JUDGMENT : H.L. Agrawal, C.J. - This writ application arises out of a proceeding under the provisions of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 (for short, "the Act") for grant of a mining lease of limestone and dolomite for about 600 acres of land in village Kutra in the district of Sundergarh. 2. An application for grant of prospecting mining lease was made by the Petitioner on 4-4-1970 through the specified authority of the State Government in accordance with Rule 9 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (for short, "the Rules"). But the said application was not disposed of within the prescribed period. According to Rule 11 of the Rules, it was deemed to have been refused, Against the deemed refusal of her application, the Petitioner moved the Central Government in revision under Rule 54 of the Rules and the Central Government by order dated 25-4-1973 informed the Petitioner vide Annexure-1 that her revision application had been allowed and that the State Government had been directed to consider and pass appropriate orders on merits "within a period of four months" after obtaining the approval of the Central Government wherever necessary. Even after the receipt of the specific direction of the Central Government, the matter remained pending with the State Government for a pretty long time and various queries were made from the Petitioner from time to time but no final order was passed in spite of repeated requests of the Petitioner. Only on 5-8-1978 the State Government intimated to the Government of India that although they had final decided to grant lease to the Petitioner, but as the stipulated time had expired, a request was made to extend the time till 31st December, 1978 "to enable the State Government to issue grant order for mining lease." The Central Government appears to have declined to accept the proposal of the State Government for extension of tipple but the Petitioner continued efforts upon the local authority to pass the orders in the matter though the time allowed by the Central Government had expired as that did not debar them from passing the order. The State Government by a Notification dated 30-11-1979 (Annexure-8) "reserved for exploitation by I.D.C., a State Public Sector Undertaking, for setting up a mini cement plant in Sundargarh district" the area in question and further said that "all prior M.C. applications filed for those areas are rejected from the date of issue of this notification." When the matter stood thus, the Petitioner filed the present writ application. 3. During the pendency of this writ application, the State Government by notification dated 25-3-85 dereserved the limestone area in question. In view of this development, the Petitioner got the writ application and the reliefs suitably amended. 4. The main stand taken by the State Government, (Opposite Party No. 1) in its counter affidavit is that it was not bound to grant the lease in favour of the Petitioner and that the Central Government was not competent under the provisions of the Act and the Rules to issue such a directive to the State Government. The State Government was therefore competent to pass an order of reservation and the writ application was misconceived. No further counter affidavit has been filed after the writ application was amended. 5. The question that now arises for consideration is as to what will now happen to the direction of the Central Government on the revision application of the Petitioner, in Annexure-1. 6. In the order on the revisional application the Central Government, as already mentioned above, had directed the State Government "to consider and pass appropriate orders on merits on the application for prospecting licence." Mr. R.K. Mohapatra, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, on the basis of the above observations raised the following contentions: (1) The State Government was under the law to bound obey and carry out the above direction of the Central Government: (2) Accordingly, they had no right to issue Notification in Annexure-8 reserving the area for exploitation in the public sector while keeping the application of the Petitioner pending and (3) After the dereservatiori Notification in Annexure-9 was published, in any view of the matter, the Petitioner's application automatically revived and the State Government was duty-bound to dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law with throwing the grant open and making it available to anybody else in the meantime. 7. Let us now examine the first two contentions of Mr. Mohapatra. 7. Let us now examine the first two contentions of Mr. Mohapatra. Under Section 2 of the Act, the Parliament has, declared that it is exepedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided in the Act. It is well settled by now that on the making of such a declaration the power to legislate in respect of such mines and minerals is exclusively in the Parliament and the State Legislatures power to make any legislation in that regard becomes extinct. It has been held that the whole of the field is occupied in regard to the subject-matter of mines and development of mine take by this Act and the State Legislature is now powerless to pass any legislation. The above view is firmly established by the Supreme Court in Baijnath Kadio Vs. State of Bihar and Others, and State of Orissa Vs. M.A. Tulloch and Co., . According to proviso (b) to Article 298 of the Constitution of India, the executive power of the State Government granted under the, main provision of this Article is subject to the legislation by the Parliament if the purpose of the executive power is one with respect to which the State Legislature cannot make laws. The order passed by the Central Government on the revisional application of the Petitioner was thus in exercise of the power granted to the Central Government under the statutory rules. It was therefore not open to the State Government not to dispose of the application of the Petitioner for grant of the prospecting licence and to reserve by the Notification (Annexure. 8) the area for exploitation in the public sector as that would amount to circumventing the order of the superior authority. 8. On examining the scheme of the Act and the Rules, it becomes obvious that the State Government is bound to obey the order of the Central Government passed under Rule 55 of the Rules. This view finds full support from the decision of Untwalia, C.J. (as he then was) in S. Lal and Co. Ltd. Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others. In that case also, the application for grant of mining lease was refused by the State Government of Bihar. This view finds full support from the decision of Untwalia, C.J. (as he then was) in S. Lal and Co. Ltd. Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others. In that case also, the application for grant of mining lease was refused by the State Government of Bihar. On revision, the Central Government had directed the State Government to grant the said lease to the Petitioner but the State Government instead, by a Notification, reserved the mining area for exploitation in the public sector which was deprecated and a writ of mandamus was issued to the State Government to obey the order of the Central Government and grant lease to the Petitioner for the area in question. 9. Reference was next made by Mr. Mohapatra the case of Amritlal Nathubhai Shah and Others Vs. Union Government of India and Another which arose out of the case reported in Amritlal Nathubhai Shah and Others Vs. Union Government of India and Another, where the question for consideration was as to whether an application for grant of mining lease for certain mineral (bauxite) in a reserved area could be rejected on the ground that the area was a reserved area. The Supreme Court held that the State Government was well within its right in rejecting the application under Rule 60 and affirmed the Gujarat decision on taking the view that bauxite as a mineral and the mines thereof vest in the State and no person has any right to exploit it otherwise then in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The State Government was therefore entitled to exploit any mineral by itself and it was its own property, and once reservation was made, such reserved land would not be available for grant of a prospecting licence or a mining lease to any person. The Patna case (supra) was distinguished on the ground that the reservation Notification by the Government of Bihar was issued after the Central Government had directed in the revisional application to grant lease to the Petitioner. The learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that in the absence of the disposal of the application of the Petitioner, even after the remand order by the Central Government within the statutory period, much less within the period fixed by the Central Government, the Petitioner's application must be deemed to have been again refused. The learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that in the absence of the disposal of the application of the Petitioner, even after the remand order by the Central Government within the statutory period, much less within the period fixed by the Central Government, the Petitioner's application must be deemed to have been again refused. He tried to take support from the aforesaid Gujarat decision. But the Gujarat decision was a case on the point whether in spite of the fact that the entire field of regulation of mines and minerals development had been taken under the control of the Union Government, any State Government had power to reserve any area for exploitation by it in the public sector and it was held that Article 298 enlarges the scope of the executive power of the State Government by adding various matters in respect of which the State Government may exercise its executive power. It includes within the executive power of the State Government the power to carry on any trade or business and acquire, hold and dispose of property for any purpose. Hence, the reservation of land for exploitation of bauxite in the public sector was comprehended within the scope and ambit of this executive, power and, therefore, once any reservation for exploitation of any mineral was made, then any application by any person for grant of a prospecting licence in respect of such land could not been tertained. The facts of the Gujarat case are, therefore, completely distinguishable. 10. The question that arises for consideration now is as to what is the effect and consequence of the expiry of this long intervening period in the background of the fixation of the 4 months time limit by the Central Government for disposing of the matter. To answer this question, I may refer two decisions, namely, Harish Tara Refactories Private Ltd., Ranchi Vs. State of Bihar and Others, and Jajati Mineral Traders v. Union of India and Anr. 55 (1983) C.L.T. 193, cited by Mr. Mohapatra. In the Patna case, the Central Government had directed, while remanding the application, for its disposal by the State Government on merits within 100 days. The State Govt. however, failed to pass any order within the stipulated time and only on this ground the Petitioner was intimated that his application stood dismissed. 55 (1983) C.L.T. 193, cited by Mr. Mohapatra. In the Patna case, the Central Government had directed, while remanding the application, for its disposal by the State Government on merits within 100 days. The State Govt. however, failed to pass any order within the stipulated time and only on this ground the Petitioner was intimated that his application stood dismissed. The Petitioner took the matter in revision again to the Central Government, but the Central Govt. refused to entertain the revisional application. On an application under Article 226 of the Constitution it was held by the Patna High Court that the period of 100 days as specified in the remand order could not be regarded as any statutory period under Rule 24(1) and, therefore, the stand of the State Government that the application must be deemed to have been rejected after the expiry of the said period of 100 days was erroneous in law and directed the Central Government to dispose of the second revisional application of the Petitioner on merits. A similar view was taken by this Court in Jajati Mineral Traders v. Union of India and Anr. 55 (1983) C.L.T. 193 (supra). In this Orissa case, reliance was placed on the decision in Kalki Subbarami Reddy Vs. Government of India and Another. There also, on the failure of the State Government to dispose of the application within the time fixed by the Central Government in the remand order, a second revision was filed before the Central Government and the Central Government directed grant of the lease. A question arose as to whether the second revision before the Central Government was maintainable and it was held that the law did not provide for a second revision against the second deemed rejection by the State Government and therefore, the order passed by the Central Government on second revision was null and void, and accordingly, the State Government was directed to dispose of the application. Therefore, this must mean that a valid application was still pending and the direction I or the Central Government had not been complied with. A more direct authority can be found in the case of Narsinghdas Jankidas Mohta Vs. Therefore, this must mean that a valid application was still pending and the direction I or the Central Government had not been complied with. A more direct authority can be found in the case of Narsinghdas Jankidas Mohta Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh where it was observed that the order passed by the Central Government in revision under Rule 54 was in the nature of a quasi-judicial order and on failure of the State Government to comply with the same, the High Court on an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, can command it to carry out the order of the Central Government. 11. No decision taking any contrary view was brought to our notice by Mr. Mohapatra. 12. The above discussion now brings us for consideration the third contention of Mr. Mohapatra, namely, as to whether any direction can be issued to the State Government on the Petitioner's application. I have already noticed the authorities where the view has been taken that the effect of the direction of the Central Government to a State Government to consider any such application for grant of lease is binding upon the State Government. It was further been found that fixation of any time limit by the Central Government for carrying out its direction is only directory in nature and on expiry of the said period, the direction does not lose its force and effect and the State Government can not be absolved of its responsibility of carrying out the direction of the Central Government under the pretext that the time for compliance of the direction had expired. Such a view is based upon a high public policy as otherwise an unwilling State Government could frustrate all such directions by simple allowing the time to expire fixed by the Central Government for compliance of its direction. 13. From the discussions and on the various authorities noticed above. I must hold that the Petitioner's application which was made way back in the year 1970, and was not disposed of within the period of four months in spite of the order of the Central Government dated 25-4-1974 must be deemed to be still pending before the State Government for passing appropriate orders on merits as directed by the Central Government. 14. 14. I would accordingly direct the State Government, opposite party No. 1, to dispose of the Petitioner's application by passing appropriate orders on its merits as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. This writ application accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances, I make no order for costs. Let a writ of mandamus issue accordingly. B.K. Behera, J. 15. I agree with my Lord the Chief-Justice. Final Result : Allowed