Judgment :- 1. The matter arises under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1964 (Aet 58 of 1961), hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’. The draft statement under S. 10(5) of the Act was published on 31st January 1979 and a copy thereof was served on the petitioner on 22nd March 1979. She did not file any objection under 5. 10(5) of the Act. Hence, the matter was further processed and final statement under S. 12 of the Act was prepared and published on 25th July, 1979 and it was served on the petitioner on 3-8-1986. The petitioner chose to file a revision under Sec. 82 of the Act to the first respondeat and that revision has come to be disposed of by the impugned order. Before the first respondent it was contended that by virtue of a dead of Trust dated 22nd January 1973 in favour of Manonmani Amman temple, the land in question would go out of the purview of the Act, as per S. 2 of the Act. The deed of Trust, seemed to have been produced before the first respondent,. After making some adverse comments on the deed of Trust, the first respondent adverted to very many aspects that should be probed into with regard to the deed of Trust. He observed that when and bow the document was acted upon haa to be examined; whether the income from the land is being accounted for separately and utilised for the purpose of the temple would be relevant and would have to be examined and as to whether the Trust has, in fact, been established within the meaning of the Act will have to be probed into and hence there is need to take fresh evidence. On the ground that this case of the petitioner cannot be considered for the first time and fresh evidence cannot be permitted at the stage of revision under S. 82 of the Act, the first respondent has dismissed the revision. 2. Mr. On the ground that this case of the petitioner cannot be considered for the first time and fresh evidence cannot be permitted at the stage of revision under S. 82 of the Act, the first respondent has dismissed the revision. 2. Mr. A.V. Dhanakoti, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that if evidence is required on the questions posed by the first respondent with regard to the deed of Trust, the first respondent ought to have remitted the matter back to the second respondent for reconsideration as contemplated under S. 82 of the Act, directing the second respondent to permit the petitioner to place the requisite evidence on the questions. This plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner on facts, requires countenance. If in fact, the deed of Trust covers the land in question and has been acted upon, and would fall within the exempted category, the petitioner may plead and succeed for exemption under S. 2 of the Act. S. 82 of the Act is generously couched, and enables the revisional authority to make an order of remittal in appropriate cases. The Act circumscribes the right to bold property and before the provisions of such a statute are enforced, any benefit thereunder, such as an exemption, which is a silver lining in an otherwise dark portals of the statute, must be given, if in fact, the party is entitled to it inlaw and on facts. The omission to put forth a plea for exemption at the earliest stage need not be rigorously put against the party, to deprive him the exemption, which he may be lawfully entitled to. In my view, the first respondent has taken too technical view, which has resulted in prejudice to the petitioner, and the first respondent has not adverted to the amplitude of his revisional powers, and he unjustly failed to exercise the power vested in him in law. It will be just and proper and it will meet the ends of justice that the second respondent considers the matter afresh permitting the petitioner to place the requisite evidence on the relevant aspects relating to the deed of Trust and then render a decision one way or other. It will be just and proper and it will meet the ends of justice that the second respondent considers the matter afresh permitting the petitioner to place the requisite evidence on the relevant aspects relating to the deed of Trust and then render a decision one way or other. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and the order of the first respondent is quashed and the matter will stand remitted to the file of the Second respondent for him to consider the same afresh is the light of the observations and directions made above. It is needless to state that the petitioner will be alert enough to participate in the enquiry, which the second respondent may initiate is this behalf after due notice to the petitioner and place all the requisite evidence to substantiate her claim for exemption. I make no order as to costs.