JUDGMENT - H.H. KANTHARIA, J.:---The applicant-accused, by this criminal revision application, challenges and judgement and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Silvassa, on 6th July, 1985 dismissing his Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1984. 2. The short facts giving rise to this application are as follows : The applicant has a small grocery shop at village Dokmardi in the Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli at Silvassa. On 16th August, 1983 at about 11.00 a.m. Food Inspector Harishsinh Govindsinh Chauhan (P.W. 1) visited his shop. He disclosed his identity and called upon the applicant to produce his licence for selling for articles which the applicant could not produce. He then demanded a sample of turmeric powder and ground-nut oil. He took 600 grams of turmeric powder and ground-nut oil. So long as ground-nut oil is concerned, it was not found adulterated and, therefore, we are concerned only with the applicant selling turmeric powder. After completing the necessary formalities of dividing the 600 grams of turmeric powder in three parts and putting them in dried and clean three bottles and after putting air tight stoppers and labels under a panchnama, he sent one of the bottles for analysis to Public Analyst at Baroda. The Public Analyst accordingly analysed the sample of turmeric powder and found that it was adulterated in the sense that it contained plenty of rice powder and paddy husk. Food Inspector Chauhan obtained necessary consent from the local health authority and charge-sheeted the applicant in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Silvassa. 3. At the trial, the learned Magistrate recorded evidence of two prosecution witnesses viz. complainant-Chauhan and one panch witness by name Ravindrakumar Amratlal Kapadi (P.W. 2). On considering the oral as well as documentary evidence, he came to the conclusion that the applicant sold adulterated turmeric powder and thus found him guilty of offences punishable under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred as "the Act") and sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month by his judgement and order dated 30th December, 1983. 4. 1,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month by his judgement and order dated 30th December, 1983. 4. The applicant felt aggrieved by the judgement and order recorded by the learned trial Magistrate and preferred criminal appeal in the Sessions Court at Silvassa. The learned Sessions Judge heard the said appeal and on re-appreciating and re-assessing the evidence he also came to the conclusion that the applicant was guilty of the offence with which he stood charged. He accordingly dismissed the appeal by a judgement and order recorded on 6th July, 1985 thus confirming the conviction and sentence imposed upon the applicant by the learned trial Magistrate. 5. Being aggrieved, the applicant filed the present criminal revision application. 6. Mr. Manudhane, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, raised a number of contentions in support of this revision application. Thus, first of all his submission is that there was non-compliance of section 10(7) of the Act. According to him, the panchnama (Exh. 12) shows that the last page was written in bigger handwriting than the earlier three pages which in indicative of the fact that the signature of the panch witness was obtained on a blank paper. He also submitted that even panch witness Ravindrakumar Kapadi has stated that his signature was obtained on a blank paper. He also urged that the panch witness was not an independent witness inasmuch as he has given admissions that he had signed the panchnama under fear that if he were not to oblige the Food Inspector in that regard probably he would also be booked as he is a dealer in sweetmeats. If this is so, Mr. Manudhane submits, the provision of section 10(7) were violated or were not complied with and in that case the conviction recorded against the applicant is bad in law. 7. If this is so, Mr. Manudhane submits, the provision of section 10(7) were violated or were not complied with and in that case the conviction recorded against the applicant is bad in law. 7. Now, section 10(7) of the Act reads as under :--- "10(7) Where the Food Inspector takes any action under Clause (a) of sub-section (1), sub-section (2), sub-section (2), sub-section (4) or sub-section (6), he shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures." It is no doubt true that the panch witness has deposed that his signatures were obtained on blank pages or papers but I am of the view that the panch witness who was declared hostile to the prosecution is not a truthful witness. He himself is a dealer in sweetmeats and further he belongs to the community of the applicant. It is quite possible, therefore, that he obliged the applicant at the time of giving evidence in the Court by deposing that he signed on blank papers. It is also true that, according to him, he signed the so-called panchnama out of fear that he would also be booked by the Food Inspector. This deposition also appears to be false and in my opinion he has given such evidence only to help out his caste-mate and fellow-trader. I also find no substance in the contention that the nature of the panchnama is suspicious in the sense that the last page of the panchnama was written in bigger handwriting than the earlier three pages which would indicate that after obtaining signature on a blank paper the pages were filled up by the Food Inspector. I have gone through the panchnama and it does appear that the last page is written in slightly bigger handwriting. But I do not find any unusual thing about it because when one is required to write so many pages at a stretch there is bound to be some difference in the handwriting in the beginning and at the end of such a writing. Hence I do not accept the submission that the provisions of section 10(7) were not complied with. 8. Before parting with this discussion let me record here that Mr. Hence I do not accept the submission that the provisions of section 10(7) were not complied with. 8. Before parting with this discussion let me record here that Mr. Manudhane also urged that the evidence of panch witness was doubtful and, therefore, there should have been some more evidence corroborating the evidence of the Food Inspector and it would not be safe to rely upon uncorroborated testimony of the Food Inspector. There are no allegations of mala fide against the Food Inspector and there is no reason to reject his evidence merely because there is no corroboration. It would also not be correct to say that his evidence is not at all corroborated as a perusal of the panchnama (Exh. 12) shows that a sample of turmeric powder was obtained from the shop of the applicant. And apart from this panchnama, it is not the case of the applicant that no sample of turmeric powder was obtained from his shop by the Food Inspector. When the panch witness is hostile to the prosecution there was no harm in accepting the evidence of the Food Inspector. Mr. Manudhane also submitted that even if the evidence of panch witness is accepted he cannot be termed an independent witness inasmuch as according to him, he has signed the panchnama under fear. He invited my attention to a Supreme Court ruling in case of (Ram Labhaya v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another)1, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 789 to point out that when a person acts as a panch witness in compliance of provisions of section 10(7) of the Act he should be an independent person. There is no dispute and can never be that such a person has to be independent but just because the panch witness in our case is in no mood to support the prosecution and on the contrary is out to oblige the applicant. I do not think that he loses his character of being independent. As I said earlier, he is a liar. 9. The second submission of Mr. Manudhane is that in this case there was breach of Rule 22 of the rules framed under the Act (hereinafter referred to as the rules). I do not think that he loses his character of being independent. As I said earlier, he is a liar. 9. The second submission of Mr. Manudhane is that in this case there was breach of Rule 22 of the rules framed under the Act (hereinafter referred to as the rules). Thus, according to him, as per Rule 22 the Food Inspector was supposed to take 200 grams of the sample of the food to be sent to the Public Analyst for which there is no satisfactory evidence. It is no doubt true that the Food Inspector had purchased 600 grams of turmeric powder from the applicant but at the time of dividing it into three parts he had not again weighed it which means that there was no clear evidence that 200 grams of turmeric powder was sent by the Food Inspector to the Public Analyst for analysis. However, Rule 22-B provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 22, the quantity of sample sent for analysis shall be considered as sufficient unless the Public Analyst or the Director reports to the contrary. So long as our case is concerned, there is no report to the contrary from the Public Analyst that the quantity of the turmeric powder which he had received for analysis was less than 200 grams or that it was not sufficient to enable him to analyse. Here we may also note that according to the Food Inspector he had divided 600 grams of turmeric powder in the three parts and for all that we know that the sample which was sent to the Public Analyst may be little more in quantity than the other two samples. At any rate, if the applicant had a real grievance about this aspect of the matter nothing prevented him from calling the Public Analyst for being examined. I, therefore, do not think that there was breach of Rule 22. 10. Thirdly, Mr. Manudhane contended that the consent to prosecute the applicant as required under section 20 of the Act was given by a person not duly authorised, as per the evidence on record. In this respect, his submission is that the consent to prosecute the applicant could be given only by the Central Government or a person duly authorised by the Central Government. In this respect, his submission is that the consent to prosecute the applicant could be given only by the Central Government or a person duly authorised by the Central Government. Now, it is to be seen that the Food Inspector had written to the Local Health Authority, Chief Medical Officer, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Silvassa, on 4th October, 1983, as per Exhibit P/22, that the applicant had committed an offence under the Act and that he was to be prosecuted for which consent of the said local health authority was necessary and he asked for it. This document shows that the Administrator of Dadra and Nagar Haveli had under Notification No. ADM/CMO/GNL/98 dated 22nd May, 1980 (sic) Gazette Part III, section 3 dated 10th June, 1972, had authorised the local health authority to give consent to prosecute a person under the Act. And in pursuance of such an authorization the local health authority, Chief Medical Officer, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Silvassa, by their order dated 5th October, 1983 (Exh. P/23) gave consent to Food Inspector Chauhan to prosecute the applicant. In these facts and circumstance, it cannot be said that there was no proper consent to prosecute the applicant. These two documents do show that there was valid consent accorded by the Central Government through the local health authority enabling Food Inspector Chauhan to prosecute the applicant. It may also be pertinent to note here that if this contention was raised in the lower courts, the original notification issued by the Administrator, representing Central Government, would have been produced in the courts below. 11. Fourthly, Mr. Manudhane's contention is that the consent to prosecute the applicant was granted without application of mind and here he submits that the evidence on the record shows that it was only on the report of the Public Analyst that an order was made that "Suit to be filed within 15 days", on 24th September, 1983 which shows that at the time of giving consent to prosecute the applicant only this document was looked into and no other documents were taken into consideration. I am not able to persuade myself to agree with Mr. Manudhane for the simple reason that the evidence of Food Inspector Chauhan does disclose that he had taken all the relevant papers along with the Public Analyst's Report to the Chief Medical Officer for obtaining consent to prosecute the applicant. I am not able to persuade myself to agree with Mr. Manudhane for the simple reason that the evidence of Food Inspector Chauhan does disclose that he had taken all the relevant papers along with the Public Analyst's Report to the Chief Medical Officer for obtaining consent to prosecute the applicant. It appears that in a bunch of these papers the first page may be the report of the Public Analyst on which the Chief Medical Officer made remarks that the suit be filed within 15 days. Therefore, it cannot be said that he had not gone through all the relevant papers before granting consent to prosecute the applicant. 12. Fifthly, Mr. Manudhane urged that prejudice was caused to the applicant on account of the fact that the examination-in-chief of the Food Inspector was recorded by the learned trial Magistrate in the absence of the Advocate of the applicant and the applicant's application for an adjournment on that day was simply rejected. It is no doubt true that the applicant had on 29-11-1983 made an application (Exh. 8) in the trial Court for an adjournment on the ground that for some unavoidable circumstances his Advocate Mr. Desai was unable to attend the Court and that the learned trial Magistrate had rejected the said application. It is important to note that all that had happened on that day was that the learned trial Magistrate had recorded evidence of complainant Chauhan before the charge. If applicant's Advocate was present in the trial Court he would have probably cross-examined the Food Inspector before the charge was framed. But that by itself will not show that as a matter of fact any prejudice was caused to the applicant only because on the day when the evidence was recorded and charge was framed his Advocate was not present. The prejudice has to be real and not imaginary. In fact, it has not been pointed out to me as to how and in what manner real prejudice was caused to the applicant for the absence of his Advocate when the evidence before the charge was recorded. The prejudice has to be real and not imaginary. In fact, it has not been pointed out to me as to how and in what manner real prejudice was caused to the applicant for the absence of his Advocate when the evidence before the charge was recorded. Even if no cross-examination was directed to the Food Inspector before the charge, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to applicant was afterwards given sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the Food Inspector and merely because charge was framed on the evidence recorded in the absence of the Advocate, it would not be proper to conclude that prejudice was caused to the applicant. 13. Sixthly, Mr. Manudhane contended that the charge as framed did not indicate the nature of the adulteration of the item of food which occasioned failure of justice. Now, the charge framed against the applicant by the learned trial Magistrate is at Exh. 27. It reads as under :--- "That you accused on 16-8-83 at village Dukhmardi sold to the Food Inspector adulterated turmeric powder and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 16(1)(a)(i) r/w section 7(1) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried by me on the said charge. Dated this 29-11-83. Sd/- C.J.M. Magistrate" This charge very much indicates the fact that what was told to the applicant by the learned trial Magistrate was that he had sold adulterated turmeric powder. The applicant knew it very well that he was prosecuted for selling turmeric powder which turned out to be adulterated because before the charge was framed he was supplied with a copy of the report of the Public Analyst. If he desired the sample given to him to be analysed independently he was entitled to send his own sample within 10 days after the complaint was filed and he was given all the papers of charge-sheet. Not having done that and knowing fully well that the Public Analyst's report clearly showed that the turmeric powder which he sold was adulterated it did not lie in his mouth to say that because of the absence of more particulars about the nature of adulteration there was failure of justice. In fact, the Public Analyst's Report does show in clear terms as to what was the nature of adulteration. I therefore, find no substance in this contention also. In fact, the Public Analyst's Report does show in clear terms as to what was the nature of adulteration. I therefore, find no substance in this contention also. 14. And lastly, Mr. Manudhane urged that the sentence imposed upon the applicant is too harsh and justice may be tampered with mercy. In his submission, the applicant has a small grocery shop and he has six children and a wife to maintain. I am afraid, nothing can be done in the matter of sentence because the sentence awarded to the applicant is the minimum and cannot be reduced. However, all said and done, it is true that the applicant is a petty grocery merchant. He has six children and a wife to look after. If he is sent to jail for three months, his wife and children would be the real sufferers as he is the only bread winner in the family. It would be like ruining his poor family. Let me make myself very clear that I have absolutely no sympathy for any person who indulges in food adulteration. But in this case I do feel that the members of the family of the applicant deserve a sympathy; especially when the applicant is a poor small grocery merchant. I, therefore, hope and trust that the Central Government may consider to remit the substantive sentence inflicted on the applicant. 15. In this view of the matter, I find no substance in this revision application. It stands rejected. Rule is accordingly discharged. However, I grant three months time to the applicant to surrender to bail. Rule accordingly discharged. -----