JUDGMENT 1. - This application is directed against the order passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge (2), Kota whereby he dismissed the revision petition of the accused petitioner and confirmed the order dated 3-9-82 passed by the Children's Court, Kota. 2. On the basis of a report lodged at P.S. Kenwas the accused-applicant was arrested in a case for the offence Under Section 302, Indian Penal Code on 1-2-82 and he was produced before the Munsiff Judicial Magistrate Sangod. During the detention of the accused-petitioner in judicial custody the accused-applicant, was sent by the jail authorities to the Medical Officer, Government Hospital, Ramganj Mandi for his examination for determining his age, and after examination the Medical Officer found that the accused-applicant is 15/16 years of age. On the basis of this report, the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Sangod observed that the accused-applicant is a child as defined in the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970 (here in after referred to as the Act of 1970), and as such he was of the opinion that the case against the accused-applicant should be enquired into by the Children's Court and after recording such opinion forwarded the accused-applicant along with the record of the proceedings to the Children's Court having jurisdiction. When the accused-applicant was produced before the Children's Court, Kota, he was directed to be kept in children's home but he was not sent by the police authorities. Therefore, the Children's Court, Kota called for the explanation of the police officers, who disputed the age of the accused-applicant and alleged that the age of the accused-applicant on the date of occurrence was more than 17 years. After the report of this objection, the Children's Court, Kota directed the jail authorities to get the applicant examined by a Medical Officer and the same was done. On the basis of ossification test the Medical Jurist, M.B.S. Hospital, Kota opined that the age of the accused-applicant is nearly 20 years. The school record relating to the admission of the accused-applicant in the school at Kanvas was also perused by the Children's Court and it was found that the admission form of the accused was submitted in the school by his father which bears his signature and in that form the date of birth was entered as 1-7-1964. Similar is the entry in the school register. Similar is the entry in the school register. Thus it was found that on the day of occurrence, i.e. 30-1-1982 the accused-applicant was more than 17 years of age. On behalf of the accused-appellant his father and two others filed their affidavits wherein the date of birth of the applicant was shown as 15-7-1966. The applicant's father in his affidavit has stated that he had never gone to the Secondary School at Kanvas at the time when the applicant took admission in the school. It has been further stated that the near relatives of the applicant we it to the school and they had given the date of birth on conjectures and surmises. After considering their relevant documents produced by the parties, the Children's Court, Kota vide its order dated 3-9-82 held that the age of the accused-applicant was more than 16 yrs. and as such the case was ordered to be remitted to the Special Judicial Magistrate, Kota to proceed accordingly. Aggrieved by this order of the Competent Authority, i.e., the Children's Court Kota a revision petition was filed in the Court of Sessions Judge, Kota which has been dismissed by the Addl. Sessions Judge (2), Kota. Hence this application. 3. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. it has been argued by the learned Counsel for the applicant that that Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Sangod passed an order Under Section 8 of the Act of 1970 after being satisfied that the applicant is a child under the Act of 1970 He, therefore, forwarded the accused to the Competent Authority along with the record. Therefore, the Munsif & Judicial Magistrate was the only competent authority, who could have decided the age of the applicant and it was not open to the Children's Court to have decided the same issue. Under Section 8(2) of the Act of 1970 after the receipt of record and appearance of the child before the Children's Court's, it is bound to hold enquiry under Section 39 of the Act of 1970. Under Section 8(2) of the Act of 1970 after the receipt of record and appearance of the child before the Children's Court's, it is bound to hold enquiry under Section 39 of the Act of 1970. It has been further argued by the learned Counsel that on 3-9-82 there were three members which constituted a bench of the Children's Court and all the three had taken part in the deliberations, but the order dated 3-9-82 has been signed only by the members of the bench, and Smt. Suhag Kapilash, Member of the Children's Court was though present, but her signatures were not obtained on the order dated 3-9-82. As such the order is illegal. It was further argued that the affidavits filed on behalf of the applicant, and specially the affidavit of his father, has been wrongly disbelieved by the Children's Court, and that the statement of his father has to be believed as against the ossification test. It was further argued that the school register is not a conclusive evidence for the determination of age. It has been further argued that the Children's court had no jurisdiction to make any enquiry for the determination of age of a person who was produced before it. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand contended that the Children's Court is fully competent to determine the age of a person who appears, is brought by or forwarded by any authority under Section 32 of the Act of 1970. 6. I have considered the arguments advanced by both the learned counsels for the parties and have perused the record. 7. Under Section 8 of the Act of 1970 when any Magistrate not empowered to exercise the powers of a Board or a Children's Court under this Act is of the opinion that a person brought before him under any provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a child, he shall record such opinion and forward the child and the record of the proceedings to the competent authority having jurisdiction over the proceedings. This action is to betaken under Section 8(1) the Act of 1970. The competent authority to which the proceedings are forwarded under Sub-section (1) of Section 8 shall hold the enquiry as if the child has originally been brought before it. This action is to betaken under Section 8(1) the Act of 1970. The competent authority to which the proceedings are forwarded under Sub-section (1) of Section 8 shall hold the enquiry as if the child has originally been brought before it. Under Section 24 of the Act of 1970 it has been laid down that not with standing anything contained in Section 239 Cr.PC or any other law for the time being in force, no child shall be charged or tried with any offence together with a person who is not a child. Under Section 32 of the Act of 1970 where it appears to the competent authority that a person brought before it under any of the provisions of the Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a child, the competent authority shall make due enquiry as to the age of that person and for that purpose shall take such evidence as may be necessary and shall record a finding whether the person is a child or not stating his age as nearly as may be. 8. In view of the provisions referred to above, it is clear that the Children's court is authorised in a case of delinquent child to have enquired in the matter in respect of the age and to give finding as to whether the person is a child or not. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant that Section 32 of the Act of 1970 cannot be applied in a case where the person is sent by Magistrate under Section 8(1) of the Act of 1970 treating it to be a child. I have mentioned that actual wordings of Section 32 of the Act of 1970, and after its perusal I find that there is no such limitation in Section 32. The Children's Court is the only authority which can determine the age of the person who is before it for the purpose of enquiry. Jurisdiction in the Children's Court can vest only when the person appearing for enquiry is a child. Therefore, the Children's Court (competent authority) is fully competent to determine the age of the person whose enquiry is to be conducted by it. Jurisdiction in the Children's Court can vest only when the person appearing for enquiry is a child. Therefore, the Children's Court (competent authority) is fully competent to determine the age of the person whose enquiry is to be conducted by it. The contention of the learned Counsel that the word 'enquiry' used in Section 8(2) of the Act of 1970 means the 'enquiry' which is to be conducted under Section 39 of the Act of 1970 has no force, because the word 'enquiry' has been used not only in Section 39 but also in Section 32 of the Act of 1970. Looking to the provisions of Section 32 and 8(2) of the Act of 1970, 1am of the opinion that the word 'enquiry' used in Section 8(2) contemplates enquiry as is required under Section 32 of the Act of 1970. 9. It has further been argued by the learned Counsel that the competent authority did not record any evidence with regard to the age of the applicant. This contention has also no substance, because the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970 is an independent Act and not subordinate to the Code of Criminal Procedure Procedure has been laid down in Section 32 of the Act of 1970, wherein it has been provided that the competent authority shall make due enquiry as to the age of that person and for that purpose shall take such evidence as may be necessary and shall record a finding whether the person is a child or not. Due enquiry does not mean that there should be a protracted enquiry. It has been left to the discretion of the competent authority to take such evidence as may be necessary to determine the age of the person. Therefore, it was necessary for the competent authority to have conducted a protracted enquiry in order to determine the age of the applicant. The competent authority did take evidence as it thought necessary. 10. In the instant case, ossification test, i.e. the medical examination of the applicant, was done by the Medical Jurist, M.B.S. Hospital Kota, who got the X-ray of the applicant done and on the basis of X-ray report he opined that the age of accused appellant was nearly 20 years. Apart from this report of the Medical Jurist, the competent authority called for the record relating to the admission of the applicant in the school at Kanvas. Apart from this report of the Medical Jurist, the competent authority called for the record relating to the admission of the applicant in the school at Kanvas. The school record revealed that the application for admission of the accused-applicant was filed by his father and this application was also signed by his father. In this admission form the date of birth of the applicant was entered as 1st July, 1964. The same age has been entered in the scholars register. On the basis of these documents the Children's court found that the accused-applicant on the date of occurrence i.e. 30-1-1982, was of the age of 17 years, six months and 29 days. As against this, three affidavits have been filed along with the general horoscope. According to the rules, admission registers are to be regularly maintained in the education institutions. They are being verified by the teachers concerned. Because of this reason it can be held that the scholars register is a public document and its certified copy is admissible in evidence without any further proof. In the present case, the original scholars register and the application for admission were called for and perused by the Children's Court and it was satisfied that the age of the applicant was more that 17 years at the time of occurrence. The admission form bears the signature of the applicant's father, who in his affidavit has stated that he had never gone to the school in order to get the admission of the accused-applicant, and that some of his relations had gone to the school and they on surmises and conjectures had mentioned the date of birth in the admission form. It has been further stated by the father of the accused-applicant that he was never consulted before making entry of the date of birth in the admission form. As such, it is submitted that the date shown in the admission form cannot be used against the accused-applicant. In the affidavit the father of the applicant has not given the names of those relations who had gone to the school for getting the admission of the applicant. As such, it is submitted that the date shown in the admission form cannot be used against the accused-applicant. In the affidavit the father of the applicant has not given the names of those relations who had gone to the school for getting the admission of the applicant. When a particular fact was alleged then it was necessary for the father of the applicant to have given the names of those persons in the affidavit who had given the date in the admission form so as to rebut the fact contained in the admission form as well as in the scholars register. The entries in the admission form and the scholars register have been further corroborated by the ossification test conducted by the Medical Jurist of M.B.S. Hospital, Kota. Therefore, it cannot be held that on the date of occurrence the accused-applicant was a child. 11. The next argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the applicant is that Smt. Suhag Kapilash was also present and the case of the applicant was heard by all the three members of the bench constituting the Children's Court. It has been further admitted in the petition that ail the three members of the bench present took part in the deliberations, but the order dated 3-9-1982 has been signed only by two members and this order does not bear the signature of Smt. Suhag Kapilash. On this ground, it has been submitted that the whole proceedings are vitiated and under Section 6 of the Act of 1970 procedure etc., in relation to Board and the Children's Court has been prescribed. It will be useful to reproduce Section 6 of the Act of 1970, which reads as under: "6. Procedure etc. On this ground, it has been submitted that the whole proceedings are vitiated and under Section 6 of the Act of 1970 procedure etc., in relation to Board and the Children's Court has been prescribed. It will be useful to reproduce Section 6 of the Act of 1970, which reads as under: "6. Procedure etc. in relation to Board and Children's Court - (1) In the event of any difference of opinion among the members of a Board or among the Magistrate of a Children's Court, the opinion of the majority shall prevail, but where there is no such majority, the opinion of the Chairman or of the senior Magistrate as the case may be shall prevail; (2) A Board or Children's Court may act not with standing the absence of any member of the Board or, as the case may be, any Magistrate of the Children's Court and no order, made by the Board or Children's Court shall be invalid by reason only of the absence of any member or Magistrate, as the case may be, during any stage of the proceedings; (3) No person shall be appointed as a member of the Board or as a Magistrate in the Children's Court unless he has, in the opinion of the State Government, knowledge of child psychology and child welfare. It is an admitted case that Smt. Suhag Kapliash was present at the time when the case of the applicant was taken up by the Children's Court on 3-9-1982. On that date the only point for determination before the Children's Court was as to whether the applicant was a child or not. It is thus clear that the case of the applicant was taken up for hearing on 3-9-1982 and Smt. Suhag Kapilash was a party in the order dated 3-9-1982. In this order it has not been stated that Smt. Suhag Kapilash expressed a different view. This order dated 3-9-1982 has been signed by two Magistrates. This shows that by inadvertence signatures of Smt. Suhag Kapilash were not taken on the order date 3-9-1982. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there appears no illegality in the order dated 3-9-1982. The order dated 3-9-1982 has been signed by two members of the Children's Court out of three. This shows that by inadvertence signatures of Smt. Suhag Kapilash were not taken on the order date 3-9-1982. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there appears no illegality in the order dated 3-9-1982. The order dated 3-9-1982 has been signed by two members of the Children's Court out of three. As per the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 1970, majority decision can be taken and it can be held that the decision taken in this case on 3-9-1982 was a majority decision, even if it is presumed that the Third member expressed a different view. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion, I do not find any force in this application and it is hereby dismissed.Application dismissed. *******