Judgment :- 1. A nice question which calls for an exercise in this proceeding is what the clause ‘whose appointment is otherwise terminated’ found in Ss.22 and 23 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (for brevity the Act) conveys. 2. The facts that gave rise to the above problem, are briefly as follows:—The 1st respondent was appointed on 1-6-1978 as prevocational instruction teacher in the petitioner school. On 1-6-1979, the 1st respondent has given a voluntary letter of resignation to take effect from 15-6-1979 on the ground of family necessity. “The said letter of resignation was accepted by the petitioner school and The services of the 1st respondent were terminated.” (Emphasis supplied by me). Thereafter, the petitioner appointed one Pushpam in that post. It is thereafter the 1st respondent challenged her termination of service on the ground that the resignation letter written by her was not voluntary. She therefore preferred an appeal obviously under S.23 of the Act to the 3rd respondent, the competent authority, against such termination of her service. The 3rd respondent in his proceedings bearing reference No. Na. Ka. 29972- A-4/79 dated 13-8-1980 accepted the 1st respondents complaint that her letter of resignation was not voluntary and consequently, directed the petitioner to reinstate the 1st respondent. It may also be stated that the 3rd respondent called for the report from the 4th respondent as regards the 1st respondents said complaint. The 4th respondent in his detailed report is said to have observed that the letter of resignation is put of own volition on the part of the 1st respondent and that her services were terminated based on such voluntary resignation letter. Aggrieved against the order passed by the 3rd respondent, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the 2nd respondent (who is the appellate tribunal constituted under the Act) under S.24 of the Act. Though the appeal was numbered as C.M.A. No. 209 of 1980 by the 2nd respondent, yet, the 2nd respondent held that because the arrears of pay, etc., were not deposited as required under S.44 of the Act, the appeal is not maintainable, nonetheless, he adjourned the matter by a fortnight for t he petitioner to make the deposit as per mandate in S.44 of the Act. The said order further provided that in the event of failure, the Appeal shall stand dismissed with costs. The said order further provided that in the event of failure, the Appeal shall stand dismissed with costs. The matter was, therefore, adjourned to 3-3-1982. “It is this order of the 2nd respondent passed on 18-2-1982 that sought to be quashed by the petitioner in this proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. At once, it may be pointed out that this proceeding came to be instituted on 5-3-1982 and the affidavit does not disclose as to the final order that must have been, passed by the 2nd respondent on 3-3-1982. Besides, in W.M.P. No. 4355 of 1982, the petitioner sought for stay of “all further proceedings in C.M.A. No. 209 of 1980 on the file of the 2nd respondent dated 18-2-1982 confirming the order of the 3rd respondent dated 13-8-1960”, and this Court was pleased to grant interim stay by order dated 16- 4-1982. 4. Be that as it may, Mr. John Edwin, learned counsel for the petitioner contended, that the clause “whose appointment is otherwise terminated” has to be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, and if so read, the said clause would not include a case of termination brought about by the teacher or other person employed in any private school submitting a letter of resignation. The learned counsel also placed emphasis on the title to S.23 of the Act, which is as follows:— Appeals against orders of punishment imposed on teachers and other persons employed in private schools. According to the learned counsel, the clause would also contemplate a case of termination of service by way of punishment, but not where the termination is on the basis of a voluntary resignation on the part of teacher or other person employed in any private school. The above contention finds support from two decisions of Mr. Justice Mohan, one unreported in W.P. No. 4966 of 1978 etc., while the other reported in Selvaraj v. Jesudasan 1, as also the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Jagadeesan v. AyyaNadar Janaki Ammal College2. 5. Before I should venture to examine the above contention, it is but necessary to refer to a decision of the Highest Court in the land reported in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology 1. The Supreme Court was considering S.20 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976. 5. Before I should venture to examine the above contention, it is but necessary to refer to a decision of the Highest Court in the land reported in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology 1. The Supreme Court was considering S.20 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976. Even in that case, the service of the teacher was terminated on the basis of this letter of resignation on 19-3-1976. It is also relevant to notice that before the teacher in that case gave the resignation letter, two charges wee levelled against him and the teacher in that case gave the resignation letter, two charges were levelled against him and the teacher also submitted his explanation refuting the above charges and that as desired by the teacher, an oral inquiry was to commence on 13-3-1976 and came to be adjourned to 19-3-1976 at the request of the teacher. On 19-3-1976, there is an endorsement of even date by the Principal at the foot of the letter of resignation by which the principal accepted the resignation of the teacher, but nonetheless directed that the appellant as desired by him be relieved from duties with effect from September, 1976, and further directed that the inquiry into the charges levelled against the teacher be dropped. The teacher, However, preferred an appeal under S.20 of Act XIX of 1976. The Government was the Appellate Authority under the said Act. The Government accepted the teachers appeal and “directed the educational institution to reinstate the teacher. The aggrieved educational institution approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the order of reinstatement passed by the Government. This Court was persuaded to set aside the order of the Government. Consequently, the aggrieved teacher took the matter to the Supreme Court on Special Leave. Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the order of this Court and restored the order of the Government. It is, therefore, essential to reproduce S.20 of Act XIX of 1976. It runs as fallows:— “20. Consequently, the aggrieved teacher took the matter to the Supreme Court on Special Leave. Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the order of this Court and restored the order of the Government. It is, therefore, essential to reproduce S.20 of Act XIX of 1976. It runs as fallows:— “20. Any teacher or other person employed in any private college:— (a),who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated or (b) whose pay or allowances or any of whose conditions of service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantage, by any order, may prefer an appeal against such order to such authority or officer as may be prescribed; and different authorities or officers may be prescribed for different classes of private colleges.” S 23 of the Act provides thus:— “23. Appeal against orders of punishment imposed on teachers and others persons employed in private schools:— Any teacher or other person employed in any private school— (a) who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated; or (b) whose pay or allowances or any of whose conditions of service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantage, by any order, may prefer an appeal against such order to such authority or officer as may be prescribed; and different such authorities or officers may be prescribed for different classes of private schools.” It is thus clear that S.20 of Act XIX of 1976 is almost a carbon copy of S.23 of the Act, save for the word school, college is substituted. It may be noticed that Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 came to be enacted long after the Act. Indeed, Act XIX of 1976 is modelled on the basis of the Act. It is true, the Supreme Court set aside the order of this Court on the ground that this Court had transgressed its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by entering upon the merits of the controversy, by embarking upon an inquiry into the facts as to whether the letter of resignation submitted by the teacher was not voluntary and that the Government had undoubtedly the jurisdiction to draw its own conclusion based upon the materials before it. It might therefore be contended that the question as posed before me did not fall for consideration in that case. It might therefore be contended that the question as posed before me did not fall for consideration in that case. But such an argument cannot gain any momentum in view of the following observations of the Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 13 of its judgment:— “In the view that we take of the case, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant based on the majority decision in Union of India v. Sri Gopal Chandra Misra and another 2, does not really arise. It is urged that it is open to a civil servant to tender his resignation on a prior date to take effect’ on a subsequent date specified and, therefore, it could always be withdrawn before the expiry of such date. There can be no dispute with the proposition, but the decision on which reliance is placed is clearly distinguishable on facts. The letter addressed by Satish Chandra, J., as he then was, to the President signifying his intention to demit the office of a Judge was couched in entirely different language. It ran thus:— “I beg to resign ray office as Judge, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. I will be on leave till 31st July, 1977. My resignation shall be effective on 1st of August, 1977.” The Court in construing the words ‘resign his office’ in proviso (a) to Art. 217(1) of the Constitution held that a High Court Judges letter addressed to the President intimating or notifying his intention to resign his office of a Judge on a future date, does not and cannot sever him from the office of the Judge, or terminate his tenure. It may be conceded that it is open to a servant to make his resignation operative from a future date and to withdraw such resignation before its acceptance. The question as to when a Government servants resignation becomes’ effective came up for consideration by this Court in Rajkumar v. Union of India 1. It was held that the services of a Government servant normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority, unless there is any law of statutory rule governing the conditions of service to the contrary. There is no reason why the same principle should not apply to the case of any other employee. There is no reason why the same principle should not apply to the case of any other employee. A reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court as a whole leaves in me an unmistakable impression that it is art authority for the proposition that termination of service even by acceptance of the resignation letter by a teacher or other employee requires the approval of the competent authority within the meaning of S.19 of Act XIX of 1976 that such termination is also contemplated under S.20 of the said Act and that any such termination of service is therefore appealable to such authority or officer as prescribed. In other words, if the management of any educational institution were to accept the letter of resignation, there is also a termination of service of the teacher concerned. If the clause ‘whose appointment is otherwise terminated’ found in sub-clause (a) of S.20 of 1976, Act has to be read ejusdem generis, the Supreme Court would not have made the above ruling. I am of the firm conviction that the above ruling has to be read along with the facts in the above case and on the construction of S.20 of 1976 Act placed by the Supreme Court. It would then follow, the Supreme Court held that even in a case where there was a termination of service on the management of the educational institution accepting the letter of resignation of the concerned teacher, such termination will fall within the ambit of the clause ‘whose appointment is otherwise terminated’ found in sub-clause (a) of S.20 of the said Act and therefore against such an order, an appeal is maintainable under S 20 of the said Act. 6. I have already referred to the fact S.20 of 1976 Act is a mere re-production of S.23 of the Act. Further, the avowed purpose and object of 1976 Act are the same as those of the Act, and in the words of the Supreme Court, “it is to confer protection to the teachers of Private educational institutions against arbitrary action of or victimisation by the management of such educational institution.” In such a case, I am bound by the ruling of the Supreme Court. Consequently, I have to necessarily hold the clause ‘whose appointment is otherwise terminated’ will also embrace a case where the termination was brought about by the management of the educational institution accepting the letter of resignation of the teachers or other persons employed in private educational institutions. 7. As regards the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, it is essential to notice that the above decision of the Supreme Court rendered on 8-1-1981 was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench which rendered the judgment on 4-8-1981 in W.A. No. 727 of 1980 reported in Jagadeesan v. Ayya Nadar Janaki Ammal College 1. Secondly, in the case before the Division Bench, the teacher was not on the permanent employment of the concerned educational institution, but was a probationer. The questions that arose for consideration as pointed out by the Division Bench are, (a) whether the appellant was a probationer at the time of termination of the service; and (b) whether S.19(1) is attracted where a probationer is discharged from service before confirmation. The Division Bench held that when a probationer is discharged from service, there was no case of termination of his service by the management. Incidentally, it observed that the words ‘otherwise terminated’ occurring in S.19(1) should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words dismissed, removed or reduced in rank and so construed. S.19(1) covers only punitive termination and not termination of service of probationer for unsatisfactory work. It may not be out of place to point out that an unreported decision of Mr. Justice Balasubrahmanyan in S.A. No. 1607 of 1974 was also not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. I will be referring to the said decision in detail in due course. There, the learned Judge has held as follows:— “Even on the footing that the transaction here was the tendering of resignation by the Headmistress of the School followed by an acceptance of the management, I hold that there was a termination of employment by the act of the management. For it is the act of acceptance of the resignation on the part of the management that terminates the employment and not offer of the resignation by itself.” I may add, but for the decision of the Supreme Court referred to supra, the judicial propriety would require me to follow the decision of the Division Bench. 8. For it is the act of acceptance of the resignation on the part of the management that terminates the employment and not offer of the resignation by itself.” I may add, but for the decision of the Supreme Court referred to supra, the judicial propriety would require me to follow the decision of the Division Bench. 8. With due respect to the learned Judge, I am to point out at the outset that in Selvaraj v. Jesudasan 2, the learned Judge has not considered the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology 3, while adverting to query No. 1 which in his own words, is, ‘what is the meaning of the words ‘otherwise terminated’ occurring under S.22(1) of the Act’. This particular question was dealt with by the learned Judge in paragraph Nos. 1 to 15. Nowhere in the course of his discussion, is there any reference to the above Supreme Court decision; on the other hand, only in paragraph No. 17, I find the following observation. “Nor the decision in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology 4, could afford any assistance to the teacher in this case in view of the factual finding.” That observation came to be made by the learned Judge while examining query No. 3, viz., Did the 1st respondent tender his resignation voluntarily. It is equally interesting to notice that in paragraph No. 7 of his judgment, while summarising the several arguments advanced by Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned counsel for the teacher, the learned Judge has stated thus:— “Presently, R.17-A has been introduced to the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974, which contemplates prior approval even in cases of this kind. What was ambiguous has now been made clear. Reliance is placed on the decision in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology 5, and it is contended that if the object of the Act is to protect the teachers, by getting the so-called resignation letter the rights of teachers cannot be defeated.” Again, with due respect to the learned Judge, I find that this contention as such was never examined by the learned Judge. 9. Further, I am unable to concur with my learned brother when he observed that certain observations of Balasubrahmanyan, J. in S.A No. 1607 of 1974 (not reported so far) extracted in paragraph No. 12 of his judgment were obiter. 9. Further, I am unable to concur with my learned brother when he observed that certain observations of Balasubrahmanyan, J. in S.A No. 1607 of 1974 (not reported so far) extracted in paragraph No. 12 of his judgment were obiter. For, the learned Judge was examining two questions, (i) whether the termination of service of the teacher by the management in that case was without any reference to the letter of resignation tendered by the teacher, and (ii) even if the termination was on the basis of such resignation letter, is the teacher entitled to prefer an appeal under S.23 of the Act? The learned Judge answered both the questions against the management. In other words, the learned Judge was called upon to consider t he second question as well; that is obvious from the following passage found in his judgment and extracted by Mr. Justice Mohan in his judgment:— “It is not, therefore, possible to accept the learned Counsels contention that what happened here was no more than an offer and an acceptance of resignation. Even on the footing that the transaction here was the tendering of a resignation by the Headmistress of the school followed by an acceptance by the Management, I hold that there was a termination of employment by act of the Management.” Thus, a specific argument was advanced before the learned Judge that the termination of the service of the teacher in that case by the management was not otherwise, but solely on its accepting the letter of resignation tendered by the teacher. As already pointed out, the above argument made by the management was turned down by the learned Judge. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the above conclusion is mere obiter. As regards the later judgment of Mr. Justice Mohan, it is enough to point out that he had followed his reported decision referred to supra . It is worthwhile to notice that even in his later decision, the learned Judge had not referred to the Supreme Court decision which in my view had settled the position of law. Thus, in my opinion the petitioner is not entitled to call to its aid either the decision of the Division Bench or the judgments of Mr. It is worthwhile to notice that even in his later decision, the learned Judge had not referred to the Supreme Court decision which in my view had settled the position of law. Thus, in my opinion the petitioner is not entitled to call to its aid either the decision of the Division Bench or the judgments of Mr. Justice Mohan to support its contention that the clause ‘otherwise terminated’ will also include a case of penal nature, but hot the managements mere acceptance of letter of resignation. 10. Besides the binding authority of the Supreme Court, I have my own reasons to conclude that the expressions ‘otherwise terminated’ have not to be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words dismissed, removed or reduced in rank. In the first place, I am to point out that a provision has to be interpreted principally bearing in mind the object and purpose that are sought to be achieved by the Act. It is apt to quote at this juncture the following from Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition):— “The object or policy of this legislation often affords the answer to problems arising from ambiguities which it contains. For it is a canon of interpretation that all words, if they be general and not precise, are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter, that is, to be construed as particular if the intention be particular. (Page 86) Just as a consideration of the object of the Act may lead to the narrower of two possible interpretations of a general word being adopted, similarly it may lead to the choice of the broader construction. (Page 88) It is said to be the duty of the judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.” (Page 96) In this case, I have already referred to the fact that the object and purpose of the Act are to save the teachers and other employees in a private educational institution from being victimised by arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the management. Take a case where the letter of resignation is obtained under duress as alleged by the teacher in the instant case or by misrepresentation; still the relationship of employer and employee is sapped only by the management accepting such letter of resignation. Take a case where the letter of resignation is obtained under duress as alleged by the teacher in the instant case or by misrepresentation; still the relationship of employer and employee is sapped only by the management accepting such letter of resignation. In other words without any active part on the part of management, there will be no termination. For instance if the management were to refuse to accept such letter of resignation, there can be no termination of service. This will clearly demonstrate that even in a case where the termination of service is brought about by the management accepting the letter of resignation, such termination is brought about by the action of the management. It might be that the action on the part of both the teacher and the management brings about such a termination. But there is no escape from the conclusion that such termination was brought about by any action on the part of the management. Indeed, this is what Mr. Justice Balasubrahmanyan pointed out in S.A. No. 1607 of 1974. If the said expression were to be interpreted bearing in mind the avowed object of the Act, I am thoroughly satisfied, the said expression covers a case where a termination of service is brought about otherwise than by punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. It is not in dispute that the other construction will be against the very object and purpose of the Act. On my understanding of S.22, there is a clear indication that the expression ‘otherwise terminated’ has no nexus to other modes of termination such as dismissal or removal. S.22(1) provides:— “22. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers or other persons employed in private schools:— (1) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher or other person employed in any private school shall be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank, nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority.” It is seen from the said provision that ‘dismissal, removal or reduction’ are brought in one sentence, while ‘otherwise terminated’ is stated disjunctively. In my view, this is a clear indication by the Legislature that ‘otherwise terminated’ has nothing to do with the penal mode of termination of service. In my view, this is a clear indication by the Legislature that ‘otherwise terminated’ has nothing to do with the penal mode of termination of service. To appreciate what really the Legislature intended to convey under the clause ‘whose appointment is otherwise terminated’ in S.23 and ‘nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated’ in S.22 of the Act, both the sections have to be read together with the background of the objective that is sought to be achieved by them. If so read, I am fully convinced that ‘otherwise terminated’ has not to be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Above all I do not find any justification whatsoever to contain the widest amplitude that is Unmistakably revealed by the said clause, nor do I find any merit in the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the title or the marginal note of these two sections will indicate that ‘otherwise terminated’ should also be of a penal nature. It is useful to quote from Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) as to the scope of marginal note or title to a particular provision:— “The notes often found printed at the side of sections in an Act, which purport to summarise the effect of the sections, have sometimes been used as an aid to construction. But the weight of the authorities is to the effect that they are not parts of the statute and so should not be considered, for they are inserted not by Parliament nor under the authority of Parliament, but by irresponsible persons.” (Pages 9 and 10). On my own, I would like to add that it is not always safe to take an aid from such marginal note or title in interpreting any provision. As a matter of fact, the marginal note to S.22 makes no reference to ‘otherwise terminated. It is true that the marginal note of S.23 will indicate that it is only against orders of punishment imposed on teachers and other persons employed in a private educational institution, an appeal would lie. But as already pointed out by me, it is highly hazardous to be carried away by the marginal note in interpreting the content and scope of any provision. I have further pointed out that the two sections, viz., Ss. But as already pointed out by me, it is highly hazardous to be carried away by the marginal note in interpreting the content and scope of any provision. I have further pointed out that the two sections, viz., Ss. 22 and 23 have to be read together to understand what really these two sections convey and that a fair reading of these two provisions will indisputably indicate that the termination need not necessarily be of penal nature. It may not be out of place to point out that even R.18 only repeats the wording found in S.23. I am, therefore, to reiterate, the clause ‘whose appointment is otherwise terminated’ will also embrace a case where the service of a teacher is terminated by the management accepting the letter of resignation tendered by the teacher. Then, it would follow that the appeal by the teacher to the 3rd respondent is maintainable in law and that the 3rd respondent had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and also that the 2nd respondent has jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal preferred by the petitioner management itself. 11. Consequently, the order passed by the 2nd respondent in C.M.A. No. 209 of 1980 is unassailable and beyond challenge under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. I would like to add that no other point was urged. 12. The result is, the Writ Petition fails and is dismissed with costs of the 1st respondent. Advocates fee fixed at Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred only).