JUDGMENT - H.H. KANTHARIA, J.:---This is an application for condonation of delay for filing an application for leave to appeal against an order of acquittal for an offence punishable under section 494 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The short facts giving rise to this application are as under : The applicant was a complainant in Criminal Case No. 307 of 1982 in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sindkhede. She had filed the said complaint charging her husband for an offence of bigamy and 12 others for aiding and abetting him. The said case resulted in the acquittal of all the accused persons by a judgment and order passed on 12th July, 1984. The applicant applied for certified copy of the said judgment and order on the same day and got the copy on 27th July, 1984. She filed Criminal Application No. 1163 of 1984 in this Court for leave to file an appeal against the order of acquittal on 12th October, 1984. As per section 378(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code such an application should be filed within 60 days from 27th July, 1984. Therefore, there is delay of 17 days in filing the said application. Hence, the applicant filed the present application for condonation of delay of 17 days. 3. Her contention in the application is that she could not file the application for leave to file an appeal within time because her local Advocate advised her that such an application could be filed within 90 days. Mr. Karia, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of opponent Nos. 1 to 13 (original accused persons), submits that the delay cannot be condoned on a specious ground that it was caused on account of wrong advice given by an Advocate. Mr. Karia relied upon a ruling of Goa, Daman and Diu Court in the case of (Pandurang B.P. Malkarnekar v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu)1, A.I.R. 1978 Goa, Daman and Dui, 22 to substantiate his contention. He further submits that the application has not mentioned the name of the Advocate who gave her wrong advise nor does she give any particulars as to when she had approached the said Advocate. Mr. He further submits that the application has not mentioned the name of the Advocate who gave her wrong advise nor does she give any particulars as to when she had approached the said Advocate. Mr. Karia also urged that the applicant failed to mention whether her Advocate was a junior Advocate or a senior Advocate and on such facts and circumstances the application for condonation of delay be rejected. 4. Now, it is very much true that the applicant has mentioned no particulars as to the name of the Advocates who gave her wrong advice and whether he was a junior or a senior Advocate and when she had approached him. It is also very much true that the learned Judicial Commissioner of Goa, Daman and Diu in the case cited by Mr. Karia had held that inadvertence of Counsel in looking to some other provisions of law cannot be sufficient cause for condoning delay and in coming to such conclusions he had relied upon a ruling of Punjab High Court in the case of (Union of India v. Shree Ram Kanwar)2, A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 365 and a Privy Council judgment in the case of (Rajendra Bahadur v. Rajeshwar)3, A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 276. However, with respect to the learned Judicial Commissioner of Goa, Daman and Diu, I am of the view that a litigant should not suffer and justice should not be denied to him/her because of the wrong or incompetent advice by an Advocate. Mr. Karia is quite justified in making his submissions that the applicant has not named the Advocate nor has she stated his seniority at the Bar and when she approached him but, all said and done, there is no reason to disbelieve the contention raised by the applicant in the instant case, who happens to be a woman, that it was on account of wrong legal advice that she could not come to this Court in time. The case involves serious offence of bigamy and if the husband of the present applicant has married another woman during her lifetime, the applicant's life is almost ruined. In such a case, I am not able to persuade myself to agree with the submissions made by Mr. Karia which, if accepted, would result into miscarriage of justice and denial of justice to a litigant. In such a case, I am not able to persuade myself to agree with the submissions made by Mr. Karia which, if accepted, would result into miscarriage of justice and denial of justice to a litigant. In my opinion, not condoning delay of 17 days in this particular case would mean further cruelty to the applicant who happened to be wrongly advised by her Advocate. Therefore, all facts and circumstances considered carefully, I am inclined to condone the delay of 17 days in preferring the application for leave to appeal against an order of acquittal in this matter. Mr. Patil, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, also submits that the delay may be condoned. 5. In this view of the matter, rule is made absolute. Rule made absolute. -----