafter but the respondent did not allow him to join the duty. In view of the above facts and circumstances the delay, if any, even assuming that the limitation was to be computed from 6-4-1980, was liable to be condoned in that case. 7. There is another aspect of this matter which is material in considering the question about the limitation itself. The instant complaint is based upon the settlement dated 30-7-1980 under which the respondent had agreed to reinstate the petitioner with effect from 1-8-1980. In my view the obligations under the settlement are continuing and, therefore, there will be continuing cause of action under the said settlement till the petitioner is reinstated in service. In this view of the matter also the impugned order of the learned Industrial Court deserves to be set aside. 8. In the result, the instant writ petition is allowed. In my view the obligations under the settlement are continuing and, therefore, there will be continuing cause of action under the said settlement till the petitioner is reinstated in service. In this view of the matter also the impugned order of the learned Industrial Court deserves to be set aside. 8. In the result, the instant writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Industrial Court is set aside and the learned Industrial Court is directed to decide the case on merits. There would, however, be no order as to costs in this writ petition. Petition allowed. -----