JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---An order passed by the Industrial Court, Nasik on April 25, 1986 did missing the complaint of the petitioner, being Complaint (ULP) No. 18 of 1986, has been challenged by the petitioner in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The facts leading to the said complaint must necessarily be stated before one can appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner by the learned Advocate Mr. Kochar appearing for him. 2. The petitioner at the relevant time was working as a driver in the Nasik Division of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "S.T.". On July 23, 1982 a charge-sheet was served upon him wherein he was charged with an act of misconduct which consisted of behaving in an arrogant and disorderly manner with his superior officer under the influence of liquor. After holding the necessary enquiry the competent authority under the State Transport Employees' Service Regulations, hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations", found the petitioner guilty of the misconduct with which he was charged. The competent authority also noticed that the punishment of dismissal from service as proposed by the department was proper. However taking into consideration the total service put in by the petitioner he was inclined to award a lesser punishment which he did as follows : "The present basic pay hereby reduced permanently to the initial basic pay for the post of a driver." 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner preferred an appeal being First Appeal No. 34 of 1984, and the first appellate authority, namely the Divisional Controller of Nasik, party allowed the said appeal. Though the first appellate authority noted that the petitioner had admitted that he drank two/three bottles of beer, Divisional Controller took a somewhat lenient view. He thought that the punishment was excessive. Therefore, he reduced the punishment by substituting the order of the competent authority with the order that the petitioner be punished by withholding his two increments without cumulative effect for two years. 4. Despite the unwarranted lenient punishment given to him by the first appellate authority, the petitioner rushed in with a second appeal which was heard and disposed of by a committee by its judgment and order dated October 31, 1985. 4. Despite the unwarranted lenient punishment given to him by the first appellate authority, the petitioner rushed in with a second appeal which was heard and disposed of by a committee by its judgment and order dated October 31, 1985. The Members of the Second Appellate Committee were shocked that the petitioner "should have been advised to file a second appeal against the orders of the first appellate authority in the case of consumption of alcohol while on duty." The second appellate committee rightly felt indignant about the leniency shown by the two authorities below in the matter of awarding punishment to a driver of a S.T. but who was found to be under the influence of alcohol while on duty. Naturally, therefore, the committee was alarmed at the risk to which the safety of the passengers is exposed if persons like the petitioner are let off on lighter punishment, as it had been done in the instant case. Therefore, the second appellate committee passed its order as follows : "Taking an overall view, therefore, we partially set aside the orders previously passed by the first appellate authority and by the competent authority and order that the basic salary of Shri Nagre (the petitioner) should be brought down to the minimum of his pay scale i.e. at Rs. 235/- and this should be effective for a period of five years and during which time he can draw yearly increments in that scale, but at the end of five years, his salary may be refixed as per rules by treating the punishment as without cumulative effect." The committee noted that even this punishment which they were giving by enhancing the one given by the authority below it was adequate and should not be treated as a precedent and it was recorded that "the committee continue to hold the view that in proved cases of consumption of alcohol, deterrent punishment of removal from service would be necessary in the interest of safety of passengers." 5. It is this order of the second appellate committee enhancing the punishment which had been given by the first appellate authority that was the subject-matter of challenge by the petitioner in the complaint filed before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court rejected the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that in an appeal preferred by him the appellate authority could not enhance the punishment. The Industrial Court rejected the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that in an appeal preferred by him the appellate authority could not enhance the punishment. While taking this view the Industrial Court noticed the provision relating to the powers of an appellate authority mentioned in the regulations. Regulation 10 under the heading "Appeals" deals with the powers of an appellate authority and is as follows : "In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any punishment referred to in Clause 7, the Appellate Authority shall consider :- (a) whether the facts on which the order was based have been established; (b) whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; and (c) whether the punishment is excessive, adequate or inadequate, and after such consideration shall pass such order as it thinks proper." The Industrial Court thought that when the appellate authority has jurisdiction to consider whether the punishment was "adequate or inadequate" and after such consideration has jurisdiction to pass such order as it thinks proper, it necessarily means that when the appellate authority, whether the first or the second, finds that the punishment was inadequate it has necessary power to enhance the same. It is this view of the Industrial Court which has been assailed by Mr. Kochar. Mr. Kochar has taken me through the relevant regulations. Mr. Pai appearing for the respondent Corporation has also invited my attention to the relevant provisions governing the filing and the disposal of appeals. 6. Mr. Kochar argues on a prior reasoning that a person who makes a grievance of a punishment meted out to him before an appellate authority cannot be placed in a position worse than what he was in before preferring the appeal. If an appellate authority is dealing with a complaint by an aggrieved employee that the punishment imposed upon him is excessive, than that appellate authority cannot consider the other question whether the punishment is inadequate. If it comes to the conclusion, says Mr. Kochar, that it is inadequate, it could legitimately dismiss the appeal because it necessarily means that the punishment is not excessive but it cannot, taking a view that the punishment is inadequate, enhance the same in an appeal preferred by an employee. On first principle the view canvassed by Mr. Kochar appears to me to be correct. Kochar, that it is inadequate, it could legitimately dismiss the appeal because it necessarily means that the punishment is not excessive but it cannot, taking a view that the punishment is inadequate, enhance the same in an appeal preferred by an employee. On first principle the view canvassed by Mr. Kochar appears to me to be correct. The powers of enhancing the punishment can be exercised if there are express powers conferred upon an appellate authority or a revisional authority if the department itself prefers an appeal. Clause (c) of Regulation 10 would therefore, be applicable whether the department feels aggrieved by the inadequate punishment awarded to a delinquent employee and prefers an appeal. Looking to the scheme of the provisions governing the appeals one cannot rule out the right of the department to prefer an appeal against an order which it thinks is not correct. Clause 10 does not restrict the right of preferring an appeal only to an employee upon whom punishment has been imposed. In my opinion, the fact that the appellate authority has been given power to consider whether the punishment is inadequate and to pass such orders after consideration indicates that the department also has a right of appeal against an order of punishment which it considers is inadequate. The contention of Mr. Kochar, therefore, is well-founded. 7. He is fortified in this contention by a judgment of the Supreme Court in (M.N. Srivastava v. State of Bihar)1, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1106. In this judgment the Supreme Court was examining the Bihar and Orissa Police Manual and in particular Rule 861. That rule, in its necessary parts, reads as follows :- "General rules as to appeals : (a) .......... (b) Against an order of dismissal, removal, reduction, withholding of promotion or periodical increment... there shall be one appeal in each case as follows : Against an order passed by a Superintendent, to the Deputy Inspector-General; Against an original order passed by a Deputy Inspector-General, to the Inspector General Against an original order passed by the Inspector-General to the Local Government. (c) The order of the appellate authority on any such appeal shall be final." Examining the said Rule, the Supreme Court noted that under the said rule an appeal would lie to the Government against the order of the Inspector General. (c) The order of the appellate authority on any such appeal shall be final." Examining the said Rule, the Supreme Court noted that under the said rule an appeal would lie to the Government against the order of the Inspector General. The petitioner before the Supreme Court had been exonerated by the Inspector-General of Police from the charges which had been levelled against him. However on the basis of certain adverse remarks in the confidential character roll of the petitioner the Inspector-General ordered the reversion of the petitioner to his substantive rank of Sub-Inspector of Police. Against this order the petitioner had preferred an appeal to the Government. The Government, though set aside the order of reversal on the ground that no opportunity had been given to the petitioner, passed an order of dismissal disagreeing with the finding of the Inspector-General and agreeing with the finding of the enquiry officer. Examining this situation the Supreme Court said that "Under Rule 851(b), the only question before the Government was whether the order of revision should be sustained or not. There was no other matter by way of an appeal before the Government by the department or by anyone else being aggrieved against the order of the Inspector-General by which he held that charges against the appellant had not been established." The mere fact that the appellate authority could pass such order as it thought fit did not mean that any order could be passed. The Government could pass in exercise of its appellate power such order as it thought fit in the appeal filed by the employee that is either upholding the order of reversion or setting it aside. Proceeding further, the Supreme Court said : "In the absence of any other appeal, the Government could not sit in judgment over the findings of the Inspector-General given by him under the power conferred upon him by section 7 of the Act." The powers of revision could probably be exercised when there is no provision for an appeal unless there are other provisions providing for it. I am therefore, satisfied that both on first principles and on the weight of the authority of the Supreme Court, the second appellate committee could not have enhanced the punishment which had been awarded to the petitioner by the first Appellate Authority. 8. I am therefore, satisfied that both on first principles and on the weight of the authority of the Supreme Court, the second appellate committee could not have enhanced the punishment which had been awarded to the petitioner by the first Appellate Authority. 8. One cannot help sharing the indignation of the second appellate committee about the manner in which the first appellate authority and the competent authority in the instance had dealt with a misconduct of this type and magnitude. Even the Magistrates in Maharashtra have been imposing sentences which are totally contrary to the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act in cases of bootleggars and others found contravening section 66(1)(b) of the said Act. This fact has been taken note of by a Division Branch of this Court (consisting of myself and Tated, J.) in (Anant Balu Patil v. K.P. Raghuvanshi, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Thane)2, Criminal Writ Petition No. 78 of 1986, decided on February 27, 1986, wherein it has been found that the Magistrates consolidate several cases of a particular accused and sentence him to one day's imprisonment when the minimum sentence is six months' imprisonment under section 66(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The police are too happy because they get credit for conviction secured and the Magistrates are happy because in their returns they can show that so many cases have been disposed of. If this is the case of judicial officers, naturally one cannot too seriously condemn the competent authority in the instant case if he has taken a lenient view about the conduct of the petitioner. But I note with gratification that the second appellate committee has taken the view that in future nothing short of dismissal from service should be meted out as proper punishment in cases where drivers are found drunk while on duty. This view should be made known to the lowest rungs of the authorities in the hierarchy of the S.T. 9. In the result, this petition is allowed. Complaint (ULP) No. 18 of 1986 will have to be allowed. The order of the Industrial Court, Nasik, dismissing the said complaint is set aside. The respondent is directed to withdraw the unfair labour practice covered by Item 9 of Schedule IV to the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 forthwith. 10. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. ----