Judgment The State represented by the Public Prosecutor has preferred this appeal challenging the legality and correctness of the order of acquittal of both the accused, who were charged for offences under Secs. 3(1) and 7(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, by the learned IV Metropolitan Magistrate., Madras. The accused were tried for offences under Secs. 3(1) and 7(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the allegation that the first accused, who is the father of the second accused, being the occupier of the premises bearing door No,8, Second Crescent Park Road, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, was keeping a brothel in the said premises and collected a sum of Rs.1,000 from one Vasu for gain and mutual benefit for himself and his daughter, the second accused, and allowed the second accused to offer her body for sexual intercourse for hire with the said Vasu in the bed-room in the said premises and further, the second accused carried on prostitution by offering her body for sexual intercourse for hire with the said Vasu, P.W.1, within the above premises, which is situated 200 meters from Rajah Muthiah High School and the Church, on 19th July, 1980 between 5.30 and 6 p.m. In support of the above charges, the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 14, filed Exs.P1 to P17 and marked M.Os. 1 to 7. 2. The case of the prosecution as disclosed from the oral and documentary evidence can be briefly stated as follows: P.W.14, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Anti-Vice Squad, on receipt of information that the premises bearing door No.10 (new), Second Crescent Park Road, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar is used for the purpose of prostitution by the first accused with the assistance of his daughter, the second accused, verified the information on different dates and confirmed that the said premises is being used as a brothel. He collected further information that a sum of Rs.1,000 was collected from every visitor for sexual intercourse with the second accused by the first accused for mutual benefit and gain of both. He collected P.W.1, a decoy witness, who is the manager of Singapore Lodge, Egmore. P.W.1 agreed to assist P.W.14 in the detection of the case. He collected further information that a sum of Rs.1,000 was collected from every visitor for sexual intercourse with the second accused by the first accused for mutual benefit and gain of both. He collected P.W.1, a decoy witness, who is the manager of Singapore Lodge, Egmore. P.W.1 agreed to assist P.W.14 in the detection of the case. P.W.1 at 2 p.m. on 19th July, 1980 phoned up to the house of the accused and asked for a time for his visit to the said brothel house for having sexual intercourse with the second accused. The reply was to the effect that P.W.1 was asked to come near the petrol bunk near Adyar and that they would pick him up in a car to the house. Thereafter, P.W.14 secured the presence of two witnesses, P.Ws. 2 and 9. He gave a sum of Rs.1,000 which consisted of 10 hundred-rupee notes, marked as M.O.1 series, duly signed by P.W.14, to P.W.1. P.W.14 asked P.W.1 to give the amount to the first accused in the house for having sexual intercourse with the second accused. The mahazar Ex.P1 was prepared at the Assistant Commissioner’s Office regarding the handing over of M.O.1 series to P.W.l by P.W.14. It was attested by P.Ws. l, 2 and 9. P.W.14 also signed. After having made all arrangements, P.W.14 along with his party and P.W.1 and witnesses went to the petrol bunk. P.W.1 was sent in a separate car, while P.W.14 and other followed in different motor vehicles. As already planned, P.W.1 reached the petrol bunk at Adyar, and telephoned to the accused’s house from there. At about 4.30 p.m. the accused sent a car bearing registration number PYP 9483 and picked up P.W.1 to the house of the accused. P.W.14 and party followed the same and stood near the southern side of the junction of the first and second road of Gandhi Nagar, Adyar. It was about 5.30 P.M. when P.W.1 reached the house of the accused. Accused 1 and 2 were present at the house, P.W.1 introduced himself to the first accused as the person who had telephoned already and that he had come for having intercourse with the second accused. So saying, he gave M.O.1 series to the first accused. After receiving the same, the first accused asked P.W. 1 to go inside the room where the second accused was available. So saying, he gave M.O.1 series to the first accused. After receiving the same, the first accused asked P.W. 1 to go inside the room where the second accused was available. P.W.1 went inside the said room and after talking to the second accused for some time, had sexual intercourse with her. In the meantime, P.W.14 sent for P.W.3, Sarojini Rao, who is an edcationalist and a member of the social health organisation and secured her presence. Waiting for sometime after P.W.1 went inside the house, P.W.14 came to know of the accommodation of the decoy witness in the house of the second accused. He prepared the grounds of belief, Ex. P14 since there was no time to get warrant of search. He proceeded to the house of the accused with his party. P.W.14 tapped the bed room of P.W.1. P.W.1 opened .the door, P.W.14 and party found P.W.1 and the second accused in a half naked condition. P.W.4 is a photographer and he attempted to take snap of the situation. The second accused pushed aside the camera and it was struck up. Hence he could not take any snap. At that time, P.W.1 was wearing the jetty M.O.2, while the second accused was wearing the skirt M.O.3. P.W.14 recovered M.Os. 2 and 3 also the bed sheet M.O.4 under cover of mahazar Ex.P3. The first accused was not available at that time. About half an hour later, he came there. P.W.1 identified the first accused before P.W.14 and party. P.W.14 recovered nine hundred rupee notes from the first accused. In all those hundred rupee notes the signature of P.W. 14 were found and that the number of the currency notes also tallied with the one already noted in the mahazar Ex. P1. After coming to know from the first accused that he had given one hundred-rupee-note to the T.U.C.S. shop at Adyar for the purchase of whisky bottle M.O.5, M.O. 5 was seized under cover of mahazar Ex. P4 attested by the same witnesses. P.W.14 directed the Inspector P.W.13 to go and seize the currency note from the said shop. Accordingly P.W.13 went to the T.U.C.S. shop and seized one hundred-rupee-note under cover of mahazar Ex. P13 attested by P.Ws. P4 attested by the same witnesses. P.W.14 directed the Inspector P.W.13 to go and seize the currency note from the said shop. Accordingly P.W.13 went to the T.U.C.S. shop and seized one hundred-rupee-note under cover of mahazar Ex. P13 attested by P.Ws. 10 and 11, employees of the shop, P.W.14 arrested accused 1 and 2 on the same day at 7.30 p.m., and brought them to the station at 8.15 p.m. He registered a case in Crime Nos.637 and 638 of 1980 under Secs. 3(1) and 7(1) of the Act. He sent P.W.1 and the second accused for medical examination. 3. P.W.6 is the Assistant Professor, Madras Medical College, Madras. He examined P.W.1 on 20.7.1980, at 12.50 P.M. and issued the certificate Ex. P7 to the effect that there is nothing to suggest that he is impotent, that there was no matting of the public hair and that there was no injury on his private part. He has also taken the saliva and the blood of the individual on the requisition from the Assistant Commissioner. Ex.P9 is the report of the Serologist to the effect that the salvia and the blood belong to the same B group. According to P.W.6, the absence of smegma suggests recent intercourse. P.W.8 Dr. Janaki, who is the Assistant Professor of Forensic Medicine, Madras Medical College, Madras, examined the second accused and issued the certificate Ex.P11. According to her, there was no recent injury to her private part and she took original swab and sent for analysis. Ex.P12, Chemical Examiner’s report, is to the effect that he did not detect any semen on the swab. Ex. P2 is the trip sheet of the car in which P.W.14 and party travelled. Ex. P6 is the receipt for repairing the camera which was used by P.W.4 for taking snap. Semen was detected in M.O. 4 bed-sheet as per Chemical Examiner’s report and as per the Serologist’s report Ex.P15, the blood group is found as B group which tallies with the blood group of P.W.1. P.W. 14 after Completing the investigation laid the charge-sheet against both the accused on 16.8.1980 under Sec. 3(1) of the Act against the first accused and under Sec. 7(1) of the Act against the second accused. 4. P.W. 14 after Completing the investigation laid the charge-sheet against both the accused on 16.8.1980 under Sec. 3(1) of the Act against the first accused and under Sec. 7(1) of the Act against the second accused. 4. When the accused were examined with reference to the incriminating piece of evidence under Sec. 313, Cr.P.C., they denied totally the prosecution evidence and also stated that this case has been foisted. The second accused would state that she was taken from her house to the Commissioner’s office at 1.30 p.m., as there was a petition against her and that she was sent out from the office only at about 10.30 p.m. No witness was examined on the side of the accused. 5. The learned Magistrate for the reasons assigned in his judgment acquitted both the accused holding that the prosecution has not proved the case against them by satisfactory evidence. Aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred this appeal. 6. At the outset it may be noted that during the pendency of this appeal, the first accused died and as such, the charge against him abates. Now the learned Government Advocate confines his argument in regard to the order of acquittal of the second accused. The learned Government Advocate submitted that the reasons assigned by the trial Magistrate for acquit ting the accused are all unsound and unsustainable. It is further submitted that in view of the evidence of P.W.1, which is corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 4, 13 and 14, the learned Magistrate ought to have convicted both the accused. It is further submitted that the Court below erred in thinking that the evidence of P.W.1 is in the nature of accomplice and no conviction can be had, while his evidence is fully corroborated by other acceptable evidence. Further, the learned Magistrate erred in holding that the non-compliance of Sec. 15(2) of the Act is fatal and the non-examination of the Assistant Inspector General of Police throws considerable doubt on the version of the prosecution. The Magistrate is also thoroughly wrong in thinking that a single and isolated act of sexual intercourse is not sufficient for conviction under Sec. 3(1) of the Act. The learned Government Advocate took me through the judgment of the Court below and the evidence on record and reiterated the above contentions. 7. The Magistrate is also thoroughly wrong in thinking that a single and isolated act of sexual intercourse is not sufficient for conviction under Sec. 3(1) of the Act. The learned Government Advocate took me through the judgment of the Court below and the evidence on record and reiterated the above contentions. 7. According to the learned Government Advocate, P.W.1 cannot be treated as accomplice witness; but he is only a decoy witness, and that the Court below erred in rejecting his evidence on the sole ground that he has given different addresses in regard to his residence. In fact he has pointed out that P.W.1 has only stated that he worked as a Manager in a lodge at Egmore and was residing at Whannels Road and there is no contradiction in respect of his residential address. It is brought to my notice that though in chief-examination he has stated that he was the manager at Singapore Lodge, Egmore, in his cross-examination it was elicited that he was residing at No.172, Royapettah High Road, Madras and that he can not say who is the owner of the property or the nature of the building. When he was examined by the Investigating Officer he has stated that he was residing at No. 9, Whannels Road, Egmore and even the letter which was received by him contained the same address. He also admitted that he used to give information often to the Anti-Vice Squad. It was also elicited from cross-examination that it was the first occasion he went to the house of accused 1 and 2 in order so have sexual intercourse with the second accused. Further, he has mentioned the name of the lodge where he was working as the. South India Lodge, in his 162 Statement. It was also pointed out that he was a witness in a prior case filed by the same Investigating Officer, P.W.14, Mr. Krishnamurthi, under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act as is evidenced by Ex.D2, where he has given his address as the son of ‘Raju’ and not ‘Appu’ and his address is No.10, Tippu Sahib Lane, Triplicane Main Road. That was 12 days prior to this occurrence, namely 7.7.1980. As such, it is clear that witness is capable of giving different addresses at different times and he has no regard for truth. That was 12 days prior to this occurrence, namely 7.7.1980. As such, it is clear that witness is capable of giving different addresses at different times and he has no regard for truth. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that though he has stated to the police that the Sub-Inspector, Ramachandran called him on the same day morning at 10 AM., he now pleaded ignorance about the name of the Sub-Inspector, and deposed that he did not know the name of the Sub-Inspector who called him. Though it is stated that when P.W.4 attempted to take photo, the second accused pushed the camera and the same was struck up and hence photo was not taken, this witness P.W.1 has not referred to anything in his respect in his evidence, learned Government Advocate argued that this witness is not expected to know all these things and he can only say about the part played by him and he need not give the entire occurrence. Such an argument cannot be accepted. In order to find out whether he is speaking the truth or not, it has to be seen whether he has given the correct version of the events which took place inside the house. The fact that he figured as a mahazar witness in the previous case and now a decoy witness does not make any difference in view of the admitted fact that he is an informant to the police regarding the cases under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act. The investigating officer admitted that P.W.1 stated that he is an informant. In this connection, the learned counsel for the respondents drew my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Panalal v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 4 S.C.C. 526 : 1979 Crl. L.J. 936: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1191, wherein it was held that a bribe giver is also an accomplice and the evidence of the Complainant is in no better position than accomplice and that corroboration in material particulars is necessary. As such he admittedly being a decoy witness and his evidence being in the nature of accomplice, his evidence should be corroborated in respect of material particulars and the learned Magistrate has rightly not accepted the evidence of P.W.1, on the ground that his evidence clearly establishes that he is a witness obliged to police. As such he admittedly being a decoy witness and his evidence being in the nature of accomplice, his evidence should be corroborated in respect of material particulars and the learned Magistrate has rightly not accepted the evidence of P.W.1, on the ground that his evidence clearly establishes that he is a witness obliged to police. Further, he is unreliable and there is absolutely nothing to interfere with the finding of the learned Magistrate as far as the evidence of P.W.1 is concerned. Coming to the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 10 and 11, it is seen that they turned hostile and hence it is not helpful to the prosecution. As regards P.W.3, the learned Magistrate rejected her evidence on the ground that she herself has admitted that she was a witness in similar cases for police from 1968. She has also asserted that the aim of her Association is to assist police to eradicate evils of such matters. Her evidence is also contradictory to the evidence of P.W.1. P.W.1 has deposed that some work was going on and two or three workers were working in the adjoining hall of the scene place, while P.W.3 has denied the same and stated that she did not see anybody working there. According to P.W.3, when P.W.4, photographer attempted to take photographs, the lense was broken, while the evidence of P.W.4 photographer and the repairer of the camera, P.W.5, is to the effect that the lense was not broken. The learned Magistrate relying on this portion of the evidence of P.W.3 observed that she is person who would say anything to help the police and that the trial Magistrate is not impressed with her evidence. In this connection, reliance was placed on the decision reported in Hira Lal v. State of Haryana, 1971 Crl. L.J. 290. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 356, wherein it was held that where a person appears as prosecution witness four or five times in police cases pertaining to particular police witness, the evidence of such witness does not carry any value. Relying on the above decision, the learned Magistrate has held that P.Ws. 1 and 3 who are admittedly stock witnesses for police and appeared in several cases do not deserve any credence. Relying on the above decision, the learned Magistrate has held that P.Ws. 1 and 3 who are admittedly stock witnesses for police and appeared in several cases do not deserve any credence. The learned Government Advocate submitted that P.W.3 is aged 72 years, that she is a respectable lady and that the reasons assigned by the Court below for rejecting her evidence are not tenable. On going through the evidence, I find that her evidence does not carry value. She has categorically stated that she has been a witness in many cases for Anti-Vice Squad and vigilance in City Civil Court and also witness for police in such cases from 1968. She has also stated that she has assisted mofussil police and used to be witness for C.I.D. police also and that she cannot say exactly as to the number of cases for which she was taken to the Commissioner’s Office from her house. She has further admitted that the aim of the Association, namely, Cultural Organization for Social Health in which she is a member, is to eradicate evils of such matters and her duty is also eradicate such evils and as such her duty is to assist police in such cases and give evidence. Further, when she was cross-examined, she has stated that after 5.30 P.M., everything was over and thereafter at 6 O’Clock she and others left for Commissioner’s Office and by 6.30 P.M. they were in the Commissioner’s Office. It is her further evidence that from the Commissioner’s Office she went to her house in police car. The learned counsel for the respondents drew my attention to the fact that though she is a witness to Exs.P3 and P4, she has specifically stated that she does not know the contents of Exs.P3 and P4 and that she does not know Tamil. It is also brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the respondents that though it is stated by P.W.3 that by 5.30 P.M. everything was over and mahazar was prepared and seizure was Completed and they left the scene place and reached the office of the Deputy Commissioner at 6.30 P.M., it is seen that Ex.P3 was prepared at 6.35 P.M., at the scene place and Ex.P4 at 7 P.M., according to the prosecution. It is seen from the evidence of P.Ws. It is seen from the evidence of P.Ws. 13 and 9 and the mahazar Ex.P13 that Ex.P13 mahazar was prepared at 7.30 P.M. at T.U.C.S. Stores, Adyar and thereafter P.W.13 returned to the scene house and thereafter they returned to the office. Relying on the circumstances, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the evidence of P.W.13 is highly contradictory to the case of the prosecution and it leads us to conclude that she (P.W.3) is not speaking the truth. It is also brought to my notice that though she had stated that she was examined by the Assistant Commissioner at the scene place, the Investigating Officer, namely, the Assistant Commissioner denied having examined her at the scene place. Further, though she has now stated that she saw the first accused coming with liquor bottle and that she told the same to the police, it was elicited from the Investigating Officer that she has not stated so. From these circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned trial Magistrate has not acted properly on the evidence of P.W.3. I am of the opinion that he has rightly rejected her evidence. Reliance was placed on the evidence of P.W.9 who is an attestor to Ex.P1 mahazar and who also accompanied the raiding party to the house of the accused and attested the mahazar Ex.P4. It is elicited in cross-examination that he came to the office of the Assistant Commissioner at 3.15 or 3.30 P.M. and the amount of Rs.1,000 was given to P.W.1 at about 3.45 or 4.00 P.M., and Ex. P1 was prepared. But, On the other hand, Ex.P1 was prepared at about 2.30 P.M. at the office of the Assistant Commissioner P.W.14. Thus, his evidence is contradictory to Ex.P1 to which he has attested. Next it was pointed out that it is the positive evidence of this witness (P.W.9) who is the driver of the car which was lent by his master to the Commissioner, that he was staying in the car in front of the yard of the house of the accused, near the front gate, for about 20 minutes, and when P.W.I entered into the house and till the police subsequently entered into the house, nobody either went inside the house or came out of the house and that there is only one gate for the house. That portion of the evidence is contradictory to the case of the prosecution that P.W.1, immediately after entering the house, paid the amount of Rs.1,000 to the first accused and after receipt of the money, he (first accused) came out of the house to purchase whisky in T.U.C.S. Stores and after the police party entered into the house and were effecting raid, he came subsequently with whisky bottle. As such, the evidence of P.W.9 that he was present is highly improbable. Further, P.W.9 is very definite in his evidence that from the first accused M.O. 5 whisky bottle, M.O. 7 permit and Ex.P5 receipt for purchasing whisky were seized and nothing else was seized from him. But it is the case of the prosecution that a sum of Rs.900 was also seized from him. Though he has now stated in evidence that he told the police that the first accused was not there when police came, P.W.14 denied his version. His evidence that the Assistant Commissioner took the first accused to the T.U.C.S. Stores is also contrary to the case of the prosecution. From all these circumstances, his evidence was not accepted by the learned Magistrate and as such there is nothing to hold that the said reasoning is perverse or improbable. 8. Next it was argued by the learned Government Advocate that the Court below ought to have accepted the evidence of the investigating officers and the police official as there is no motive alleged against them to reject their testimony. In this connection, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 1974 S.C.C. (Crl.) 405: 1974 Crl. L.J. 729: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1024, wherein it is held as follows: “Police officials cannot be discredited in a trap case merely because they are police officials, nor can other witnesses be rejected because on some other occasion they have been witnesses for the prosecution in the past. Basically, the Court has to view the evidence in the light of the probabilities and the intrinsic credibility of those who testify.” On the other hand, it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that in the instant case though P.W.13 accompanied P.W.14 during the raid and he was deputed to seize the one-hundred- rupee-note from the T.U.C.S. Stores, Adyar, the 162-statement recorded from him was admittedly not sent to Court. Further suggestion has been put to P.W.13 that the accused were taken to the Commissioner’s Office in connection with petition and pressure. The second accused has also in her 313-statement stated that she was taken, on the presentation that there was petition against her, to the Commissioner’s office at about 1.30 P.M., and later in the night she was allowed to go. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the version given by P.W.14 regarding the trap is falsified by the evidence of other witnesses. It was also suggested to him that the mahazars were fabricated and further the timings given in the mahazar and the actual occurrence is quite different. He also submitted that there is no proper investigation; in this case and the driver of the car belonging to the accused which fetched P.W.1 from the petrol bunk was not arrested. There is absolutely nothing to show that he was examined. The car was also not seized. If really P.W.4 was prevented from taking photo, certainly there should be a Complaint against the second accused for preventing P.W.4 from discharging his lawful duty. Further, the provisions of the Act relating to search have not been Complied with. Though it is stated by P.W.14 that after collecting information he deployed his informant and Inspector to gather information about the usage of the premises as brothel and that he also verified the information on different dates and confirmed that the said house was being used as a brothel, the Inspector P.W.13 who investigated did not speak about that and nothing was produced before Court to substantiate the same. On the other hand, in cross-examination he has stated that he received information 5 or 6 days prior to the raid and that he cannot say from the CD. when exactly he received the information. Yet he has stated that he had verified it through many sources. As such, it cannot be said that any weight could be attached to the evidence of the investigating officers in this case. Further, though P.W.1 was available, he was not sent to the doctor on the same day for examination and he was actually sent on the next day at about 12.50 P.M. If he was sent to the doctor on the same, the doctor would have noted symptoms of sexual intercourse. Further, though P.W.1 was available, he was not sent to the doctor on the same day for examination and he was actually sent on the next day at about 12.50 P.M. If he was sent to the doctor on the same, the doctor would have noted symptoms of sexual intercourse. Further the semen of P.W.1 and the second accused were not sent for Comparison. The absence of semen on the clothes of P.W.I and the second accused also falsifies the case of the prosecution that there was sexual intercourse between P.W.1 and the second accused. The presence of semen in the bed-sheet recovered from the house of the second accused would not in any way advance the case of the prosecution as there are many adult persons residing in the said house. The room from where the bed-sheet was recovered was used as a bed room. There is nothing to show that the semen group tallied with the semen group of P.W.1 or the second accused. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that under Sec. 15(1) (2) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, it is obligatory on the part of the special police officer to call upon two or more respectable inhabitants (at least one of whom shall be a woman) of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate, to attend and witness the search. Even under the proviso, the ‘locality witness’ is important as far as the ‘male’ is concerned. In the instant case, the mahazar witnesses P.Ws. 2, 3 and 9 are residents of Thiruvanmiyoor, T.Nagar and Teynam-pet and they are not witnesses of the locality. It is also elicited in cross-examination of P.W.14 that there are houses near the house of the accused and that Adyar is a big residential area and particular Gandhinagar is a residential area with more than 500 houses. P.W.14 has stated that he tried to contact the residents of Adyar, but he could not secure anyone. When he was further cross-examined, he could not say the particulars of the persons who are residing in the adjoining houses. On the other hand, P.W.9 has clearly stated that before ever the police party came outside the bouse, the neighbours were brought and that their signatures were obtained in mahazars; particularly the owner of the opposite house attested Exs.P3 and P4. On the other hand, P.W.9 has clearly stated that before ever the police party came outside the bouse, the neighbours were brought and that their signatures were obtained in mahazars; particularly the owner of the opposite house attested Exs.P3 and P4. It is also commented upon by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is absolutely no valid reason for not obtaining the search warrant from Magistrate for effecting search of the house of accused. The reason given by the investigating officer cannot be accepted. According to the investigating officer, his office is adjacent to Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court at Egmore and that it struck him to get a warrant. But since he was not sure whether the decoy witness would accommodate or not, he did not get warrant. He has further stated that he was not sure whether there was a brothel. It is to be noted that since P.W.14 was satisfied by himself by deploying his informant and Inspector to gather information about the usage of the premises as brothel and he verified the information on different dates and confirmed that the said house was being used as a brothel and he arranged for a trap by securing P.Ws. 1, 3,4,9 and others, he ought to have obtained search warrant from Magistrate and the reason given by him that he was not sure whether the decoy witness will accommodate him cannot be accepted for not obtaining search warrant. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in P. Damodaran, In re., 1973 L.W. (Crl.) 23, wherein it was held that the provision under Sec. 15(2) must be satisfied to make a search legal one. Unless the same is proved, the conviction under Sec 4(1) cannot be imposed. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate submitted that it is only an illegality and it cannot vitiate the search, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Bai Radha v. State of Gujarat, 1970 M.L.J. (Crl.) 414: (1970) 1 S.C.J. 323: (1969) 2 S.C.R. 792: A.I.R 1970 S.C. 1396: 1970 Crl. L.J. 1279, wherein it was held that on account of the omission to record the reasons, the trial is not vitiated and further the non-compliance of Sec 15(1) (2) is only an irregularity and the trial is not vitiated unless it has caused prejudice. L.J. 1279, wherein it was held that on account of the omission to record the reasons, the trial is not vitiated and further the non-compliance of Sec 15(1) (2) is only an irregularity and the trial is not vitiated unless it has caused prejudice. In the instant case, the scene place is located in a residential locality and there are number of houses available and persons were also available and some of them were working in the same premises and hence certainly the failure to obtain attestation from the neighbours would prejudice the case of the accused especially when it is contended that nothing took place and that they were taken from the house on the petitions received against them. In any event the failure to observe the procedure clearly shows that no reliance could be placed on the evidence of the investigating officer. 10. It is also commented upon by the lower Court that Mr.A.I.G. was present at the time of raid and his non-examination throws considerable doubt on the version of the prosecution. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate submits that Mr.Jain was not a signatory to any of the documents and as such, his non-examination would not in any way affect the case of the prosecution. But in the instant case it was brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the respondents that Mr.Jain also played some part in the investigation as it is seen from the evidence of P.W.3 that Mr.Jain, Deputy Commissioner wanted to take photo, that the lady (namely, the second accused) pushed the camera and it fell down and that the lense was broken. According to her, it was only the Deputy Commissioner, namely, Mr. Jain contacted her over phone on 19th July, 1980. She has further stated that they saw a gentleman using whisky bottle and card board box and Mr. Jain, Deputy Commissioner, questioned him. In the circumstances, the non-examination certainly throws considerable doubt on the version of the prosecution. I find some force in the said contention also. 11. Jain contacted her over phone on 19th July, 1980. She has further stated that they saw a gentleman using whisky bottle and card board box and Mr. Jain, Deputy Commissioner, questioned him. In the circumstances, the non-examination certainly throws considerable doubt on the version of the prosecution. I find some force in the said contention also. 11. Next it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that under Sec.3 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act a single and isolated instance instance is not sufficient, relying on the decision of this Court reported in P.K. Unni Kumar, In re., 1973 L.W. (Crl.) 198 and Dhanalakshmi, In re., 1972 L.W. (Crl.) 122 Learned counsel for the respondents submits that under Sec. 2(f) of the Act ‘prostitution’ means the act of a female offering her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire. The word ‘promiscuous’ means indiscriminate offering of body for sexual intercourse and further under Sec. 2(a), brothel includes any house, etc., which is used for purposes of prostitution. Hence, prostitution per se is not an offence. Indiscriminate offering of body alone is offence. In the instant case, the prosecution has not let in any evidence to show that the second accused had offered her body for sexual intercourse with any other person except the fact that P.W.1 had sexual intercourse with the second accused. It is not the evidence of P.W.1 also that he was visiting the second accused on prior occasions. On the other hand, it is his positive evidence that for the first time, it is his positive evidence that for the first time, he went there and introduced himself as the person who talked over phone. As rightly observed by the learned Magistrate, the prosecution has not let in any evidence by examining the neighbours to prove the anticedents of the accused. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate relied on the decision of this Court reported in Krishnamurthy v. Public Prosecutor, Madras, 1967 L.W. (Crl.) 59, where it was held that a single instance coupled with the surrounding circumstances is sufficient to establish that the premises is being used as a brothel. It was pointed out that in the instant case P.W.1 is only a stranger and the second accused allowed him to have sexual intercourse and that the said circumstance is enough to satisfy the requirement. It was pointed out that in the instant case P.W.1 is only a stranger and the second accused allowed him to have sexual intercourse and that the said circumstance is enough to satisfy the requirement. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there is absolutely nothing to show that P.W.1 had sexual intercourse with the second accused. P.W.8 examined the second accused and issued the certificate Ex.P11. She did not find any recent injuries to her private parts and she took the original swab and sent for anyalysis and no semen was detected in the swab as is evidenced by Ex. P12 the report of the Chemical Examiner. It is to be noted that the second accused was examined immediately after the occurrence, i.e., even at 8.45 P.M. on the same day she was examined by P.W.8 soon after her arrival. The prosecution has failed to establish (hat there was any intercourse between P.W.1 and the second accused. P.W.1 was examined by P.W.6 on the next day. According to him, the absence of smegma suggests the recent intercourse. In cross-examination, it was elicited that a person who washes the genital organ will not have smegma and that the absence of smegma does not by itself show evidence of recent intercourse. It is the case of the prosecution that the second accused rushed to the adjacent bath room and washed her private part and dressed herself. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the police party went there for the purpose of detecting the crime and to trap the woman and that it is highly impossible that the police party allowed her to enter the bath room and wash her private part to destroy evidence. The version of the prosecution is highly improbable. Reliance was placed on the presence of semen in the bed sheet. It is to be noted that there is no semen detected on M.Os. 2 and 3, clothes worn by the second accused as well as P.W.1 at the time of occurrence. As already pointed out, the presence of semen in the bed sheet does not advance the case of the prosecution as it was not conclusively proved that the semen found there tallied with the semen of the second accused or P.W.1. It is also pointed out that even in Ex. As already pointed out, the presence of semen in the bed sheet does not advance the case of the prosecution as it was not conclusively proved that the semen found there tallied with the semen of the second accused or P.W.1. It is also pointed out that even in Ex. P3 mahazar there is no indication that the bed sheet was wet or it contained any seminal stain. Admittedly, the semen of P.W.1 and the second accused were not sent for Comparison. It is also not established that the blood group and the semen group would be the same. As such, even in respect of the single act there is no acceptable evidence on the side of the prosecution that P.W.1 and the second accused had intercourse on that day. 12. Next it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that in the instant case no first information report was marked and is made available to the accused to find out the truth or otherwise. According to him, originally the investigating agency was called Vigilance Cell and subsequently it has been changed into Anti Vice Squad and there is no Government Order for the change of the nomenclature. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate produced a copy of the letter, dated 10th August, 1977 in reference No. 80877/GA3/76-1 from the Secretary to Government, Social Welfare Department, Madras-9, to the Commissioner of Police, Madras, wherein it was observed that the Government after careful consideration accept the suggestion of the Commissioner of Police and direct that the nomenclature of the ‘City Vigilance Unit’ of the Madras City Police entrusted with the task of enforcing the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act shall be changed into Anti Vice Squad, Madras City Police. In view of the above letter, the absence of any Government Order is of no consequence. Next it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Anti Vice Squad has not been declared as a police station as it is absolutely necessary for registering the Complaint. In this case, the prosecution has not produced the first information report and a copy was not given to the accused. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, a case ought to have been registered at the Adyar Police Station which has the jurisdiction. In this case, the prosecution has not produced the first information report and a copy was not given to the accused. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, a case ought to have been registered at the Adyar Police Station which has the jurisdiction. Anti-Vice Squad is not a police station, and the evidence of the investigating officer that the same was registered at the Squad is not tenable. Learned counsel for the respondents drew my attention to Sec. 2(s) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein ‘police station’ is defined. ‘Police station’ means any post or place declared generally or specially by the State Government, to be a police station, and includes any local area specified by the State Government in this behalf. There is absolutely nothing to show that Anti-Vice Squad was declared as police station by the State Government. Under Sec. 154, Cr.P.C. it is provided "Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police-station, shall be reduced to writing by him....." As such, only the officer in charge of the police station is Competent to register a case under Sec. 154, Crl. P.C. Even Sec. 173, Crl. P.C, under Sub-cl. (2) (i), it is provided that as soon as investigation is Completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empower to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government. Under Sec. 36, Cr.P.C., it is provided that police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station. It is also brought to my notice that in respect of similar cases under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, first information reports were registered in the concerned police station. In C.C.No. 4457 of 1985 under Crime numbers 1534 and 1535 of 1985, cases were registered in J-l police station under Sec.4(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Giris Act. Similarly in R-1 Mambalam Police Station Crime No.8 of 1984 was registered. In C.C.No. 4457 of 1985 under Crime numbers 1534 and 1535 of 1985, cases were registered in J-l police station under Sec.4(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Giris Act. Similarly in R-1 Mambalam Police Station Crime No.8 of 1984 was registered. P.W.14 has also admitted in his evidence that J-2 Adyar police station is 2-1/2 furlongs from the house of the accused and that he did not take the accused to J-2 police station to register a case. The failure to register a case in the police station at the earliest point of time, even if it does not vitiate the proceedings, throws considerable doubt on the investigation done by P.W.14 and the accused are prejudiced by not getting any earliest report in the case to challenge the evidence of the material witnesses. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that under Sec. 13 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, there shall be for each area to be specified by State Government in this behalf a special police officer appointed by or on behalf of that Government for dealing with offences under this Act in that area and that the Special Police Officer shall not be below the rank of an Inspector of Police. Special Police Officer has been defined under Sec. 2(i) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act as a police officer appointed by or on behalf of the State Government to be in charge of police duties within a specified area for the purpose of this Act. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, there is nothing to show that P.W.14 was empowered under the provisions of the Act as a special police officer. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate produced G.O.Ms.No. 14%, Home, dated 25.5.1959 whereby the Assistant Commissioner of Police sanctioned in Paragraph 2 of the G.O., shall be designated as Assistant Commissioner of Police (Vigilance) and he will have jurisdiction throughout the City of Madras (Municipal limits). In view of the above I do not find any merit in the said contention. 13. In view of the above I do not find any merit in the said contention. 13. Lastly, it was urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that this is an appeal by the State against the judgment of acquittal of the accused, that the trial Magistrate, who tried the case, had the opportunity to see the witnesses and has given a finding that he is not impressed with their evidence or that they are speaking the truth, that the said view cannot be said to be not possible on the evidence and that even if two views are possible on the evidence, this Court will not interfere with the order of acquittal. In this connection, he drew my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ramji Suriya v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 810, wherein it was held as follows: "While there is no doubt that the jurisdiction of an appellate Court is co-extensive with that of the trial Court, in the case of an appeal against a judgment of acquittal, it cannot totally brush aside the appreciation of the evidence by the trial Court. The reasons for reversing the judgment of acquittal should be cogent and if two views are reasonably possible, the appellate Court should be slow in interfering with the judgment of the trial Court, even if it is possible for it to take a different view after a process of laborious reasoning." In State of Punjab v. Savitri Devi, 1983 Crl. L.J. 1093: A.I.R. 1983 P. & H. 306: "In an appeal against acquittal, the verdict of acquittal cannot be set aside merely on the ground that the High Court have a different view than the one taken by the trial Judge. There have to be Compelling reasons to set aside the judgment of acquittal. If two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, then the view in support of the acquittal of the accused should be preferred." Applying the ratio laid down in the above decisions and the consistent views expressed by the Supreme Court in catena of cases, unless this Court finds that the view taken by the trial Court is unreasonable or preverse, the finding of acquittal should not be disturbed even if it is really of the view that on the evidence different conclusion is possible. In view of the discussion already made, it cannot be said that the finding arrived at by the trial Magistrate is either perverse or unreasonable or that the reasons given by the Court below are palpably and unerringly shaky. On the other hand, he has given acceptable seasons for arriving at a finding of not guilty of the accused and there is absolutely nothing to interfere with the said finding. For all these reasons, the order of acquittal passed by the Court below is confirmed and this appeal fails and stands dismissed.